Abstract: Nearly three years after the Somali government launched its offensive against al-Shabaab, the security landscape remains precarious. Al-Shabaab has resurged, coordination between federal and Puntland forces is limited despite Islamic State-Somalia’s growing global remit, and the future of the African Union mission is uncertain. These trends are driven by political discord, a fragmented national landscape, donor fatigue, operational challenges, and al-Shabaab’s resilience. This article offers a comprehensive overview of current security efforts and evaluates the drivers shaping Somalia’s precarious trajectory, concluding that political compromise is essential to effectively counter the dual threats posed by al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia.
On March 18, 2025, an improvised explosive device (IED) was remotely detonated at a junction near Mogadishu. The intended target was the president of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The perpetrator was al-Shabaab, one of al-Qa`ida’s most successful affiliates. The president survived, but the attack, one of the deadliest in recent months,a signaled a growing concern that some observers, practitioners, and researchers have been echoing over the past few months: Al-Shabaab is resurging, advancing ever closer to the Somali capital, and, as a result, Mogadishu may not be safe.1 The possibility of al-Shabaab encircling or even overrunning Mogadishu has also been raised. However, differences in opinion exist, with some analysts more cautiously concluding that the group may not be interested in and/or lack the capacity to seize Mogadishu at this time.2 Where there is agreement is that al-Shabaab is exploiting a divided political environment to strike and reverse the government’s gains in central Somalia. Whether or not al-Shabaab is currently positioning itself to seize control of Mogadishu in the near term, what the recent attempt on President Mohamud’s convoy does demonstrate is a significant departure from the optimistic narratives that characterized the first few months of his administration’s offensive against the group in late 2022.
Meanwhile, in the northeastern Puntland region of the country, Islamic State-Somalia, once regarded as a marginal player overshadowed by the more dominant al-Shabaab, has been making international headlines. The group has evolved from a small, localized breakaway faction of the al-Qa`ida-affiliated al-Shabaab into a key player in the Islamic State’s broader global network.b In the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) 2025 Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Service Committee, General Michael Langley confirmed that the Islamic State is directing its global operations from Somalia, further emphasizing the threat posed by the group.3 However, despite its growing global remit, national efforts by Somali federal forces to counter Islamic State-Somalia have been limited. In fact, the most robust efforts against the group are being led by the forces of the semi-autonomous region Puntland, with little ground support from either the FGS or African Union forces.
As efforts against these two insurgent-terrorist actors continue, they are occurring against a backdrop of uncertainty over the future of the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Funding shortfalls and an unclear path forward for securing stable and predictable funding past June 20254 raise concerns over AUSSOM’s ability to support efforts to degrade al-Shabaab, achieve its milestones, and prevent security gaps that the insurgent group could exploit.
In light of these developments, it is important to reflect on the factors that have contributed to the resurgence of al-Shabaab, a Puntland-led response to Islamic State-Somalia with little FGS support, and the uncertainty that surrounds the AUSSOM mission. By assessing the factors that led to this situation, one can better inform the path forward. This article is organized in two parts. The first provides an overview of the background and current status of national efforts against al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia, and AUSSOM’s current status. The second part assesses the factors that have contributed to the current situation.
Part 1: The Evolving Fight Against al-Shabaab, Puntland’s Efforts Against Islamic State-Somalia, and AUSSOM’s Precarious Future
Launched in August 2022, only a few months after President Mohamud was reelected into office, the FGS’ offensive against al-Shabaab was initially met with much optimism. Fighting alongside clan militiac (known as Ma’awisley) in central regions of the country, and receiving support from U.S. and Turkish drones, federal forces were taking the lead in fighting al-Shabaab.5 In doing so, they managed to recover significant amounts of territory held by al-Shabaab in Hiraan (located in Hirshabelle) and Galgaduud (located in Galmudug). Much of these gains occurred between August and December 2022, and an Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) report from April 2023 indicated that the Somali forces within the first phase of the offensive had managed to regain control of over 215 locations, mostly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug.6
However, the tides began to shift against the government in 2023. Though the offensive maintained some momentum at the beginning of that year, it also experienced a string of attacks from al-Shabaab that slowed its pace. By June 2023, the government’s ambitious plans to launch a second phase of the offensive against al-Shabaab’s southern strongholds, dubbed Operation Black Lion,d had to be postponed. Setbacks in Hirshabelle and Galmudug forced government forces to remain focused on central Somalia instead of pivoting south.7
Despite maintaining some of its gains in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle (Hirshabelle State), and parts of Mudug (Galmudug), by August 2023 a deadly attack in the village of Cowsweyne in Galgaduud revealed shortcomings and obstacles in the government’s offensive that undermined and stalled its efforts into 2024.8 The attack not only inflicted heavy losses on Somali National Army (SNA) brigades, but also resulted in the collapse of the government’s frontline in southern Galmudug.9
By January 2024, al-Shabaab remained a persistent threat while the government’s offensive had stalled in Galgaduud. Over the year, the FGS on several occasions indicated it was about to resume its offensive operations against al-Shabaab, but other than episodic engagements in Hirshabelle, there was not much offensive activity against the group when compared to the previous years.10 Where there was meaningful activity was farther south in Jubaland’s Lower Juba region. Here, between March and July 2024, SNA and Jubaland regional forces, supported by U.S. airstrikes, targeted al-Shabaab positions and seized villages and towns such as Bulo Haji (also spelled Buulo Xaaji), Harboole, and Mido that surround Kismayo city.11 Overall, however, the federal government found it difficult to recapture the momentum that characterized the initial phase of the offensive in 2022 when it was able to ensure coordination at the federal, state, and local level.
