Abstract: Previous sociocultural research linked conditions in the Iraq conflict zone with factors known to be associated with youth violence and radicalization, supporting predictions of a future cohort of fighters that would be extremely aggressive, violent, and remorseless. The exacerbation of these conditions and intentional efforts by the Islamic State to indoctrinate and radicalize youth has resulted in the weaponization of children, creating a “perfect storm” of consequence and influence. Unless addressed effectively, this will represent a persistent, transgenerational capability in support of the Islamic State’s “long game.”
As efforts against the Islamic State have been accelerated, associated territorial losses in Syria and Iraq are escalating. Recent reports indicate that approximately 27,000 square miles have been reclaimed from the Islamic State since the height of the group’s control in early 2015; approximately one-third of which has been recovered within the past six months.1 While the increasing pace of military gain is encouraging, significant tears in the social fabric of the region will take far longer to repair. In particular, lasting and potentially persistent consequence will include damage to children, especially young men and boys living in the Islamic State, as well as the Cubs of the Caliphate; young men and boys indoctrinated and “weaponized” as part of the Islamic State’s “long game.” This multifaceted approach to youth radicalization and indoctrination—the weaponization of children—represents a transgenerational, persistent capability designed specifically to sustain the Islamic State, transcend territorial losses, and outlast efforts against the group. As a result, ongoing attention will be required not only in areas where the Islamic State manages to sustain a presence or maintain control, but also in areas they occupied previously, as these children will continue to pose significant risk, even as territory is reclaimed.
Previous sociocultural research correlated conditions in the Iraq conflict zone with factors known to promote youth violence and radicalization,2 predicting a future cohort of fighters who would be extremely “aggressive, violent and remorseless.”3 The emergence of the Islamic State in the region has resulted in conditions far more damaging than previously anticipated, however. In combination with the serious developmental consequences of living in an active conflict zone, the Islamic State’s efforts to indoctrinate and radicalize youth are expected to create a sociocultural “perfect storm” of influence that will result in a generation of fighters more violent than previously encountered. Analysis of Islamic State propaganda suggests that this may be intentional, representing a kind of transgenerational “long game” designed to ensure survival of the group.4 Much of what is known currently about youth radicalization and indoctrination in the Islamic State comes from the media and anecdotal reports. The U.S. military, however, is in a position to inform discussion given access to primary source material, which provides unique understanding and insight. Applying social science research and models to this primary source data can provide deeper understanding of this phenomenon.
Specifically, the primary sources available to the U.S. military include not only Islamic State propaganda and other media available to the broader community, but also direct access to many of the group’s education and training materials and other captured enemy material. Moreover, in contrast to many ad hoc and media reports, the U.S. military has access to the broader corpus of Islamic State material. In many cases, knowledge regarding the sheer volume of material recovered, particularly as relates to specific topics, focus areas, or inferred lines of adversary effort, can provide insight regarding areas of emphasis and importance to the Islamic State. Finally, if “Data + Context = Insight,”5 then the frequently subtle and nuanced information regarding the location, circumstances, and general human terrain and atmospherics associated with recovered material can play an invaluable role in establishing the context necessary for deeper insight and understanding in the analysis of these primary sources, as well as an informed interpretation of the results.
Introduction
Ten years ago in this publication, the authors published observations describing conditions in the Iraq conflict zone, particularly as related to the normalization, expectation, and glamorization of violence; diminished collective efficacy,6 or the inability of a community to effectively control individual and group behavior, enforce established social norms, and generally support the rule of law; and the emergence of violence as a “spectator sport” in the conflict environment.7 One especially graphic and noteworthy example cited in the original paper was the murder and public desecration of the remains of the Blackwater contractors in Fallujah. Media reports at the time noted the presence of children in the crowd of spectators. These behaviors were not new to those familiar with the crack cocaine epidemic in the United States from the 1990s where crowds would gather at crime scenes and young children frequently would attend as spectators, regardless of the time of day or location. Highlighting the fact that violence can become a “spectator sport,” youngsters often could be observed consuming food as the crime scene was processed.8 Many of the adults at these scenes would comment that the victim may have deserved the crime or otherwise engaged in behavior that increased its likelihood, and would decline to participate in the investigation given their belief that the crime was the logical consequence of behavior that went against informal community norms.9 This behavior visibly and very effectively reinforced the key role that illegal enforcement networks play in upholding social rules and norms, particularly in communities where official enforcement agents of the rule of law are ineffective, diminished, or otherwise lacking. Overall, this behavior indicated an erosion of social rules and norms, particularly as related to the inability of the community to effectively enforce the rule of law, and an associated transfer of the responsibility for enforcement from legal to illegal enforcement networks.10 These were unhealthy communities with the potential to profoundly alter normal development, especially for boys and young males.
