The Evolution of the Islamist Terror Threat Landscape in Germany Since 2020

Abstract: Today, Germany is facing heightened security alerts due to Islamist terror threats at Christmas markets in the winter, Carnival parades in the spring, public festivals, pedestrian areas, protests, and at Israeli diplomatic missions and Jewish institutions. Over the last five years, authorities have seen younger perpetrators, new online spaces for radicalization, and new targets. Attackers are using familiar methods of attack and declaring support to well-known groups such as the Islamic State. This article provides an overview of the key developments in the Islamist terror threat in Germany between 2020 and 2025 by taking an in-depth look at all nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks and the 20 publicly reported thwarted attack plots during that time. It concludes with an analysis of the five most notable trends according to the data regarding attack vectors, terrorist profiles, propaganda and recruitment, the impact of October 7, and the role of foreign intelligence.

Since the October 7, 2023, attack against Israel, German authorities have warned of an increased Islamist threat in Germany. However, even prior to Hamas’ terrorist attack, Germany had seen a resurgence in major Islamist terrorist incidents such as in Dresden, Nuremburg, and Duisburg. As Minister for the Interior Nancy Faeser stated in the Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution for the year 2023: “Since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the threat posed by Islamist terrorism has increased further. But even before that the threat level was high.”¹

So, what does this threat actually look like in Germany? How has the threat landscape evolved between 2020 and May 2025? What are the notable trends that can be seen in Islamist terror attacks as well as interrupted Islamist terror plots in Germany? Who are the perpetrators behind the attacks and are there commonalities across their radicalization processes? To find answers to these questions, this article is divided into three parts: The first section will analyze the nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany between January 2020 and May 2025.^a To broaden the base of information, the second part will look at the 20 publicly disclosed failed Islamist attack plots in Germany during the same timeframe.^b The third section identifies key trends based on the information collected for all 29 attacks and attack plots detailed in the previous two sections. The piece ends with some concluding observations.

Part One: Islamist Terrorist Attacks in Germany Since 2020
Between 2020 and May 2025, there have been nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany. As a foundation for the analysis of key trends and developments in the Islamist terrorist threat landscape in Germany, this article will first explore each of the attacks, looking at the target, the perpetrator, their radicalization, affiliation with any known terrorist groups, the weapon used, the subsequent trial, and any other notable information.

The April 2020 Waldkraiburg Terrorist Attack
In April 2020, a series of attacks targeted Turkish-owned businesses and a mosque in the Bavarian town of Waldkraiburg.² The perpetrator, Muharrem D.,^c a 27-year-old German citizen of Kurdish descent, carried out arson attacks against multiple locations including a Turkish supermarket, hair salon, kebab shop, pizzeria, and a local mosque. Although no fatalities occurred, four individuals suffered from smoke inhalation injuries during the fire. The perpetrator was found guilty of serious arson, 31 counts of attempted murder, and planning further attacks with firearms and explosives—including on the Turkish General Consulate in Munich.³ He was sentenced to 9.5 years imprisonment and transferred to psychiatric confinement.⁴ During the trial, Muharrem D. voiced remorse saying: “I really regret what I did. It was just tunnel vision.”⁵

The court determined that Muharrem D. suffered from schizophrenia, with the presiding judge concluding that “without the schizophrenia, the attacks by the accused would have been unthinkable.”⁶ However, the court also emphasized that his jihadi radicalization was an equally necessary component,⁷ noting that the defendant saw himself as an Islamic State member.⁸ In 2017, Muharrem D. started becoming a follower of an Islamic State worldview. In addition, he developed a lasting hatred of the Turkish state and “all people of Turkish heritage”⁹ in connection with his perception of the actions of the Turkish state in the Syrian conflict and its dealings with certain preachers in Turkey. The attacker for these reasons specifically decided to target people of Turkish descent.¹⁰ He had initially planned to travel to Syria but was unsuccessful and instead started to plan his attacks in Germany.¹¹

The terrorist attacks in Waldkraiburg highlights two persistent issues that security agencies have been confronting in recent years. One aspect is the role of mental health in cases involving jihadi ideology. Secondly, the use of explosives in Waldkraiburg for arson attacks stood out from the more frequently employed tactics of knife or vehicle attacks, emphasizing the need to focus on suspicious purchases of other dual use items as well.

The August 2020 Attack on Berlin’s A100 Autobahn
On August 18, 2020, a 30-year-old Iraqi man, Sarmad A., deliberately rammed his black Opel Astra into three motorcyclists on the Berlin highway, causing severe injuries to three people while three others sustained minor injuries.¹² After the crashes, the attacker reportedly shouted “Allahu Akbar,” claimed he was a “soldier of God,” and warned “nobody come closer or else you’ll die.”¹³ He also rolled out a prayer rug on the street and started praying.¹⁴ Prior to the attack, Sarmad A. had posted photographs of his vehicle on Facebook along with religious phrases and references to martyrdom.¹⁵ The subsequent investigation, however, revealed a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.¹⁶ While the attack was listed as a jihadi attack in the 2020 Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution,¹⁷ the court later stated that the attacker was mainly acting in a state of psychosis with only minor religious motives.¹⁸

The attacker had applied for asylum in Germany but was rejected and had remained in the country under a “tolerated stay” provision.^{19 d e} He was known to authorities due to prior psychological problems, which led to incidents of physical violence.²⁰ The attacker reportedly told a doctor after his arrest that an “angel of death” had driven the car and that the “angel’s foot had been on earth and his head under the throne of the seventh heaven,”²¹ suggesting religious delusions rather than coherent ideological motivation.²² The incident was treated as attempted murder and not an Islamist attack.²³ Sarmad A. was judged to be exempt from criminal responsibility because of his mental state at the time of the attack.^f Instead of a prison sentence, he was committed to a psychiatric facility as the court stated that he was still a danger to society.²⁴

The case of Sarmad A. again highlights the difficulty in determining the role of religious extremism in lone-actor attacks when the perpetrator simultaneously suffers from a mental illness. As noted, after an initial suspicion of a primary ideologically motivated terrorist attack, investigations into the perpetrators background showed that his schizophrenia was the primary driver.

The October 2020 Dresden Terrorist Attack
On October 4, 2020, 20-year-old Abdullah Al H. H. attacked two men in downtown Dresden, who were targeted specifically because of their sexual orientation.²⁵ This Islamist terrorist attack resulted in the death of one individual and serious injury to another. The two victims were a gay couple from North Rhine-Westphalia who were visiting Dresden.²⁶ The perpetrator attacked both men with two knives.²⁷ According to the psychiatrist who questioned Abdullah Al H. H., he planned to die as a martyr but saw it as a sign from God that he initially was able to escape, hoping to now prepare for “bigger things” either by traveling to Syria or killing more “unbelievers.”²⁸ Following a forensic investigation, he was arrested two weeks after the attack.²⁹

The attacker had arrived in Germany in 2015 from Syria seeking asylum.³⁰ Abdullah Al H. H. was not raised in a strict religious household.³¹ During the trial, he stated that his intention of coming to Germany had not been to carry out terrorist attack and that he had only “found Islam and his religious duties” after he had settled in Germany.^{32 g} Starting in 2017, according to the court psychiatrist, Abdullah Al H. H. had become “addicted” to jihadi content online.³³ He had little prior religious education and only few social contacts at the time.³⁴ In particular, he watched speeches by Sheikh Khalid Mohammad Hamad Al Rashid.^h Because of his own “sinful” behavior, Abdullah Al H. H. became afraid of “hell” and thought a suicide attack would bring “him to the right path again.”³⁵ He also joined a chat group of Islamic State followers,³⁶ became interested in building explosive belts, and began close communications with one individual who encouraged him in his plan to commit a violent attack. When he also started posting jihadi content on Facebook, he was classified as a “Gefährder” (potential threat to public safety) by security services.ⁱ

After his arrest in 2017, Abdullah Al H. H. was convicted in November 2018 of soliciting support for a foreign terrorist organization.^{37 j} He was released after a three-year sentence from juvenile detention just days before the attack on September 29. At the time of his release, he was under observation by the authorities, had to check in three times a week with the local police,³⁸ and had attended 10 consultations with the organization Violence Prevention Network in 2020.³⁹ The Saxonian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, however, did not surveil him around the clock, and he was able to purchase his weapon for the attack: kitchen knives. After his arrest, Abdullah Al H. H. told the psychiatrist that he “plans to kill more people when he is released.”⁴⁰ He was sentenced to life imprisonment in May 2021.⁴¹

The terrorist attack in Dresden was the first recorded Islamist attack in Germany targeting someone who is gay. Overall, the attack underlines three key concerns for security services in Germany: Abdullah Al H. H. did not arrive as a radicalized jihadi but was radicalized online by Islamic State propaganda and an individual while he was already living in Germany. In addition, his attack was an example of how some groups—in this case, a same-sex couple—can be singled out as part of the overall category of “unbelievers.” Finally, Abdullah Al H. H.’s case raises questions of how to deal with dangerous individuals who are released from jail after serving their sentences. While he was prohibited after his release from owning or carrying stabbing weapons,⁴² this excluded everyday items such as kitchen knives, which were used in the attack. Police check-ins, counseling, and partial surveillance did not prevent him from being able to carry out the attack.

The November 2021 ICE Train Attack
In November 2021, the 27-year-old Abdalrahman A. launched a knife attack against four passengers aboard an ICE high-speed train traveling from Passau to Nuremberg in southern Germany.⁴³ The assailant was Palestinian, had lived in Syria, and came to Germany in 2014 as a refugee where he was granted asylum in 2016. During the attack, which was carried out with a 3.3-inch pocketknife, he attacked four male travelers, inflicting severe injuries on three of them. Directly after the attack, he reportedly told police “he was sick” and later added that he felt like he was being followed. After a two-month trial and investigations, the court rejected defense claims of paranoid schizophrenia and unaccountability. While a first assessment by a court psychiatrist had supported the claim, three separate reports later found no evidence of schizophrenia or any psychiatric condition.⁴⁴ Instead, the court ruled that the perpetrator was fully aware of his actions and was “simulating a mental illness.”⁴⁵ The court furthermore concluded that there was sufficient evidence of jihadi motivation behind the attack as investigators found Islamic State propaganda videos in his possession⁴⁶ and ideological posts he had shared on Facebook.⁴⁷ Abdalrahman A. also attended a mosque in Passau that is considered salafi by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution.⁴⁸ Investigators did not, however, find any direct communications with known jihadi groups such as the Islamic State.⁴⁹ The judge sentenced Abdalrahman A. to a 14-year prison sentence for attempted murder and aggravated assault.⁵⁰

The case highlighted three recurring challenges for German authorities: First, the attack was conducted with a small and easily accessible weapon, a pocketknife, which is difficult to restrict. Second, the attacker acted alone and never became a member of a terrorist organization, making his radicalization process much harder to uncover. And finally, the case was another example of the challenge of distinguishing between on the one hand genuine mental illnesses of individuals as the primary driver of the attack and on the other hand religious extremism.^k

The April 2023 Duisburg Double Attack
While there were no executed Islamist terror plots recorded in 2022, another terrorist attack occurred in 2023 when a single 27-year-old perpetrator carried out two separate knife attacks in Duisburg, North Rhine-Westphalia.⁵¹ On April 9 and April 18, the attacker, Maan D., killed one person and inflicted life-threatening injuries on four others across both incidents. He used a store bought 7.8-inch kitchen knife to kill “unbelievers”⁵² and targeted individuals who had been drinking alcohol, were listening to music, and working out in a gym.⁵³ According to security services, the attacker had fled his home country (Syria) in 2015 in order to avoid conscription and was granted refugee status in Germany in 2016. Maan D. had grown up in a religious family but only started consuming salafi and particularly Islamic State propaganda in 2020. Trial evidence showed that in 2023, he started seeing it as his duty to kill male “unbelievers” in Germany and was anticipating dying as a martyr during police fire.⁵⁴ According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the attacker explicitly claimed that he had acted on behalf of the Islamic State.⁵⁵ Maan D. confessed to all of his attacks, showed no remorse, and threatened further crimes during the trial.⁵⁶ He was sentenced to life in prison^l with particular severity of guilt^m and additionally ordered preventive detention if he is ever released.ⁿ

The Duisburg attack featured an easily accessible weapon, a kitchen knife. Maan D. attacked the victims on the street and at the gym, two soft targets that unlike large gatherings at Christmas markets or concert and sport venues are not heavily guarded. Finally, the perpetrator’s radicalization process emphasizes the continued influence of the Islamic State’s propaganda despite its territorial defeat in the Middle East.

The May 2024 Mannheim Market Square Attack
On May 31, 2024, a 25-year-old Afghan national carried out a knife attack on Mannheim’s marketplace, targeting anti-Islam activist Michael Stürzenberger^o during preparations for a right-wing demonstration. The assailant^p also stabbed six individuals, including a 29-year-old police officer who later died from his injuries.⁵⁷ Eyewitness accounts and CCTV footage revealed the perpetrator specifically sought out Stürzenberger—a figure known for organizing “anti-Islamization” rallies—before turning his 11.8-inch hunting knife on intervening officers and bystanders.⁵⁸

The attacker, Sulaiman A., came to Germany as a minor in 2013, and while he was not granted asylum, a halt on deportations for minors to Afghanistan allowed him to stay in Germany.⁵⁹ He was not known to security services prior to the attack and was seen as “well integrated” according to members of the community.⁶⁰ During the trial, Sulaiman A. recounted that he started turning to radical Islamist online preachers on YouTube in 2022 and started following links to Telegram channels. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, he became more and more interested in the Taliban government, but after a while, he decided they were not strict enough in their enforcement of ‘Islamic’ law and started turning toward the Islamic State instead.⁶¹ Over Telegram, he was encouraged by a “religious teacher” in his plans for the attack.⁶² He also stated that his “life changed when this Gaza war started”⁶³ and that “he cried every day” after seeing images of dead men women and children on Telegram.⁶⁴ During the trial, he also recounted the attack itself.⁶⁵ After the Mannheim attack, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in Yemen, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), declared Sulaiman A. a hero for defending Islam in its online publication Inspire Guide 8.⁶⁶

The knife attack in Mannheim had four important characteristics: First, Sulaiman A. was unknown to security services prior to the attack and therefore not under surveillance by law enforcement. In addition, he specifically targeted a right-wing and anti-Islam activist instead of pursuing a more general attack on “unbelievers.” Third, the stabbing in Mannheim sparked a larger debate about potentially harsher anti-immigration measures. And finally, though Sulaiman A. was not affiliated with AQAP and had primarily consumed Islamic State propaganda, his attack was used as propaganda by AQAP to inspire others with a similar ideology.