By the beginning of 2025, the offensive against al-Shabaab appeared to have reached a stalemate. However, since February, a little before Ramadan, al-Shabaab began to resurge, launching a counteroffensive primarily focused in Middle Shabelle.e Aiming to recover the territory it lost in Middle Shabelle, al-Shabaab managed to recapture several locations, including strategic towns such as Adan Yabaal in April 2025,f that served as the group’s regional center of operations in Middle Shabelle before government forces captured it in December 2022.12
By mid-May 2025, al-Shabaab had managed to recapture most of the territory it lost in Middle Shabelle since 2022. Meanwhile, government forces continued to face increased pressure to push back against the insurgents in Middle Shabelle, while clan militia (Ma’awisley) in Hiraan, particularly those from the Hawadle clan, had been reportedly fighting al-Shabaab on their own due to a decline in federal military support in the region and the government’s preoccupation with pushing back against the insurgents in neighboring Middle Shabelle.13 However, the situation remains fluid, with some territories in rural areas changing hands between the government and al-Shabaab on a regular basis.14
In addition to its efforts in Middle Shabelle, al-Shabaab has also conducted attacks in Lower Shabelle, including launching mortal rounds into Afgooye town’s SNA base, about 30 kilometers from Mogadishu, and attacks in and around Mogadishu.15 The most high-profile of these attacks was the IED attack on President Mohamud’s convoy in the streets of Mogadishu in March 2025.16
The government, for its part, has dispatched forces and weapons to Middle Shabelle, with the president himself traveling back and forth from the frontline as part of a broader effort to mount a counteroffensive against al-Shabaab.17 The government has managed to hold some of the territory it captured during the initial phases of its offensive, and so far its position has not collapsed in the face of al-Shabaab’s attacks. Meanwhile, Turkey and the United States have supported the FGS with airstrikes, with Washington recently loosening its restrictions on airstrikes and increasing their tempo inside Somalia.g
The beginning of 2025 also saw an uptick in activity from Islamic State-Somalia and efforts to counter the group in Puntland. According to reports from ACLED, January saw the Islamic State affiliate detonate at least seven IEDs and successfully conduct two drone attacks against Puntland security forces.18 The surge in Islamic State-Somalia’s activities comes as a result of Puntland’s efforts to crackdown on the group. Following months of preparations, in January 2025 Puntland’s authorities launched Operation Hilaac (meaning lightning). Mobilizing roughly 3,000 forcesh against Islamic State-Somalia in the Al-Miskaad mountains in the Bari region, Puntland security forces have been successful in the first phase of the operation.i Islamic State-Somalia has been pushed out of key supply routes and bases during this period.19
Intending to build upon January’s momentum, on January 30, 2025, Puntland’s President Said Abdullahi Deni announced the launch of the second phase of the government’s operation. The objective is to push Islamic State-Somalia out of its remaining stronghold in the Al-Miskaad mountains.20 As of May 2025, these operations remain ongoing. Despite early successes, pushing Islamic State forces out of the mountains and its complex cave system will be challenging.21
Puntland has been fighting Islamic State-Somalia for years, often with little support from the FGS, A.U. forces, or external actors such as Turkey. However, on February 1, 2025, the United States conducted its first major military operation under the new administration, and the target was Islamic State-Somalia in Puntland, signaling the group’s growing role as a global threat.j The United States, as well as Puntland’s longtime external partner, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has continued to launch airstrikes in support of the domestic operations.22 Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Kenya have also aided Puntland’s efforts.23 Despite this external support, “Puntland has been leading much of the ground offensives against the militants.”24
Meanwhile, questions over the future of AUSSOM in Somalia remained a point of conversation over 2024 given the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) deadline for a full drawdown at the end of that year. Past delays in ATMIS troop withdrawals in 2023 drew into focus the lack of Somali forces preparedness to takeover after December 2024. It is for this reason that the Somali government in December 2023 requested a follow-on mission to replace ATMIS during the Somalia Security Conference in New York and subsequently submitted a proposal to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in March 2024 and to the United Nations Security Council in April 2024.25 The FGS’ initial proposal outlined a plan for a new mission with a limited mandate, scope, and size, with the FGS anticipating a follow-on force not exceeding 10,000 personnel covering 14 forward operating bases (FOBs) with a mission timeframe corresponding to the FGS’ three- to five-year plan to build up its capacity to independently provide security to key population centers.k
On August 1, 2024, the AUPSC adopted the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) for AUSSOM, and in late December 2024, the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 2767, endorsed the AUPSC’s decision. Replacing ATMIS, AUSSOM was set to begin functions on January 1, 2025, with up to 11,911 personnel,l including civilian and police personnel, and operate for five years.26
Despite being declared de jure operational as of January 1, several outstanding concerns remained unresolved about the AUSSOM mission. At the beginning of the year, uncertainty over the size and location of pending troop contributions meant that there was also a lack of clarity on the mission’s operational set-up, mission design, command and control, and ultimately its capabilities. In February 2025, following a series of bilateral and multilateral consultations, the FGS and African Union agreed on the number of troop contributing countries (TCCs) for the mission.27 The new arrangement allocated the following troop numbers to: Uganda (4,500), Ethiopia (2,500), Djibouti (1,520), Kenya (1,410), and Egypt (1,091).m
However, during a summit held by the heads of state and governments of the TCCs in Kampala, Uganda, on April 25, 2025, the TCCs “stressed the need to increase troop strength by at least 8,000 additional personnel to address the prevailing security challenges.”n Recognizing the deteriorating security situation, and resurgence of al-Shabaab, the TCCs further concluded the urgency to, beyond the additional troop surge, deploy bilateral troops to augment AUSSOM.28 These requests not only made clear the precarious security situation, but that the A.U. troop drawdowns over the past years had “not been replaced with Somali forces as planned, resulting in major gaps that Al Shabaab has been able to exploit to regain territories.”29 While TCCs urged for sustainable funding to support the mission, uncertainty still remains.
As the AUPSC noted in its report to the February 2024 A.U. summit, the ATMIS mission was already experiencing a funding shortfall estimated to be “over $100 million by the time the ATMIS forces exit on 31 December 2024” as a result of extensions placed on troop drawdown.o The total amount required to cover the financial costs for the AUSSOM mission between January to June 2025 is estimated to be approximately U.S. $96 million.30 “With only less than 20% of the funding required for the period of January to June 2025 mobilised,” it is clear that the mission is experiencing major funding shortfalls and uncertainty looms for continued funding beyond June 2025.31 There has been conversation about possibly funding AUSSOM using United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2719 (2023), which provides a framework for peace operations led by the African Union and authorized by the UNSC to access U.N. funding through assessed contributions.p However, there are divergent views within the U.N. Security Council on how to finance the mission, with the United States reluctant to apply the resolution to the Somalia case.32
To summarize, what started as an optimistic offensive against al-Shabaab in 2022 is now recognized as a deteriorating security situation. Meanwhile, as already noted, Puntland forces are making progress in their operations against Islamic State-Somalia with little direct support from or coordination with federal forces. Finally, uncertainty looms over AUSSOM’s funding as well as its ability to meet its mandate within the prevailing security challenges. These developments raise the question of how we arrived at this moment and situation in the first place.
