Abstract: Not only could COVID-19 worsen the already acute humanitarian crisis within detention facilities holding Islamic State-affiliated individuals in northeastern Syria, but the pandemic’s indirect effects may create security risks in the camps and prisons managed by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Preventing the transmission of COVID-19 among detainees, security forces, aid workers, and other personnel who maintain detention sites must remain a priority among key stakeholders. The already apparent indirect effects of COVID-19 also demand attention because of the challenges these pressures bring to managing these sites, such as stoking uncertainty among detainees, disrupting humanitarian assistance, and limiting security forces’ ability to operate in these facilities. In the past, bad conditions arguably contributed to heightened levels of discontent among detainees that culminated in breakout attempts, riots, the proliferation of smuggling networks, and attacks on guards. Today, a similar dynamic is unfolding: as COVID-19 adds urgency to Islamic State detainees’ desires to change their situation in the camps and prisons, and makes the environment more permissive to criminal activity, violence, and low-level corruption, it allows the illicit networks facilitating the Islamic State detainees’ objectives to expand.
Even without a single confirmed case of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in detention facilities holding alleged Islamic State affiliates in northeastern Syria, the pandemic is complicating a range of humanitarian and security challenges within the prisons and camps.1 The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military arm, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a Kurdish-led alliance of militias and partner to the U.S.-led Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State—control much of this part of the country.2 The SDF is largely responsible for maintaining and securing Islamic State detaineesa in a range of detention sites, including prisonsb and camps.c Several factors make this task daunting, particularly as the pandemic increases uncertainty while constraining resources, and SDF officials continue to call on the international community for more support.3
While some humanitarian groups and members of the coalition against the Islamic State have responded to these calls, providing monetary support and other resources to the SDF, insights from SDF officials, counterterrorism analysts, and a variety of sources suggest that circumstances in some facilities remain precarious.4 The SDF takes preventative measures against COVID-19 in the prisons and camps, but it lacks adequate resources and infrastructure.5 In an interview with the author in June 2020, General Mazloum Abdi, the top commander of the SDF, explained, “We are depending on international support to be able to manage and control all these facilities. So far, the assistance and the support that is provided from the coalition and the international community is not enough.”6
It is hard to gauge the COVID-19 situation in Syria, the country’s northeast, and SDF-run detention sites because factors including drastically limited testing capabilities, disparate medical services, inconsistencies in reporting, and transparency issues can influence the figures that are recorded.7 As of June 28, 2020, Johns Hopkins University’s COVID-19 dashboard showed 242 total confirmed cases, and seven related deaths, in Syria.8 In northeastern Syria, updated figures on the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases are hard to find, but “only a handful of deaths have been reported.”9 At the time of writing (late June 2020), there are no reported confirmed cases in sites holding Islamic State detainees in northeastern Syria.d However, fears that the pandemic could have grave effects on these facilities have not subsided.10 General Mazloum explained, “Unfortunately, if we have any [cases of COVID-19] in the future, the situation will not be good at all … our capabilities to control [COVID-19 in the prisons and camps] are very weak.”11 A May 2020 report by the Rojava Information Center notes that “widespread tuberculosis in Hol and other camps and detention facilities mean medical staff fear a 10%+ death rate if the disease enters these facilities.”12 As this article will show, with or without COVID-19 transmission among populations within these sites, the pandemic is set to impact the camps and prisons in significant ways.
Some problems affecting the prisons and camps today include overcrowding, poor sanitation, limited humanitarian assistance, and a range of security challenges involving activities like ideologically motivated violence, rioting, and the smuggling of money, goods, and people.13 In recent months, researchers and practitioners have delineated which of these issues COVID-19 could make more acute. After touching on a few of these factors in the following section, this article examines how the pandemic risks further fostering an environment vulnerable to criminal activity, violence, and corrupt behavior within the detention facilities. In short, circumstances surrounding COVID-19 add urgency to Islamic State detainees’ desires to change their situation in SDF-run camps and prisons. Whether that change involves improving access to goods, challenging power dynamics, or escaping from detention facilities, illicit networks may expand to meet these demands. This could progressively erode security at the camps and prisons. If the personnel maintaining, servicing, and guarding the detention facilities also continue to experience a variety of pressures associated with COVID-19, which would be significantly amplified if there is an outbreak in the facilities, it could exacerbate security vulnerabilities and create additional opportunities for illicit networks, criminal activity, and low-level corruption.
Although it is hard to anticipate the precise effects of COVID-19 on detention facilities, mounting evidence suggests the pandemic could impact health and safety in both direct and indirect ways. COVID-19 transmission among populations in these sites remains a distinct possibility, and might directly affect detainees, guards, and other people who maintain detention facilities. Meanwhile, the pandemic’s indirect effects, which this article investigates, are already making bad problems worse within the prisons and camps. Minimizing the impact of COVID-19 on detention facilities, and improving their conditions writ large, could help curb the demand for criminal activity and reduce the incentives for corrupt behaviors in the camps and prisons. In turn, slowing growth of networks supplying detainees with money, goods, and services may also prevent the Islamic State and possibly other violent extremist groups operating in Syria, from leveraging such contacts in the weeks, months, and years ahead.
Backdrop
Despite longstanding reservations among stakeholders about the suitability and sustainability of detention of Islamic State members in northeastern Syria, supplemental measures and alternatives to the current configuration are slow to come to fruition.14 e This response, or lack thereof, leaves the SDF with the unenviable but essential task of managing a humanitarian and security crisis under the shadow of a global pandemic.
