Kidnappings and murders have become common in post-Qadhafi Libya. Eastern Libya has suffered the worst, with an ongoing assassination campaign that has killed scores of security personnel and members of the judiciary in drive-by shootings and bomb attacks, especially in the towns of Benghazi and Derna. The country has also witnessed hundreds of kidnappings and abductions since the fall of the former regime. An armed group even seized and detained former Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan in October 2013. These murders and kidnappings have become part and parcel of the chaos that has enveloped the country since the fall of the former regime in 2011.
Alongside these attacks, however, there has been a growing number of kidnappings and murders of foreigners. These incidents do not appear to be connected. No single group has claimed responsibility for either the killings or abductions, and the motives appear to be as varied as the incidents themselves. While some of the attacks are clearly politically or ideologically driven, others seem simply to be opportunistic attempts by criminal groups seeking financial gain. Due to its ongoing weakness and the collapse of the central authorities that accompanied the fall of the former regime, the Libyan state is still beholden to the array of militias, revolutionary brigades, and armed groups that control the ground. As a result, the state has been unable to counter the entrenchment of militant Islamist groups, especially in the east. As Culture Minister Habib al-Ameen argued in early March 2014, extremists are getting the upper hand in Benghazi, which is now comprised of “armed cantons,” each controlled by certain currents or groups.
This article examines some of the kidnappings and murders of foreigners that have occurred in Libya during recent months. It finds that although not part of an organized or unified strategy, these incidents represent a new trend that is indicative of the generalized chaos that has gripped the country since the revolution, as well as further evidence of the entrenchment of militant Islamist groups.
Kidnapping of Foreigners: Political Motives
Assailants have kidnapped a number of foreigners in Libya in recent months. Notably, they have kidnapped diplomatic personnel who have clearly been seized with the aim of achieving specific political goals, namely the release of Libyans detained abroad.
On April 15, 2014, masked gunmen kidnapped the Jordanian ambassador, Fawaz al-Itan, from the center of Tripoli as he was on his way to work. Not long after he was seized, his abductors, whose identities are still unknown, demanded that Jordanian authorities release Libyan militant Mohamed Said Dersi, known as al-Nass, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in Jordan in 2007 for plotting to blow up a Jordanian airport. Dersi, who is from the Islamist stronghold of al-Laithi in Benghazi, is a former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and was arrested in April 2006 in Jordan along with two Iraqis. The Jordanian authorities accused him of being part of al-Qa`ida.
According to Libyan sources quoted in an article by Libyan journalist Omar al-Keddie and published on the Bawabat al-Wasat website, Dersi’s family and tribe had been pushing Amman to grant him clemency. Frustrated at their lack of progress, the family allegedly turned to revolutionary elements in the capital who carried out the kidnapping on their behalf. The veracity of these reports is not clear. Al-Itan’s abductors demanded Dersi’s release and appealed to Jordan to stop torturing Islamist prisoners in Jordanian prisons and to free a number of detainees.
The abductors’ actions paid off. After a period of intense negotiations between Amman and Tripoli, Dersi was handed over to Libya on May 13 in return for al-Itan’s release on the same day. Dersi was supposed to receive a reduction in his sentence and be allowed to serve the remainder of his prison time in Libya. Once back on Libyan soil, however, Dersi was allowed to go free. It seems as though his kidnappers struck a hard bargain: Dersi was met at Tripoli airport by his brother, who accompanied him home to Benghazi, telling the media the following day: “My brother is free and he resides in the family home in Benghazi and he is not in a Libyan prison.”
In a similar vein, two Tunisian diplomats were kidnapped around the same time by a group with specific political motivations. On March 21, secretary of the Tunisian embassy, Mohamed Ben Sheikh, was abducted from his car in the Ain Zara area of the capital, forced into his abductors’ vehicle and driven away. A few weeks later on April 17, Laroussi Gantassi, an adviser at the Tunisian embassy, was seized from Tripoli’s al-Kadasia Square. According to reports in the Tunisian media, Gantassi may not have been the intended target of the abduction. These reports claim that he had intervened to save two Tunisian engineers who had been detained at a security checkpoint. This has not been confirmed, however. The diplomats’ abductors, who appeared to be from the same group that kidnapped Ben Sheikh, later demanded the release of two Libyan prisoners who were sentenced to 20 years in prison in Tunisia for taking part in a May 2011 gun battle between militants and security forces that killed two Tunisian soldiers at Rouhia. Then, on April 21, a poorly produced video appeared on social media sites showing a sobbing Ben Sheikh appealing to Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki to talk to his captors to secure his release.