Part 2: The Drivers of the Current Security Dynamics
Several factors have shaped the current dynamics in Somalia. These factors include political infighting; regional tensions and external actor influence; growing donor fatigue; persistent logistical challenges and force generation concerns; and al-Shabaab’s resilience and propaganda.
Political Infighting
The slowdown in the FGS’ offensive against al-Shabaab in 2024 can largely be attributed to national and regional political tensions. As these tensions escalated over the course of the year, they diverted attention away from counterinsurgency efforts, undermined progress, and created space for al-Shabaab to regroup. This section will discuss these national-level tensions, followed by an examination of those tensions at the regional level.
At the national level, a political crisis emerged following the FGS’ decision to amend four of the 15 chapters of Somalia’s provisional constitutionq—a move critics saw as unilateral and an attempt by the federal government to centralize power. The amendments expanded the powers of the president; abolished the post of prime minister, replacing it with a vice president; established a multi-party system; and introduced universal suffrage to replace the indirect voting processr currently used at the federal and member state levels.s
On March 30, 2024, these amendments were approved by Somalia’s bicameral federal parliament, sharply dividing opinion in Somalia and triggering criticism from various political stakeholders. Some of the strongest critics have included former Somali presidents Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; former prime ministers Hassan Ali Khaire and Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke; some parliamentarians within the national legislature; and regional administrations such as Puntland and Jubaland.33 The main criticism has been the perception that the reforms are aimed at consolidating power within the federal executive and were introduced and adopted without adequate consultation.
Since he came back to office, President Mohamud has convened platforms for national dialogue, political coordination, and consensus-building such as the National Consultative Council (NCC) that bring together leaders of the FGS and the federal member states (FMS). However, rather than serving as a mechanism to hammer out the crucial details of the federal model, finalize the provisional constitution, and coordinate efforts to combat threats such as al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia, critics have argued that the forum has instead served as a mechanism for elites at the national and regional levels to postpone elections and battle over electoral strategies and models that are self-serving.34
Moreover, since January 2023, Puntland has not participated in the NCC meetings. The semi-autonomous region announced that it would act independently from the federal government until a constitution is agreed upon by a referendum in which Puntland participates.35 Similarly, the NCC meeting held on October 2, 2024—during which the FGS presented its plans to introduce universal suffrage at both the national and regional levels, and proposed extending the terms of FMS presidents by one year to accommodate the transition—ended in a stalemate.36 Jubaland’s president, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” rejected the FGS’ proposals, withdrew from the meeting, and, a month later, announced the suspension of working relations with the federal government.37
Jubaland’s leadership proceeded with their own plans to hold indirect elections through a parliamentary vote. In November 2024, the long-serving President Madobe was reelected.t Jubaland’s decision to hold indirect elections was supported by Puntland and some members of the opposition, but the FGS firmly rejected it.38 The FGS accused Jubaland of violating electoral agreements, particularly those related to the implementation of universal suffrage, and subsequently questioned the legitimacy of the regional election.39
These developments set the stage for violent clashes between federal and Jubaland forces that may have provided opportunities for al-Shabaab to exploit. Shortly after the Jubaland elections in late November 2024, federal forces from the Turkish-trained Gorgor unit were airlifted to Ras Kamboni, located in the southernmost region of Somalia near the Kenyan border in the Lower Juba region of Jubaland.40 Jubaland also deployed its forces to the same region, resulting in an armed confrontation.u The clashes spilled into December, with several federal forces reportedly captured and others fleeing across the border into Kenya.41
Over this period, al-Shabaab attacked Jubaland forces in Bulo Haji, a town regional forces had captured earlier in the year. Though the attack was repelled, Jubaland officials have warned that “Al-Shabaab has been regrouping in the region and could exploit the ongoing political row between Mogadishu and Kismayo.”42
At the beginning of 2025, relations between the federal government, the regional authorities in Jubaland and Puntland, and the political opposition remain strained. Despite lacking political and clan consensus, the FGS continued to pursue its plans to hold local elections in June 2025, using the one-person, one-vote model, ahead of presidential elections scheduled for 2026. All the while, political tensions significantly undermined efforts to build the political consensus needed to effectively counter al-Shabaab.v
Throughout 2024, the government has made attempts to revive clan support for its counterinsurgency efforts in central Somalia but has faced challenges.43 During the first two phases of its offensive, political infighting and clashes between sub-clans and political figures within states like Hirshabelle undermined its efforts.44 Over the last year, and especially since al-Shabaab launched a new offensive in February 2025, President Mohamud has been having a difficult time rallying support from his fellow Abgaal (sub-clan of the Hawiye), some of whom are prominent voices in the opposition based in and around Mogadishu.
Recognizing the need for political concessions, domestic stakeholders and external partners such as the United States and United Kingdom have pushed for a national dialogue and have encouraged national unity.45 As a result, the FGS called for an NCC meeting.w After being delayed twice, in large part due to key FMS—Puntland and Jubaland—boycotting the process,x the NCC finally kicked off on May 6, with leaders from Galmudug, Hirshabelle, South West State, and the newly recognized FMS SSC-Khaatumo State in attendance, while Puntland and Jubaland remained noticeably absent.46
The decisions that emerged from the May NCC conference drew a lot of domestic and international criticism given the absence of Jubaland and Puntland.47 One of the resolutions from the NCC pertained to Jubaland, with the federal government pledging to have the ministry of interior draft a legal framework to investigate the constitutional status of the regional member state given its recently concluded indirect elections in November 2024—a move that Jubaland’s authorities and other member of the opposition rejected as an effort to politically interfere in the affairs of a regional administration.48 Political tensions also escalated on May 13, 2025, when President Mohamud launched a new political party, the Justice and Solidarity Party, with him as the elected chairman in an effort to press forward with electoral plans for universal suffrage.49 Critics saw the move by the federal government as an attempt to further consolidate power and undermine federalism.50 At the time of publication, the political situation remains fluid with concerns that tensions could rise further as the FGS pushes forward with its election and constitutional amendments plans.
Regional Tensions and External Actor Influence
At the regional level, the announcement of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on January 1, 2024, between Ethiopia and Somaliland set off a crisis in the Horn of Africa that reverberated beyond the region. Though details of the MoU remained opaque, the surprise memorandum reportedly would grant Somaliland recognition as an independent country in exchange for providing Ethiopia with access to the sea.51 There was significant outrage in Mogadishu. Viewing the move as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, President Mohamud engaged in an intense diplomatic campaign to block the MoU’s implementation and Somaliland’s formal recognition.52 Though President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a joint declaration in Ankara, Turkey, on December 12, 2024, to resolve their dispute,y the almost year-long diplomatic rift raised critical questions for efforts to counter al-Shabaab, including regarding Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia.