With or without COVID-19, it is hard to disentangle all the factors influencing dynamics within SDF detention facilities, but overstretched resources, logistical issues, and uncertainty about the futuref make the system sensitive to pressures.g Events and policies beyond the perimeters of detention sites can have spin-off effects that influence the lives of detainees and people working in the prisons and camps.15 The United States’ drawdown from Syria and Turkey’s subsequent incursion into Syria in October 2019, for example, notably affected the health, security, and disposition of the populations in several facilities.16 Albeit to varying degrees, as some locations faced more direct problems than others due to their proximity to armed forces involved in the Turkish offensive,17 these events shaped staffing considerations for security forces and NGOs,18 which reduced security, disrupted essential maintenance work, and diminished humanitarian assistance, particularly with regard to medical care.19
Similarly, circumstances in and around the detention facilities in northeastern Syria, and efforts to manage COVID-19, are already affecting the camps and prisons in complex ways. Economic, political, and logistical factors hinder the AANES’ efforts to prevent and respond to COVID-19 writ large, which trickle down and impact the SDF’s capabilities in detention facilities. At a time where humanitarian assistance is vital to the COVID-19 response, reports indicate that COVID-19 aid routed through Damascus, like resources from the World Health Organization, does not reliably reach northeastern Syria and other parts of the country.20 To make matters worse, restrictions at Yaroubia border crossing, which closed because a U.N. Security Council resolution did not reauthorize its use,h and Faysh Khabour (Semalka), which reduced operations because of COVID-19, further limit “the movement of humanitarian aid into these areas.”21 Meanwhile, Turkey’s recent disruptions to the water supply in a section of northeastern Syria have impacted areas that encompass detention facilities, making it hard for people to access water and practice basic sanitation measures.22 In turbulent, overpopulated facilities with poor conditions, limited water supply could diminish the quality of life, stoke discord, and invite numerous health risks, including (given, for example, the importance of hand washing to protect against the disease) the spread of COVID-19.23
The SDF, with some support from the coalition and non-governmental organizations, has implemented measures to prevent and counter the spread of COVID-19 in detention facilities.24 Security forces reportedly receive additional training on sanitation, infection prevention and management procedures, and proper use of personal protective equipment.25 Changes in day-to-day operations within detention facilities seem to include things like limiting physical contact, reducing staff and staff rotations, restricting the mobility of the population, and providing only essential services.26 In Al-Hol, for instance, stalls in the markets for detainees temporarily closed.27 Preventative measures such as these are necessary and commendable. Still, no matter how directly COVID-19 affects the camps and prisons, the resource-strained SDF and its partners will have to contend with the knock-on effects of the pandemic. On this point, General Mazloum told the author that if an outbreak occurs, “it will affect and impact work against [Islamic State],” like the SDF’s counterterrorism operations, “because we will be busy” managing the situation in detention facilities.28
Like the impact of the latest U.S. drawdown and Turkey’s October 2019 incursion into Syria, COVID-19 has the potential to affect humanitarian and security conditions directly and indirectly in the SDF-run camps and prisons. Preventing the potential transmission of COVID-19 among detainees, security forces, aid workers, and other personnel who maintain detention sites should remain a top priority for facility administrators, the SDF, and the latter’s partners in the coalition to defeat the Islamic State. However, given the indirect effects COVID-19 could have on the prisons and camps, such as stoking uncertainty among detainees, disrupting humanitarian assistance, and affecting the staffing of security forces in detention facilities, stakeholders ought to also remain vigilant about the dangers associated with these dynamics. To support that objective, this article pivots to discusses how COVID-19 may invite security risks by making camps and prison in northeastern Syria more permissive to illicit networks, criminal activity, and low-level corruption. At various points, it will also discuss how the situation might evolve in the event of an outbreak in a camp, prison, or across multiple sites in the detention system.
How COVID-19 Adds Urgency to Detainee’s Desires for Change
With or without COVID-19 transmission in detention facilities, circumstances surrounding the pandemic add urgency to Islamic State detainees’ desires to change their situation in SDF-run camps and prisons. In an interview with the author on June 22, 2020, General (Ret) Joseph Votel, who served as commander of U.S. Central Command from March 2016 to March 2019, noted that “a COVID outbreak would act as an accelerant in these detainee camps and prisons—making bad situations worse; making it harder to get support where it is needed; and underscoring the narrative that coalition forces are not focused on or able to take care of the people. This would be a powerful narrative for [the Islamic State] to exploit against the international community—and especially the West.”29 With that in mind, this section looks at how detainees have been trying, and may in the case of an outbreak, accelerate their efforts, to resist the SDF by challenging power dynamics, rioting or attempting to escape from detention facilities, and making open calls for help.
Defiance of preventative measures implemented by officials in detention facilities is one way that detainees attempt to change their circumstances. One report noted that detainees flouting COVID-19 guidance in the camps argued that “the virus is part of god’s wrath against infidels.”30 This narrative mimics pandemic-related propaganda produced and distributed by the Islamic State and its sympathizers.31 To an extent, these propaganda products might help strengthen the resolve of enduring members inside and outside detention facilities by disseminating a narrative of persecution and injustice, and encouraging followers to fight back.32 If an outbreak ultimately sickens a significant number of detainees, Islamic State media may be opportunistic in highlighting the situation further, using it to draw sympathy, mobilize recruits, and call for retributive attacks.
Runaways, riots, and breakout attempts were issues for detention facilities before the pandemic,33 and now, uncertainty associated with COVID-19 may create a sense of urgency to escape, motivating some detainees to take matters into their own hands. Historically, “assaulting prisons and inciting prison riots are cornerstones of jihadi operational strategy,” and the Islamic State has leveraged such practices.34 An early 2020 report to Congress noted that “the longer [Islamic State] prisoners are held in SDF prisons, the greater the potential for them to organize breakouts.”35 COVID-19, and issues exacerbated by the pandemic, may already serve as a rallying point for Islamic State detainees. Since the end of March 2020, one prison in Hasaka experienced two riots.36 While speculative, multiple sources raised the idea that stress around COVID-19 played a contributing role in the unrest.37 As the SDF adapts its security presence within detention facilities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the risks of riots and breakout remain high. If an outbreak occurs in the facilities and significantly affects security forces and other administrators in detention sites, further reductions in staffing or substitutions with personnel who have less experience managing camps or prisons, could further amplify these risks.
