On August 6, 2010, the U.S. government identified Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri as a specially designated global terrorist for his role and actions in Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) and al-Qa`ida.[1] Prior to the U.S. government’s decision, Pakistani, Indian and Afghan authorities were already well acquainted with Kashmiri, whose militant operations stretch back decades. Kashmiri is number four on the Pakistani Interior Ministry’s most wanted terrorist list, a significant feat considering the number of jihadists operating in the country.[2] He has emerged as a key operational commander for al-Qa`ida and a major player overall in the Pakistan-based jihadist scene. His deep involvement in the Kashmir jihad, close associations with jihadists based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), relationship with al-Qa`ida and ties to Punjabi militant organizations allows him to link together these various strands of the Pakistan-based jihadist movement.
Kashmiri has been tied to recent assassinations of Pakistani generals, transnational terrorist plots and suicide bombings in Pakistan. There is also speculation that Kashmiri was involved in the suicide attack on the Central Intelligence Agency’s Camp Chapman in Afghanistan’s Khost Province in December 2009.[3] All of these factors have earned him a reputation as one of the most formidable and effective jihadist commanders operating today.
This article profiles Ilyas Kashmiri, providing background information on his early years and how he became involved in fighting jihad. It looks at his break with the Pakistani state and identifies concerns related to Kashmiri’s increasing connections to transnational jihadist terrorism threatening the West. Most worryingly to U.S. and European authorities, Kashmiri has been directly linked to terrorist plots in the United States and Denmark through his connections to David Coleman Headley, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Raja Lahrasib Khan and unnamed European operatives.[4] Kashmiri now appears fully engaged in transnational terrorist activity, and he has become a key component in al-Qa`ida’s strategy to conduct attacks against the West.
Early Years and Joining the Jihad
Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri was reportedly born in either January or February 1964 in Bhimber in Azad Kashmir.[6] He attended Allama Iqbal Open University in Islamabad where he studied communications, but left after becoming embroiled in jihadist activities.[7] In the 1980s, he fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, losing an eye and a finger on the battlefield.[8] There are conflicting accounts on whether he was a member of the Pakistan Army’s special forces, known as the Special Services Group (SSG), or whether he served in the military at all.[9] Whatever his military role, Kashmiri later proved adept at recruiting members of the Pakistani military to his cause.
Following Afghanistan, Kashmiri joined the Kashmir conflict as part of HuJI.[10] He was appointed HuJI’s “chief commander of Jammu and Kashmir” with his unit known as Harkat-ul-Jihad Brigade 111 (also known as Brigade 313).[11] As amir of HuJI’s Kashmir wing, he earned a reputation as a ruthless and skilled commander, and he trained his cadre at a camp outside Kotli in Azad Kashmir.[12] Kashmiri’s operatives were considered an elite group of jihadists who launched a daring series of cross-border operations into Indian-controlled Kashmir. During one of these raids, Kashmiri was captured and imprisoned for two years before escaping.[13] Describing his tactics, Kashmiri explained in 1999,
I have learned the art of war from the Arabs. The Arabs fighting in Afghanistan, including Egyptians and Palestinians, have adopted a separate style combining the war strategies of the Russians and Americans. I am an expert in that style. We have trained our boys also in that mode so that they can fight better than India’s regular army commandos.[14]
In 1994, Kashmiri took part in an operation utilizing the group cover name al-Hadid with the future kidnapper of Daniel Pearl, Omar Saeed Sheikh.[15] They kidnapped four Western tourists (including an American), brought them to safe houses outside New Delhi and demanded the release of militant commanders in Indian prisons.[16] In a police raid, Saeed was shot and detained, while Kashmiri narrowly escaped.[17]
Kashmiri’s notoriety greatly increased in February 2000 after he led a gruesome attack on an Indian military post in which he allegedly beheaded an Indian soldier.[18] Pictures of Kashmiri holding the head circulated through the press, and it was reported that he received a personal reward after presenting the head to General Pervez Musharraf.[19] This action made Kashmiri a hero among jihadists fighting in Kashmir.