The Solingen August 2024 Festival Attack
On August 23, 2024, 26-year-old Isaa Al H. launched a knife attack at a public festival celebrating Solingen’s 650th anniversary.⁶⁷ The attacker was a Syrian citizen who had come to Germany in 2022 to claim asylum.^q He was not known to any security services as an Islamist extremist.⁶⁸ In the attack the assailant killed three people and wounded eight others.⁶⁹ Investigations uncovered that he had been in contact with an Islamic State member over a messaging app, who encouraged him to carry out an attack in the name of the group.⁷⁰ Isaa Al H. recorded videos of his loyalty pledge and an announcement of his attack and sent these videos to his contact prior to carrying out his plan.⁷¹ The Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility in a statement to the Düsseldorf police,⁷² characterizing the perpetrator as a “soldier of the Islamic State” who targeted “Christians” in revenge for “Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere.”⁷³ The attack in Solingen is the first terrorist attack in Germany for which the Islamic State has officially claimed responsibility since the truck attack on the Christmas market at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin in 2016.⁷⁴ The attack was later celebrated in Islamic State Khorasan (ISK’s) propaganda publication “Voice of Khurasan.”⁷⁵ The trial against Isaa Al H. started on May 27, 2025, and he admitted to the knife attack saying: “I have brought heavy guilt upon myself. I am ready to accept the verdict,” further adding “I killed innocents, not unbelievers.”⁷⁶

The attack in Solingen sparked major debates in Germany regarding weapon laws and gaps in immigration procedures. In response, the government coalition presented and passed a security package⁷⁷ in parliament that created “knife free zones” in more public spaces and on public transportation and also gave law enforcement the ability to check for knives.⁷⁸ A second aspect of the debate in Germany focused on Isaa Al H.’s failed deportation to Bulgaria. This led to new legislation giving the Ministry for Migration and Refugees access to biometric data to check the identity of people seeking protection status. The German government also decided to end social security benefits for people—except minors—where it was determined that another European country had responsibility for them and had agreed to take them back.⁷⁹

The attack in Solingen showed how terrorist groups such as the Islamic State not only continue to inspire individuals but are also still pursuing direct connections and outreach through operatives in Germany. The target this time was a large gathering of people, similar to Christmas markets or Carnival parades. As noted, the attack led to the adoption of legislation measures relating to immigration and the threat posed by knives.

The February 2025 Munich Trade Union Protest Demonstration Attack
In February 2025 just before the federal elections, 24-year-old suspected jihadi extremist Farhad N. drove a Mini Cooper into a ver.di trade union march near Munich Hauptbahnhof (main train station).⁸⁰ Munich was hosting the Munich Security Conference at that time, investigations so far, however, have not shown a connection to the event.⁸¹ The vehicle-ramming killed a woman and her two-year-old daughter, while injuring at least 54 protesters.⁸² Farhad N. had come to Germany in 2016 as an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan seeking asylum.⁸³ While his asylum claim was denied in 2017 and an appeal rejected it again in 2020,⁸⁴ he was allowed to remain in Germany under a “tolerated stay” provision^r because he was finishing his education at the time.⁸⁵ Munich authorities later granted Farhad N. temporary residency in 2021 under humanitarian provisions following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.⁸⁶ He worked as a store detective⁸⁷ and was also a bodybuilder and fitness influencer on Instagram and TikTok.⁸⁸ The public prosecutor said in a statement shortly after the attack that investigations suggested an Islamist religious motive, but that there were no indications that Farhad N. had been a member of the Islamic State or in direct contact with a terrorist organization.⁸⁹ In reaction to the attack, Bavaria’s state premier, Markus Söder, called on the German government to revisit the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban to ensure deportations for Afghans who have committed crimes in Germany.⁹⁰

The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office obtained a second arrest warrant for Farhad N.—replacing the previous one from February 2025—which states he is “strongly suspected of two counts of murder (…), 54 counts of attempted murder and bodily harm (…), and dangerous interference with road traffic.”⁹¹ He remains in pre-trial detention. While more details and evidence—especially regarding Farhad N.’s radicalization process—are still unknown prior to court proceedings, the attack in Munich shows commonalities with other jihadi attacks in Germany. As in the case of the attacks in Mannheim and Solingen, the perpetrator was not on the radar of any federal or state level security services. Furthermore, vehicle ramming, in addition to knife attacks, has been another commonly used tactic by terrorists in Germany. While there were many changes regarding protection against vehicle ramming made after the Breitscheidplatz attack in Berlin in 2016, softer targets such as the union protest march in Munich remain difficult to protect.⁹² Finally, the attack in Munich and the political reactions following it, are another example of the effect that terrorist attacks by individuals who applied for asylum in Germany have on the country’s public immigration debate.

The February 2025 Berlin Holocaust Memorial Attack
On the evening of February 21, 2025, an attack occurred at Germany’s central Holocaust memorial in Berlin, resulting in life-threatening injuries to a Spanish tourist.⁹³ The victim was attacked from behind with a knife while walking through the memorial.⁹⁴ After the attack, the perpetrator fled the scene but was apprehended by police three hours later. The attacker was identified as a 19-year-old Syrian refugee, Wassim Al M.,⁹⁵ who was living in refugee housing in Leipzig.⁹⁶ He had come to Germany in 2023 as an unaccompanied minor. In his backpack, police found a prayer rug, a Koran, a note with Qur’an verses, and the suspected weapon.⁹⁷ The Federal Prosecutor’s Office stated that he had acted out of a radical Islamist and antisemitic conviction and shared the ideology of the Islamic State.⁹⁸ A joint statement from the police and the Berlin public prosecutor’s office stated: “According to initial investigations and current information, there appears to be connections to the Middle East conflict.”⁹⁹ The suspect reportedly had been planning for several weeks to “kill Jews.”¹⁰⁰ After initial investigations, there was no evidence to suggest a direct connection to a terrorist organization or a larger network and no initial signs of mental illness.¹⁰¹ Wassim Al M. was also—according to early investigation’s results—not known as an Islamist extremist to security services.¹⁰² An arrest warrant for Wasim Al M. was issued on February 28, 2025, accusing him of malicious murder, and he was ordered to pre-trial detention.¹⁰³

The attack at the Holocaust memorial underlined three key trends that have emerged for jihadi attacks in Germany: The perpetrator was young (19 years old), he was not officially affiliated with a broader terrorist organization and network, and he specifically chose a location to target Jewish people.

All of the executed terrorist attacks provide important insights into the trajectory of the threat landscape in Germany. For a more complete picture of the Islamist threat environment, it is also important to take a look at interrupted terrorist plots between 2020 and May 2025.

Part Two: Failed Islamist Terror Plots in Germany (2020-2025)
Unsuccessful terrorist plots can reveal important information about trends in targets, weapons, demographics of perpetrators, and radicalization. In December 2023, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) announced that 18 Islamist terrorist attacks had been prevented since 2010.¹⁰⁴ Since then, there have been many additional arrests of individuals planning a jihadi terrorist attack. The following section will explore all publicly reported failed Islamist terrorist plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025.

The April 2020 Plot to Attack U.S. and NATO Facilities in Germany
In April 2020, German authorities arrested four Tajik nationals accused of operating as a cell linked to the Islamic State.¹⁰⁵ The men—aged between 24 and 32 years old¹⁰⁶—were suspected to have planned attacks on U.S. and NATO military facilities in Germany, including Spangdahlem Air Base and the AWACS site in Geilenkirchen.¹⁰⁷ According to investigations, the group had downloaded bomb-making instructions via Telegram and was in contact with Islamic State operatives in Afghanistan and Syria who were directing their plan.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the cell had acquired weapons, ammunition, chemicals as well as explosives, and were involved in murder-for-hire schemes in Albania and Germany to fund their activities.¹⁰⁹ A prominent Islam critic in Neuss was also suspected to have been a potential target, and members of the group had started surveilling him.¹¹⁰ The men received sentences between three years and eight months and nine and a half years.¹¹¹

The August 2021 Hamburg Bomb Plot
On August 26, 2021, German authorities thwarted a planned Islamist terror attack in Hamburg by arresting 20-year-old Abdurachman C., a German-Moroccan national.¹¹² He had attempted to purchase a Makarov pistol, 50 rounds of ammunition, and a hand grenade via the Darknet, unknowingly negotiating with an undercover officer.¹¹³ Following his arrest, investigators discovered bomb-making materials—including potassium nitrate, sulfur, charcoal dust, and hundreds of screws—in a Hamburg apartment.¹¹⁴ According to the federal prosecutor’s office, he was planning an attack along the lines of the 2013 attack on the Boston marathon.¹¹⁵ His father, a known Islamist figure, had been involved with the Al-Quds Mosque, which had had connections to the 9/11 hijackers.¹¹⁶ Abdurachman C. was also found to be a follower of al-Qa`ida’s ideology and was sentenced to eight years in prison.¹¹⁷

The September 2021 Hagen Synagogue Bomb Plot
In September 2021, Oday J., a 16-year-old Syrian refugee in Hagen, Germany, was arrested for planning a bomb attack on the local synagogue.¹¹⁸ The plot was uncovered reportedly following a tip from a foreign intelligence service,¹¹⁹ leading to a police operation involving 200 officers.¹²⁰ Investigators found no explosives but discovered Islamic State propaganda videos¹²¹ and that the plotter had been in contact via Telegram with an individual named “Abu Harb,” who provided instructions on bomb construction and advised targeting the synagogue.¹²² According to the court, the teenager had “wanted to be ready if Kabul had been bombed or civilians had died in an attack by Western allies on targets in Afghanistan.”¹²³ The 16-year-old was not previously known to security services, but German authorities reportedly received a tip from a foreign intelligence service.¹²⁴ He was sentenced to one year and nine months’ probation, with mandatory placement in a youth facility for three years.¹²⁵

The September 2021 Duisburg/Cologne Plot
The German Federal Police Office stated that it thwarted another Islamist attack in 2021, “a planned gun attack in Duisburg or in the Cologne area” but gave no further details on the incident.¹²⁶

The January 2023 Castrop-Rauxel Chem/Bio Plot
In January 2023, two Iranian brothers, age 25 and 32, Jalal and Monir J., were arrested in Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, on suspicion of planning an Islamist-motivated chem/bio attack using ricin or cyanide.¹²⁷ According to a media report, the plan was disrupted following a tip from the FBI,¹²⁸ which had apparently intercepted communications indicating the brothers were seeking instructions on producing the toxins.¹²⁹ The 32-year-old brother was released due to insufficient evidence, while the 25-year-old was sentenced to four years in jail.¹³⁰ Prosecutors alleged that he had been in contact with members of the Islamic State via messaging services on how to acquire substances needed to produce cyanide.¹³¹

The April 2023 Sweden Church Plot
In April 2023, German authorities arrested two Syrian nationals, 28-year-old and 24-year-old brothers Anas and Ahmad K. for planning a jihadi terror attack. Both had come to Germany in 2015 as refugees, and while the younger of the two, Ahmad, was able to integrate, finish school, and learn German, the older brother Anas struggled.¹³² Investigations revealed that a church in Sweden was the focus of the perpetrators’ plans. The planned attack was supposed to avenge Swedish “Quran burnings” but a specific church within Sweden had not yet been chosen.¹³³ The older brother had been in contact with someone through a messaging app who claimed to be a member of the Islamic State.^s He then purchased chemical materials online via eBay to construct a homemade explosive belt intended for use against civilian targets.¹³⁴ The German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel reported that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) alerted the suspicious online shopping activities to the German authorities.¹³⁵ According to the court verdict, the younger brother (Ahmad K.) bought one of the supplies for the attack, but overall did not share his older brother’s extremist convictions.¹³⁶ Anas K. was sentenced to four years and nine months in prison, while Ahmad K. received a one-year suspended prison sentence.^{137 t}

The October 2023 Duisburg Plot to Target a Pro-Israel Demonstration
On October 24, 2023, 29-year-old Tarik S. was arrested in Duisburg for planning an attack on a pro-Israel demonstration.¹³⁸ The German citizen had previously joined the Islamic State as a foreign fighter under the name “Osama Al-Almani”¹³⁹ and had traveled to Syria in 2013.¹⁴⁰ He was featured in several Islamic State propaganda videos while he was in Syria. After his return, he was arrested and placed in juvenile detention between 2016 and 2021.¹⁴¹ During that time, he participated in a deradicalization program and was certified a “successful exit.”¹⁴² A foreign intelligence service reportedly provided information about his attack plot.¹⁴³ For his plan to drive a van into a pro-Israel demonstration, he was sentenced to eight years in prison.¹⁴⁴