Detainees with cell phones and internet access, particularly foreign women in the camps, use online platforms to discuss their grievances, make their trying situations known to others, and overtly call for support.i A recent report by the International Crisis Group detailed the role of communications technology in spreading rumors and conspiracies related to COVID-19 in the camps.38 A range of evidence also suggests that detainees use social media and messaging platforms to call on others for support in the form of donating money, carrying out targeted attacks against people accused of spying, or facilitating efforts to smuggle people out of the detention facilities.39 At least anecdotally, there appear to be more posts of this variety surfacing online during the COVID-19 pandemic.40 One researcher from the Rojava Information Center speculates that a reduced guard presence associated with COVID-19 may influence this uptick in online messaging from detention facilities.41 In the camps especially, if an outbreak occurs and the mobility of detainees is severely restricted within a site to prevent the spread of the virus, online activities like those mentioned above may increase.
How COVID-19 Might Bolster Illicit Networks Aiding Detainees
Numerous accounts suggest that a variety of underground networks already exist to facilitate the exchange of money, goods, and services for at least some detainees,42 and COVID-19 may see these networks grow in size, scope, and capability if they are left unchecked. Here, it is interesting to note that ideological and personal sympathies may motivate some people to help detainees, while material incentives might drive others to act. In any case, it is hard to know precisely how many actors are involved in such activities. With this caveat, this section explores how these networks may continue to expand and improve their operations if left unchecked.
Compelling evidence suggests that supportive networks continue to help money flow into, out of, and around detainees in the camps, predominately among foreign women.43 Given the state of the camps and prisons, the relative wealth of some foreign detainees is paradoxical.44 A recent report to Congress citing the DIA notes, “female ISIS members continued to conduct operations—such as attacks against camp security personnel—in Al-Hol using funds received via wire transfers.”45 While some finances sent to the camps hail from inside Syria—evidence of money transfers from Idlib, for instance—other funds come from farther afield.j In a media interview, a man working in the “money transfer facility” in Al-Hol illustrates this trend, noting that “some [Islamic State] women are receiving large amounts of money, exceeding $3,000 monthly, from their relatives and friends in Turkish-backed opposition areas in Idlib and also from abroad, mostly from Turkey and several European countries.”46 At least anecdotally, online fundraising campaigns geared toward garnering material support for detainees, particularly women, children, and foreigners in the camps, appear to have been especially active online during the pandemic.47 If an outbreak occurs, sympathetic networks may be more motivated to support the cause, siphoning more money to the numerous financial webs that raise (or at least claim to raise) funds to help detainees.48
It is noteworthy that some detainees are capable of amassing resources and acquiring contraband in SDF detention facilities, hinting at varying degrees of logistical coordination to facilitate these activities.49 Trends likely differ between sites, as the environment in the camps seems to offer more affordances than the prisons, but security vulnerabilities are systemic.50 As a basic example, the SDF supposedly prohibits cell phones in the annexed section of Al-Hol, where foreign (here meaning non-Syrian and non-Iraqis) Islamic State affiliates are held, and yet, several accounts indicate that people in this area of the camp have phones.51 Other items reportedly smuggled into the camps include knives, hammers, and firearms.52 In the current environment, detainees may be even more motivated to hoard supplies or use backchannels to acquire materials.53 In a media interview, a security officer in Al-Hol explained, “‘Last month [approximately April 2020], we found a big tent used as a warehouse for dozens of 25-litre kerosene containers, to be used in making explosive devices.”54 In June 2020, raids in the foreigners annex of Al-Hol upturned “large quantities of inflammable bottles … consisting of citric acid, alcohol, and other materials.”55 k According to one news report, camp administrators have limited the amount of citric acid coming into the facility as a result of this development.56 In the event of an outbreak at detention facilities, it is possible smugglers might think twice about coming to these sites. However, if the economic situation in Syria continues to inflate the price of goods,57 especially within detention facilities, the potential market for smuggled items like medicine, cash, cell phones, false identity documents, and weapons during an outbreak may increase incentives that draw illicit networks to these facilities.
In addition to financial schemes and an underground market for goods, human smuggling networks, and the stakeholders that enable such activities, are an enduring issue in the prisons and camps. There are security challenges associated with monitoring smuggling routes during the pandemic, which receive more attention in the following section, but it is crucial to recognize that smugglers coming into and out of detention facilities may invite COVID-19-related health risks.58 Despite this reality, the market for human smugglers is unsurprising given that, as has already been noted, there have been numerous reports of breakout attempts, runaways, and riots. A variety of players appear to make these efforts possible, including detainees themselves, financiers, criminal networks, smugglers, and even some security forces, humanitarian workers, and personnel servicing detention facilities.59 One interesting effort promoted on Telegram titled (“Fukku al-Asirat” [Free the Female Prisoners]), which reportedly claims to raise money to help smuggle women and children out of the camps, has alleged links to al-Qa`ida supporters operating in Idlib.60 It is hard to know how many Islamic State detainees escape the detention facilities in this manner due to the surreptitious nature of smuggling, but it does not appear to be a rare occurrence.61 Demonstrating the relevance of this problem, it was reported in mid-June 2020 that three Islamic State-affiliated women had been arrested in northeastern Syria after fleeing SDF custody and moving toward Turkish-occupied areas with the help of “some brokers and ISIS cells in the region.”62 Like other illicit networks, it is hard to know how human smugglers operations could change if there is an outbreak in the detention facilities. Even so, as is the case with networks bringing in materials to the camps, if either the cost or demand for such services rises, the danger of contracting or spreading COVID-19 may not dissuade people from facilitating such activities altogether.