Kashmiri’s more extreme views were evident in these early days. In 1999, when asked what he would do if the conflict in Kashmir were resolved, he responded that there were many other parts of India left to conquer.[20] He further stated that his fighters could continue their war in Chechnya, Palestine or elsewhere, elaborating, “we folks have taken an oath from Mullah Omar and we consider him as Ameerul Momineen. We have absolute permission from him to go to any place and engage ourselves in jihadi activities.”[21]
Breaking with the Pakistani State
Following the 9/11 attacks and the toppling of the Taliban, Kashmiri turned his sights once again to Afghanistan and the internal dynamics of Pakistan. As with many Pakistani jihadists, Kashmiri was reexamining his relationship with the Pakistani military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[22] After 9/11, Pakistan began limited crackdowns on jihadist groups, restricting their activity in Kashmir and shutting down training camps. The clearest challenge to the Pakistani state came with assassination attempts on President Musharraf in 2003, organized by HuJI operative Amjad Hussain Farooqi.[23] The ISI detained Kashmiri on a number of occasions for his alleged role in these attacks, links to al-Qa`ida and refusing to shut down his operations in Kashmir.[24] Although a major suspect in the attacks, Kashmiri was released, apparently due to lack of evidence or pressure from other Kashmiri jihadist leaders.[25] He transferred his operations from Kotli to Ramzak in North Waziristan Agency in 2005 where he was back on familiar ground from his days fighting the Soviets.[26]
In 2007, the situation changed again for Kashmiri when Pakistani authorities raided Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. Zahid Hussain, a Pakistani security analyst, explained that “the Lal Masjid incident was the turning point for Pakistani militant groups when they declared jihad against the state and the military.”[27] Kashmiri resumed his activities and reentered the jihadist world.
Today, Kashmiri is thought to be closely involved with a series of suicide attacks in response to events at Lal Masjid and Pakistani military incursions in FATA.[28] He is further suspected in spreading suicide operations into Azad Kashmir.[29] Two major operations attributed to Kashmiri include the mid-2009 attack against ISI offices in Lahore, and the assassination of a former commander of the SSG, General Amir Faisal Alvi, in 2008.[30] Kashmiri is also thought to have been involved in the attack on the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi in October 2009.[31] A purported interview with Kashmiri offers important insights into his thinking and significance among Pakistan-based jihadists. When asked why he is now fighting the Pakistani military, he answered, “It was never the Pakistan Army that was against me, but certain elements who branded me as an enemy to cover up their weaknesses and to appease their masters.”[32]
Beyond these attacks, he reportedly turned to kidnap-for-ransom activities for funding, such as the October 2008 kidnapping of a film producer.[33] Another kidnapping operation believed to have had Kashmiri’s backing was the capture of former ISI operatives Khalid Khwaja and Sultan Amir Tarar (also known as Colonel Imam), along with a British Pakistani journalist.[34] As a result of these operations, Kashmiri’s networks are believed to have garnered millions of dollars in ransom payouts.[35]
Transnational Plots and Kashmiri’s Western Operatives
In addition to South Asia plots, Kashmiri appears to have more recently focused his attention on plotting attacks in the West. According to a recent purported interview, the jihadist leader explained how his focus changed from regional jihads in places such as Kashmir to a more global jihadist strategy with the United States as a central target. “The real game is the fight against the great Satan [U.S.] and its adherents,” he reportedly said.[36] Providing further insight into why he joined with FATA-based militants, Kashmiri explained that “a unified strategy is compulsory. The defeat of American global hegemony is a must if I want the liberation of my homeland Kashmir, and therefore it provided the reasoning for my presence in this war theater.”[37]
Kashmiri’s threats against the West appear to have come to fruition. The cases of David Coleman Headley, Tahawwur Rana and Raja Lahrasib Khan expose Kashmiri’s connections to Western operatives in North America and Europe. These cases also point to the significant role Kashmiri is playing in al-Qa`ida’s international operations and his connections to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and the Mumbai operation. Headley allegedly met with Lashkar member Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed (also known as Pasha), a close associate of Kashmiri’s, who instructed him to conduct surveillance in Denmark.[38] In Europe, Headley allegedly met with Kashmiri’s contacts there to gain assistance in planning and supporting attacks in Denmark against locations and individuals associated with the Prophet Muhammad cartoon controversy.[39] During a February 2009 meeting in Waziristan, Kashmiri allegedly informed Headley that he could provide the manpower, weaponry and funding for the Denmark operations.[40]