The November 2023 Christmas Market Plot
In connection to terrorist attacks planned at German Christmas markets in 2023, there were multiple arrests. First, on November 21, 2023, a 20-year-old Iraqi asylum seeker was arrested in Lower Saxony, on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack at the Christmas market in Hanover.¹⁴⁵ German authorities reportedly received information from foreign intelligence services.¹⁴⁶ Evidence indicated that he was planning to commit a knife attack.¹⁴⁷ He had been in Germany since 2022, but his asylum application had been rejected the day he was arrested and was therefore close to being deported.¹⁴⁸ A spokesperson for the State Office of Criminal Investigation revealed that he had declared his support for the Islamic State and was willing to commit an attack for the group.¹⁴⁹ He was placed in preventive custody and later deported to Iraq on December 15, 2023, with a permanent Germany entry ban imposed.¹⁵⁰

The November 2023 Leverkusen Christmas Market Plot
Shortly after, on November 28, 2023, 16-year-old Rasul M. was arrested in Brandenburg as was his accomplice 15-year-old Edris D. near Leverkusen.¹⁵¹ Rasul M. is a Russian citizen with Chechen origins, and Edris D. is a German Afghan dual citizen. Both met each other in a chat group of Islamic State sympathizers.¹⁵² The crucial alert for the attack plot had reportedly come from a foreign intelligence service.¹⁵³ According to investigators, plans had been in the early stages as not all material had been purchased yet, but the two teens had specifically focused on exploding a van filled with gas cylinders at the Christmas market in Leverkusen.¹⁵⁴ Edris D. had shared a video in a chat group announcing the attack, and authorities arrested the two only a few days later.¹⁵⁵ Both were sentenced to four years of juvenile detention.¹⁵⁶

The December 2023 Cologne Cathedral Plot
In December 2023, 30-year-old Tajik national Mukhammadrajab B. was arrested for having scouted the Cologne Cathedral as a potential target for a terrorist attack.¹⁵⁷ He was later extradited to Austria in early 2024 where he was known to security services as it was also believed that he was planning an attack on the St. Stephen’s Cathedral in Vienna.¹⁵⁸ Six individuals believed to be related to the plot were arrested as well but five were released hours later.¹⁵⁹ A 25-year-old man from Tajikistan who was considered an accomplice of Mukhammadrajab B. was ordered to be deported.¹⁶⁰

The December 2023 Terror Plotting by Hamas Members
On December 14, 2023, German authorities arrested four alleged members of Hamas, between 34 and 57 years old,¹⁶¹ identified as Abdelhamid Al A., Mohamed B., Ibrahim El-R., and Nazih R.^{162 u} The group had tried to amass weapons and bring them to their weapons collection point in Berlin.¹⁶³ The prosecution stated that possible targets included the Israeli embassy in Berlin, the U.S. air base in Ramstein, and the area around the former airport Tempelhof in Berlin.¹⁶⁴ All four individuals were known to security services prior to their arrest¹⁶⁵ and were reported to have “had close ties to leaders” of the military wing of Hamas.¹⁶⁶

The April 2024 North Rhine-Westphalia Plot Against Police and Places of Worship
In early April 2024, law enforcement in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia arrested a 15-year-old girl from Düsseldorf, a 16-year-old girl from Iserloh, and a 15-year-old boy from Lippstadt who had planned an Islamist attack.¹⁶⁷ The fourth member of the group, a 16-year-old boy from Ostfildern was also arrested in the state of Baden-Württemberg.¹⁶⁸ While the group had not settled on a specific target or location, they had decided to attack police stations or churches/synagogues during Ramadan to set people on fire with Molotov cocktails and to use firearms and stabbing weapons with the goal of killing as many people as possible.¹⁶⁹ The four teenagers communicated through the messaging apps Telegram, Session, and Discord.¹⁷⁰ Security services were alerted to the four teenagers because the 16-year-old from Iserloh consumed Islamic State propaganda and planned to travel to Syria.¹⁷¹ According to the court, all four had become radicalized through Islamic State propaganda online.¹⁷² The three from North Rhine Westphalia were sentenced to three years juvenile detention,¹⁷³ and the fourth member was sentenced to two years suspended juvenile detention.¹⁷⁴

The May 2024 Heidelberg/Frankfurt Synagogues Plot
In May 2024, authorities in Bad Friedrichshall and Weinheim arrested an 18-year-old German Turkish man (Ö.) and a 24-year-old German (Y.) for planning attacks on synagogues in Heidelberg or Frankfurt.¹⁷⁵ The older of the two had planned to travel to Syria to fight with HTS, but returned after a first stop in Turkey and was turned in by his family.¹⁷⁶ Through a chat, they had discussed their plan to use a knife to attack synagogues and later die a “martyr” death by being shot by the police.¹⁷⁷ During a search of his apartment, the 24-year-old attacked police with a knife and was shot at by the police.¹⁷⁸ Both, however, showed remorse during the trial, recounting “setbacks at school and professionally, receiving support from Islam and finally becoming radicalized on social media” as well as “being desperate and angry.”¹⁷⁹ Y. was sentenced to six years in prison, and Ö. was sentenced to two years and 10 months in juvenile detention.¹⁸⁰

The June 2024 Esslingen Explosive Drone Plot
In Esslingen, on June 19, 2024,¹⁸¹ authorities arrested 27-year-old Mahmoud A., an Iraqi citizen¹⁸² who had planned to fly a drone with an explosive into a not-yet-defined target. He was going to detonate the explosive remotely with a car key.¹⁸³ When the suspect started buying different chemical components online, police arrested him.¹⁸⁴ According to investigations, Mahmoud A. had been an Islamic State member since 2016 in Iraq and had also fought for the group.¹⁸⁵ He then came to Germany in 2022 to prepare a terrorist attack.¹⁸⁶ He was sentenced by the court to five years and six months in prison.¹⁸⁷

The September 2024 Attempted Munich Rifle Attack
On September 5, 2024, an 18-year-old Austrian citizen, Emrah I., shot with a rifle at the Munich Documentation Centre for the History of National Socialism and wanted to attack the neighboring Israeli General Consulate in Munich.^{188 v} In a confrontation with the police, the suspect was shot at the scene.¹⁸⁹ The perpetrator was stopped in his attack as he struggled to identify the General Consulate, which was also closed that day in memory of the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972.¹⁹⁰ Emrah I. did not have any direct contact with terrorist organizations or operatives but investigators alleged that he was a supporter of by then disbanded group Jabhat al-Nusra.¹⁹¹ He lived socially isolated and had watched many videos about the Israeli intervention in Gaza.¹⁹² Authorities described his motive as primarily anti-Israel and that Islamist ideology had only played a minor role.¹⁹³

The September 2024 Attempted Linz Police Station Attack
On September 6, 2024 at 02:30 am a 29 year-old Albanian citizen stormed the Linz police station with an 18.5 inch machete.¹⁹⁴ His goal was to kill as many police personnel as possible but he was held up in the security gate area and later stopped by a specialized unit with a taser before he could injure anyone.¹⁹⁵ A witness stated that the attacker had said he was fighting for the Islamic State.¹⁹⁶ In a search of his apartment investigators found an Islamic State flag¹⁹⁷ and the court stated that he had radicalized online in Islamic State forums.¹⁹⁸ It was determined he had acted alone. He was sentenced to eight years in prison by the court.^{199 w}

The September 2024 Wuppertal Plot Against Jewish Institutions
On September 20, 2024, a 15-year-old male teenager in Wuppertal, North Rhine-Westphalia, was placed into preventive custody awaiting trial on suspicion of planning attacks on Jewish institutions.²⁰⁰ Security services were alerted to him after the attack in Solingen in August 2024; investigations found no direct connection to that attack, however.²⁰¹ He had been in contact with another Islamist abroad through a chat and was encouraged by that individual to carry out a knife attack.²⁰² Moreover, he had posted content with Islamic State flags on TikTok and had become radicalized online.²⁰³ According to the verdict in his case, “the teenager has fallen victim to pied pipers who know their trade as Islamist recruiters.”²⁰⁴ The suspect confessed and was sentenced to two and a half years in prison.^{205 x}

The November 2024 Schleswig-Holstein Rifle Attack Plot
Authorities in northern Germany, in Schleswig-Holstein, arrested 17-year-old German citizen Emin B. on November 6, 2024, on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack with a truck or rapid-fire rifles.²⁰⁶ The tip reportedly had come from foreign intelligence.²⁰⁷ According to investigations, he was allegedly in contact and planning the attack with another person abroad and planning to “die as a martyr.”²⁰⁸ According to the indictment, he was looking to kill “non-believers” and had been an Islamic State sympathizer on social media.²⁰⁹ A friend of the suspect told reporters that Emin B. had been impacted by the situation in Gaza.²¹⁰ The trial started on April 25, 2025.²¹¹

The November 2024 Rhineland-Palatinate Pipe Bomb Plot
On November 26, 2024, authorities arrested a 17-year-old in Rhineland-Palatinate who allegedly planned an Islamist terrorist attack using pipe bombs.²¹² Prosecutors stated that he downloaded manuals for bomb making online, and in a search of his apartment, investigators found two bayonets and four pieces of pipe with caps on both sides.²¹³ He is suspected to have radicalized online as well as to have shared Islamic State propaganda content.²¹⁴ The suspect was indicted in late April 2025 and has been in custody pending trial since his arrest.^{215 y}

The December 2024 Mannheim/Hesse Attack Plot
On December 8, 2024, police arrested three men: two German Lebanese brothers aged 15 and 20 from Mannheim and a 22-year-old German Turkish man from Hesse.²¹⁶ All three were suspected of planning an Islamist terrorist attack together. Investigations alleged that they held sympathies for the Islamic State and were making attack plans.²¹⁷ In a search of the 22-year-old’s apartment, police found an assault rifle and ammunition.²¹⁸ The three men were placed in custody pending further investigations.²¹⁹

The February 2025 Israeli Embassy Plot
At the time of publication, there has only been one publicly disclosed failed Islamist terror plot in Germany so far this year. On February 20, 2025, police arrested an 18-year-old Russian citizen with Chechen origin in Brandenburg for planning an attack on the Israeli embassy in Berlin.²²⁰ He was arrested at the Berlin airport and suspected of trying to travel to join the Islamic State, potentially in Somalia.²²¹ He was connected to a group of three Islamists in Berlin, two of whom had already traveled to Somalia to join the Islamic State’s branch there.²²² Information about his attack plans reportedly had been shared by a foreign intelligence service,²²³ and authorities found an “unconventional explosive device” in his apartment.²²⁴ Investigations of the attack plot are being led by the Office for the Public Prosecutor General.²²⁵

Part Three: Key Islamist Terror Trends in Germany
With the data from all executed as well as publicly disclosed failed Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, the following section will look at five key trends that stand out.

1. Attack Vectors: Most attacks are low-tech, involving knives and vehicles, but these are not the only threat.
Looking at the data of Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany since 2020, knife and vehicle attacks are the dominant attack vectors. Out of the nine executed Islamist terrorist attacks between January 2020 and May 2025, six were perpetrated by a knife, two by vehicles, and in one case arson. Although these statistics suggest that knives and vehicles are the predominant weapons used by Islamist extremists in Germany, they offer only a partial view of the broader landscape.

Taking into account the thwarted and intercepted Islamist attack plots during that same time period reveals that individuals and groups still consider other weapons and methods. Out of 20 failed Islamist terrorist plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, only three involved either a van, truck, or car and five included knives. Instead, at least eight cases involved explosive devices including pipe bombs, a drone with an explosive, multiple bombs, Molotov cocktails, and a homemade explosive belt. In seven cases, the attackers were planning to use firearms, which due to German weapon laws are much harder to obtain and often illegal. There was also notably a chem/bio attack plot involving the use of ricin or cyanide as a weapon. One explanation for these findings is that German security services are much more successful at intercepting attack plots that do not involve everyday items such as knives and cars. The purchase of certain components for explosives, firearms, or even chemicals is more likely to alert authorities to illegal activities. In some cases, the planning process itself, especially the procurement and use of explosives can be lengthier, giving law enforcement and security services more time to become aware of someone’s plans.

This also highlights that while ISK celebrated the knife attack in Solingen and AQAP declared the attacker in the Mannheim stabbing attack “a hero,” terrorist organizations and operators affiliated with the groups also still widely distribute bomb-making instructions online and encourage using explosives. While the following analysis will look at the German response specifically to knife and vehicle attacks, security services nevertheless need to continue to guard against terrorist plots involving explosives and other attack vectors.

As knives were the most used weapon by terrorists in Islamist terror attacks in Germany between 2020 and 2025, they have been at the center of many security debates. One response by officials has been the call for more “weapon-free zones.” On a federal level, public events such as markets, sporting events, theaters, movie theaters, and public festivals are by law weapon-free zones.²²⁶ Implementing additional permanent geographical weapon zones is up to the states in Germany, and many cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, and Stuttgart have indeed created them.^{227 z} However, the effectiveness of these weapon-free zones remains debated, and initial evaluations have presented mixed results. As a prevention for crime and terrorist attacks, weapon-free zones alone cannot address the problem. Police have argued that enforcement often poses a challenge, especially considering a lack of personnel for controls or exceptions to some of the prohibitions such as for “barbeque and picnic equipment” in Berlin.²²⁹ More generally, as criminologist Elena Rausch has argued, “if someone is planning an extremist act, they know they are not allowed to do it. Even a weapons free zone doesn’t matter then.”²³⁰

The new German government under chancellor Friedrich Merz has looked at a potential legal tool for preventing knife attacks. The Coalition Agreement²³¹ proposes to include everyday items such as knives and vehicles in §89a of the German Criminal Code (“Preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state”)²³² that currently focuses on firearms, explosives, radioactive substances, poisonous substances, and so forth. This law is used most in indictments against people planning an attack. Including knives and vehicles on the list will criminalize the planning of an attack using these attack vectors and allow for additional surveillance and investigative tools in these cases.²³³

The second-most used weapon in executed Islamist terrorist attacks between 2020 and 2025 in Germany were cars. Vehicle rammings have been used by terrorist actors around the world.²³⁴ As they are often perceived as being successful, they can inspire a copycat effect, in particular in the immediate time period following an attack.²³⁵ Security services, as a result, in addition to general security measures, may have to increase their preventive efforts in the aftermath of such attacks.