In recent weeks, the SDF and the coalition made a concerted effort to disrupt Islamic State networks in parts of northeastern Syria. General Mazloum told the author that the SDF-led “Deterrence of Terrorism” campaign,l which was launched earlier this month (June 2020), was a response to increased Islamic State activity, particularly in a “corridor” used by the group to go from Syria to Iraq.63
General Mazloum noted, “Because of COVID-19, we limited our movement in this region and [the Islamic State] took advantage of this” by increasing their mobility.64 In conjunction with counterterrorism operations targeting activities in that corridor, the SDF campaign also involved an operation in the annexed section of the Al-Hol camp, which reportedly included raids and measures to collect biometric data and records of people in this area.65 When asked about the factors driving the two-pronged approach to the campaign, General Mazloum told the author that there was “cooperation between some of these cells in the desert where we conducted operation and some of [the Islamic State] supporters inside the camp.”66 According to General Mazloum, the SDF had also received reports that “a group of ISIS fighters are planning to attack Al-Hol camp in order to release some of the important” people inside the facility, and that is why the two operations occurred at approximately the same time.67 Considering the recent gains made against the Islamic State during the Deterrence of Terrorism campaign,68 it is important to recall General Mazloum’s point that if a COVID-19 outbreak occurs in detention facilities, “it will affect and impact work against” the Islamic State as security forces’ efforts to manage the situation in prisons and camps will divert attention and resources away from counterterrorism operations.69
How COVID-19 Could Further Undermine Security to Crime and Corruption
As COVID-19 affects dynamics inside and outside detention facilities, guards and other people managing the facilities may be vulnerable to targeted attacks, forced to limit services and patrols in critical areas, and, as explained below, more likely to work in a corrupt manner. Particularly in combination, these dynamics could greatly exacerbate security vulnerabilities and create an environment that is relatively permissive to the Islamic State and networks abetting the group’s adherents. General Votel noted to the author, “The Islamic State and its networks will only gain from these conditions. They’ve been waiting to make the case that ‘nothing has changed’ and will take this opportunity to recruit and grow their capabilities.”70
Security forces, humanitarian workers, healthcare providers, maintenance crews, and local vendors, and even detainees themselves, may be increasingly vulnerable to attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic. Attacks perpetrated by detainees, including physical violence and property destruction, are already a problem.71 Deteriorating conditions, limited services, and diminished security might make the situation even more volatile.72 In mid-June 2020, hours after security forces in Al-Hol conducted a campaign to search and document foreign detainees living in the annex, officials reportedly discovered the body of an Iraqi refugee “who own[ed] an Internet shop in the camp.”73 The camp administrators reportedly accused Islamic State-affiliated women of attacking the man, and the supposed motivation for the murder was “that [the shop owner] cut off the internet from the entire camp during the hours of the security campaign.”74 In the event that COVID-19 affects detainees, individuals might try to leverage it against guards and aid workers with pointed efforts to expose them to the virus.
Reduced staffing, and other dynamics related to managing COVID-19 in detention facilities such as limited contact between guards and detainees, may make it more difficult for guards and other personnel to adequately service and monitor detention sites. Research by the Rojava Information Center (RIC) raised concerns that the understaffed authorities in Al-Hol, who have been “with a skeleton staff and minimizing rotation in and out of the camps” to prevent the spread of COVID-19, may not be able to sufficiently patrol, monitor, and service certain parts of the camp.75 In turn, this pandemic-prevention measure may further enable smugglers to use clandestine routes to come and go from the facility.76 A RIC researcher expanded on the impact of this situation, noting in early June 2020 that foreigners from the Netherlands, France, Finland, and Switzerland escaped from the camp “over the last month.”77
In terms of the prisons, a quarterly report to Congress by the Pentagon’s inspector general’s office, citing the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, noted that “riots and ongoing small-scale escape attempts underscore the ‘high-impact risk of a mass breakout.’”78 The report continued, adding, “CJTF-OIR said that if the SDF were to reduce its guard force, as it did following the Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria in October 2019, the risk of a breakout would increase significantly.”79 If COVID-19 transmission persists in northeastern Syria and reaches detention facilities, or if other issues divert security forces to other locations in northeastern Syria, reducing staff and/or limiting rotations of people working in the facilities, as it has done in the past, may be a measure the SDF takes to protect its forces. Moreover, if guards are significantly affected by the pandemic in the future, the SDF may have no choice other than maintaining facilities with fewer personnel.
Finally, a range of factors associated with COVID-19 could make some stakeholders working in detention facilities more inclined to behave in corrupt or unethical ways. At least anecdotally, past transgressions tend to involve acts like accepting bribes to permit or facilitate the smuggling of people, goods, or money.80 These problems are not new, but COVID-19’s progressive socio-economic impact on northeastern Syria, “notably in food security and livelihoods,”81 as well as the dynamic in SDF-run detention facilities, may alter some workers’ calculations concerning risky behavior and activities like bribery. People wanting or desperate for cash, for instance, might find more opportunities in the current environment because there is a market for enabling detainees and criminal networks, and possibly less oversight due to the strain on security forces. Sadly, if conditions in northeastern Syria deteriorate, some people working in detention facilities may feel that the personal, short-term benefits of enabling Islamic State detainees and their networks outweigh the long-term costs of their escape and continuity in operations. If a COVID-19 outbreak occurs in a camp or prison, it could create even more favorable conditions for such activities.
Conclusion
Not unlike the ripple effects set off by events like the United States’ drawdown from Syria, and Turkey’s subsequent incursion into Syria in October 2019, which exacerbated humanitarian and security challenges in detention facilities, the pandemic invites a host of dangers to SDF-run camps and prisons. Although transmission among detainees would be a direct threat to health and security, the pandemic also has broader effects that undermine security in indirect ways.
Months before the W.H.O. announced the COVID-19 pandemic, a report citing the DIA noted, “overcrowding and poor access to basic services” in detention facilities “created openings for [Islamic State] supporters to exert control, and enabled [Islamic State] recruiting, crime, corruption, and violence.”82 Similarly, COVID-19 already has, and probably will continue to, limit access to essential goods and services in detention facilities. In the event of an outbreak in one or several detention facilities, conditions may quickly go from bad to worse, further increasing detainees’ desires to alter their circumstances. Possibly more than before, various financial and smuggling networks would likely grow to meet detainees’ demands, enhancing infrastructures that enable groups like the Islamic State and its adherents. Personnel maintaining, servicing, and guarding the detention facilities already experience a variety of pressures associated with COVID-19, which could exacerbate security vulnerabilities and create a permissive environment for illicit networks, criminal activities, and low-level corruption. If the pandemic affects these populations directly, spreading within the facilities, conditions may become even more hospitable to activities that enable Islamic State detainees and their contacts, at least in the short term.