Following the Mumbai attacks, Kashmiri also wanted Headley to return to India to conduct surveillance on Israeli targets in response to events in Gaza in 2009.[41] Kashmiri told Headley that “the elders,” supposedly referring to the al-Qa`ida leadership, were extremely unhappy with Israel’s Gaza activities.[42] Furthermore, the targeting of the Nariman House and Israeli Jews in the Mumbai attacks may have demonstrated involvement by Kashmiri’s Brigade 313, as that name was referenced in phone intercepts between the attackers and handlers.[43] When asked if more Mumbai-style attacks would be carried out, Kashmiri responded, “That was nothing compared to what has already been planned for the future.”[44] When further asked if he meant attacks against the United States and Israel, he reportedly replied, “As a military commander, I would say every target has a specific time and reasons, and the responses will be forthcoming accordingly.”[45]
The separate case of Raja Lahrasib Khan reveals Kashmiri’s intent to support attacks in the United States. Khan is a Pakistan-born U.S. citizen who was arrested in Chicago in March 2010 and charged with providing material support to al-Qa`ida.[46] Khan claimed to have known Kashmiri for 15 years, met him numerous times and learned that he wanted to train operatives to strike in the United States.[47] Khan discussed attacking a stadium in the United States with an unnamed associate, although it does not appear he was doing so under orders from Kashmiri.[48] In recorded discussions, Khan also seemed to intimate that Kashmiri was at one time part of the Pakistan Army and developed an international network.[49] Khan also discussed Kashmiri’s ties to al-Qa`ida and said that Kashmiri acts under Bin Ladin’s orders.[50]
Various other international connections to Kashmiri and HuJI have been reported. The Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly documented the presence of Brigade 313 operatives in various European cities.[51] According to Pakistani prosecutors, the five men from the Washington D.C. area who were arrested in December 2009 in Sargodha made contact with Kashmiri’s fellow HuJI commander Qari Saifullah Akhtar.[52] All of this leads to further evidence of HuJI’s and Brigade 313’s involvement with Western jihadists.[53]
Role with Al-Qa`ida and Other Jihadist Organizations
Following HuJI’s and Kashmiri’s recent designations, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Daniel Benjamin stated, “The linkages between HUJI and Al-Qaeda are clear, and today’s designations convey the operational relationship between these organizations.”[54] On a number of occasions, both Headley and Raja Khan stated that Kashmiri worked for and was in contact with al-Qa`ida’s leaders.[55] Kashmiri further confirmed his involvement when asked why he joined al-Qa`ida, purportedly stating, “We were both victims of the same tyrant. Today, the entire Muslim world is sick of Americans and that’s why they are agreeing with Sheikh Osama.”[56] Aside from al-Qa`ida, Kashmiri is known to have close relationships with a multitude of jihadist groups including the Haqqani network and the TTP.[57]
In a posthumous audio statement released in June, former al-Qa`ida operative Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid referred to Kashmiri as a part of al-Qa`ida, saying that he heads “Qaedat al-Jihad in Kashmir.”[58] Al-Yazid further claimed that al-Qa`ida in Kashmir carried out the February 2010 bombing in Pune, India, which killed 16 people at a German bakery.[59] Following that attack, Brigade 313 issued threats against internationally connected events, such as the 2010 Hockey World Cup and the Commonwealth Games.[60] Kashmiri himself stated that attacks conducted in India were part of a larger strategy of striking at the United States regionally.[61]
Conclusion
Kashmiri brings a wealth of advantages to al-Qa`ida and associated groups. His decades of experience and contacts with Pakistani jihadist networks are deep and widespread. He has directly participated in and supported a range of insurgent and terrorist operations in Afghanistan, Kashmir and India. Involvement with transnational terrorist plots in Denmark and the United States proves he has developed international contacts willing to carry out and support attacks in the West. Kashmiri also offers al-Qa`ida a route into Kashmir and India; this is the first time that al-Qa`ida has placed a longtime Kashmir jihad veteran—and an ethnic Kashmiri—in such a central role in their operations.