Since 2006, Ethiopia has deployed thousands of troops to support the federal government in Somalia and combat al-Shabaab, both through bilateral arrangements and as part of A.U. missions. As relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa worsened during 2024, the FGS insisted that unless Ethiopia withdrew from the MoU, its troops would have to leave the country by the end of December and not participate in AUSSOM.53
Citing its shared border and national security concerns, Ethiopia for much of 2024 emphasized its right to self-defense against al-Shabaab, suggesting that its military presence in Somalia was necessary to protect its interests.54 This triggered concern and speculation over whether Ethiopian forces would leave on their own, be pushed out, or stay in the country without permission. The ultimatum from the FGS also divided opinions across the country. Some officials from Jubaland and South West State expressed concerns over a potential Ethiopian exit, warning that such a move would only benefit al-Shabaab.55
The MoU also prompted the FGS to rally as much international support as it could to pressure Ethiopia to relent, including through the Arab League, the United Nations, and the African Union. Mogadishu also pursued bilateral actions. This has involved expanding security cooperation with longstanding partners, such as Turkey,z as well as with states such as Egypt.aa Eager to capitalize on the dispute to undermine its longstanding rival (i.e., Ethiopia), Egypt has pursued greater engagement with Somalia, culminating in a defense pact agreed to by both countries in August 2024 that escalated tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.56
The Egypt-Somalia defense pact and calls for Ethiopian troops to exit Somalia became closely interlinked with the conversations about AUSSOM. The Ankara joint-declaration certainly eased concerns and helped to avert fears that Ethiopia could pull out and that a security vacuum could result along the Ethiopia-Somalia border.ab However, the almost year-long diplomatic spat not only drew significant attention away from coordinating offensive efforts against al-Shabaab, but also undermined effective planning over AUSSOM’s troop contributions, operational set up, mission design, and capabilities.57
Beyond the MoU, other developments involving external actors have also contributed toward the fragmented manner in which counterinsurgency efforts have been undertaken in Somalia, most notably in the case of Puntland’s offensive against Islamic State-Somalia. It is broadly recognized that the number of foreign actors engaged in Somalia’s security arena has increased over the past decades, as has the number of security assistance initiatives in Somalia that lack unity.58 The result has been fragmented Somali military forces at the national and regional levels, with limited command and control, and poor coordination.
Though Puntland has been fighting Islamic State-Somalia with limited external support for years, the large number of external powers engaging Somalia on a bilateral basis has enabled the FMS to engage these actors directly without having to always coordinate their actions through Mogadishu or rely on multilateral initiatives such as the AU Mission, for additional support. In the case of Operation Hilaac, which was launched in January 2025, Puntland’s authorities have been able to leverage their bilateral relationships, particularly with the UAE, to support its forces.59 In the case of U.S. airstrikes against Islamic State-Somalia, however, AFRICOM has indicated that the strikes were taken in coordination with the FGS.60 Though Puntland is having success against Islamic State-Somalia at the moment, in the long-run coordinated efforts will be needed to address threats including al-Shabaab.
Growing Donor Fatigue
Donor fatigue and concerns over funding remain perennial issues that continue to cast uncertainties over the future of the A.U. mission and its ability to support efforts to degrade al-Shabaab. Long-standing external partners—particularly from the West—who have provided humanitarian and security assistance in Somalia for decades are increasingly concerned about the sustainability of funding amid competing global priorities. Some also feel their contributions are not producing lasting results and are being taken for granted.61
The European Union, which has shouldered “the bulk of direct mission costs” for AUSSOM’s predecessor missions,ac has reiterated its support for multilateral peacekeeping, but has also advocated for a more balanced distribution of financial responsibilities among international partners.ad In fact, the European Union has been in favor of a hybrid funding model, as outlined in UNSCR 2719. However, the United States has over the past year supported a transitional funding mechanism instead of fully implementing UNSCR 2719, arguing that it was premature to apply the resolution.62 The current U.S. administration has come down even stronger against applying assessed contributions to the AUSSOM case, introducing a bill that prohibits U.S. contribution to the mission under UNSCR 2719.63
Donor fatigue among these traditional partners can be partly attributed to broader global events. The war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza have drawn much of Europe and the United States’ focus in the last few years. Moreover, divisions over UNSCR 2719 reflect broader divisions over multilateralism and burden sharing among global powers that have been brewing for several years.64
Political dynamics within Somalia have also played a significant role in driving the decline in support. While there is broad consensus on the need for a new A.U. mission to prevent a security vacuum in Somalia, donors and external partners widely agree that the conflict with al-Shabaab cannot be resolved through military means alone.65 To ensure gains against al-Shabaab, there is also the need for political agreement within Somalia between the FGS, FMS, and other key stakeholders. Somali leaders should, through consensus, finalize the key elements of the federal system, including the constitution, the national security architecture, and the mechanisms for coordinated action against al-Shabaab.66 The difficulties that successive federal and member state administrations have experienced in building political consensus and achieving lasting political reconciliation have undermined traditional donor confidence in the country’s ability to unite against al-Shabaab and, more recently, Islamic State-Somalia.
With funding under UNSCR 2719 increasingly uncertain, AUSSOM facing a substantial financial shortfall, and outstanding reimbursements still owed to TCCs, there is a serious risk that troop morale and the mission’s ability to meet A.U.-U.N. joint roadmap benchmarks could be compromised unless a sustainable financing solution is secured.67 The United Kingdom has pledged an unspecified amount,68 while China, Japan, and Korea have contributed US$ 1 million, US$ 3 million, and US$1.6 million, respectively.69 Meanwhile, the AU Peace Fund has made progress in meeting its endowment target of US$400 million, and has committed US$10 million to AUSSOM.70 However, the amount required to fund peace support operations such as AUSSOM would certainly deplete the fund.71
Questions have been raised about the possibility of Gulf State actors and Turkey pursuing more multilateral approaches to Somalia. A donors conference was expected to be hosted in Doha, Qatar, in April 2025. Observers have acknowledged that such a summit would have been a useful opportunity to engage Gulf countries and Turkey in a multilateral manner, however the conference was postponed from late April 2025 to the end of May 2025.72 As of May 23, there has been no confirmed date for the event, raising uncertainty over donors’ interest in convening the conference.73 More immediate action is needed to bridge the funding gap and ensure operational continuity, otherwise the ensuing security vacuum will create opportunities for al-Shabaab to exploit.