When asked how he saw the security situation changing during the pandemic, particularly as the crisis becomes more acute, General Votel told the author, “The changes in the security situation would not be pronounced in the beginning, but the pandemic could progressively normalize the deteriorating situation of refugees and detainees—taking what was hoped to be a temporary situation and making it a permanent condition. It could normalize violence and replace legitimate supply chains with black markets and smuggling networks. In the long term, these effects would be dramatic. As this develops, it is important to understand the changing situation on the ground and make sure that either the SDF has what it needs to address the situation or conditions exist for NGOs to get on the ground.”83
For now, in addition to building capacity to prevent, detect, and manage COVID-19, policymakers and practitioners should consider looking for ways to manage the indirect, adverse effects the pandemic has on detention facilities. A recent report by the Rojava Information Center highlights some prospective considerations, including reopening border crossings for aid and delivering supplies like testing materials and medical equipment directly to the areas that need it.84
When asked about his outlook on the SDF’s management of sites holding Islamic State detainees in northeastern Syria, General Mazloum told the author, “the current situation regarding [Islamic State] detention facilities and also the camps is going to take a long time to be solved … We will need to work in order to provide better conditions regarding food, security, and other materials to the prisons and the camps.”85 General Mazloum highlighted the ongoing economic crisis and reiterated the point that the support the SDF receives to help with the camps and prisons is “not enough,” noting that the SDF will need additional help from NGOs and other stakeholders to manage and improve the facilities.86
In individual camps and prisons, specific security-related, infrastructural, and procedural developments may enhance the SDF’s ability to manage different sites, so long as the SDF has the means to implement the measures. Efforts like the recent SDF-led “Deterrence of Terrorism” campaign, which involved the creation of a robust database of detainees in the annex of Al-Hol,87 may eventually help manage escape attempts, disrupt criminal activity, and enable stakeholders to process the cases of individual detainees and families. Acquiring technologies to help secure camps and prisons while maintaining a reduced presence may improve guards’ abilities to patrol and monitor sites if there is an outbreak. Although infrastructure-related improvements are hard to implement in the short-term, relocating some of the detainee population to other facilities, when logistically feasible, may help manage tension and resources while disrupting the formation of networks.88
Coherent medium- and long-term responses to the detention of alleged Islamic State-affiliated adults and minors remain necessary.89 Even amidst the backdrop of COVID-19, coalition members must acknowledge that one other way to reduce the burden on detention facilities involves repatriating foreign nationals. On this point, even in the event of an outbreak in these locations, it would be unwise for states to use the pandemic as a rationale for halting repatriation efforts. Instead, countries should consider developing contingency plans to repatriate citizens and alleviate some of the strain that perpetuates humanitarian and security problems.
Finally, as countries look inward to manage their response to COVID-19, political leaders and their constituencies may not want to devote their resources or sympathies toward improving the situation of the detainees. This sentiment is understandable, but apathy toward the issue will not alter the situation’s trajectory nor deliver justice. Instead, it could lead to the proliferation of violent extremist networks. CTC
Substantive Notes
[a] In this context, the term “detainee(s)” refers to the population of alleged Islamic State affiliates, including adults and children, held under guard in SDF-run camps and prisons. The word “detainee” is not universally adopted by stakeholders working on this topic, but this article uses a similar conceptualization about what constitutes a “detainee” in the current situation as the International Crisis Group and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. For more on differing definitions, see “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019,” released February 4, 2020, p. 48.
[b] As a point of clarity, there are generally important distinctions between the terms “jail” and “prison” since they are usually associated with different stages and methods of incarceration. Though imprecise, this article uses the term “prison” to refer to sites where Islamic State detainees are held under lock and key. To offer more context on the various types of facilities, a New York Times report explained that the SDF “has operated an archipelago of about half a dozen ad hoc wartime detention sites for captive ISIS fighters, ranging from former schoolhouses in towns like Ain Issa and Kobani to a former Syrian government prison at Hasaka.” The same article offered estimates on the number of detainees, including approximately 9,000 Syrian or Iraqi men, and 2,000 men from 50 other countries. For more, see Charlie Savage, “The Kurds’ Prisons and Detention Camps for ISIS Members, Explained,” New York Times, October 22, 2019. For a useful resource and map of the sites in northeastern Syria, see Myriam Francois and Azeem Ibrahim, “The Children of ISIS Detainees: Europe’s Dilemma,” Center for Global Policy, June 2020, p. 7.
[c] The same New York Times report as cited in footnote B explains, “The Kurds also operate more than a dozen camps for families displaced by conflict that hold tens of thousands of people, many of them non-Syrian wives and children of Islamic State fighters.” See Savage.
[d] There are few indications that the SDF has the capacity to test the detainee population for COVID-19, so please note that the absence of confirmed cases in detention facilities is not a complete assurance that COVID-19 has not spread in SDF-run prisons and camps holding Islamic State detainees. To see the latest COVID-19 humanitarian update on the Syrian Arab Republic, see United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization.
[e] Syrian Kurdish officials have repeatedly indicated that their force’s capacity to process and manage thousands of supposed Islamic State detainees is strained in a variety of interviews and statements. Liz Sly and Louisa Loveluck, “Kurdish-led forces put down revolt by ISIS detainees at prison in Syria,” Washington Post, March 30, 2020; “SDF: Not enough guards at Syria camp holding Islamic State Families,” Reuters, October 13, 2019; Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Wades Deeper into Detainee Operations in Syria,” New York Times, April 5, 2018. A variety of government documents, research products, and news reports validate such claims, indicating that critical stakeholders in the region, namely the SDF, lack the necessary resources and capabilities to manage Islamic State detainees. John Dunford and Jennifer Cafarella, “ISIS’s Opportunity in Northern Syria’s Detention Facilities and Camps,” Institute for the Study of War, May 13, 2019; Elizabeth Dent, “The Unsuitability of ISIS Detentions in Syria,” Middle East Institute, Policy Paper 2018-5, March 2019; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019,” released November 19, 2019.