After the 2016 Christmas market attack in Berlin, Germany changed and implemented a lot of security procedures to prevent vehicle ramming attacks, especially those targeting crowded events. Organizers of such events, together with municipal administrations provide security concepts with different kinds of barriers.²³⁶ As targets for vehicle attacks, however, are not limited to larger public events, Director for Public Security at the German Ministry for Interior and Community Dr. Christian Klos recently noted in this publication: “We have to be honest, we cannot protect all our public spaces. It’s impossible, especially with spontaneous gatherings. We have to look into this, but no 100-percent security is possible.”²³⁷ This points to the limitations of hardened security as counterterrorism measures in the case of every day, dual-use items such as knives and cars.

Technological advances can potentially play a role for the type of weapon used in attacks, recruitment—in particular, communication—and online propaganda. For weapons, as seen above, Islamist terrorists in Germany continue to choose simple everyday items such as vehicles and knives in eight out of the nine executed attacks and “old school” bombs or firearms in the case of the failed plots. A notable exception is the drone attack plot using explosives that was stopped in June 2024. Given the fact that most attacks are planned by a single individual or with one accomplice instead of larger cells, the level of attack planning might be limited to simpler methods. Most importantly, as knives and cars continue to be used successfully in terrorist attacks in Germany, Islamists planning a future attack might not see a reason to purchase more expensive or technologically advanced tools.

2. Profiles: Most attackers carried out their attacks alone and did not have direct links to terror groups. A significant number of plotters are teenagers. Mental health challenges are a feature of some cases.
One significant trend many practitioners and scholars have pointed out over the last couple of years is that the average age of Islamist terrorists in many countries, including Germany, has decreased.²³⁸ While the average attacker in the executed attacks between 2020 and May 2025 was 25 years old, the trend toward younger radicalized individuals becomes especially visible when looking at the thwarted attacks. Half of the interrupted terrorist plots were planned by individuals who were 18 or younger. In 2024 alone, there were seven uncovered terrorist plots of people 18 or younger.

A shift in the demographic of terrorists has consequences for counterterrorism as well. Peter Neumann noted that younger individuals in Germany are increasingly undergoing full radicalization cycles online without the need for personal interaction, marking a recent trend in jihadi recruitment. Platforms such as TikTok are playing a key role in this shift, contributing to the emergence of a new generation of perpetrators.²³⁹ Consequently, preventive programs and measures aimed at countering extremist content should be tailored specifically to this younger demographic. Additionally, educators and others working closely with youth, such as sports coaches, volunteers in community centers, or religious youth groups, could benefit from training to effectively identify early signs of radicalization.

For the executed and thwarted attacks between 2020 and May 2025, the analysis reveals a clear pattern of attacks by individuals with no direct links to terror groups. The majority of attackers were not official members of the Islamic State but were instead inspired by its propaganda and propaganda shared by the larger Islamic State online ecosystem, as seen in the November 2021 ICE train attack, the April 2023 Duisburg attack, and the May 2024 Mannheim attack.

The cases in Germany echoed a trend seen in other countries as well where those who carried out successful attacks tended to view themselves as part of the Islamic State’s broader struggle, believing they were fighting for the group even without formal affiliation. A notable exception was the August 2024 knife attack in Solingen for which the Islamic State officially claimed responsibility and celebrated the event in its propaganda channels. While isolated incidents involving more structured coordination were uncovered—such as the December 2023 case involving four Hamas members closely tied to the group’s leadership, the former fighter Tarik S. in 2023, and the Tajik cell in 2020 linked to the Islamic State—the overwhelming majority of perpetrators had only consumed Islamic State propaganda or, like the brothers involved in the April 2023 Sweden Church Plot with explosive belts, maintained contact with individuals who were either Islamic State members or sympathizers.

Looking at the number of participants in each plot, it is notable that while all executed terrorist attacks involved only a single individual, the uncovered terrorist plots during that same time period also included smaller groups of two or four members. In fact, eight out of the 20 uncovered terrorist plots involved at least two potential attackers. It stands to reason that this is a function of the fact that as in the case of the four teenagers arrested in April 2024, communication between different individuals increases the chances of being discovered. When security services become aware of one member of a small group, this is likely to lead them to any other members.

Finally, it is notable that two attacks out of the nine executed terrorist attacks were carried out by individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. While it is dangerous, incorrect, and counterproductive to equate terrorism and radicalization with mental illness, there are cases where both may overlap as seen in Waldkraiburg and the Autobahn attacks in 2020. Here, it is important to exercise caution and acknowledge that there are cases that show a complicated connection of Islamist ideology and psychological disorders. This can be helpful for prevention efforts as well as security services when identifying violent individuals but cannot be generalized for every or even most jihadi terrorists in Germany.

3. Propaganda and Recruitment: YouTube preachers and TikTok algorithms are fueling the threat.
A 2025 report by the Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) on Islamist propaganda on social media in Germany identified three different groups of online propaganda.²⁴⁰ First, individuals such as Pierre Vogel^aa and Abul Baraa^ab who present themselves as religious preachers. While religious teachings are the focus of this group of online jihadis, most have very little actual religious education, which does not keep their followers from seeing them as a religious authority.

The second group includes actors such as “Botschaft des Islam,” “Generation Islam,” “Realität Islam,” and “Muslim Interaktiv.”²⁴¹ They have a farther reach on social media—for example, on YouTube—and are more focused on political and societal aspects like spreading the narrative that German society is fighting against Islam.²⁴² The third group is made up of individual influencers especially on TikTok who do not clearly belong to a larger group. They are able to reach the largest audience in Germany, and many accounts have gained followers since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel.²⁴³ The intersection of TikTok and jihadi terrorism has therefore become a pressing concern for security agencies.²⁴⁴ The platform’s algorithmic design, which promotes content based on user engagement, has facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies among younger people. Peter Neumann has explained that the presence and rise of online Islamist influencers is also a logical consequence of bans of in-person activities in Germany by jihadis groups, such as preaching in the street.²⁴⁵

Looking at Islamist terrorist attacks and failed plots in Germany between 2020 and May 2025, there are several cases that exemplify these trends. One example is the attacker in Dresden in 2020 who was influenced most by speeches of Sheik Khalid Al-Rashid and came in contact with other jihadis through the comment section of a YouTube video. He then joined a chat group where he and others shared Islamic State propaganda.²⁴⁶ Another example is the case of the Duisburg attack in April 2023 where the attacker did not grow up in an extremist household and found the Islamic State through the internet. Or the May 2024 Mannheim attacker who adopted more radical views through listening to Islamist preachers on YouTube and then followed links to Telegram chats. An important pattern these cases share is the interest and initial introduction to Islamist content through mainstream platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok and later a transition to more private chat groups or channels such as Telegram or Discord that allow for interaction between likeminded individuals, often in encrypted online environments.²⁴⁷

In the thwarted attacks, other examples of online radicalization included the four teenagers in April 2024, the 17-year-old in November 2024, and the 15-year-old in September 2024. The last case specifically included a radicalization through TikTok. These examples show that content on mainstream social media platforms such as TikTok specifically targets and successfully reaches younger audiences.^ac Moreover, it also demonstrates a pattern where minors connect online in virtual groups with connections to the larger Islamic State ecosystem.²⁴⁸ These trends likely explain the significant number of teenagers getting involved in jihadi terror plotting in Germany (and farther afield). Overall, Islamic State propaganda online is highly decentralized with content being created and shared by smaller groups of supporters across the world.²⁴⁹

4. The Impact of October 7: There has been a rise in threat activity and especially against Jewish institutions and Israelis.
Of course, it is still too early to tell the final impact of October 7, but there are a few trends that are notable and significant for counterterrorism efforts. First, Jewish institutions and Israeli diplomatic missions have come under greater threat. There were no successful attacks on Jewish institutions or Israelis and only one failed plot (the September 2021 Hagen Synagogue Bomb Plot) in the 2020s prior to October 7, 2023. In the period since October 7, 2023 (despite it being a shorter time interval), there has been one executed terrorist attack at the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin in 2025 as well as seven unsuccessful attack plots that involved either synagogues, pro-Israel protests, the Israeli consulate or embassy, and Jewish institutions more broadly.

Between January 2020 and October 7, 2023, there were five successful Islamist terrorist attacks in Germany. Since then (as of May 2025), there have been four additional executed Islamist terrorist attacks. While this does not show a significant change in the number of attacks, there has been a notable increase in reported thwarted attack plots overall since October 7 (15), compared to the period between January 2020 and October 2023 (five). This, however, may also be due to other factors, and the final impact of October 7 on jihadi radicalization has to be the subject of further monitoring and research. One indicator to look at for this development is violent crime. The 2023 Report of the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution noted that in the category of “politically motivated crime because of religious ideology,” which also includes non-violent crime, antisemitic crimes increased dramatically mainly due to incidents after October 7, from 33 crimes (two of those violent) in 2022 to 492 crimes (22 violent) in 2023.^{250 ad}

Third, as online propaganda, especially by the Islamic States, plays a significant role in the radicalization process of most terrorist attackers in Germany, it is crucial to point out that jihadi terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida—despite their differences from Hamas—have utilized the October 7 attack for their propaganda.²⁵¹ The head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution Thomas Haldenwang said in November 2023 that “in the jihadist spectrum, we see calls for attacks and a ‘latch-on’ of ‘Al-Qaeda’ and IS to the conflict in the Middle East. This threat is now encountering highly emotionalized individuals inspired by trigger events … The danger is real and higher than it has been for a long time.”²⁵² Early in 2024, the Islamic State published a video by its official spokesperson that, among other things, emphasized the events in Gaza and called for attacks with explosives in Western cities.²⁵³ German jihadi online propaganda since October 7th has been rife with antisemitic messaging and content related to Gaza.²⁵⁴

Three examples of how this may impact the radicalization of individuals can be seen in the case of the terrorist attack in Mannheim in May 2024, as well as the two thwarted attack plots in Munich and Schleswig Holstein in September and November of 2024. In Mannheim, the attacker already held extremist views prior to October 7, and in the two other cases, additional factors may have played a role as well. Nevertheless, as noted before, the perpetrator in Mannheim stated in court that “the war in Gaza changed his life,”²⁵⁵ the teenager in Munich consumed numerous videos of Gaza and specifically chose the Israeli Consulate as a target and a witness described the personal impact of the war in Gaza on the attacker in the case of the teenager from Schleswig Holstein. At the very least, the war in Gaza accelerated the radicalization of these individuals.

And finally, it is also important to point out the ways in which October 7 has not changed previously existing patterns: Christmas markets and other public festivals remain one of the most prominent targets for attacks. This includes the executed knife attack in Solingen in 2024 as well as at least two disrupted attack plots against Christmas markets in 2023. In addition, the Islamic State called for attacks at the European Soccer Championship in 2024²⁵⁶ hosted by Germany and on Carnival parades in 2025.²⁵⁷ ‘Soft targets’ such as pedestrian zones, shopping areas, gyms, and public transportation also remain popular targets.

5. Recent cases have underscored the importance of foreign intelligence and Germany’s dependence on it.
According to the author’s data, in the first half of the 2020s, out of the 18 Islamist terrorist plots that were stopped before the perpetrator could start the attack,^ae at least eight were reported to have relied on important information from foreign intelligence services. Between 2011 and 2021, out of the 13 attacks that were prevented by security services, in six cases information from foreign intelligence was “of essential importance for the prevention.”²⁵⁸ The role of information by foreign security services in German counterterrorism represents is a positive dynamic. Given the transnational connections of terrorist networks, especially online, international cooperation in counterterrorism is crucial. The data shows that Germany has good working relationships with other countries and in particular the United States when it comes to counterterrorism efforts. As Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community Christian Klos recently stated:

We are very thankful to our American partners to receive important information, which is sometimes or actually often, much more accessible for American colleagues than for us because of legal reasons and very different perceptions of privacy. Data protection plays a very big role—I would even say from my perspective, an exaggerated role in Europe. Of course, I wouldn’t go so far as fully endorsing the American approach but something in between for Europe and Germany would be much better. Therefore, we sometimes rely on information gathered in the online world by our American partners. It’s extremely worthwhile. We have prevented a high number of terrorist attacks in Germany due to such information—not only from the U.S. but a large part of this information has come from the U.S. agencies—and this is very important for us.²⁵⁹

Still, there is some cause for concern. While CT cooperation in the European Union as well as with partners such as the United States is working well, the reliance on foreign information highlights the constraints Germany’s security services face.

Over the last three years, different German officials have called for legislative changes to address a lack of tools and access for security services because of privacy regulations. Thuringia’s head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Stephan Kramer, argued in October 2024: “The good and trusting international cooperation is working. But it also shows that we finally need to have a fundamental discussion about the powers of the German intelligence services to collect information and data and draw conclusions.”²⁶⁰ Similarly, Rainer Wendt, federal chairman of the German Police Union, stated in December 2024: “We urgently need to improve the technical and personnel conditions of our state security authorities and intelligence services. Their legal powers also need to be extended.”²⁶¹ Hesse’s Minister of the Interior Roman Poseck had previously said in October 2024: “We must strengthen our security authorities in order to become more independent of foreign intelligence services.”²⁶² He furthermore called for the ability to store and use certain data and IP addresses for counterterrorism as well as additional competencies on the darknet: “Terrorist activities are usually prepared there. Our intelligence services need the means to decrypt encrypted communications.”²⁶³ Two former heads of the BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, August Hanning and Gerhard Schindler, argued in August 2023 that “German services should once again become partners on an equal footing with other Western services.”²⁶⁴

The new Coalition Agreement acknowledges the challenges German security services face in light of data protection requirements and declares that the new government will “make full use of the scope provided by European and constitutional law to ensure the highest level of security for our citizens. The tension between security policy requirements and data protection regulations must therefore be rebalanced.”²⁶⁵ It remains to be seen whether such rebalancing will occur.