Kashmiri’s links to Pakistani Taliban militants, al-Qa`ida operatives, and Punjab-based militants[62] who have fought in Kashmir places him at the crossroads of all these groups, demonstrating his danger. He has improved the ability of militants to strike in Pakistan’s interior and has created important logistics routes throughout the country.
Kashmiri is described as an exceptional guerrilla fighter who “turns the strategic vision into reality, provides the resources and gets targets achieved, but he chooses to remain in the background and very low key.”[63] Kashmiri himself stated that “I have always been a field commander and I know the language of battlefields.”[64] Having honed his skills from years of warfare and commanding an insurgent group in Kashmir, Ilyas Kashmiri is now transferring the same tactics and experience to other theaters of jihad.[65]
Seth Nye is currently an instructor with the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point’s Practitioner Education Program and an Adjunct Professor at New York University (NYU), where he teaches a graduate course on terrorism and insurgencies. He spent four years as an Intelligence Analyst and Team Leader for the New York City Police Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau and Intelligence Division. Prior to the NYPD, Mr. Nye was a Navy Intelligence Officer where among various positions he was assigned to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and a F/A-18F Super Hornet squadron (VFA-102). He deployed to Afghanistan and served on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
[1] Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam was founded by Qari Saifullah Akhtar in the early 1980s. It has been active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. HuJI was also designated as a “foreign terrorist organization” by the United States. For details, see “Designations of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) and its Leader Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. State Department, August 6, 2010. The United Nations added Ilyas Kashmiri and HuJI to their 1267 Committee Sanctions List. For details, see “The Consolidated List Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them,” United Nations, August 6, 2010.
[2] Amir Mir, “The Top Ten Most Wanted Jehadis,” The News International, September 1, 2009.
[3] Amir Mir, “US Seeks Harkat Chief for Khost CIA Attack,” The News International, January 6, 2010.
[4] Headley conducted surveillance operations in Denmark on behalf of Kashmiri, discussed conducting attacks there and met with Kashmiri’s contacts in Europe. Headley directly assisted Lashkar-i-Tayyiba in the preparation for the Mumbai attacks of 2008 by conducting surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
[5] Raja Khan, for example, claimed that Kashmiri wants to train operatives to conduct attacks in the United States. See “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2010. Kashmiri’s own rhetoric makes clear that he views the United States as his central enemy.
[6] “United States Targets Terrorist Organization Operating in India and Pakistan in Joint Terrorism Actions, Treasury, State Designate Harakat-ul Jihad Islami And Its Senior Leader Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. Treasury Department, August 6, 2010. Physically, he is described as more than six feet tall, well built and has a long white beard dyed with reddish henna. For details, see Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy,” Asia Times Online, October 15, 2009.
[7] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[8] Ibid.; Arif Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri,” Militant Leadership Monitor 1:1 (2010).
[9] Kashmiri may have been trained by Pakistan’s military or the ISI. In Kashmiri’s most recent purported interview, he appears to deny that he was ever in the SSG. For that interview, see Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.” Hamid Mir wrote that Kashmiri was an SSG member. See Hamid Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist,” The News International, September 20, 2009.
[10] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[11] Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004). The 111 may refer to one of the branches of HuJI, all of which would add up to 313, which references the number of Muslims who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad at the Battle of Badr.
[12] Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.”
[13] Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist.”