[f] In the author’s interview with him, General Mazloum also emphasized the effects of political uncertainty on the SDF’s ability to uphold morale and manage detention facilities in the longer term: “In our fight against ISIS, the most helpful support for us is to admire our current relations. Because the people here still don’t know what the political future is going to be in the region, that makes them feel weaker for the future. Because of the American withdrawal decision for two times, that gave less hope to the people that the bright political future will be reached.” Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[g] Some rudimentary problems, like overcrowding and poor sanitation, stem from the physical unsuitability of facilities holding Islamic State detainees. Though a few detention sites occupy structures designed for the purpose they serve, such as a former government prison in Hasaka, many are makeshift establishments. From schools converted into prisons in Kobane and Ain Issa to a series of emergency and transitional shelters propped up in camps, most sites seem unfit to hold for prolonged periods the populations they do, especially in seasonal weather. Charlie Savage, “The Kurds’ Prisons and Detention Camps for ISIS Members, Explained,” New York Times, October 22, 2019.
[h] In January 2020, the Yaroubia border crossing closed because a U.N. Security Council resolution did not reauthorize its use. Today, this closure affects the movement of aid in northeastern Syria, leading to shortages of medicine and other supplies. Colum Lynch, “Bowing to Russia, U.N. Halts Funding for Pandemic Relief in Northeastern Syria,” Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020; “Syria: Aid Restrictions Hinder Covid-19 Response: UN Should Reauthorize Assistance from Iraq; Damascus Should Allow Passage,” Human Rights Watch, April 28, 2020.
[i] The author has observed that networks of social media accounts that appear to be maintained by women in Kurdish-run detention camps manifest on platforms including Telegram, Facebook, and Instagram. These users share a range of content including pictures of their living conditions, meals, and children, as well as commentary about events inside and outside the camps. Even though it is difficult to fact-check every post, some appear to be less founded than others. An article by Elizabeth Tsurkov illustrates this phenomenon with anecdotes about women in Al-Hol, noting, “Supporters of the jihadist organisation also routinely spread false stories inside Al-Hol and on the social media platform Telegram, including of supposed crimes by the camp’s management: tales of organ harvesting, murder, mutilation, even of the kidnapping of children for recruitment into the ranks of the Turkey-based Kurdish PKK militia, which is linked to the SDF.” Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Uncertainty, violence, and the fear of fostering extremism in Syria’s al-Hol camp,” New Humanitarian, August 27, 2019.
[j] A report citing the DIA noted, “residents of the camps have received financial support from external ISIS supporters outside of Syria.” “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019,” released February 4, 2020, p. 47. For more on this phenomenon, see also “Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2020, pp. 13-14; Hisham Arafat, “Remittances for ISIS women in northeast Syria’s al-Hawl camp trigger imminent resurgence of the jihadist group,” North Press Agency, May 31, 2020; Roj Mousa and Mohammad Habash, “Documents – Money orders from Idlib to ISIS familiar in al-Hawl camp, northeastern Syria,” North Press Agency, February 26, 2020; Aaron Zelin, “Wilayat al-Hawl: ‘Remaining’ and Incubating the Next Islamic State Generation,” Washington Institute, October 2019.
[k] Citric acid has many uses, but it is also recognized as a common precursor for creating improvised explosives. “Respond and Mitigate: Bomb Threat Standoff Distances,” Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, accessed June 18, 2020.
[l] According to the official Twitter account of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the first phase of the “Deterrence of Terrorism” campaign against Islamic State cells was completed by June 10, 2020, and resulted in the arrest of 110 members of sleeper cells and the clearing of more than 150 villages and farms in southern Hasaka and the countryside of Deir ez-Zor. The campaign began in early June 2020. See Coordination & Military Ops Center – SDF, “#Deterrence_of_Terrorism operations continues for the sixth consecutive day …,” Twitter, June 9, 2020, and Coordination & Military Ops Center – SDF, “3SDF and the #International_Coalition complete the first phase of #Deterrence_of_Terrorism against #ISIS cells …,” Twitter, June 10, 2020.
Citations
[1] “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp,” Rojava Information Center, May 21, 2020; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, p. 13; Lara Seligman, “U.S. military fears pandemic could lead to ISIS resurgence in Syria,” Politico, April 2, 2020; “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Group, April 7, 2020; Eric Schmitt, “ISIS Prisoners Threaten U.S. Mission in Northeastern Syria,” New York Times, May 25, 2020.
[2] For a primer on the configuration of the SDF, see Ruby Mellen, “A brief history of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led alliance that helped the U.S. defeat the Islamic State,” Washington Post, October 7, 2020. For added context, see also Carla Humud and Christopher Blanchard, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response,” Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2020.
[3] See Mazloum Abdi, “Due to great efforts made by our forces & swift intervention against the insubordination of ISIS detainees inside one prison, we were able to avoid catastrophe & take control …,” Twitter, March 30, 2020; Sirwan Kajjo, “Kurdish Officials, Rights Groups Concerned Coronavirus Will Spread Among IS Prisoners in Syria,” Voice of America, March 31, 2020; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020; and Elizabeth Dent, “The Unsuitability of ISIS Detentions in Syria,” Middle East Institute, Policy Paper 2018-5, March 2019.
[4] “Press Release: Coalition provides COVID-19 equipment in NE Syria,” Operation Inherent Resolve, April 4, 2020; “Syrian Arab Republic: COVID-19, Humanitarian Update No. 12,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization, June 14, 2020; Mohammad Abdulssattar Ibrahim and Will Christou, “Overcrowded prisons and camps in northeast Syria raise rears of COVID-19 Outbreak,” Syria Direct, May 5, 2020.