Conclusion
The terrorist threat landscape in Germany has evolved in the first half of the 2020s. A significant number of young perpetrators are being radicalized online, often inspired by groups such as the Islamic State. They are using the same simple weapons while seeking out new and familiar targets. At the same time, German authorities are seeing the effects of October 7 and are trying to find ways to stop the most successful methods of attacks with knives and cars. In addition, they are looking for innovative approaches to prevent teenagers from getting radicalized online while relying on outside information from foreign security services.

Closing gaps in the German counterterrorism toolkit will be critical to containing what is likely to be a persistent threat. The new Coalition Agreement promises to address some of these problems and hurdles encountered by the CT community by, for example, looking to include knives and cars in new criminal legislation regarding the planning of an attack, and adding enhanced investigatory and CT tools for security services.²⁶⁶ In the end, while complete security is never possible, the attacks that got through over the last five years has shown that improvements are necessary in stopping Islamist terrorists in Germany.     CTC

Julika Enslin was the CTC Resident Fulbright Fellow for the 2024-2025 academic year. At West Point, she taught cadets in the course “Terrorism: New Challenges” and among other topics worked on terrorist threats in Europe. Originally from Germany, she was selected as a Foreign Fulbright Student to study in the United States in 2022. Prior to working at the CTC, Enslin graduated from Georgetown University with a Master of Science in Foreign Service.

© 2025 Julika Enslin

Substantive Notes
[a] The author is aware of the knife attack by Mahmoud M. in Bielefeld on May 18, 2025. An Islamist motive has been suggested in news reporting but not confirmed as investigations are still ongoing. As a result, the attack was not included in this analysis.

[b] The author acknowledges that because of the existence of mental health issues among attackers and plotters, it is sometimes not clear cut on whether an attack or plot should be coded as Islamist terrorist. The author adopted the following criteria in coding threat activity as Islamist terrorist in Germany during the time period January 2020 to May 2025: If an attack was reported as an Islamist terrorist attack or disrupted attack plot by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution or by State Level Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, it was included in this analysis. In addition, for 2024 and 2025 in particular, the author also included credible reporting from major German news agencies for the most recent cases. This data was complemented by and cross-referenced with think-tank and NGO reports, court and trial documents as well as data from Europol and the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany.

[c] In German media and legal documents, individuals involved in criminal or sensitive legal matters are typically referred to by their first name and the initial of their last name (e.g., “Muharrem D.”) rather than their full names. This practice is rooted in Germany’s privacy rights laws.

[d] Sarmad A.’s asylum claim was denied because he had previously applied for asylum in another E.U. country (Finland) and was rejected. His “obligation to leave the country” (Ausreisepflicht) was not enforced because of missing identification and travel documents. Landgericht Berlin, Verdict January 31, 2022 – Az. 521 Ks 1/21 –, BeckRS 2022, 1007.

[e] In the German immigration system, a “Duldung” (tolerated stay) refers to the temporary suspension of deportation for individuals who are legally required to leave the country but cannot be deported due to practical or legal obstacles, such as medical issues or lack of travel documents. It does not constitute a legal residence status and generally comes with restricted rights.

[f] In German criminal law, Schuldunfähigkeit (§ 20 German Criminal Code) refers to the absence of criminal responsibility due to a severe mental disorder, rendering the offender incapable of understanding or controlling their actions. If such a person poses a continuing danger, § 63 German Criminal Code allows for their indefinite confinement in a psychiatric hospital as a preventive measure.

[g] In 2014, Abdullah Al H. H. was stopped at an Islamic State checkpoint in Syria. The group found music as well as photos and videos of naked women on his cellphone and confiscated his memory card. Fearful of punishment, he left for Turkey and later with financial help from his father went through the Balkan route to Germany in 2015. Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021 – 4 St 1/21, BeckRS 2021, 11754.

[h] Sheikh Khalid Mohammad Hamad Al Rashid is a cleric from Saudi Arabia who was arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2005 for a sermon that called for protests in response to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad. “Khaled Al-Rashed,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), accessed May 20, 2025.

[i] In German law, a “Gefährder” is a designation for an individual that security authorities consider potentially dangerous, particularly in the context of terrorism and politically motivated crimes. While the person may not have committed a crime, authorities believe there is a “concrete” likelihood they may do so, allowing for certain preemptive measures such as, for example, surveillance or an electronic ankle monitor. “‘Gefährder,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, January 13, 2020; “Legaldefinition Des Begriffes ‘Gefährder,’” Deutscher Bundestag, 2020.

[j] After the attack, research by the German media outlets NDR, WDR and SZ revealed that the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) had received a warning regarding Abdullah Al H. H. planning a terrorist attack in 2019 from a foreign intelligence service. The information was not passed on to the domestic intelligence service, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, or any state-level intelligence. Analysis, however, also suggested that this warning would likely not have changed the assessment of Abdullah Al H. H., who at that point was already considered a radical Islamist by domestic federal- and state-level intelligence and imprisoned for soliciting support for a foreign terrorist organization, the Islamic State. Florian Flade and Georg Mascolo, “Attentäter von Dresden: BND Leitete Hinweis Nicht Weiter,” Tagesschau, October 29, 2020.

[k] Only a few months prior, in June 2021, a 24-year-old man from Somalia had fatally stabbed three women and injured seven others at a shopping center in Würzburg. While initial statements by the Bavarian Interior Minister mentioned a possible jihadi motive, the investigation later concluded that the perpetrator suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. No Islamist motivation was found, and the man was admitted to a psychiatric institution. “Tödlicher Angriff in Würzburg: Staatsanwaltschaft Will Messerstecher Dauerhaft in Psychiatrie Unterbringen Lassen,” Der Spiegel, July 25, 2022; Pirmin Breninek, “Urteil Zur Würzburger Messerattacke: Täter Muss in Psychiatrie,” BR24, July 26, 2022.

[l] “Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe” (life imprisonment) is the most severe form of imprisonment under German criminal law, entailing an indeterminate sentence without a fixed release date. While the law allows for parole after 15 years, this is contingent upon the absence of a determination of “besondere Schwere der Schuld” (particular severity of guilt) and a positive prognosis regarding the offender’s future behavior. Maan D. was sentenced to life due to the extreme gravity of his crimes, including multiple murders and attempted murders. “Nach Islamistischen Messerattacken in Duisburg: Urteil Gegen Maan D. Wegen Mordes Sowie Versuchten Mordes in Vier Fällen – Pressemitteilung Nr. 37/2023,” Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Justiz NRW, December 19, 2023.

[m] “Besondere Schwere der Schuld” (particular severity of guilt) is a legal determination under German criminal law, typically made when imposing a life sentence. It indicates that the defendant’s culpability is so grave—due to factors such as the brutality of the crime, motives, or harm caused—that early release after 15 years (as otherwise permitted under §57a StGB) is generally excluded. In the case of Maan D., the court found such severity due to the number of victims, the malicious murder motive, as well as the considerable consequences of the acts for the injured, the court found that the defendant was particularly guilty. This finding makes an early release after 15 years extremely unlikely. “Nach Islamistischen Messerattacken in Duisburg: Urteil Gegen Maan D. Wegen Mordes Sowie Versuchten Mordes in Vier Fällen – Pressemitteilung Nr. 37/2023,” Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Justiz NRW, December 19, 2023.

[n] “Sicherungsverwahrung” (preventive detention) is a legal measure in German criminal law ordered when a convicted individual is considered a continuing danger to society, even after serving their prison sentence. Unlike regular imprisonment, it is not based on the severity of the offense but on the offender’s assessed risk of reoffending. Courts may impose it when the person has committed severe crimes and shows lasting criminal tendencies or dangerous personality traits. In the case of Maan D., the court ordered preventive detention due to the defendant’s ongoing threat, rooted in his violent extremism, no remorse, continued threats, and therefore high risk of reoffending. “Extremismus: Messerattacken von Duisburg: Höchststrafe Für IS-Anhänger,” Zeit Online, December 19, 2023.

[o] Michael Stürzenberger is a German far-right activist known for his strong anti-Islam views. He is a leading figure in the Citizens’ Movement Pax Europa (BPE), a group that campaigns against what it sees as the spread of Islam in Europe. He was also involved in Pegida (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West”), a protest movement known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. Previously, he led the small right-wing party “Die Freiheit,” which dissolved in 2016. Due to his activities and inflammatory public speeches, he has been monitored by German domestic intelligence for suspected extremist tendencies. Nils Metzger, “Messerangriff in Mannheim: Wer Ist Michael Stürzenberger?” ZDFheute, May 31, 2024; “Nach Tödlicher Messerattacke in Mannheim: ‘Pax Europa’ Will in NRW Auftreten,” WDR, June 2, 2024.

[p] The author follows the recommendations from the German “Pressekodex” (press code) and writes about an individual as a perpetrator “if they have confessed and there is evidence against them or if they have committed the offense in the eyes of the public.” “Pressekodex – Ziffer 13.1,” Deutscher Presserat, March 19, 2025.

[q] Because of EU Dublin regulations, Isaa Al H. was supposed to be processed by Bulgaria where he was already registered. When German authorities tried to deport him to Bulgaria in June 2023, he was not found at his refugee housing facility and the immigration office was not notified. As a result, the deadline for Bulgaria to keep the asylum claim expired and Germany took on the case in August 2023. His application for protection was granted in December. Manuel Bewarder and Florian Flade, “Solingen: Hat Der Tatverdächtige Falsche Asylangaben Gemacht?” Tagesschau, August 26, 2024.

[r] In the German immigration system, a “Duldung” (tolerated stay) refers to the temporary suspension of deportation for individuals who are legally required to leave the country but cannot be deported due to practical or legal obstacles, such as medical issues or lack of travel documents. It does not constitute a legal residence status and generally comes with restricted rights.

[s] Investigators were not able to determine conclusively the identity and Islamic State membership of this individual, who went by “Emir.” “Prozess Gegen Terrorbrüder: Hinter ‘Emir’ Verbarg Sich Eine Kontaktperson Des Islamischen Staats,” Die Welt, December 14, 2023.

[t] In July 2023, authorities in Germany and the Netherlands arrested nine individuals, most of them from Tajikistan, who were suspected to be part of an ISK cell. All seven had come to Germany in 2022 claiming to be refugees from Ukraine. The prosecution alleged that three men had been surveilled while scouting the Cologne Deutz fair—a public festival—as a potential target for an attack. While no specific plan was discovered, investigators said that the group had been looking at potential locations for an attack, examined chemicals in Home Depot stores, and tried to acquire weapons. Other potential targets according to reporting by Der Spiegel included people of Jewish faith in Germany as well as the more liberal Ibn-Rushd-Goethe-Mosque in Berlin. The group also was in communications with another ISK cell in Germany, which was planning a terrorist attack on the Cologne cathedral on New Years Eve. With regard to judicial proceedings against the seven individuals, proceedings were closed after a few weeks for one individual, and he was deported back to Kyrgyzstan. Two men were acquitted after the trial and four were sentenced to between one and four years for supporting the Islamic State through donations. The judge emphasized that the group did not form a terrorist cell. “Medienbericht: Terrorverdächtige Sollen Kölner Kirmes Als Anschlagsziel Ausgespäht Haben,” Der Spiegel, January 3, 2024; Christian Wernicke, “Mutmaßliche IS-Mitglieder in Düsseldorf Angeklagt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 30, 2024; “Deutzer Kirmes in Köln War Mögliches Anschlagsziel,” WDR, January 3, 2024; “BKA Gab Information Nicht Weiter: Polizei Wusste Nichts Über Kölner Kirmes Als Mögliches Anschlagsziel,” Der Tagesspiegel, January 5, 2024; Martin Höke, “Düsseldorf: Haftstrafen Und Freisprüche Im Terror-Prozess,” WDR, April 9, 2025.

[u] The trial began in February 2025, with trial dates scheduled until December 2025. “Kammergericht Verhandelt Bis Ende 2025: Prozess Gegen Mutmaßliche Hamas-Mitglieder Hat Begonnen,” Legal Tribune Online, February 25, 2025.

[v] The Munich Public Prosecutor General’s Office and the Bavarian State Office of Criminal Investigation presented their findings on March 14, 2025, and a trial has not yet started. “Anschlag Auf Das Israelische Generalkonsulat Am 5. September 2024 in München,” Bayrisches Landeskriminalamt, March 14, 2025.

[w] On September 12, 2024, a 27-year-old Syrian man was arrested for allegedly planning attacks in the city center of Hof (Bavaria) specifically targeting German soldiers during their lunch break. Investigations quickly revealed, however, that there were no indications that “the accused had planned such an act or adhered to a radical Islamic ideology.” After the case was closed, the suspect was released in November 2024. Gregor Grosse, “Was Über Den Mutmaßlichen Anschlagsplan in Hof Bekannt Ist,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 13, 2024; Anna Fries, “Terrorverdacht in Hof: Ermittlungen Eingestellt, U-Haft Beendet,” BR24, November 14, 2024.