[14] Bill Roggio, “Ilyas Kashmiri, Then and Now,” The Long War Journal, October 26, 2009.
[15] Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.”
[16] Ibid.
[17] PranabDhalSamanta, “Omar Sheikh’s Pak Handler Ilyas Kashmiri also Handled Headley,” Indian Express, November 15, 2009.
[18] Jamal, “South Asia’s Architect of Jihad: A Profile of Commander Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri.”
[19] Ibid. Ranjani Raghavan, “Dead Sepoy’s Village Doesn’t Know his Killer is Killed in Pakistan,” Indian Express, September 23, 2009.
[20] Roggio.
[21] Ibid.
[22] In 2000, Kashmiri had already come into conflict with a Pakistani general when he refused orders to join the newly created Jaysh-i-Muhammad. For details, see Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist.” As with a variety of jihadist groups that interacted with the Pakistani military and intelligence units for operations in Kashmir, the relationships were complicated. Many were happy to receive arms, training and funding, yet resisted government control of their operations.
[23] Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2006), p. 166. Farooqi was later killed in a shootout with Pakistani security forces.
[24] Mohammad Imran, “Government Releases Maulana Ilyas Kashmiri,” Daily Times, June 9, 2004. A demonstration of Kashmiri’s continued stature among Kashmir jihadists was evident when Syed Salahudin, head of Hizb al-Mujahidin, personally intervened with Pakistani authorities to get him released. See “Militant Leader Ilyas Kashmiri Released,” Daily Times, February 2, 2004; Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[25] Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist”; Mir, “The Top Ten Most Wanted Jehadis.”
[26] Amir Mir, “Kashmiri Behind Khawaja’s Murder?” The News International, May 1, 2010. In September 2009, a drone strike in the Machikhel area of North Waziristan Agency was thought to have killed Kashmiri, yet he survived. For details, see “Pakistani Al Qaeda Leader Killed in U.S. Strike,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2009.
[27] Zaffar Abbas, “Khwaja’s Murder Points to Home Truths,” Dawn, May 3, 2010.
[28] Asad Kharal, “LJ, HJI, TTP Behind Recent Attacks in Punjab: Report,” Daily Times, July 12, 2010.
[29] A previous base of operations for Kashmiri along with many other jihadists, Azad Kashmir remained largely untouched by the violence plaguing Pakistan until these recent attacks. For more details, see Mir, “Kashmiri Behind Khawaja’s Murder?”; Amir Mir, “Lashkar-e-Zil Behind Azad Kashmir Suicide Hits,” The News International, January 11, 2010.
[30] “Designations of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) and its Leader Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri,” U.S. State Department, August 6, 2010. Kashmiri developed a plan to kill Pakistan’s current chief of army staff (General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani), a plan that even al-Qa`ida at the time was supposedly reluctant to carry out. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Keeps its Eyes on Afghanistan,” Asia Times Online, May 22, 2009.
[31] This attack was thought to have been carried out in revenge for the killing of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud. See Amir Mir, “Cursing the Nurse,” The News International, October 18, 2009.
[32] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.” It is impossible to verify the accuracy of this interview.
[33] Retired Pakistani Major Haroon Rasheed (also known as Abu Khattab) was charged for his role in this operation, along with two others, but was acquitted in June 2010 by an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan. See “3 Acquitted of Former SSG Commandos Murder,” Dawn, June 16, 2010.
[34] Arif Jamal, “The Asian Tigers – The New Face of the Punjabi Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor 8:20 (2010). Following the claim by the Asian Tigers, a group called “Lashkar Jhangvi al-Alami, Abdullah Mansour” claimed responsibility for this operation with a video release of Colonel Imam. See “Video of Pakistani Colonel Imam Sultan Amir Tarar,” Flashpoint Partners, July 26, 2010.
[35] Kashmiri specifically stated to the Pakistani major who led the operation that the militants’ financial situation was dire. For details, see S. Raza Hassan, “Tale of Militants’ Motivation and Reach,” Dawn, April 14, 2009.