[5] Ibrahim and Christou; Kajjo; “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East;” “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” United Nations Human Rights Council, September 2019; “Women and Children First: Repatriating the Westerners Affiliated with ISIS,” International Crisis Group, November 18, 2019.
[6] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum, June 21, 2020.
[7] “W.H.O. Failed to Tell Syrian Kurds of Their First Coronavirus Death,” New York Times, April 17, 2020. For other considerations, see also Will Todman, “Assad attempts to weaponize COVID-19 in Syria,” Hill, May 27, 2020. To see the latest COVID-19 humanitarian update on the Syrian Arab Republic, see United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization as well as Ignacio Miguel Delgado Culebras, “Journalists in Syria tell CPJ of fear of humanitarian catastrophe if COVID-19 spreads,” Committee to Protect Journalists, June 15, 2020.
[9] Schmitt, “ISIS Prisoners Threaten U.S. Mission in Northeastern Syria.” Please note, though the most recent figures on confirmed COVID-19 cases are difficult to find, the Rojava Information Center offers useful updates on some of its reports. See “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp;” Kajjo; and “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East.”
[10] Schmitt, “ISIS Prisoners Threaten U.S. Mission in Northeastern Syria;” Seligman.
[11] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum, June 21, 2020.
[12] “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020; “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp.”
[13] John Dunford and Jennifer Cafarella, “ISIS’s Opportunity in Northern Syria’s Detention Facilities and Camps,” Institute for the Study of War, May 13, 2019; Dent.
[14] Dent; Schmitt, “Pentagon Wades Deeper into Detainee Operations in Syria;” Ellen Francis, “Syrian Kurdish official warns of Islamic State jail break,” Reuters, October 10, 2019; Liz Sly and Louisa Loveluck, “Kurdish-led forces put down revolt by ISIS detainees at prison in Syria,” Washington Post, March 30, 2020; Dunford and Cafarella; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019,” released November 19, 2019; “SDF: Not enough guards at Syria camp holding Islamic State Families,” Reuters, October 13, 2019.
[15] For a poignant illustration of phenomenon, see Elizabeth Tsurkov and Dareen Khalifa, “An Unnerving Fate for the Families of Syria’s Northeast,” Sada Feature, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 31, 2020.
[16] “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, pp. 49-59; Joseph Votel and Elizabeth Dent, “The Danger of Abandoning Our Partners,” Atlantic, October 8, 2019.
[17] For example, a report to Congress notes, “USAID reported that during the Turkish incursion in October, all 13,000 residents of the Ayn Issa camp near the Turkey border fled as hostilities drew near.” For more information, see “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019,” released February 4, 2020, p. 47. See also Tsurkov and Khalifa.
[18] For more on how staffing configuration may change over time for security forces and NGO workers, see Tsurkov and Khalifa.
[19] Tsurkov and Khalifa; Votel and Dent; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019,” released November 19, 2019, p. 8; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, pp. 49-59; “SDF: Not enough guards at Syria camp holding Islamic State Families.”
[20] “Syria: Aid Restrictions Hinder Covid-19 Response: UN Should Reauthorize Assistance from Iraq; Damascus Should Allow Passage,” Human Rights Watch, April 28, 2020; Todman.
[21] “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East;” “Syria: Aid Restrictions Hinder Covid-19 Response;” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; World Health Organization.
[22] Fran Equiza, “Statement from UNICEF Representative in Syria: Interruption to key water station in the northeast of Syria put 460,000 people at risk as efforts to ramp up to prevent the spread of Coronavirus disease,” UNICEF, March 23, 2020; “The Coronavirus Crisis in North & East Syria in Numbers,” Rojava Information Center, April 5, 2020; “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp.”
[23] “Concerns mount over COVID-19 response in northern Syria,” Medicins Sans Frontieres, April 22, 2020; “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East;” Ibrahim and Christou.
[24] Kajjo; “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East.”
[26] Ibid.; “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp;” “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East.”
[27] “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp.”
[28] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum, June 21, 2020.
[29] Author interview, General (Ret) Joseph Votel, June 22, 2020.
[31] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Islamic State Editorial on the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi blog, March 19, 2020. See also Chelsea Daymon and Meili Criezisin, “Pandemic Narratives: Pro-Islamic State Media and the Coronavirus,” CTC Sentinel 13:6 (2020).
[33] John Dunford and Brandon Wallace, “ISIS Prepares for Breakout in Prisons and Camps,” Institute for the Study of War, September 23, 2019; Tsurkov and Khalifa.
[36] Schmitt, “ISIS Prisoners Threaten U.S. Mission in Northeastern Syria.” For more on the security challenges in the prisons, see “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, pp. 57-59.
[37] “Coronavirus crisis in North and East Syria: 22 April Update,” Rojava Information Center, April 22, 2020; Schmitt, “ISIS Prisoners Threaten U.S. Mission in Northeastern Syria.”
[38] “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East.”
[39] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center, June 4, 2020; Anne Speckhard and Molly Ellenberg, “Inside the Sisterhood Springing Jihadis From Jail,” Daily Beast, May 24, 2020; “Episode 80: Infiltrating the ISIS Bride Telegram Networks,” Popular Front podcast, June 18, 2020; Switched, “On the distribution of donations to the sisters in al Hawl and Ruj,” Twitter, June 22, 2020; Switched, “A sister in al Hawl refugee camp pleads for help in English,” Twitter, June 21, 2020.
[40] The author of this article observed this trend while conducting research for the following article: Audrey Alexander, “‘Help for Sisters’: A Look at Crowdfunding Campaigns with Potential Links to Terrorist and Criminal Networks,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, June 11, 2020.
[41] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center.