Persistent Logistical Challenges and Force Generation Concerns
The SNA continues to experience operational challenges that affect its offensive efforts in Somalia. As has been documented at length by several other studies, the federal government’s offensive has and continues to experience various challenges, including ambitious timelines that stretch its limited resources thin; difficulties consolidating early territorial gains; problems holding and stabilizing recovered territory; an overreliance on special units; a force generation process that lacks a unified recruitment, training, and equipping process; and the absence of a comprehensive strategy that coordinates federal, member state, and clan forces.74
The SNA’s recent military setbacks can also be attributed to what journalist Harun Maruf has identified as “dysfunctional command and control.”75 SNA troops have often been recruited, trained, and equipped, through separate bilateral programs funded by different external actors, such as the United States, Turkey, the UAE, European Union, Eritrea, and Uganda. The results are loosely integrated forces with limited central command. Integrating these various SNA units under a unified command has proved to be challenging. Furthermore, “unit commanders were constantly reshuffled over the years which disrupted stability, preparations and training.”76
Compounding the command-and-control challenges is the government’s failure to effectively secure clan engagement and mobilize Ma’awisley in advance of its offensive in Galmudug. Clan mobilization “has arguably been the most consequential for the government’s initial gains against al-Shabaab” in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle.ae The same momentum was not replicated in Galmudug, partly due to how quickly government forces expanded their offensive into the region, leaving less room to prioritize Ma’awisley fighters.
It is worth noting, however, that despite command-and-control challenges and al-Shabaab recovering much of the territory lost in Middle Shabelle, the government and local clan militia have managed to maintain control of some of their gains from 2022. In Hiiraan, clan militia are still holding areas of the countryside, while the government still retains some territory in Middle Shabelle, Hiiraan, Galgaduud, and Mudug.77
The A.U. mission’s troop reduction over the past years has also contributed to recent setbacks. Under a drawdown process executed over three phases since 2023, ATMIS handed over 21 FOBs to Somali security forces and has withdrawn 9,000 troops.78 Somali armed forces have assumed a much larger role in securing the country today than they have done in the past. However, as the last few years have demonstrated, despite noteworthy progress in taking ownership of security in the country, Somali forces remain unprepared to fully replace ATMIS forces across several FOBs over a relatively short period of time.
As FOBs were being handed and A.U. troops drew down in Middle Shabelle, some SNA forces were still being trained and deployed to the field.79 In some instances, this raised questions about whether government forces with only “about 3 months training” were ready to take over security responsibilities from A.U. forces.80 In a recent TCC summit held in April 2025, the FGS made clear its plans to further “recruit community/local defence forces and mobile force in order to hold and consolidate the areas that were liberated.” Meanwhile, TCCs during the same summit raised alarm over the deterioration of the security situation in the country.81 All this emphasizes the reality that A.U. drawdowns have not been fully replaced with Somali security forces as planned, resulting in gaps that al-Shabaab have exploited to regain territory.82
Al-Shabaab Resilience and Propaganda
Lastly, although al-Shabaab’s resurgence and attacks in Mogadishu are partly the result of political tensions, SNA’s operational challenges, as well as the regional and international factors discussed above, a key factor is also al-Shabaab’s resilience and propaganda. In its close to two decades of existence, the group has experienced and survived significant territorial and battlefield losses and endured through internal divisions, demonstrating a capacity to adapt and effectively deploy guerrilla tactics against larger and better resourced forces.83
Over the years, al-Shabaab has developed several advantages that have allowed it to remain resilient despite repeated military setbacks. Although it possesses fewer materiel and financial resources than the SNA and FGS, the group has successfully cultivated diverse and sustainable revenue streams, enabling it to finance its operations in a largely self-sufficient manner.84 As Paul D. Williams noted in a 2024 net assessment in this publication, despite losing significant territory between 2011 and 2014, neither al-Shabaab nor the FGS has been able to “decisively break the strategic stalemate,” and a clear military victory appears unlikely in the near term.85 In contrast to the FGS—whose effectiveness is measured by its ability to reduce the threat from al-Shabaab, including through mediated efforts; deliver effective governance; and achieve political stability—al-Shabaab’s ability to merely disrupt government counterterrorism efforts serves as a form of victory.86 Accordingly, with its fewer fighters and resources, al-Shabaab benefits from maintaining a relatively low-cost force, especially when compared to the SNA, which is dispersed across numerous FOBs.
Lastly, one must also consider how effective al-Shabaab has been in controlling and shaping narratives around the conflict and taking advantage of the current political crisis to serve its propaganda. The primary focus of al-Shabaab’s recent offensive efforts in 2025 appears to be reversing its territorial losses in Middle Shabelle. That is where most of its resources have been concentrated.87
However, the attacks in Lower Shabelle and in-and-around Mogadishu have not only served to distract and draw the government’s attention from Middle Shabelle, they also reflect efforts by al-Shabaab to encroach closer to the capital at a time they perceive the government and its forces to be vulnerable. With the FGS facing a fragmented political landscape, increasing donor fatigue, and uncertainty over AUSSOM’s future, these attacks have “amplified al-Shabaab’s narrative”88 about Mogadishu failures, spurring media and social media chatter about the possibility of Mogadishu falling.
Whether or not the militant group is ready, or capable, of capturing Mogadishu in the near term, al-Shabaab has seized the opportunity to undermine confidence in the government’s ability to secure the country, capitalizing on broader national, regional, and international developments.
Takeaways
Moving forward, political compromise between the FGS, FMS, and opposition stakeholders is necessary before any real progress can be made to meaningfully degrade al-Shabaab. As Horn of Africa analyst Omar Mahmood recently explained, a tension has always existed within Somalia between efforts to counter al-Shabaab, on one hand, and politics and electioneering, on the other.89 This tension has been pronounced over the last year with the constitutional amendments and the FGS’ push for universal suffrage distracting from efforts against the insurgent group. Though the government is attempting to refocus its efforts to counter al-Shabaab, hard-won gains risk being reversed.