[x] Another suspect arrested in October 2024 on suspicion of plotting an attack against the Israeli embassy in Berlin was later released after the investigation did not find any evidence and his charges were dropped. On October 19, 2024, a 28-year-old Libyan asylum seeker was arrested in Brandenburg, as it was suspected that he was planning an attack on the Israeli embassy in Berlin. The initial arrest warrant alleged that he communicated via a messaging platform with an Islamic State member, discussing plans to carry out a gun attack on the embassy. Investigations, however, did not find any credible evidence to support that accusation and the suspect was released. He had cooperated with authorities, giving them full access to his phone and claimed he was confused with someone else who participated in a chat group. “Geplanter Terroranschlag? Haftbefehl Wegen Geplanten Anschlags Auf Israels Botschaft,” Legal Tribune Online, October 21, 2024; “Offenbar Anschlagsplan Auf Israels Botschaft,” Tagesschau, October 20, 2024; “Anschlagsverdacht Nicht Erhärtet: Terrorverdächtiger Libyer Wieder Auf Freiem Fuß,” Der Spiegel, January 13, 2025.

[y] On December 4, 2024, police in Augsburg arrested a 37-year-old man from Iraq who was suspected of planning an attack on the local Christmas market. He was known as a potential risk to security services as a result of his social media posts. While he is still being investigated for allegedly financially supporting the Islamic State, according to the Bavarian minister of interior, there were no specific attack plans. The suspect was deported to Iraq in February 2025. Frank Jordan, Joseph Röhmel, Barbara Leinfelder, and Andreas Herz, “Anschlag Auf Augsburger Christkindlesmarkt Geplant?” BR24, December 6, 2024; “Zugriff in Bayern: 37-Jähriger Wegen Verdachts Der Terrorfinanzierung Festgenommen,” Der Spiegel, December 6, 2024; Katja Auer, Florian Fuchs, and Sebastian Beck, “Terrorgefahr in Bayern: IS-Sympathisant in Augsburg Festgenommen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 6, 2024; Barbara Leinfelder and Andreas Herz, “Augsburger Gefährder per Charterflug in Den Irak Abgeschoben,” BR24, February 17, 2025.

[z] Since 2023, Frankfurt, for example, has banned all weapons defined as such by German weapons law as well as all knives with blades over 1.5 inches in the borough surrounding the central train station. Furthermore, weapons and all knives (including kitchen knives) are prohibited on public transportation in the state of Hesse, where Frankfurt is located, as they are a “weapon free zone.” Police have the authority to conduct controls and confiscate weapons, with fines up to 10,000 euros for violations. “Waffenverbotszone,” Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 2024; “Neue Messer- Und Waffenverbotszone Im Öffentlichen Personenverkehr,” Hessisches Ministerium des Innern, für Sicherheit und Heimatschutz, February 7, 2025.

[aa] Pierre Vogel, according to the North Rine Westphalian Ministry of Interior, is “probably the most prominent representative and face of the Salafist scene in Germany.” Born in 1978, he converted to Islam in 2001 and has spread salafi jihadi propaganda on various platforms. While he is not aligned with the Islamic State, the Badem Württemberg Office for the Protection of the Constitution described him in 2020 “as a kind of gateway drug that gives women and men access to the Salafist ideology and scene.” He currently has 93,000 followers on TikTok and almost 70,000 subscribers on YouTube. “Sitzung Des Innenausschusses Am 26.09.2024 Antrag Der Fraktion Der SPD Vom 15.09.2024 ‘Aktivitäten Des Extremistisch-Salafistischen Predigers Pierre Vogel in NRW,’” Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, September 20, 2024; “Serie ‘Salafistische Netzwerke Im Wandel’ | Teil 1: Pierre VOGEL,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, July 1, 2020.

[ab] Abul Baraa is a 51-year-old German salafi jihadi preacher whose TikTok videos, among others, radicalized Beran A., the suspect of the Taylor Swift attack plot in Vienna in 2024. Baraa used to be the imam at Berlin’s As-Sahaba Mosque, which was closed by the government in 2020. He is now a guest preacher at mosques in Germany and an influential preacher on social media who has been described as “the rock star of the Salafist scene in Germany.” He operates a YouTube channel but is also very active on TikTok where he has over 100,000 followers and posts popular short Q&A videos. “Serie ‘Salafistische Netzwerke Im Wandel’ Teil 10: Ahmad ABUL BARAA,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, December 13, 2022; Salma Abdelaziz, Florence Davey-Attlee, and Nina Avramova, “The ‘Rock Star’ Preacher Influencing Young People Online,” CNN, August 15, 2024; Nicolas Stockhammer and Colin Clarke, “The August 2024 Taylor Swift Vienna Concert Plot,” CTC Sentinel 18:1 (2025).

[ac] In 2023, the average age of a TikTok user was 24 years old with 10- to 19-year-olds taking up the largest share in demographics at 25 percent. Nic Dunn, “Top 23 TikTok Statistics & Facts You Need to Know in 2025!” Charle Agency, January 4, 2025.

[ad] This number does not include antisemitic attacks from right-wing extremists as they are reported separately.

[ae] Of the 20 thwarted Islamist attack plots between January 2020 and May 2025, two failed attempts were interrupted right after they started.

Citations
[1] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, June 18, 2024, p. 6.

[2] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2020,” Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, June 15, 2021, p. 189.

[3] “Plädoyers Im Terror-Prozess Um Anschläge von Waldkraiburg,” Zeit Online, July 21, 2025.

[4] “Urteil: Neuneinhalb Jahre Haft Für Anschläge von Waldkraiburg,” Zeit Online, July 23, 2021.

[5] “IS-Sympathisant: Angeklagter Im Prozess Um Anschläge in Waldkraiburg Geständig,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 2, 2021.

[6] “Neuneinhalb Jahre Haft Im Waldkraiburg-Prozess,” beck-aktuell, February 23, 2021.

[7] “Anschläge Auf Türkische Läden: Neuneinhalb Jahre Haft Für Angeklagten Im Waldkraiburg-Prozess,” Zeit Online, July 23, 2021.

[8] “Verfassungsschutzbericht Bayern 2020,” Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, für Sport und Integration, April 19, 2021, p. 65.

[9] “Urteil.”

[10] “Anklage Wegen Der Anschlagsserie in Waldkraiburg Und Weiterer Anschlagsvorhaben Erhoben,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, December 21, 2020.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Frank Jansen, Julius Betschka, and Alexander Fröhlich, “Mehrere Verletzte Auf Berliner A100: Fahrer Nach Berliner Autobahn-Anschlag in Psychiatrie,” Der Tagesspiegel, August 19, 2020.

[13] Landgericht Berlin, Verdict January 31, 2022 – Az. 521 Ks 1/21 – BeckRS 2022, 1007.

[14] “Berliner Amokfahrer Kommt in Die Psychiatrie,” beck-aktuell, February 1, 2022; Lisa Jani, “Landgericht Berlin Ordnet Nach Amokfahrt Auf Der Berliner Stadtautobahn Unterbringung Des Beschuldigten in Einem Psychiatrischen Krankenhaus An,” Berliner Strafgerichte, February 1, 2022.

[15] Frank Jansen, “Wer Ist Der Täter von Der Berliner Stadtautobahn?: Sarmad A. – Zwischen Fanatismus Und Psychischer Störung,” Der Tagesspiegel, August 19, 2020.

[16] Wiebke Ramm, “Prozess Gegen Stadtautobahn-Attentäter: Im Wahn,” Der Spiegel, April 15, 2021.

[17] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2020,” Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, June 15, 2021, p. 189.

[18] “Berliner Amokfahrer Kommt in Die Psychiatrie.”

[19] Susanne Memarnia and Stefan Alberti, “Terroranschlag Oder Amokfahrt,” taz, August 20, 2020.

[20] Ibid.; “Anschlag Auf A100: Staatsanwaltschaft Spricht von ‘Regelrechter Jagd Auf Motorradfahrer,’” rbb24, August 19, 2020.

[21] Landgericht Berlin, Verdict January 31, 2022 – Az. 521 Ks 1/21 – BeckRS 2022, 1007.

[22] Ramm, “Prozess Gegen Stadtautobahn-Attentäter.”

[23] “Berliner Amokfahrer Kommt in Die Psychiatrie.”

[24] Jani.

[25] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2020,” Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, June 15, 2021, p. 190; Wiebke Ramm, “Islamistenprozess in Dresden: ‘Seine Homophobie Hat Ihn Dazu Bewogen, Sich Gerade Diese Beiden Menschen Auszusuchen,’” Der Spiegel, April 12, 2021.

[26] “Urteil Gegen Abdullah A. Wegen Des Messerangriffs in Dresden,” Sächsische Staatskanzlei, OLG Dresden, May 21, 2021.

[27] “Urteil Gegen Abdullah A. Wegen Des Messerangriffs in Dresden,” TP-Presseagentur, May 21, 2021.

[28] Ramm, “Islamistenprozess in Dresden.”

[29] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021 – 4 St 1/21, BeckRS 2021, 11754.

[30] Europol, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report,” Publications Office of the European Union, 2021, p. 45.

[31] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021.

[32] Florian Barth, “Wie Sich Abdullah H. In Deutschland Radikalisiert Hat,” MDR, May 21, 2021.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] “Frühere Verurteilung Des Abdullah A.H.H.,” Oberlandesgericht Dresden, November 12, 2020.

[38] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021.

[39] Doreen Reinhard, “Messerangriff in Dresden: ‘Er War Vollkommen Ruhig Und Gelassen,’” Zeit Online, October 23, 2020.

[40] Ramm, “Islamistenprozess in Dresden.’”

[41] “Urteil Gegen Abdullah A. Wegen Des Messerangriffs in Dresden.”

[42] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021.

[43] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021,” Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, June 7, 2022, p. 177.

[44] Bettina Kaestner, “Strafverfahren Gegen Abdalrahman A. Wegen Des Verdachts Des Versuchten Mordes (‘ICE’),” Oberlandesgericht München, Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Justiz, December 23, 2022.

[45] “OLG München: ICE-Messerangreifer Zu 14 Jahren Haft Verurteilt,” Legal Tribune Online, December 23, 2022.

[46] “Verfassungsschutzbericht Bayern 2022,” Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, für Sport und Integration, April 24, 2023, p. 117.

[47] “ICE-Messerangriff: Ermittler Schließen Islamistischen Hintergrund Nicht Aus,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 16, 2021; Konrad Litschko, “Messerangriff in ICE Bei Regensburg: Anklage Wegen Islamistischer Tat,” taz, July 25, 2022.

[48] Benedikt Warmbrunn, “Messerattacke Im ICE: 14 Jahre Haft Für Täter,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 23, 2022.

[49] Ibid.

[50] “OLG München: ICE-Messerangreifer Zu 14 Jahren Haft Verurteilt.”

[51] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” p. 207.

[52] “Nach Islamistischen Messerattacken in Duisburg: Urteil Gegen Maan D. Wegen Mordes Sowie Versuchten Mordes in Vier Fällen – Pressemitteilung Nr. 37/2023,” Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, Justiz NRW, December 19, 2023.

[53] “Prozess Um Messerattacke in Duisburg: Lebenslange Haft Mit Sicherungsverwahrung,” WDR, December 19, 2023.

[54] Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, “Verdict – 6 StS 2/23,” Justiz NRW, December 19, 2023.

[55] “Islamismus Und Islamistischer Terrorismus,” Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2024.

[56] “Messerattacken in Duisburg – Angeklagter Zu Lebenslanger Haft Verurteilt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 19, 2023.

[57] “Staatsschutzverfahren Am OLG Stuttgart: Pro-zess Zum Mann-heimer Mes-ser-an-griff Hat Begonnen,” Legal Tribune Online, February 13, 2025.

[58] “Anklage Wegen Des Messerangriffs Auf Dem Marktplatz Mannheim Erhoben,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, November 6, 2024.

[59] Timo Steppat and Rüdiger Soldt, “Mannheim-Attentäter: Warum Sulaiman A. Nicht Abgeschoben Wurde,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 4, 2024.

[60] Christoph Koopmann and Roland Muschel, “Attentat von Mannheim: Der Islamist, Der Niemandem Auffiel,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 6, 2024.

[61] Benno Stieber, “Mannheim Prozess: Schrittweise Radikalisierung,” taz, March 23, 2025.

[62] Ibid.

[63] “Messerangriff von Mannheim: Angeklagter Gesteht Bluttat,” ZDFheute, March 25, 2025.

[64] “Messerattacke von Mannheim ‘Dann Habe Ich Plötzlich Gedacht: Heute Muss Jemand Sterben,’” STERN, March 25, 2025.

[65] “Messer-Angreifer von Mannheim legt Geständnis ab,” RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland, March 25, 2025.

[66] “‘Zur Verteidigung Des Koran’– Das Attentat von Mannheim Im Fokus von Al-Qaida,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, September 25, 2024.

[67] “Verfassungsschutzbericht Des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen Über Das Jahr 2024,” Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, April 8, 2025.

[68] Florian Flade, “Lassen Sich Terroranschläge Verhindern?” Tagesschau, August 28, 2024.

[69] Daniel Niemann and Stephanie Liechtenstein, “Islamic State Group Claims Responsibility for Knife Attack That Killed 3 at German Festival,” PBS News, August 24, 2024.

[70] “Terroranschlag Auf Stadtfest von Solingen: Generalbundesanwalt Erhebt Anklage Wegen Mordes,” Legal Tribune Online, February 27, 2025.

[71] Ibid.

[72] “Messerattacke: Mutmaßlicher Attentäter von Solingen Gefasst,” Deutsche Welle, August 24, 2024.

[73] “Polizei Prüft Bekennerschreiben: ‘Islamischer Staat’ Reklamiert Angriff in Solingen Für Sich,” Der Spiegel, August 25, 2024.

[74] Manuel Bewarder and Florian Flade, “Solingen: Hat Der Tatverdächtige Falsche Asylangaben Gemacht?” Tagesschau, August 26, 2024.

[75] “Voice of Khurasan: The Spider’s Web,” ISK, Internet Archive, accessed May 13, 2025, p. 26.

[76] “Angeklagter im Solingen-Prozess gesteht Messerangriff,” Tagesschau, May 27, 2025.

[77] “Sicherheitspaket Der Bundesregierung: Mehr Sicherheit Für Deutschland,” Die Bundesregierung, October 30, 2024.