The authors’ original assessment of the impact that conditions in the Iraq conflict zone would have on violence, particularly among young men and boys, was based on social science research describing the erosion in social controls and norms linked to the influx of drugs and violence associated with the U.S. crack cocaine “wars” during the 1990s. The so-called “Tripartite Model” described in detail maternal, familial, and community pathways of negative influence on development, particularly moral and emotional development, that resulted in both qualitative and quantitative increases in violence.
Unfortunately, these authors were correct in a number of their predictions. The anticipated youth bulge11 has arrived in many Arab states, creating economic and educational challenges that are driving perceptions of diminished opportunity for this demographic cohort and associated attraction to extremist narratives.12 Children continue to be exposed to acts of intense violence, including public executions.13 These reports parallel previous observations of the intentional exposure of children to violence as community social events or “entertainment,” as well as a means by which to illustrate the role that illegal enforcement plays in the regulation of social rules and norms.14 The growing presence of youth combatants, including child executioners and “Cubs of the Caliphate,” embodies the anticipated increase in violence, including marked increases in the nature and brutality of violent acts perpetrated by young people.15 Moreover, the normalization and expectation of violence noted in the original paper continued to evolve. While the original assessment proved disturbingly prescient, the authors did not anticipate the extent or overt depravity of the Islamic State, to include the creation and promulgation of educational materials promoting its violent agenda, active indoctrination of young males, and the intentional weaponization of children in support of transgenerational capacity development and an associated “long game.”
Image captured from a video released by Wilayat al-Raqqah on June 15, 2015, entitled “Cubs of the Caliphate”
Tripartite Model
Qualitative changes in the nature of youth violence during the 1990s resulted in the creation of the Tripartite Model of youth violence in order to provide a theoretical framework for explaining the marked differences in the nature of violence seen on the streets and in juvenile correctional facilities.16 Specifically, this generation of young males was qualitatively more violent than previous generations. They were “aggressive, violent and remorseless,”17 unlike anything anyone had seen previously.
The Tripartite Model defines the role that maternal, familial, and community factors may play in shaping behavior during critical periods of development, underscoring the transgenerational nature and consequence of unhealthy communities and the development of violent behavior itself. Exposure to these factors during critical periods of moral and emotional development18 may profoundly influence the developmental trajectory, particularly related to the child’s perception of the value of human life; value of their own life and associated expectations regarding their own life expectancy and outcomes; their place in society and the role that they will play; and the use of violence to influence behavior and other social rules and norms.19 Again, the same factors associated with the increase in urban violence—maternal, familial, and community—were noted a decade ago by the authors in the Iraq conflict zone. Young males, in particular, were expected to be most vulnerable.20
Maternal
Developmentally, maternal influence is powerful and unique. Criminology research is replete with examples of maternal behavior likely to increase risk to dependent children through exposure to unhealthy individuals and environments, however this generally does not appear to be witting or intentional. Initial consideration of maternal influence in the Islamic State similarly focused largely on expectations of diminished influence of females given traditional gender roles in Muslim society and passive exposure to unhealthy environments. Further examination, however, reveals direct enablement of activity likely to cause harm. Maternal influence is assuming a far more significant role than originally anticipated and includes active movement of dependent children to the conflict zone; an increased birth rate in an effort to populate, sustain, and even grow the Islamic State; 21 and active maternal engagement in radicalization, recruitment, and indoctrination. The Islamic State not only encourages active parental participation in the indoctrination and recruiting process, but directly anticipates and proactively counters criticism of maternal involvement, acknowledging that “[t]he mother may hear criticism from some people who would argue that the manner in which she raises her children might kill their childhood and destroy their innocence.”22
Familial
As noted recently, tens of thousands of Islamic State fighters have been killed in battle.23 These losses, added to the significant number of male civilians who either fled the region or were killed during the Islamic State’s reign,24 are likely to have changed the demographics of the region. These changes are expected to be associated with limited access to male role models. The absence of men or appropriate male role models in a child’s life would be expected to lead to poor outcomes for children within the community.