The video was made by Shabab al-Tawhid Lil A’alam (the Young Monotheists’ Media), which, according to Tunisian jihadist sources, is one of the media arms of Ansar al-Shari`a in Tunisia. At the end of the video, text appeared on the screen threatening, “As you imprison ours, we imprison yours. As you kill ours, we kill yours.”
The kidnappings seem to have been some sort of collaboration between Libyan and Tunisian militants. A Tunisian jihadist who resides in Libya told the media that the abductions were a joint operation undertaken by Libyan jihadist elements who are part of Ansar al-Shari`a and Tunisian elements that belong to the same organization in Tunisia but who have been residing in Libya since August 2013. Little is known about the extent of collaboration between Ansar al-Shari`a in Libya and Tunisia. Tunisian militants, however, have certainly joined Ansar al-Shari`a run training camps that are preparing volunteers to fight in Syria.
Why these elements chose only to demand the release of Libyan militants rather than both Libyan and Tunisian militants is not clear.
The abductions, however, sparked a rush of negotiations that included mediation from former LIFG amir and head of the al-Watan party, Abdelhakim Belhadj. On April 26, Bensheikh’s sister, Samira Bensheikh, divulged that she had received a call from one of the leaders of the al-Watan party, Jamal Sadawi, who resides in Tunisia and who reassured her that Belhadj was making every effort to secure her brother’s release. The abductors, however, reportedly refused to continue negotiations with other involved parties until Belhadj was removed from the talks.
The identities of the other parties are not clear. On April 28, Acting Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni told the media that his government was communicating with the kidnappers of both the Tunisians and the Jordanian ambassador al-Itan, asserting, “We do not want to use force against the kidnappers, we want to reach peaceful solutions.” As a result, it appears likely that those holding the Tunisians hostage will achieve their demands.
This is not the first time in post-Qadhafi Libya that abducting foreign diplomatic personnel resulted in the realization of a specific political demand. In January 2014, five Egyptian diplomats were kidnapped from their Tripoli homes. Their abductors demanded that Egypt free revolutionary commander Hadia Shaban (also known as Abu Obeida Zawi), who had been arrested in Alexandria in January. Shaban, a hard line Salafist, spent 10 years in Yemen from 1993 where he was known for his militant preaching. He is the commander of the Libyan Revolutionary Operations Chamber (LROC), the body accused of kidnapping Prime Minister Ali Zidan and which answers directly to the General National Congress (GNC). The LROC is deemed to be particularly close to GNC head Nouri Abu Sahmaine, who in the summer of 2013 appointed Shaban to head up the LROC and tasked it with securing Tripoli. Although the LROC denied any involvement in the kidnapping of the Egyptian diplomats, it was not shy in making it clear that it would not tolerate Shaban’s imprisonment. Adel Ghariani of the LROC threatened that the Egyptians would face a “strong response” if Shaban was not released.
It is still not entirely clear why the Egyptian authorities detained Shaban. On January 26, al-Sharq al-Awsat quoted Egyptian security sources who claimed that Shaban had been in contact with members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and that he intended to carry out “acts of terror” on the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. The Egyptian Interior Ministry, however, maintained that the commander had been arrested because his residency had expired.
Despite denials of a “deal,” both Shaban and the Egyptian diplomats were released at the end of January following negotiations between the Libyan and Egyptian governments. No one was arrested or held accountable for the incident, sending out a clear signal that one’s political goals could be achieved by seizing foreign diplomatic personnel. Indeed, Libya has developed a culture of impunity in which such crimes go unpunished. Even those who kidnapped former Prime Minister Zidan have not been held accountable.
Other Kidnapping Motives
Other foreigners have also been targeted in kidnap operations during recent months, although in these cases the perpetrators remain unknown and the motivations are far less clear. Although it is impossible to be certain, these appear to be largely opportunistic attempts with the primary aim of securing financial gain.