[78] “Messerattacke in Solingen – Wie Die Politik Jetzt Handeln Will,” Deutschlandfunk, August 30, 2024.

[79] “Asyl- Und Waffenrecht: Bundestag Verabschiedet ‘Sicherheitspaket,’” Tagesschau, October 18, 2024.

[80] “Mutmaßlicher Anschlag in München: Verdächtiger Vor Haftrichter – Noch Viele Offene Fragen,” Tagesschau, February 14, 2025.

[81] Ibid.

[82] “Anschlag in München: Zweijähriges Kind Und Mutter Nach Anschlag in München Gestorben,” Tagesschau, February 16, 2025; Johannes Reichart, BR24, and Dominik Einzel, “Mehr Als Bisher Bekannt: 54 Verletzte Nach Anschlag in München,” BR24, April 18, 2025.

[83] “Anschlag in München: Ermittler Sprechen von Islamistischem Motiv,” Tagesschau, February 14, 2025.

[84] “Die Juristische Presseschau Vom 14. Februar 2025: GenStA Ermittelt Zu Anschlag von München / Neuer Präsident Des Cour Constitutionelle / EGMR Verhandelte Zu Pushbacks,” Legal Tribune Online, February 14, 2025.

[85] Petr Jerabek and Anita Fünffinger, “Attentäter von München: Abgelehnt, Illegal Oder Legal Im Land?” BR24, February 14, 2025.

[86] Ibid.

[87] “Die Juristische Presseschau Vom 14. Februar 2025.”

[88] “Täter von München: Hatte Sich Farhad N. Radikalisiert?” WDR, February 15, 2025.

[89] Kevin Weber and Corina Gall, “München: Auto Fährt in Eine Menschengruppe – Offenbar Mehrere Verletzte,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 13, 2025.

[90] Ferdinand Meyen, “Nach Anschlag in München: Söder Für Verhandlungen Mit Taliban,” BR24, February 16, 2025.

[91] “New Arrest Warrant Obtained in Connection with the Suspected Terrorist Attack on a Ver.di Event in Munich,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, April 14, 2025.

[92] Julika Enslin, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Dr. Christian Klos, Director General of Public Security, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community,” CTC Sentinel 18:3 (2025).

[93] Sam Hancock, “Berlin Stabbing Suspect Planned to Kill Jewish People, Police Believe,” BBC, February 21, 2025.

[94] “Messerangriff Am Holocaust-Mahnmal: Haftbefehl Gegen 19-Jährigen Syrer Erlassen,” rbb24, February 22, 2025; “Incident at the Holocaust Memorial,” Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, February 22, 2025.

[95] “Berlin Holocaust Memorial Attack Suspect Shares IS Beliefs: Prosecutors,” Barrons, February 24, 2025.

[96] “Angriff Am Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlin – Polizei: Tat War Antisemitisch Motiviert,” Deutschlandfunk, February 22, 2025.

[97] “Mahnmal-Angriff in Berlin: Generalbundesanwalt Zieht Ermittlungen an Sich,” Legal Tribune Online, February 24, 2025.

[98] “Übernahme Der Ermittlungen Wegen Des Versuchten Mordes Am Holocaust-Denkmal in Berlin,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, February 24, 2025.

[99] “Tourist Schwer Verletzt: Angriff Am Holocaustmahnmal in Berlin – Verdächtiger Wollte Laut Polizei ‘Juden Töten,’” Der Spiegel, February 22, 2025.

[100] Florian Pütz, Sven Röbel, and Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Ermittlungen in Berlin: Verdächtiger Wollte ‘Juden Töten’– Was Über Den Angriff Am Holocaustmahnmal Bekannt Ist,” Der Spiegel, February 22, 2025.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] “Neuer Haftbefehl Wegen Des Versuchten Mordes Am Holocaust-Denkmal in Berlin Erlassen Und in Vollzug Gesetzt,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, February 28, 2025; “Übernahme Der Ermittlungen Wegen Des Versuchten Mordes Am Holocaust-Denkmal in Berlin.”

[104] “BKA: 18 Islamistische Anschläge Seit 2010 Verhindert,” RedaktionsNetzwerk Deutschland, December 12, 2023.

[105] “Festnahme Fünf Mutmaßlicher Mitglieder Einer Terrorzelle Der Ausländischen Terroristischen Vereinigung ‘Islamischer Staat (IS),’” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, April 15, 2020. For an in-depth analysis of the plot, see Nodirbek Soliev, “The April 2020 Islamic State Terror Plot against U.S. And NATO Military Bases in Germany: The Tajik Connection,” CTC Sentinel 14:1 (2021).

[106] “Germany Arrests Four Tajik Nationals Suspected of Plotting Terrorist Attack,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 15, 2020.

[107] “Germany Arrests IS Suspects Plotting Attacks on US Bases,” Deutsche Welle, April 15, 2020; Soliev.

[108] Soliev.

[109] “Festnahme Fünf Mutmaßlicher Mitglieder Einer Terrorzelle Der Ausländischen Terroristischen Vereinigung ‘Islamischer Staat (IS).’”

[110] “Haftstrafen Wegen IS-Mitgliedschaft,” Deutsche Welle, May 31, 2022.

[111] Ibid.

[112] “Islamistischer Anschlag in Hamburg Verhindert,” Deutsche Welle, December 10, 2021; Kai Biermann, “Terrorismus: Dschihadist Der Nächsten Generation,” Zeit Online, December 11, 2021.

[113] Biermann.

[114] “Verhinderter Mutmaßlicher Terroranschlag: Bundesanwaltschaft Übernimmt Ermittlungen Gegen Abdurrahman C.,” Der Spiegel, December 13, 2021; “Durchsuchungen Und Festnahme: Offenbar Anschlag in Hamburg Verhindert,” Tagesschau, December 10, 2021.

[115] “Anschlagsvorbereitung in Hamburg: Al-Qaida-Anhänger Wegen Terrorplanung Zu Acht Jahren Haft Verurteilt,” Der Spiegel, July 8, 2022.

[116] “Durchsuchungen Und Festnahme.”

[117] “Anschlagsvorbereitung in Hamburg.”

[118] Tobias Großekemper, “Prozess nach Terrorverdacht in Hagen: Detaillierte Baupläne für die Bombe,” Der Spiegel, March 5, 2022.

[119] “Hagen in NRW: Vier Fest-nahmen Nach Gefahr Eines Anschlags Auf Syna-goge,” Legal Tribune Online, September 16, 2021.

[120] Luisa Ebbrecht, “Vereitelter Terroranschlag in Hagen Sollte „Möglichst Volle Synagoge“ Treffen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, September 23, 2021.

[121] Großekemper.

[122] “Hagen: Bewährungsstrafe Für Geplanten Anschlag Auf Synagoge,” Zeit Online, March 28, 2022; “16-Jähriger in Untersuchungshaft: Terrorverdächtiger Kundschaftete Synagoge in Hagen Aus,” Der Spiegel, September 24, 2021.

[123] “Haftstrafe Auf Bewährung: Jugendlicher Für Anschlagspläne Auf Synagoge in Hagen Verurteilt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 28, 2022.

[124] “Hagen: Bewährungsstrafe Für Geplanten Anschlag Auf Synagoge;” “Geplante Terroranschläge: Ausländische Geheimdienste Lieferten Jeden Zweiten Hinweis,” Der Spiegel, February 6, 2022.

[125] “Urteil Im Verfahren Wegen Anschlagsplänen Auf Die Hagener Synagoge,” Landgericht Hagen, March 28, 2022.

[126] Christian Wolf, “Anschlag Auf Weihnachtsmarkt Geplant: Was Bisher Über Die Terrorverdächtigen Bekannt Ist,” WDR, November 30, 2023.

[127] Christoph Koopmann, “Terror-Ermittlungen in Castrop-Rauxel: Zweite Durchsuchung Ohne Erfolg,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 9, 2023.

[128] Rainer Striewski and Moritz Börner, “Castrop-Rauxel: Terror-Verdächtige sollen Silvester-Anschlag geplant haben,” WDR, January 16, 2023.

[129] Koopmann, “Terror-Ermittlungen in Castrop-Rauxel.”

[130] “Iraner Aus Castrop-Rauxel: Giftanschlag Geplant – Islamist Zu Vier Jahren Gefängnis Verurteilt,” Der Spiegel, November 23, 2023.

[131] “Bundesgerichtshof: Geplanter Terroranschlag Mit Gift: Urteil Rechtskräftig,” Zeit Online, September 3, 2024.

[132] “Oberlandesgericht: Brüder Nach Geplantem Islamistischen Anschlag Verurteilt,” Zeit Online, December 19, 2023.

[133] Ibid.

[134] “Festnahme in Hamburg: 28-Jähriger Soll Sprengstoffanschlag Geplant Haben,” Der Spiegel, April 25, 2023; “Syrer Soll Anschlag Geplant Haben,” Deutsche Welle, April 25, 2023.

[135] Pascal Bartosz, “Pläne Islamistischer Terroristen: Diese Anschläge Wurden Durch Hinweise von US-Geheimdiensten Verhindert,” Der Tagesspiegel, March 7, 2025.

[136] “Urteilsverkündung Im Prozess Um Geplanten Terroranschlag,” NDR, December 18, 2023.

[137] “Anschlag Auf Kirche Geplant: Zwei Brüder in Hamburg Verurteilt,” NDR, December 17, 2023.

[138] “Acht Jahre Haft Für Vereitelten Terroranschlag Auf Pro-Israel-Demo,” WDR, March 13, 2025.

[139] Candan Six-Sasmaz and Carl Exner, “Wie Groß Ist Die Islamistische Gefahr in Deutschland?” ZDFheute, April 24, 2024.

[140] Jörg Diehl, Roman Lehberger, Sven Röbel, Fidelius Schmid, and Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Terrorgefahr in Deutschland: Zwei Teenager Sollen Anschlag Auf Weihnachtsmarkt Geplant Haben,” Der Spiegel, November 29, 2023.

[141] “Festnahme in Duisburg: Wer Ist Der Terrorverdächtige Tarik S.?” WDR, October 26, 2023.

[142] Six-Sasmaz and Exner.

[143] “Festnahme in Duisburg.”

[144] “Acht Jahre Haft Für Vereitelten Terroranschlag Auf Pro-Israel-Demo.”

[145] Marvin Kalies, Leonard Schubert, and Cornelia Winkler, “Mutmaßlicher Islamist Aus Sachsen-Anhalt Stand Kurz Vor Der Abschiebung,” MDR, December 1, 2023.

[146] Bartosz.

[147] “20-Jähriger Soll Weihnachtsmarkt-Anschlag Geplant Haben,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 1, 2023.

[148] Florian Flade and Reiko Pinkert, “Terroranschlag Auf Weihnachtsmarkt in Hannover Geplant?” NDR, December 1, 2023.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Karl Doeleke, “Attacke Mit Messer Verhindert? Anschlag Auf Weihnachtsmarkt in Hannover Geplant: 20-Jähriger Iraker Abgeschoben,” Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, December 16, 2023.

[151] Jörg Diehl, Lehberger, Röbel, Schmid, and Wiedmann-Schmidt.

[152] “Verurteilung Wegen Eines Geplanten Anschlags Auf Einen Weihnachtsmarkt Mit Einem Kraftfahrzeug Rechtskräftig,” Bundesgerichtshof, January 16, 2025.

[153] “Terrorabwehr: Warum Deutschland Auf Tipps Aus Dem Ausland Angewiesen Ist,” WDR, December 2, 2023.

[154] “Mutmaßlicher Anschlagsplan Auf Weihnachtsmarkt: Anklage,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 9, 2024.

[155] Björn Haase-Wendt, “Prozess Gegen 17-Jährigen Wegen Geplanten Anschlags Auf Weihnachtsmarkt Startet,” rbb24, July 17, 2024; “Mutmaßlicher Anschlagsplan Auf Weihnachtsmarkt: Anklage.”

[156] Markus Schmitz, “Vier Jahre Jugendhaft Für Anschlagspläne Auf Weihnachtsmarkt in Leverkusen,” WDR, June 28, 2024; “Anschlagsplan Auf Weihnachtsmarkt – 17-Jähriger Aus Wittstock Verurteilt,” rbb24, August 1, 2024.

[157] “Islamistische Terroristen – Der Mutmaßliche Anschlagversuch in Köln Und Die Rolle Extremistischer Tadschiken (Drucksache 20/10460),” Deutscher Bundestag, March 26, 2024, p. 1.

[158] Jochen Hilgers, “Tadschike Nach Terrorwarnung Gegen Den Kölner Dom Ausgeliefert,” WDR, February 22, 2024.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Jan Henrich, “Hamas: Prozess Gegen Mutmaßliche Mitglieder in Berlin,” ZDFheute, February 25, 2025.

[162] “Anklage Gegen Vier Mutmaßliche Mitglieder Der Ausländischen Terroristischen Vereinigung HAMAS Erhoben,” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, November 25, 2024.

[163] “Anschlagspläne: Hamas-Mitglieder Festgenommen,” ZDFheute, December 14, 2023.

[164] “Anklage Gegen Vier Mutmaßliche Mitglieder Der Ausländischen Terroristischen Vereinigung HAMAS Erhoben.”

[165] “Folgen Und Konsequenzen Des Betätigungsverbotes Der HAMAS (Drucksache 20/13161),” Deutscher Bundestag, January 17, 2022, p. 6.

[166] “Mutmaßliche Hamas-Anhänger Planten Offenbar Terroranschläge in Deutschland,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 25, 2024.

[167] “Anklage Gegen Jugendliche Wegen Terrorverdachts,” Tagesschau, October 6, 2024.

[168] “Verfassungsschutz: Jugendliche Radikalisieren Sich Im Internet,” Zeit Online, May 3, 2024.