In those areas still under the control of the Islamic State, the challenge is not only the absence of positive male role models, but rather the presence of inappropriate or poor role models, a dynamic similar to that found in earlier analysis of families in communities inundated with violence.25 Underscoring this point, adult males depicted in propaganda materials are portrayed simultaneously in brutal acts of violence, including executions, while exhibiting tenderness and camaraderie to their peers and young males alike. This influences perceptions of male roles and shapes young male behavior, while creating an attractive image of the bonds and fellowship promised by the Islamic State. In addition to this passive exposure, propaganda films encourage active familial involvement in indoctrination and recruitment, and various scholarly26 and media27 reports confirm that parents are sending their young boys to Islamic State military training. Therefore, while kidnapping and forcible conscription play a role, parents also may offer their children to the Islamic State because they support the ideology or for direct monetary compensation, which suggests that familial involvement in the recruiting and indoctrination process is complex and multifaceted.28 Finally, research on multigenerational involvement in criminal activity29 suggests perceptions of familial involvement in the Islamic State are likely to normalize violence and increase the likelihood that young people also will chose to join the Islamic State as they develop their own identify and look within the family for cues regarding future vocational options and roles.
Community
Again, initial analysis focused largely on passive or otherwise incidental exposure to deleterious environmental factors associated with the conflict environment. The normalization, expectation, and glamorization of violence noted in the original paper has continued to evolve, particularly with the emergence of “jihadi cool” as a recruiting theme for young males30—a narrative that depicts the lifestyle, including increased risk, as attractive and glamorous. This parallels the glamorization of violence from both the victim and perpetrator perspective documented in the original urban violence research, which effectively reinforces a “short-term approach to life” that perpetuates high-risk activity.31
Community acceptance of violence, including tacit approval of the use of violence to enforce social rules and norms,32 can negatively influence development. Similar to the increased brutality and “overkill”33 associated with urban violence intended to send a message to the community,34 torture and public executions perpetrated by the Islamic State also are used to send a message of compliance to the community, regulate behavior, and enforce social rules and norms. Direct exposure to this violence can be particularly harmful during critical periods of emotional and moral development when young people are acquiring behaviors and judgments relating to the value of human life, including their own; social responsibility; and the ethics of harming others. Furthermore, accompanying messaging that indicates the victim “deserved” the outcome or that otherwise reinforces the use of street violence further shapes the perception that violence is a normal and acceptable means by which to influence or regulate behavior, negatively influencing the perceptions of the use of violence by children.35 Finally, the frequently public nature of these violent events reinforces the perception of violence as a “spectator sport.”36
The emergence of hisbah police as the (illegal) enforcement network in Islamic State-held territory as well as public torture and executions further erode social rules and norms, and associated collective efficacy. Moreover, the belief that neighbors are involved in or support violence and the positive perceptions of individuals involved in violent behavior—including the social elevation of jihadi fighters, caliphate key leaders, and martyrs in the community—underscore the position of these fighters and Islamic State martyrs and leaders as influential role models. This solidifies the tacit approval of jihad and related activities on the part of significant people in the young person’s life (mother, family, community), creating a particularly attractive image to young malesa and concurrently reinforcing community norms regarding socially desirable behavior and the preferred life path. Additional normalization, expectation, and glamorization of violence, including references to the glamor associated with dying in support of jihad, complete the array of negative influence.
Finally, with regard to the original “youth bulge”37 and associated demographic trends, research indicates that high-risk youth, particularly those at increased risk for intentional injury, are associated with an increased prevalence of adolescent parenthood as they adjust their reproductive strategy to accommodate the perception of a diminished life expectancy.38 This research, in association with the Islamic State’s active encouragement of marriage and procreation, suggests that original estimates regarding the birth rate in the region and associated youth “bulge” may underrepresent actual population increases.
Active Indoctrination
In addition to the deleterious effects of living in an active conflict zone, increasing evidence shows the Islamic State is intentionally indoctrinating, radicalizing, and recruiting young people as part of a transgenerational “long game.” This active indoctrination represents the weaponization of children and includes at least three lines of effort: intentional exposure to violence, active incorporation of the Islamic State narrative in educational materials, and Cubs of the Caliphate.