This would certainly seem to be the case with the kidnappings of three Italians in the east of the country. On March 22, Italian construction company employee Gianluca Salviato was seized near Tobruk. Salviato’s car was discovered with the keys still in the ignition after he failed to show up for work on the site of a new sewer project in the al-Hadaek area of the town. Since Salviatio’s kidnapping, there has been no ransom demand, or at least not one that has been made public, and no news of his whereabouts.
Salviato’s kidnapping came just weeks after the release of two Italians, Francesco Scalise and Luciano Gallo. The two contractors, who worked for an engineering firm, were kidnapped in January in the village of Martouba on the road between Derna and Tobruk. Little is known about their abduction and the circumstances surrounding their release. The fact that they were freed, however, suggests that they may have been taken by a criminal gang seeking financial gain, rather than by a group with more ideological motives. The same appears to be true of Salviato’s kidnapping. An Italian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated following his abduction that they believed Salviato had been seized by a “criminal organization intending to seek a ransom, rather than an Islamist group.”
On January 20, South Korean Han Seok-Woo, who headed the Libya office of the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), was abducted in Tripoli on his way home from work. He was dragged from his car by four gunmen who forced him in their vehicle before driving away, leaving his Iraqi driver behind.
Libyan security forces freed Seok-Woo three days later and arrested his abductors. According to a spokesman from Libya’s Foreign Ministry, the South Korean was freed by security forces with the cooperation of citizens in the neighborhood where he was detained. The spokesman stated, “The people who kidnapped him were not ideologically or politically motivated. Some of the kidnappers were arrested.” Therefore, his abduction appears to have been another opportunistic kidnapping by a group trying to take advantage of the pervading lawlessness, possibly for financial gain.
Murders of Foreigners
Foreigners have also been targeted in fatal attacks during recent months, mostly in the troubled east. On March 2, 2014, French engineer Patrice Real was shot dead in his car by unidentified gunmen in the Ras Obraida area of Benghazi. Real had been working on a project to upgrade and expand the Benghazi Medical Center. Little is known about the circumstances surrounding his death or who was behind it.
The same is true of the killing of British oil worker Mark de Salis and his New Zealand companion, Lynn Howie, on January 1, 2014. They were shot dead as they picnicked on a beach near Mellitah in the west of the country. Both were shot in the head in what was clearly an execution-style attack. A photograph posted on the internet showed what is purported to be the couple lying face down in the sand next to their belongings with what appear to be gunshot wounds to the head. This style of killing, along with the fact that according to the Libyan Defense Ministry the couple’s car, passports and belongings were all left untouched, suggests that their deaths were more ideologically motivated and probably represented an opportunistic attack by someone with an antipathy towards Westerners.
The killing in December 2013 of American school teacher Ronnie Smith, who was shot dead while jogging near his Benghazi home, may also have been ideologically motivated. According to an Interior Ministry statement, four unidentified assailants in a black Jeep opened fire on Smith, a chemistry teacher at the Benghazi International School, killing him immediately. No one claimed responsibility for his murder. Although there is no evidence of any direct causal link, it is notable that Smith was murdered just days after al-Qa`ida operative Adam Gadahn called on Libyans to take revenge for the apprehension of Abu Anas al-Libi by U.S. forces in October.
Furthermore, Smith was a devout Christian and appears to have been in Libya partly on a personal proselytizing mission. As his widow explained in an interview following his killing, “What I want people to know about him…he wanted to shine the light and the love of Jesus to the Libyan people…he really did.” Meanwhile a statement posted on the website of the Austin Stone Community Church where Smith was a pastor declared, “Ronnie’s greatest desire was for peace and prosperity in Libya and for the people of Libya to have the joy of knowing God through Christ.” Given the sensitivities around proselytizing in Libya and the fact that dozens of Egyptian Christians were rounded up in Benghazi and tortured in 2013 by Islamist militants after being accused of proselytizing, anyone openly promoting Christianity would have been extremely vulnerable. Smith also tweeted mocking comments about Islamist militants. Neither Smith’s tweets nor his sense of Christian mission justify or explain his murder, but they suggest why he might have been a particular target for Islamist militants.