Compromises need to be made on the issues that have drawn the most political heat: the electoral framework and further constitutional amendments. On these two issues, it is incumbent upon the FGS to consider the merits of advancing its electoral and constitutional visionaf despite the lack of political and clan consensus. The FGS has responded to calls for national dialogue by convening the NCC in Mogadishu on May 6. However, with Jubaland and Puntland noticeably absent, the meeting has drawn criticism due to its lack of inclusivity, further undermining the unity needed to coordinate efforts against al-Shabaab.90 Perhaps the most significant consequence of the political crisis of the last year and al-Shabaab’s recapture of territory in Middle Shabelle has been the potential loss of confidence in the government among the public. This is especially the case for those who stood alongside the government during the offensive.
The lack of sustainable and predictable funding for AUSSOM will continue to be a concern. Though Somalia is not in control of any external actor’s decisions to fund the force, the cycle of political tensions and fragmented politics in the country has contributed to the growing donor fatigue. It is within the power of Somalia’s political elites at the federal and state level to work toward genuine and lasting reconciliation and unity. If AUSSOM fails to secure funding or the mission is terminated, the FGS will need, more than ever, the political unity across member states and clans to coordinate efforts against al-Shabaab. In April 2025, Puntland’s president indicated an interest in sending troops to southern Somalia to support federal efforts against al-Shabaab.91 But if al-Shabaab’s offensive gains momentum and Puntland forces decide to deploy, it may not be able to maintain the consistent and continued deployment of forces needed in the Bari region to sustain its fight against Islamic State-Somalia while also supporting federal efforts against al-Shabaab.
In the longer run, FGS and FMS attention should be focused on finalizing key aspects of the federal system through consensus. This would involve not only finalizing the provisional constitution through an inclusive process but also working out the finer details of the national security architecture. Doing so would help to better coordinate federal, state, and clan forces and provide an opportunity to develop a more combined, sustainable, and lasting approach to countering the dual threats posed by al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia. CTC
Dr. Daisy Muibu is an Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Her work is focused on counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, and security sector governance in conflict-affected states. Prior to joining the Africa Center, Dr. Muibu was a Research Fellow at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and an Assistant Professor at the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Alabama. Dr. Muibu holds a Ph.D. in Justice, Law and Criminology from the American University in Washington, D.C. X: @daisy_muibu
Ms. Yayedior Mbengue currently serves as an Academic Specialist at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies where she works on program research and execution on counterterrorism, artificial intelligence, and maritime safety and security across the African continent. Prior to joining the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, she worked with Tostan and the World Bank in Africa on policy initiatives. Mbengue holds a Masters in International Educational Development from Columbia University and a Bachelors in Management from Rollins College.
© 2025 Daisy Muibu, Yayedior Mbengue
Substantive Notes
[a] This was the first attack since 2014 to directly target the president. See Adam Daud Ahmed, “From Insurgency to Power Grab: Al-Shabaab’s deadly advance on Mogadishu signals Somalia’s descent into disaster,” Addis Standard, March 21, 2025.
[b] Islamic State-Somalia poses much less of a threat in Somalia than al-Shabaab. However, its outsized role within the Islamic State’s global network is noteworthy. The Islamic State affiliate has gained significance through its coordination office, al-Karrar, which plays a strategic role in overseeing the financing of other Islamic State affiliates and directing funds to support their operations. This office has been linked to facilitating the movement of trainers, finances, and operational support to other Islamic State affiliates in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Turkey, and Afghanistan. When compared to al-Shabaab, Islamic State-Somalia’s estimated size (600-700, though some estimates put the force at 1,600) is significantly smaller. However, the group has attracted foreign fighters from countries such as Yemen, Tanzania, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Morrocco, Ethiopia, and Syria. See Caleb Weiss and Lucas Webber, “Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing Global Terror Concern,” CTC Sentinel 17:8 (2024); Jason Warner, Ryan O’Farrell, Héni Nsaibia, and Ryan Cummings, “The Islamic State in Somalia,” The Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront (online edition) (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2022); Tricia Bacon and Austin C. Doctor, “The Death of Bilal al-Sudani and Its Impact on Islamic State Operations,” GWU Program on Extremism, March 2023; Caleb Weiss, Ryan O’Farrell, Tara Candland, and Laren Poole, “Fatal Transaction: The Funding Behind the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province,” GWU Program on Extremism, June 2023; Tore Hamming, “The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network,” CTC Sentinel 16:7 (2023); Daisy Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia: A Global Threat and Efforts to Counter the Militants,” Orion Policy Institute, March 6, 2025; “The Islamic State in Somalia: Responding to an Evolving Threat,” International Crisis Group Briefing No. 201, September 12, 2024; and Mary Harper, “Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia,” BBC, February 6, 2025.
[c] Antagonized by al-Shabaab’s predation, coercion, and repressive tactics, local clans—particularly the Haber Gedir/Saleeban sub-clan of the Hawiye clan family (of which President Mohamud is a member)—mobilized against al-Shabaab. The federal government’s offensive was launched months after these clan uprisings in Hirshabelle and Galmudug, as well as an attack launched by al-Shabaab in August 2022 against a well-known hotel in Mogadishu. See “Sustaining Gains in Somalia’s Offensive against Al-Shabaab,” International Crisis Group, March 21, 2023; James Barnett, “Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia’s War against al-Shabaab,” Hudson Institute, September 28, 2023; Daisy Muibu, “Operation Black Lion: Challenges That Lay Ahead of Somalia’s Second Phase of the Offensive,” Soufan Center, October 30, 2023; and Daisy Muibu, “Somalia’s Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Taking Stock of Obstacles,” CTC Sentinel 17:2 (2024).
[d] Operation Black Lion was conceived as a lightning advance against al-Shabaab’s southern strongholds in the member states of Jubaland and South West State (SWS). The intention was to conduct the operation in collaboration with the country’s federal member states, South West State and Jubaland, and neighboring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti). See Barnett, “Faltering Lion;” Muibu, “Operation Black Lion;” and “Navigating Security in Somalia with Rashid Abdi,” Sahan Pathfinders podcast, August 14, 2023.
[e] It is important to note also that al-Shabaab waited until after ATMIS’ drawdown was complete before launching its offensive in Middle Shabelle. “The Enemy Gets A Vote,” Somali Wire Issue 820, May 9, 2025; “Between Islamic State and Al-Shabaab: An Embattled Mogadishu?” Soufan Center, April 2, 2025; “April 2025 Monthly Forecast: Somalia,” Security Council Report, March 31, 2025; Boswell and Mahmood, “Which Way Will Trump Go on Somalia?”