Scholarly research39 as well as Islamic State propaganda40 document the intentional exposure of children to and forced participation in violence, including executions—factors known to be associated with the development of violent behavior.41 Analysis of Islamic State-produced educational materials reveals an intentionally created curriculum that weaves themes of radicalization and indoctrination throughout the content in an effort to reinforce preferred narrative themes. “[The Islamic State’s] curriculum is uniquely lethal in the way it teaches other subjects to justify its quartet of interests: the foundation of a caliphate, the building of an “Islamic” state, the use of merciless violence, and the perpetuation of an apocalyptic narrative” [emphasis added].42 The material is professionally produced and sophisticated, paralleling Western academic content in pedagogy and the seamless integration of global narrative themes across disparate subject matter.
Perhaps most concerning, the so-called “Cubs of the Caliphate” represent intentional development of the next generation in fulfillment of the Islamic State’s reference to “an entire [future] generation”43 that will sustain the fight. As such, the Cubs represent a persistent, transgenerational capability in support of the Islamic State’s long game, a kind of “insurance policy”44 that represents a continuity plan for the caliphate. The program of incremental exposure to and participation in violence effectively operationalizes “best practices” known to produce trained killers.45 The Cubs differ significantly from other child soldiers, however. Unlike other forcibly conscripted child soldiers who “are recruited not for the future but the present,”46 there appears to be a much greater commitment of time and effort associated with the Cubs as an “investment” on the part of Islamic State leadership. Underscoring their importance to the future of the Islamic State, Cubs training also includes religious, language, and academic training.47 From a developmental perspective, the Cubs training occurs at a time when the boys are emotionally and morally malleable, underscoring the relatively permanent nature of the behavior change.48
Implications
The Islamic State is weaponizing children. Unless effectively addressed, this will represent a persistent, transgenerational capability, particularly given the increasing use of children for military purposes.49 Moreover, as Lieutenant General Michael Nagata of the National Counterterrorism Center, recently noted, the threat is growing. “[R]ising and rapidly adapting terrorism” is emerging as a “new normal.”50 As the authors have asked previously, what happens when “normal” is the problem? Lessons learned from the crack cocaine “wars” confirm that “locking them up and patching them up”51 is unsatisfactory at best. Similarly, indefinite incarceration of youth combatants is not an acceptable or practical option, and de-radicalization efforts are risky given the lack of proven or reliable methods, particularly considering the large number of youth combatants currently in detention52 and increasing reports of former Cubs of the Caliphate embedded in migrant flows and refugee camps.53 Meaningful response likely will require a whole of government and related civil society effort in order to be effective and sustainable. Again, experience during the crack cocaine “wars” revealed urban violence as a challenge that transcended traditional professional boundaries. Many of the most effective, meaningful, and sustainable solutions came from novel, transdisciplinary approaches recognizing that violent crime sat at the intersection of public health, medicine, social services, and public safety—effectively leveraging these seemingly disparate professional domains to get in front of the problem through primary prevention.54 The military is similarly positioned to inform these efforts, including non-kinetic options for disruption through its unique access, insight, and understanding. Specific options follow below.
Disrupt the recruiting, radicalizing, and training pipeline. Research consistently supports primary prevention as the best option. This is especially true for radicalization and recruitment given limited understanding and associated uncertainty regarding the efficacy of various de-radicalization programs and related efforts. Moreover, research suggests that once the developmental trajectory has been influenced, there is very little that can be done to de-radicalize this group given current understanding of child development and behavior change.55 In other words, it is unlikely that the Cubs can be rendered safe. Again, radicalization and indoctrination during critical periods of moral and emotional development are expected to be highly (if not permanently) resistant to treatment. Therefore, primary prevention that disrupts the recruiting, radicalizing, and training pipeline is likely to offer the best outcomes.
Protect the force. Youth combatants represent a physical and emotional threat56 to the force, as well as the potential for “moral injury.”57 Children have freedom of movement not available to adults, affording them unique access to locations where they can inflict maximum damage. Moreover, the potential for emotional harm associated with these youth combatants is significant. Experience with juvenile murderers indicates that the responding professional often needs to suspend everything they know, or think they know, about children in order to effectively investigate seriously violent youth.58 This experience suggests that it will be very difficult for members of the force, particularly those with children themselves, to view young people as remorseless killers, creating a potential limitation in the U.S. military’s ability to understand and respond effectively to this threat, not to mention possible emotional harm to the individuals who encounter them.