Ideological motivations may also explain the executions of seven Egyptian Coptic Christians at the end of February. According to neighbors, gunmen forced their way into the men’s apartment building in the Garoutha suburb of Benghazi and demanded to know which residents were Christian. The Christians in the building were then rounded up and abducted at gunpoint. The Egyptian human rights group Nations Without Borders has recounted how the gunmen also spraypainted a message on the building and other buildings in the area offering 10,000 Libyan dinars ($8,160) for anyone who hands a Christian over. The corpses of the abductees were found on a beach approximately 19 miles west of Benghazi. According to Ibrahim Sharaa of the Benghazi Joint Security Chamber, several of the men were found with their hands bound and with a single gunshot wound to the head. Shortly afterwards, on March 2, an Egyptian Copt was shot as he was unloading fruit and vegetables from a car onto his market stall in Benghazi’s Majouri area.
These are not the first attacks against Egyptian Christians in Libya. There have been numerous incidents, including attacks on Christian churches, as well as the detention of scores of Copts on charges of proselytizing by armed Islamist groups.
Other Copts or foreign Christians have also been killed. In September 2013, two Egyptian Christians were stopped on a rural road in the militant Islamist stronghold of Derna. The men, Waleed Saad Shaker and Nash’at Shenouda Ishaq, were robbed, tied up and then shot dead after they refused to convert to Islam.
Meanwhile, in March 2014, Iraqi Christian Adison Karkha, a medical school professor, was killed on his way to work in Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte, another town that is fast becoming a center for Islamist militancy. His death came a few months after the killing of Iraqi academic Hamid Khalf, who was abducted on his way to work and later killed in Derna, in November 2013. Khalf, who had been living in Iraq since 1998, was a Shi`a Muslim. It is believed he may have been killed in retaliation for the execution in Iraq of Libyan citizen Adel al-Zawi who had been convicted of terrorism charges.
While it is difficult to pull these incidents together into a single narrative and in most cases to say with any certainty who was behind them, the pattern of the killings and at least some of the kidnappings suggests that they were the work of Islamist militants and groups. The one aspect these incidents have in common, however, is that as with the kidnappings, no one has been brought to justice. This is partly a result of the weakness of the Libyan state. The central authorities, which are losing legitimacy by the day, still have no real control on the ground, having been unable to build a national army or police force. There is still resistance among the armed groups on the ground to building such a force, which is strongly associated in their minds with the forces of the former regime.
As a result, the state still has to rely on the various brigades and militias to assist whenever there is a crisis. For example, despite accusations of involvement in the kidnapping of the Egyptian diplomats and Ali Zidan, the LROC is still entrusted with protecting Tripoli under the orders of Abu Sahmaine who, as part of his role as head of the GNC, is also supreme commander of the armed forces. Thus, in many cases, even when the state knows who is behind a crime, it is unable to act. As culture minister and government spokesman Habib al-Ameen lamented recently, “There are takfiri groups in Benghazi and Derna and they are responsible for the repeated assassinations. Everyone knows these groups and everyone knows their members and where they are located. But no one can confront them or stop them.”
The problem is compounded by the fact that some of these militias and groups have support right at the heart of the political establishment. As al-Ameen explained, there are “political parties inside the congress who are supporting these [takfiri] groups and who cover for them and provide them with all facilities.” Although such assertions are difficult to prove, it is clear that the ideological outlook of some congress members is not especially far removed from that of some of the militant groups. Indeed, Ali Zidan accused two hard line Islamist congress members from Zawia—Mohamed al-Ghaylani and Mustafa Treiki—of being involved in his own abduction.
In addition, reports have emerged that Islamist militants are infiltrating official security bodies. In March 2014, the former spokesman of the Benghazi Security Directorate, Tariq al-Kharass, stated, “the state security body is penetrated by the extremists and if someone writes a report about these extremists, the report is leaked and whoever wrote it will be killed instantly.”
The array of militant groups has become ever more entrenched and more difficult to challenge in post-Qadhafi Libya, as evidenced by the military parade that was staged by a newly announced group in Derna on April 4, 2014. This evidently well-armed and well-equipped group—the Shura Council of the Youth of Islam in Derna—announced that it was planning to set up special camps and forums to explain the “pure faith” to the people and to open a number of recruitment centers in the town.