[f] Al-Shabaab reportedly recaptured Adan Yabaal on April 16, 2025. See “Al-Shabaab Captures Key Town of Aadan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle After Fierce Assault,” Horn Observer, April 17, 2025, and “Al Shabaab captures strategic Somalia town as it presses offensive,” Reuters, April 16, 2025.
[g] According to the FDD’s Long War Journal, in just the first three months of President Trump’s second term, the United States has launched at least “16 manned aircraft or drone strikes inside Somalia.” See Caleb Weiss, “Trump admin ups the tempo of airstrikes against jihadist groups in Somalia,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 30, 2025.
[h] The 3,000 forces mobilized are composed of the following actors: Puntland’s Maritime Police Force (PMPF), its Presidential Guard, Daraawiish, alongside militia. See “Inside Operation Hilaac,” Somali Wire Issue 772, January 10, 2025.
[i] Part of the reason for Puntland’s early success has been the support and engagement of local communities, particularly the Ali Salebaan sub-clan that Islamic State-Somalia depends on. For more on the successes of the operation, see Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia;” “Operation Hilaac Advances in Puntland,” Somali Wire Issue 783, February 5, 2025; and Ido Levy, “How the small autonomous region of Puntland found success in battling Islamic State in Somalia,” Conversation, April 7, 2025.
[j] This is not the first time the United States has targeted Islamic State-Somalia. Washington first authorized a strike against the group in November 2017. Other notable attacks include the January 2023 military operation that resulted in the death of Bilal al-Sudani, a key figure in Islamic State-Somalia’s operations, as well as the May 2024 airstrike targeting Abdulqadir Mumin, leader of the Islamic State-Somalia, and rumored global head of the Islamic State. See Harper; Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia;” “The War in Somalia New America, n.d.; and Bacon and Doctor.
[k] Moreover, the March 2024 proposal suggested that the 10,000 strong follow-on mission be deployed to 14 FOBs within four sectors: Sector 1 (comprising of Mogadishu City and Banadir Region and Lower Shabelle), Sector 2 (comprising of Lower and Middle Juba and Gedo), Sector 3 (comprising of Bay and Bakool) and Sector 4 (comprising of Middle Shabelle, Hiraan, and Galgaduud regions). See “Strategic Planning for Post ATMIS: A proposal from the Federal Government of Somalia,” Federal Government of Somalia, March 2024, and “Analytical briefing on the Strategic Planning for Post-ATMIS Somalia,” Amani Africa, April 2, 2024.
[l] The 11,911 personnel would comprise 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in four sectors. See “Updated ‘Insights on the PSC’ on the consideration of the Concept of Operations for the post-ATMIS mission,” Amani Africa, July 31, 2024.
[m] Noticeably absent is Burundi, which has served as part of A.U. missions since the first mission was launched in 2006. Burundi opted out due to disagreement over the troop number allocated to Burundi as part of the new mission. See Harun Maruf, “AU, Somalia agree on troop numbers for new mission,” Voice of America, February 25, 2025, and Harun Maruf, “Breaking: Somali officials disrespected us, says a Burundian diplomat …,” X, December 29, 2024.
[n] TCCs also emphasized the need to enhance their air capabilities, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM,” Amani Africa, April 28, 2025.
[o] The outstanding liabilities owed to TCCs for 2002-2004 total “$93.9 million, including Uganda ($34.5 million), Kenya ($15.7 million), Ethiopia ($17.2 million), Djibouti ($8.3 million) and Burundi ($18.1 million).” See the following for more information: “Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia,” Amani Africa, April 10, 2025; “The new AU Somalia mission (AUSSOM) is ATMIS by another name but with more problems,” Amani Africa, February 5, 2025.
[p] The federal government of Somalia—in its March proposal to the AUPSC and later to the UNSC—proposed funding the follow-on mission using assessed contributions, as outlined in U.N. Security Council resolution 2719 (2023). Through this arrangement, the United Nations would pay 75% of the budget, leaving 25% for the African Union and its partners to finance. However, there have also been debates about what types of missions should be funding under the resolution, whether AUSSOM is the type of mission that should be funded, and if 75% of the mission’s funding is paid by the United Nations, who should pay the remaining 25%. Omar Mahmood and Paul Williams, “What to Expect from the New AU Mission in Somalia” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, January 16, 2025.
[q] Somalia has had a provisional constitution since 2012. Two previous federal administrations have failed to finalize the constitution, while the current FGS began a process to amend and approve it back in 2023.
[r] Instead of a universal suffrage model, Somalia employs a clan-based, indirect electoral system in which elders and clan representatives select members of parliament, who then elect the president. Political representation is allocated through the “4.5 formula,” which distributes power among the four major Somali clan families—Hawiye, Darood, Digil-Mirifle, and Dir—and a coalition of minority clans comprising the remaining 0.5.
[s] The amendments also expanded the president’s ability to appoint and dismiss the prime minister before the position is replaced with a vice president during the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2026. Previously, the provisional constitution gave the parliament the power to dismiss a prime minister. The amendments also extended the term of office from four to five years for constitutional bodies such as the president, vice president, and FMS leaders, while referring to the FMS presidents as leaders. See Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia’s Parliament Approves Historic Constitutional Amendments,” Voice of America, March 30, 2024, and “Somalia: Dispute Over Constitutional Amendment and Increased al-Shabaab Attacks,” ACLED, April 26, 2024.
[t] This marked President Madobe’s third term in office, following a constitutional amendment passed by the regional parliament in July 2024 that removed the presidential two-term limit. See Abdirisaq Shino, “Ahmed Madobe Wins Third Term as Jubaland President Amid Constitutional Changes,” Horseed Media, November 25, 2024, and “December 2024 Monthly Forecast: Somalia,” Security Council Report, December 1, 2024.
[u] The standoff escalated further in late November 2024 when the federal government issued an Interpol Red Notice for the arrest of Jubaland’s president, prompting the Jubaland First Instance Court to retaliate by issuing an arrest warrant for President Mohamud. See “Somalia requests Interpol Red Notice for Jubaland leader Ahmed Madobe,” Hiiraan Online, November 28, 2024.
[v] However, it is worth noting that on April 26, 2025, Puntland’s president announced that the semi-autonomous region intends to send its troops to southern Somalia to support federal efforts against al-Shabaab once it has concluded its ongoing operations against Islamic State-Somalia. See “Puntland leader says region will send forces to southern Somalia to fight militants,” Somali Guardian, April 26, 2025.