Review Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Islamic State is purposefully exploiting Western legal and moral prohibitions against the targeting of “child soldiers,” which is providing it with a competitive advantage. Moreover, criminology research suggests that this new wave of fighters will be expected to have “no hope, no fear, no rules, and no life expectancy.”59 Traditional assumptions regarding the use of force and ROE will need to be reconciled with realities on the ground as social science research indicates these fighters will have a “short-term approach to life” and act accordingly.60 Again, these radicalized and indoctrinated youth differ markedly from current models of child soldiers given their intentional development as a sustainable, transgenerational resource. Although altering ROE raises serious ethical questions that need to be properly debated, review of ROE from a legal, emotional, and moral perspective may be merited, particularly as relates to youth combatants.
Contribute to the knowledge base. As conflict and associated adversary TTPsb evolve, the U.S. military has unique access, insight, and understanding given its proximity to the fight. Capturing this knowledge and sharing it with the broader community positions the military to adapt to the United States’ needs as they grow in response to this increasing threat, enabling the military to inform and advise in support of meaningful, sustainable solutions.
Conclusion
Analysis of the challenges associated with the current conflict environment indicate that conditions have been set for increased radicalization and qualitative differences in violence, particularly in the boys and young men exposed to the normalization, expectation, and glamorization of violence. Conditions and associated outcomes, however, are far worse than originally envisioned. Caliphate architects are intentionally promulgating a framework for radicalization and indoctrination (e.g., curriculum development, Cubs of the Caliphate) while actively cultivating local environments to further the radicalization process. The Islamic State is weaponizing children. Unless effectively addressed, this will represent a persistent capability that will transcend the careers of most working this problem set today. Meaningful response to youth radicalization and indoctrination likely will require a whole of government approach, as well as active civil society engagement. The military is positioned to inform these efforts through its unique access, insight, and understanding, including non-kinetic opportunities for disruption. CTC
Dr. Colleen McCue is a principal data scientist with CACI, supporting special missions.
Colonel Joseph Massengill is a career Army officer who is currently a student at the Army War College.
Commander Dorothy Milbrandt is a career Naval Intelligence officer who has completed multiple command and staff tours in support of both conventional and special operations forces.
Lieutenant Colonel John Gaughan is a career Air Force intelligence officer with multiple deployments conducting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance missions in support of special operations forces.
Major Meghan Cumpston is a squadron executive officer and has served in various command and staff positions, including service as an instructor in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point.
Substantive Notes
[a] While this and the original analysis focused exclusively on boys and young men, evidence is increasingly emerging that females living under the Islamic State also have been impacted significantly, including abuse perpetrated against Yazidi slaves and the increasingly regular Rumiyah articles written for the Islamic State “sisters” outlining appropriate and acceptable behavior. See Rukmini Callimachi, “Freed from ISIS, Yazidi women return in ‘Severe Shock’,” New York Times, July 27, 2017, and “The woman is a shepherd in her husbands’ home and responsible for her flock” (2017), respectively.
[b] Terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Citations
[1] Karen DeYoung, “Under Trump, gains against ISIS have ‘dramatically accelerated,’” Washington Post, August, 4, 2017.
[2] Colleen McCue and Kathryn Haahr, “The impact of global youth bulges on Islamist radicalization and violence,” CTC Sentinel 1:11 (2008).
[3] William Bennett, John Diluio, and John Walters, Body Count (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 21-34.
[4] From “The crusaders’ illusions in the age of the caliphate, al-Nava,” as cited by Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhennat, “Inside ISIS: Quietly preparing for the Loss of the Caliphate,” Washington Post, July 12, 2016.
[5] Christian Gheorghe concept, marketing material, unknown date.
[6] Robert Sampson, Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls, “Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multi-level study of collective efficacy,” Science 277 (1997): pp. 918-924.
[7] McCue and Haahr.
[8] Robyn Lacks, Jill Gordon, and Colleen McCue, “Who, what, and when: A descriptive examination of crowd formation, crowd behavior, and participation with law enforcement at homicide scenes in one city,” Journal of Criminal Justice 30:1 (2005): pp. 1-34.
[9] Jerry Oliver and Colleen McLaughlin, “Focusing on the other side of the crime scene tape: What happens when ‘normal’ is the problem?” The Police Chief 65:11 (1998): pp. 50-63.
[10] Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls.
[11] “Mapping the Global Future,” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, December 2004.
[12] Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour, “Counterterrorism and youth radicalization in Jordan: Social and political dimensions,” CTC Sentinel 10:4 (2017).