It is the entrenchment of these groups and the state’s failure to respond that prompted retired Libyan army general Khalifa Hafter to intervene and launch his own assault against militant groups in Benghazi. On May 16, Hafter—backed by the Libyan National Army—staged a number of attacks in a handful of Islamist-dominated neighborhoods in Benghazi. This move prompted other forces to rally in support of Hafter’s cause, and a number of militias in Tripoli attacked the Libyan parliament, while Libyan National Army spokesman Mohamed al-Hegazi told Libya’s al-Ahrar television that the parliament “is what supports these extremist Islamist entities. The aim was to arrest these Islamist bodies who wear the cloak of politics.”
Hafter’s actions have plunged Libya even deeper into crisis. The country is highly polarized with talk of civil war. With the Libyan state proving itself incapable of offering any real protection at this time, further killings and kidnappings of both foreigners and Libyans are inevitable.
Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and a Senior Associate at Menas Associates Consulting Firm. She specializes in security issues in North Africa and in political Islamist movements in the region. Her books include: Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qadhafi (2012), The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (2010), and The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe (2008).
 “Libyan PM Ali Zeidan Detained by Militia,” BBC, October 10, 2013.
 “Mesoul Libi Rafia Yatarif Lil Mara Oula Biwujoud Al-Takfireen fi Benghazi,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 2, 2014.
 “Jordanian Ambassador’s Kidnappers Seek Libyan Militant’s Release,” Asharq al-Awsat, April 16, 2014.
 “Al-Urdon Sefruj An Al-Dersi Muqabel Safirahu Bi Libya,” al-Jazira, April 22, 2014.
 “Omar Al-Keddie: Awaqib Ikhtitaf Al-Safir Al-Urdani Ala Libya,” Bawabat al-Wasat, April 17, 2014. Bawabat al-Wasat is a relatively new venture established and headed by former head of media in the executive office of the Transitional National Council (NTC), Mahmoud Shamam. It is based in Cairo and is generally considered to be liberal in orientation.
 “Menji Hamadi: Al-diplmasi Tunisi Laroussi Gantassi Maktouf Min Jama`a Tutaleb Beitlaq Serah Libyeen Min Sijoun Tunis,” al-Sada Press, undated.
 “Libya: Al-Urdon Sertusalim Sajeenan Islamiyan Mukabel Al-Ifrage An-Safiriha Al-Mukhtataf,” Libya al-Mostakbal, April 29, 2014.
 “Libya Focus,” Menas Associates, May 2014.
 “Tunisia Diplomat Kidnapped in Libya,” Press TV [Tehran], March 23, 2014.
 “Khass: Al-Tafaseel Al-Kamela Li Amaliyat Ikhtitaf Al-Diplmasi Laroussi Gantassi Bi Libya,” Elhasade, April 26, 2014.
 “Al-Kadha Al-Tunisi Yestima Lilibeen Itha Ikhtitaf Tuniseen Fi Tarablus,” Elaph, April 23, 2014.
 “Libyan Jihadist Group Parades Sobbing Hostage,” al-Arabiya, April 21, 2014.
 “Amaliat Ikhtitaf Al-Diplomasi Tunisi Nafedhaha Muntamoun Li Ansar Al-Sharia Fi Tunis,” al-Jarida, April 22, 2014. This group should not be confused with the Libyan Shabab al-Tawhid group, which is a separate entity, and which did not post the video on its Facebook page.
 “Tunisian Diplomat, in Video Message, Urges Government to Negotiate with Libyan Kidnappers,” Reuters, April 21, 2014.
 “Khass: Majmua Jihadiya Tunisia-Libeeya Takif Wara Ikhtitaf Al-Diplomsi Al-Tunisi,” Afrigate News, April 21, 2014.
 Aaron Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar al-Sharia in Libya Training Camps,” al-Wasat blog, August 8, 2013.
 “Belhaj Utamin Shakiqa Al-Diplomasi Al-Tunisi Al-Muqtataf,” Bawabat al-Wasat, April 26, 2014.
 Alikhbaria, April 26, 2014.
 “Kidnapped Diplomats in Good Health Says Al-Thinni,” Libya Herald, April 28, 2014.