[42] Dunford and Wallace; Richard Hall, “ISIS Suspects in Syrian camp raise thousand through online crowdfunding campaign,” Independent, July 25, 2019; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “‘Free the Female Prisoners’: A Campaign to Free Women Held in SDF Camps,” Aymenn Jawad Al- Tamimi blog, October 15, 2019; Aaron Zelin, “Wilayat al-Hawl: ‘Remaining’ and Incubating the Next Islamic State Generation,” Washington Institute, October 2019.
[43] For more on this phenomenon, see “Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, January 20, 2020, pp. 13-14.
[47] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center. The author of this article also observed this trend conducting research for the following article: Alexander, “‘Help for Sister.’” For more about various schemes to support detainees, see Dunford and Wallace; Hall, “ISIS Suspects in Syrian camp raise thousand through online crowdfunding campaign;” Al-Tamimi, “‘Free the Female Prisoners;’” Zelin; “Turkish Woman Promotes Fundraising Effort for Widows of ‘Martyrs,’ Children, Prisoners in Turkey and in Al-Hol Camp in Syria,” MEMRI, January 28, 2020.
[48] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center.
[49] Richard Hall, “Tunnels, knives and riots: This Syrian camp holding thousands of ISIS wives is at a breaking point,” Independent, December 9, 2019; Zelin; Gina Vale, “Women in Islamic State: From Caliphate to Camps,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2019, p. 6; Arafat.
[50] Arafat; “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East,” International Crisis Croup, July 31, 2019.
[51] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center; “Episode 80: Infiltrating the ISIS Bride Telegram Networks;” Arafat; Vivian Yee, “Guns, Filth and ISIS: Syrian Camp Is ‘Disaster in the Making,’” New York Times, September 3, 2019; “Women and Children First: Repatriating the Westerners Affiliated with ISIS.”
[52] Yee; “Women and Children First: Repatriating the Westerners Affiliated with ISIS.”
[53] “Virus Fears Spread at Camps for ISIS Families in Syria’s North East.”
[54] Arafat. See also “Incendiary devices’ warehouse found in al-Hol camp,” Hawar News Agency, June 13, 2020.
[55] “Iraqi refugee found dead in al-Hawl camp, Syria’s Hasakah,” North Press Agency, June 11, 2020. See also “Cache of highly flammable materials found in al-Hol camp,” Hawar News Agency, April 28, 2020.
[56] “Iraqi refugee found dead in al-Hawl camp, Syria’s Hasakah.”
[58] “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp.”
[59] “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019,” released February 4, 2020, p. 47; Arafat. See also Coordination & Military Ops Center – SDF, “Today, #SDF & @coalition detained a senior #ISIS smuggler in #Dashisha …,” Twitter, December 4, 2019; “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East.”
[60] Al-Tamimi, “‘Free the Female Prisoners;’” Zelin; Dunford and Wallace.
[61] Ahmed Mohammed, “Who Smuggles ISIS women from al-Hol camp? Here is irrefutable evidence,” Hawar News Agency, March 21, 2020; “The Coronavirus Crisis in North & East Syria in Numbers;” Nisan Ahmado and Mutlu Civiroglu, “IS Foreign Women Smuggled Out of Northeastern Syria Camp,” Voice of America, October 1, 2019; Vera Mironova, “Everyone talks about Western #Alhol females, but non Western females are a bigger issue …,” Twitter, June 17, 2020; Al-Tamimi, “‘Free the Female Prisoners;’” Devorah Margolin, Joana Cook, and Charlie Winter, “In Syria, the Women and Children of ISIS Have Been Forgotten,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2019.
[62] “Three ISIS women arrested trying to enter Turkish-occupied areas,” Hawar News Agency, June 14, 2020. For examples of other recent efforts to escape, see also Guy Van Vlierden, “Confirmed by multiple sources that two former #IslamicState women from #Belgium & #France have managed to escape from the #SDF detainee camp in #Roj, #Syria …,” Twitter, April 7, 2020; “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center.
[63] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[64] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[65] “Syrian-Kurdish Led Administration Makes Database for Foreign ISIS families,” North Press Agency, June 10, 2020.
[66] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[67] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[68] Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “SDF detains 110 suspects in anti-ISIS campaign,” Kurdistan24, June 10, 2020; “Campaign to comb, organize al-Hol camp ends 2 days after its launch,” Hawar News Agency, June 12, 2020; “Incendiary devices’ warehouse found in al-Hol camp.”
[69] Author interview, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[70] Author interview, General (Ret) Joseph Votel, June 22, 2020.
[71] Vale; Zelin; “Camp,” Caki Blog associated with Rojava Information Center; “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, pp. 49-59; “Another crime in al-Hol camp, Iraqi refugee killed,” Hawar News Agency, May 28, 2020.
[72] “Operation Inherent Resolve, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-March 31, 2020,” released May 13, 2020, pp. 49-59; “Syria: Aid Restrictions Hinder Covid-19 Response.”
[73] “Iraqi refugee found dead in al-Hawl camp, Syria’s Hasakah,” North Press Agency, June 11, 2020.
[74] Ibid.
[75] “Briefing: Coronavirus risks and preventative measures in Hol camp;” “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center.
[76] Ibid.
[77] “Camp,” Caki blog associated with Rojava Information Center.
[80] Arafat; Zelin; “Squaring the Circles in Syria’s North East;” Dunford and Wallace.
[81] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. For more insight on the economic impact of COVID-19 in northeastern Syria, see also “Interview: Workers discuss the economic impact of Corona in NES,” Rojava Information Center, June 6, 2020.
[83] Author interview, General (Ret) Joseph Votel, June 22, 2020.
[84] “The Coronavirus Crisis in North & East Syria in Numbers.”
[85] Author interview, General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[86] Author interview, General Mazloum Abdi, June 21, 2020.
[87] “Syrian-Kurdish Led Administration Makes Database for Foreign ISIS families.”
[89] Dent; Brian Michael Jenkins, “Options for Dealing with Islamic State Foreign Fighters Currently Detained in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 12:5 (2019).