[13] Katrin Kuntz and Andy Spyra, “Life after Islamic State: ‘They taught us how to decapitate a person,’” Der Spiegel, April 14, 2017.
[14] Paul Goldstein, “The drugs/violence nexus: A tripartite conceptual framework,” Journal of Drug Issues 15 (1985): pp. 493-506.
[15] Mia Bloom, John Horgan, and Charlie Winter, “Depictions of children and youth in the Islamic State’s martyrdom propaganda, 2016-2016,” CTC Sentinel 9:2 (2016).
[16] Colleen McLaughlin, Jay Yelon, Rao Ivatury, and Harvey Sugerman, “Youth violence: A tripartite examination of putative causes, consequences, and correlates,” Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1:2 (2000): pp. 115-127.
[17] Bennett, Diluio, and Walters.
[18] Lawrence Kohlberg, The development of moral character and moral ideology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964).
[19] McLaughlin, Yelon, Ivatury, and Sugerman.
[20] McCue and Haahr.
[21] “The Children of ISIS: The indoctrination of minors in ISIS-held territory,” The Hague, National Coordination for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), 2009.
[22] “The woman is a shepherd in her husbands’ home and responsible for her flock,” Rumiyah, Issue 9, 2017, p. 20.
[23] Brian Dodwell and Dan Rassler, “A View from the CTC foxhole: LTG Michael K. Nagata, Director, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, NCTC,” CTC Sentinel 10:6 (2017).
[24] Phillip Connor, “Number of refugees to Europe surges to record 1.3 million in 2015,” Pew Research Center, August 2, 2016.
[25] Bonita Stanton and Jennifer Galbraith, “Drug trafficking among African-American early adolescents: Prevalence, consequences, and associated behaviors and beliefs,” Pediatrics 93:6 (1994): pp. 1,039-1,043.
[26] “The Children of ISIS.”
[27] Kuntz and Spyra.
[28] Jamie Dettmer, “Steeped in martyrdom, Cubs of the caliphate groomed as jihadist legacy,” Voice of America, July, 6, 2017.
[29] Stanton and Galbraith.
[30] See Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist recruiters’ latest weapon,” NPR, March, 26, 2010.
[31] “The short-term approach to life,” Positively Aware, 1994, pp. 10-11; Oliver and McLaughlin.
[32] Oliver and McLaughlin; Lacks, Gordon, and McCue.
[33] “Homicide,” in John Douglas, Ann W. Burgess, Allen G. Burgess, and Robert K. Ressler, Crime Classification Manual (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), pp. 17-161.
[34] Goldstein.
[35] McLaughlin, Yelon, Ivatury, and Sugerman.
[36] Lacks, Gordon, and McCue.
[37] “Mapping the Global Future.”
[38] Colleen McLaughlin, Scott Reiner, Patricia Reams, and Timothy Joost, “Intentional injury and adolescent parenting among incarcerated juvenile offenders,” Adolescence 34 (1999): pp. 665-670.
[39] “The Children of ISIS.”
[40] Quentin Sommerville and Riam Dalati, “An Education in Terror,” BBC, August, 2017.
[41] See David Grossman, On Killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1996).
[42] Jacob Olidort, “Inside the caliphate’s classroom: Textbooks, guidance literature, and indoctrination methods of the Islamic State,” The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, 2016.
[43] Olidort.
[44] Sommerville and Dalati.
[45] See Grossman.
[46] Author interview, Mia Bloom, Foreign Affairs Quick Note, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2015.
[47] Olidort.
[48] Kohlberg.
[49] Bloom, Horgan, and Winter.
[50] Dodwell and Rassler.
[51] Oliver and McLaughlin.
[52] Dettmer.
[53] Sommerville and Dalati.
[54] Colleen McCue, “Cops and Docs program brings police and ED staff together to address the cycle of violence,” Journal of Emergency Nursing 27 (2001): pp. 578-580.
[55] See author interview, Mia Bloom.
[56] Bloom, Horgan, and Winter.
[57] Pete Kilner, “The military leader’s role in mitigating moral injury,” Thoughts of a Solider-Ethicist, November 11, 2016.
[58] Colleen McCue, “Juvenile Murderers,” in Arthur Westveer ed., Managing Death Investigation 1:5 (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002).
[59] Ted Guest and Victoria Pope, “Crime time bomb,” U.S. News & World Report 120:12 (1996): pp. 28-36.
[60] “The short-term approach to life.”