 The abductors appeared on the al-Arabiya channel on January 25, 2014, demanding Hadia be released within 24 hours. See “Libya Says Five Kidnapped Egyptian Diplomats Freed,” Reuters, January 26, 2014.
 “Libya: Militias, Politicians Meld in Explosive Mix,” Associated Press, October 22, 2013.
 “Ghorfat Amaliat Thuwar Libya Wa Lajnat Mukafat Al-Jarima…Qiyanat Ghamdht Fi Dawla Al-Libyeea,” Asharq al-Awsat, October 11, 2013.
 “Libya Politics and Security,” Menas Associates, January 27, 2014.
 “Masader Amnia: Al-Ishtiba Bintima Qa’id Thuwar Libya Lil Qa’ida Wa Tawasal Ma Al-Ikhwan Fil Qahira,” Asharq al-Awsat, January 26, 2014.
 “Libyan Militiaman Released in Egypt after Diplomats Freed,” Reuters, January 27, 2014.
 “Kidnapped Egyptian Diplomats in Libya Freed,” al-Jazira, January 27, 2014.
 “Gianluca Salviato rapito in Libia: ‘Un mese senza notizie,’” La Nouva Di Venezia e Mestre, April 19, 2014.
 “Paura in Cirenaica rapiti due operai italiani,” L’Unita.January 19, 2014.
 “Italy Says its Citizen Kidnapped in Libya, Needs Medical Help,” Reuters, March 23, 2014.
 “Kidnapped South Korean Trade Official Freed in Libya,” al-Arabiya, January 23, 2014.
 “Abducted South Korean Trade Official Freed in Libya – Government,” Reuters, January 22, 2014.
 “French National Shot Dead in Benghazi,” Libya Herald, March 2, 2014.
 “Nusha Ala Shatta Al-Bahr Al-Libi Intaht Bi Rasassa Fee Al-Ras,” al-Arabiya, January 5, 2014.
 “American Teacher Slain in Libya,” CNN, December 6, 2014.
 “Al-Qaida: US Committed ‘Crime of Piracy’ by Kidnapping Abu Anas al-Liby,” Guardian, December 1, 2013.
 “Widow of American Teacher Forgives Attackers who Killed her Husband in Libya,” CNN, December 21, 2013.
 “Grieving the Loss of Our Brother in Christ,” The Austin Stone Community Church, undated.
 Some Libyans, meanwhile, complained about Smith’s alleged posting of a series of tweets that were derogatory about Libyans.
 In October 2013, he wrote, “Libya Islamists are threatening kidnappings. As if they can fit kidnapping into a 2hr work day that already includes a nap. Losers.” See “American Teacher Ronnie Smith Shot Dead While Jogging in Benghazi,” Guardian, December 5, 2013.
 “Islamist Militia Group in Libya Suspected in Killing of Seven Coptic Christians,” Morning Star News, February 25, 2014.
 “Libya Politics and Security,” Menas Associates, March 3, 2014.
 “Another Egyptian Targeted in Benghazi,” Libya Herald, March 2, 2014.
 See “Egyptian Copts in Libya Allegedly Detained, Tortured Following ‘Missionising’ Claims,” al-Ahram, February 28, 2013.
 “Islamist Militia Group in Libya Suspected in Killing of Seven Coptic Christians.”
 “Report: Christian Iraqi Killed in Libya,” Associated Press, March 18, 2014.
 “Libyan Jihadists Kill Shi’ite in Revenge for Prisoner Executions by Iraq,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 15, 2014.
 “Mesoul Libi Rafia Yatarif Lil Mara Oula Biwujoud Al-Takfireen fi Benghazi,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 2, 2014.
 “Ghorfat Amaliyat Thuwar Libya Militia Mutheera Li Jedel,” al-Arabiya, January 30, 2014.
 “Mesoul Amni Sabak Yakshif Al-Tajawasat fi Mudiriyat Al-Am Bi Benghazi,” Bawabat al-Wasat, March 18, 2014.
 “Tanzeem Jihadi Fi Libya Yalin Adawatahu Lil Kuwat Nidamia,” Libya News Network, April 6, 2014.
 “Rogue Libyan General Launches Anti-Islamist Raid on Parliament,” The National, May 18, 2014.