[169] “Drei Jugendliche Wegen Terror-Anschlagsplänen Verurteilt,” WDR, March 21, 2025.

[170] “Drei Jugendliche Wegen Mutmaßlicher Terrorpläne Vor Gericht,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 13, 2024.

[171] “Anklage Gegen Jugendliche Wegen Terrorverdachts.”

[172] “Radikalisiert Durch Den IS: Drei Jugendliche in Düsseldorf Wegen Anschlagsplänen Verurteilt,” Der Spiegel, March 21, 2025.

[173] “Drei Jugendliche Wegen Terror-Anschlagsplänen Verurteilt.”

[174] “Radikalisiert Durch Den IS.”

[175] Koopmann and Muschel; “Gericht Verurteilt Islamisten Heilbronn: Mehrere Jahre Haft Für Anschlagspläne Auf Synagoge,” SWR Aktuell, January 24, 2025.

[176] “Gericht Verurteilt Islamisten Heilbronn.”

[177] “Anschlag Auf Synagoge Geplant?” Tagesschau, May 24, 2024.

[178] “LKA-BW: Gemeinsame Pressemitteilung Der Staatsanwaltschaften Stuttgart Und Karlsruhe Und Des Landeskriminalamts Baden-Württemberg: Festnahme Nach Verabredung Zum Mord,” Landeskriminalamt Baden-Württemberg, May 24, 2024.

[179] “Heidelberg – Urteile Nach Geständnissen Zu Anschlagsplan Auf Synagoge,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, January 23, 2025.

[180] “Urteil Im Verfahren 15 KLs 331 Js 57240/24 (‘Prozess Gegen Mutmaßliche Islamisten’),” Landgericht Heilbronn, January 24, 2025.

[181] Franz Feyder, “Prozess Gegen Mutmaßlichen IS-Terroristen – 27-Jähriger Aus Esslingen Soll Anschlag Mit Sprengstoff-Drohne Geplant Haben,” Esslinger Zeitung, January 9, 2025.

[182] “Festnahme Eines Mutmaßlichen Mitglieds Der Ausländischen Terroristischen Vereinigung ‘Islamischer Staat (IS),’” Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, June 20, 2024.

[183] “Stuttgart: Mann Wegen Mutmaßlicher Anschlagspläne Vor Gericht,” SWR Aktuell, January 9, 2025.

[184] Feyder.

[185] “Verdächtiger Aus Esslingen Angeklagt: Stuttgarter IS-Prozess Wegen Mutmaßlicher Anschlagspläne Beginnt,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, January 8, 2025.

[186] “Stuttgart: Mann Wegen Mutmaßlicher Anschlagspläne Vor Gericht.”

[187] “Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart: IS-Mitglied Wegen Anschlagsplänen Zu Mehreren Jahren Gefängnis Verurteilt,” SWR Aktuell, March 31, 2025; “7. Strafsenat: Angeklagter Wegen Mitgliedschaft Beim IS Und Wegen Vorbereitung Eines Sprengstoffanschlags Zu Gesamt-freiheitsstrafe von 5 Jahren Und 1 Woche Sowie Zu Weiterer Freiheitsstrafe von 6 Monaten Verurteilt,” Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 2025.

[188] “Anschlag Auf Das Israelische Generalkonsulat Am 5. September 2024 in München,” Bayrisches Landeskriminalamt, March 14, 2025.

[189] “München: Ermittlungen Nach Versuchtem Terroranschlag Gehen Weiter,” Deutschlandfunk, September 6, 2024.

[190] “Tat in München War Antiisraelischer Terroranschlag,” Tagesschau, March 14, 2025; “Anschlag Auf Das Israelische Generalkonsulat Am 5. September 2024 in München.”

[191] “Tat in München War Antiisraelischer Terroranschlag;” Florian Flade, “Das Ist Über Den Schützen von München Bekannt,” Tagesschau, September 5, 2024.

[192] “Anschlag Auf Das Israelische Generalkonsulat Am 5. September 2024 in München.”

[193] Ibid.

[194] “Macheten-Angriff Auf Polizei in Linz: Prozess Hat Begonnen,” SWR Aktuell, February 19, 2025.

[195] Ibid.

[196] “Acht Jahre Haft Nach Machetenangriff Auf Polizei in Linz,” SWR Aktuell, March 6, 2025.

[197] Ibid.

[198] “Machetenangriff Auf Polizeiwache: Angeklagter Verurteilt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 6, 2025.

[199] “Acht Jahre Haft Nach Machetenangriff Auf Polizei in Linz.”

[200] “Wuppertal: 15-Jähriger Jugendlicher Soll Attentat Auf Juden Geplant Haben,” Zeit Online, October 3, 2024.

[201] Antonia Rüller, “Zum Mord Verabredet: 16-Jähriger Wuppertaler Zu Jugendhaft Verurteilt,” WDR, March 28, 2025.

[202] Tobias Großekemper and Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, “Mutmaßlicher Islamist: Teenager Aus Wuppertal Soll Anschläge Auf Juden Geplant Haben,” Der Spiegel, October 3, 2024.

[203] “Wuppertal: 15-Jähriger Jugendlicher Soll Attentat Auf Juden Geplant Haben.”

[204] Rüller.

[205] “Haftstrafe: Landgericht Wuppertal Verurteilt 16-Jährigen Wegen Terrorabsichten,” Der Spiegel, March 28, 2025.

[206] “Mutmaßlicher Islamist Aus Schleswig-Holstein: 18-Jähriger Soll Massenmord Geplant Haben – Anklage Erhoben,” Der Spiegel, March 14, 2025.

[207] “Elmshorn: Details Zum Terrorverdacht Gegen 17-Jährigen,” NDR, November 12, 2024.

[208] “Geplanter Anschlag: 17-Jähriger Aus Elmshorn Wollte ‘Ins Paradies,’” NDR, November 14, 2024.

[209] “Mutmaßlicher Islamist Aus Schleswig-Holstein.”

[210] Eike Köhler and Julian Feldmann, “Itzehoe: 18-Jähriger Wegen Mutmaßlicher Anschlagspläne Vor Gericht,” NDR, April 25, 2025.

[211] Eike Köhler and Julian Feldmann, “Itzehoe: 18-Jähriger Wegen Mutmaßlicher Anschlagspläne Vor Gericht,” NDR, April 25, 2025.

[212] Lucretia Gather and Stefan Schmelzer, “Terrorverdacht? Jugendlicher Aus Kreis Mainz-Bingen Angeklagt,” SWR Aktuell, April 28, 2025.

[213] Nail Akkoyun, “Selbstgebaute Rohrbomben: Jugendlicher Wegen Islamistischen Anschlagsplans Verhaftet,” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 28, 2024.

[214] “Festnahme Wegen Des Verdachts Der Vorbereitung Einer Schweren Staatsgefährdenden Gewalttat,” Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Koblenz, November 28, 2024.

[215] Lucretia Gather and Stefan Schmelzer, “Terrorverdacht? Jugendlicher Aus Kreis Mainz-Bingen Angeklagt,” SWR Aktuell, April 28, 2025.

[216] “LKA-BW: Gemeinsame Pressemitteilung Der Staatsanwaltschaft Karlsruhe, Des LKA BW Und Des Hessischen LKA: Verdacht Der Vorbereitung Einer Schweren Staatsgefährdenden Gewalttat – Drei Männer Festgenommen,” Landeskriminalamt Baden-Württemberg, December 10, 2024.

[217] “Drei IS-Anhänger Wegen Konkreter Anschlagspläne Festgenommen,” Zeit Online, December 10, 2024.

[218] “IS-Sympathisanten Unter Terrorverdacht: Drei Junge Männer Wegen Anschlags-Plänen in U-Haft,” Hessenschau, December 10, 2024.

[219] “Hessen Und Baden-Württemberg – Drei Mutmaßliche IS-Anhänger Wegen Verdachts Auf Geplanten Terroranschlag Festgenommen,” Deutschlandfunk, December 14, 2024.

[220] “18-Jähriger Russe Wegen Mutmaßlichen Anschlagsplänen Festgenommen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 21, 2025; “Anschlag Auf Israelische Botschaft? 18-Jähriger Verhaftet,” BR24, February 22, 2025.

[221] “Anschlag Vereitelt: Anschlagsplan Auf Israelische Botschaft – Russe in Haft,” Zeit Online, February 21, 2025.

[222] “18-Jähriger in Brandenburg Wegen Möglicher Anschlagspläne Festgenommen,” rbb24, February 21, 2025.

[223] Alexander Fröhlich and Constanze Nauhaus, “Anschlag Auf Israelische Botschaft in Berlin Geplant: Fünf Festnahmen Nach Durchsuchungen in Potsdam,” Der Tagesspiegel, February 22, 2025.

[224] “Mögliche Anschlagspläne in Berlin: Durchsuchungen, Eine Sprengvorrichtung, Offene Fragen,” Tagesschau, February 22, 2025.

[225] “Mutmaßlicher Anschlagsplan: Polizei Sichert Möglichen Sprengsatz,” ZDFheute, February 22, 2025.

[226] “§ 42 WaffG – Einzelnorm,” Bundesministerium der Justiz, accessed May 19, 2025.

[227] Fabian Siegel, “Wie Wirksam Sind Waffenverbotszonen?” Tagesschau, February 15, 2025.

[228] Ibid.

[229] “Praxisfern, Kompliziert Und Ineffizient: Position Der DPolG Berlin Zu Den Messer-/Waffenverbotszonen,” Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft Landesverband Berlin, February 10, 2025.

[230] Torben Heine and Jan Schneider, “Umstrittene Scholz-Forderung: Bringen Waffenverbotszonen Mehr Sicherheit?” ZDFheute, June 6, 2024.

[231] “Verantwortung Für Deutschland: Koalitionsvertrag Zwischen CDU, CSU Und SPD – 21. Legislaturperiode,” CDU, CSU, and SPD, 2025, p. 89.

[232] “§ 89a StGB – Einzelnorm,” Bundesministerium der Justiz, accessed May 19, 2025.

[233] “Debatte Um Terrorismus-Strafbarkeit: Vorfeldkriminalisierung Auch von Messern Und Autos?” Legal Tribune Online, January 27, 2025.

[234] Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead, “Into the Crowd: The Evolution of Vehicular Attacks and Prevention Efforts,” CTC Sentinel 18:3 (2025).

[235] Ibid.

[236] Enslin.

[237] Ibid.

[238] Moustafa Ayad, “Teenage Terrorists and the Digital Ecosystem of the Islamic State,” CTC Sentinel 18:2 (2025); Peter R. Neumann, “Die Rückkehr des Terrors: Wie uns der Dschihadismus herausfordert,” authorized audio edition, read by the author (Munich: Der Hörverlag, 2023), chapter: “TikTok-Dschihadisten.”

[239] Neumann, chapter: “TikTok-Dschihadisten,” 4:00.

[240] Friedhelm Hartwig, “Islamistische Propaganda Auf Social Media,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, April 11, 2025.

[241] Ibid.

[242] Niklas Brinkmöller, Benedikt Büchsenschütz, and Margareta Wetchy, “‘Brother, Who Still Believes the Newspaper?’ Media as Enemy and Point of Reference in the Communication of Islamist Online Actors,” Violence Prevention Network, 2024, p. 28.

[243] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” p. 209; Neumann, chapter: “Virtuelle Ökosysteme,” 5:36.

[244] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” p. 227.

[245] Neumann, chapter: “Islamistische Influencer.”

[246] Oberlandesgericht Dresden, Verdict May 21, 2021.

[247] Neumann, chapter: “Virtuelle Ökosysteme,” 5:35.

[248] Ayad.

[249] Ibid.

[250] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” p. 42.

[251] “Spy Chat with Chris Costa – Guest: Christine Abizaid,” International Spy Museum via YouTube, September 16, 2024, 8:45-10:26.

[252] “Auswirkungen Des Terrorangriffs Der HAMAS Gegen Israel Auf Die Sicherheitslage in Deutschland,” Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, November 29, 2023.

[253] “7. Strafsenat: Angeklagter Wegen Mitgliedschaft Beim IS Und Wegen Vorbereitung Eines Sprengstoffanschlags Zu Gesamt-freiheitsstrafe von 5 Jahren Und 1 Woche Sowie Zu Weiterer Freiheitsstrafe von 6 Monaten Verurteilt.”

[254] “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023,” p. 226.

[255] “Täter in Marktplatz-Prozess: ‘Heute Muss Jemand Sterben,’” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 25, 2025.

[256] Joseph Röhmel, “Vor Fußball-EM: Wie Der IS Die Sicherheit Bedroht,” BR24, May 29, 2024.

[257] Christoph Koopmann, “Terror-Experte Im Interview: Wie Groß Ist Die Anschlagsgefahr an Karneval?” Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 1, 2025.

[258] “Schriftliche Fragen Mit Den in Der Woche Vom 31. Januar 2022 Eingegangenen Antworten Der Bundesregierung (Drucksache 20/602),” Deutscher Bundestag, February 4, 2022, p. 43.

[259] Enslin.

[260] “‘Sicherheitspaket Plus’ – Das Sind Die Forderungen,” Tagesschau, October 21, 2024.

[261] “Hohe Gefährdungslage Durch Islamistischen Terrorismus: Deutschland Muss Eigene Fähigkeiten Bei Der Terrorabwehr Stärken!” Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft, December 10, 2024.

[262] “Hessens Innenminister Fordert Mehr Geheimdienst-Befugnisse,” Zeit Online, October 21, 2024.

[263] Ibid.

[264] “Deutsche Nachrichtendienste – Ehemalige BND-Chefs Fordern Mehr Befugnisse,” Deutschlandfunk, August 6, 2023.

[265] “Verantwortung Für Deutschland,” p. 82.

[266] Ibid.