[36] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[37] Ibid.
[38] U.S.A. v. David C. Headley, Northern District of Illinois, 2009.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid. Kashmiri felt that as part of the Denmark operation a suicide attack should be conducted along with beheading anyone captured.
[41] Sagnik Chowdhury, “Post-26/11, Headley Scouted Israeli Targets in India to ‘Avenge’ Gaza War,” Indian Express, April 6, 2010.
[42] Ibid.; Tejas Mehta, “The Importance of Being Ilyas Kashmiri,” NDTV, August 7, 2010.
[43] Ibid. Headley’s associate, Tahawwur Rana, met with Abdur Rehman in Dubai before the attacks in Mumbai and learned they were going to take place. See U.S.A. v. Tahawwur Hussain Rana, Northern District of Illinois, 2009. The revitalized Brigade 313 is thought to be different from the one Kashmiri led in the Kashmir days and now has members from a variety of groups.
[44] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[45] Ibid.
[46] Those al-Qa`ida charges were for his assistance to Kashmiri. Khan’s case is unrelated to that of Headley and Rana, aside from the links to Kashmiri.
[47] Khan’s meetings with Kashmiri took place in both Miran Shah (North Waziristan) and Kotli (in 2008) indicating Kashmiri traveled out of FATA in recent years.
[48] “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2010.
[49] U.S.A. v. Raja Lahrasib Khan, Northern District of Illinois, 2010.
[50] Ibid.
[51] “I-Team Report: Brigade 313,” ABC Local, January 28, 2010.
[52] Akhtar reportedly encouraged them to come to Pakistan. See “American Suspects Linked to Militants: Prosecutor,” Dawn, April 17, 2010. Kashmiri joined HuJI when it was under Akhtar’s leadership and served as leader of HuJI operations in Azad Kashmir. Interestingly, the U.S. designation of Kashmiri appears to portray him as the overall commander of HuJI.
[53] An additional case of interest is that of Bangladeshi-born British citizen Golam Mostafa, who is described as the UK amir for HuJI-B (Bangladesh).
[54] “US, UN Declare Harakat-ul Jihad al-Islami a Terrorist Group,” Agence France-Presse, August 7, 2010. HuJI’s relationship with al-Qa`ida dates back more than a decade, and HuJI-B’s leader signed Bin Ladin’s 1998 fatwa declaring war on the United States and Israel.
[55] “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas.”
[56] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[57] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan Has its Own Battle to Fight,” Asia Times Online, July 28, 2010; “Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami Merges With Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Preparing Suicide Bombers Squad,” Daily Express, September 20, 2008.
[58] “Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid in Posthumous Audio Message Urges Attacks in U.S.; Says Al-Qaeda in Kashmir Behind February 2010 Attack in India; Complains of Shortage of Funds,” Middle East Media Research Institute, June 15, 2010. A group claiming to be al-Qa`ida in Jammu and Kashmir announced itself in 2006, and another individual claiming to represent al-Qa`ida in India emerged in June 2007. See “CD Announces Qaeda Hehad in India,” Economic Times, June 9, 2007.
[59] “Sahab: Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid in Posthumous Audio Message,” Middle East Observatory, June 15, 2010; Jane Cowan, “Two Men Arrested Over India Bomb Attack,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September 8, 2010.
[60] The message did not specifically claim responsibility for the attack. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Times Online, February 10, 2010. Kashmiri may have delivered on these threats when two bomb blasts occurred outside a cricket stadium in the Indian city of Bangalore. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Times Online, February 10, 2010.
[61] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.” Baitullah Mehsud was said to have also been working with Kashmiri on expanding operations into India. See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Afghanistan: The Neo-Taliban Campaign,” Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1, 2008.
[62] The Punjabi Taliban is said to consist of operatives from Lashkar-i-Jhanghvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and Jaysh-i-Muhammad. For details, see Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (2009).
[63] Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”
[64] Ibid.
[65] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Rise and Rise of the Neo-Taliban,” Asia Times Online, April 1, 2009.