[w] The last meeting was in October 2024.
[x] Initially, the NCC was set for May 2, 2025, but was later rescheduled to May 5, then finally held on May 6. See “Uncertainty Looms Over Somalia’s NCC in Mogadishu Amid Delays and Boycotts,” Garowe Online, May 5, 2025, and “Somalia delays key national talks again as rift over president’s new party deepens,” Somali Guardian, May 6, 2025.
[y] It is worth noting that uncertainties regarding the implementation of the Ankara Declaration remain a concern. Although the declaration does underscore mutual respect for the territorial integrity, unity, and sovereignty of the two countries, it does not directly address Ethiopia’s interests in maritime basing on the Red Sea. The declaration does stipulate that the two countries would work together to ensure Ethiopia’s commercial access to the Red Sea, and technical negotiations between the two countries have begun. But it is unclear whether Ethiopia will abandon its controversial naval base agreement with Somaliland. See Eliab Taye, “Ankara Declaration: A Positive Development Imbued with Regional Risks,” African Arguments, January 13, 2025; Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia Implications for the Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical and Security Landscapes,” Megatrends Afrika Policy Brief 35, March 2025; and “Statement on the First Round of Technical Negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia within the scope of the Ankara Process,” Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2025.
[z] In February 2024, Turkey and Somalia signed a comprehensive maritime and defense agreement. See Kiran Baez, “Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them?” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2024, and Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, September 19, 2024.
[aa] To be clear, President Mohamud had, prior to the MoU, pursued closer relations with Egypt compared to his predecessor. See Boswell and Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions.”
[ab] A major concern around Ethiopia’s possible exit was the absence of a compelling alternative TCC and/or bilateral actor to replace the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF). For a discussion on concerns related to an Ethiopian troop exit, see Boswell and Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions.”
[ac] Since 2007, the European Union has invested close to €2.7 billion in Somalia’s security, including paying A.U. soldiers’ stipends, as well as provided further support to civilian and police components for AMISOM and ATMIS. “Reforming the AU Mission in Somalia,” International Crisis Group Briefing No. 176, November 15, 2021; “Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?” Amani Africa, May 23, 2025; “EU Statement: UN High Level Meeting on ATMIS Financing and Resourcing for the Somali Security Transition,” European External Action Service, March 22, 2023; Rossella Marangio, “Dawn or doom? The new AU mission in Somalia and the fight for stability,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 27, 2025.
[ad] In fact, in the last few years, the European Union has substantially reduced its contribution in support of ATMIS, cutting its funding of the military component from Euro 140 million for 2022 to 85 million for 2023. In 2024, the European Union contributed Euro 70 million to ATMIS. See “One year of ATMIS Operations: Progress, Challenges and Funding,” Amani Africa, April 28, 2023; “EU Calls for Fair Burden-Sharing in Somalia Peacekeeping Mission,” European Times, February 10, 2025; and “EU support to Somalia: Council approves further support under the European Peace Facility to the Somali National Army and to the military component of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia,” Council of the European Union, April 16, 2024.
[ae] It is worth caveating that in 2022, clan militia self-mobilized ahead of the government’s offensive. See Muibu, “Somalia’s Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab” and Muibu, “Operation Black Lion.”
[af] Despite lacking broad political and clan consensus, the FGS intends to hold local elections in June 2025, using the one-person, one-vote model, ahead of presidential elections scheduled for 2026. Furthermore, the federal government has pushed for a multi-party system in Somalia, announcing the new Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP), which critics argue was approved by presidential decree rather than through a political consensus, and serves as a move by the federal government to further consolidate power and undermine federalism. See Mohamed Sheikh Nor, “Somalia: President Mohamud’s new party could centralise power, critics warn,” Africa Report, May 21, 2025; “Farmaajo accuses President Hassan Sheikh of constitutional violations, warns of rising political crisis,” Hiiraan Online, May 15, 2025; and “Sixteen former leaders accuse President Hassan Sheikh of politicizing leadership, undermining federal unity,” Hiiraan Online, May 15, 2025.
Citations
[1] Adam Daud Ahmed, “From Insurgency to Power Grab: Al-Shabaab’s deadly advance on Mogadishu signals Somalia’s descent into disaster,” Addis Standard, March 21, 2025.
[2] Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood, “Which Way Will Trump Go on Somalia?” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, March 27, 2025.
[3] “U.S. Africa Command 2025 Posture Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee,” U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, April 4, 2025.
[4] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM,” Amani Africa, April 28, 2025.
[5] Stig Jarle Hansen, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat al-Shabaab?” CTC Sentinel 16:1 (2023); “Sustaining Gains in Somalia’s Offensive against Al-Shabaab,” International Crisis Group, March 21, 2023.
[6] “Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist,” ACLED Situation Update, April 21, 2023.
[7] Daisy Muibu, “Somalia’s Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Taking Stock of Obstacles,” CTC Sentinel 17:2 (2024).
[8] Harun Maruf, “Somalia Military Offensive Suffers Setback as Troops Retreat,” Voice of America, April 29, 2023; Falastine Iman and Harun Maruf, “Somalia Shifts Military Tactics in Fight Against Al-Shabab,” Voice of America, September 6, 2023.
[9] James Barnett, “Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia’s War against al-Shabaab,” Hudson Institute, September 28, 2023; “Somalia: The Government and al-Shabaab Vie for the Support of Clan Militias,” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, September 15, 2023; Alan Boswell, Omar Mahmood, and Sarah Harrison, “Somalia’s Stalling Fight Against Al-Shabaab and America’s Wobbly Strategy” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, November 6, 2023.
[10] “Somalia: Renewed counter-insurgency operations expected as al-Shabaab regroups,” ACLED, May 31, 2024; Alan Boswell and Omar Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, September 19, 2024; “Crisis Watch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide,” International Crisis Group, July 2024.
[11] Harun Maruf, “Somali forces kill dozens of militants following attack,” Voice of America, July 22, 2024; Harun Maruf, “Somali officials in Jubaland have reported …,” X, June 18, 2024; “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Regains Lost Territories Amid Run-up to State Elections,” ACLED, March 2024; “Somali Military Operations in Jubaland Win Back Territory from al-Shabaab,” Africa Defense Forum, March 19, 2024.
[12] “Al Shabaab captures strategic Somalia town as it presses offensive,” Reuters, April 16, 2025; “Sustaining Gains in Somalia’s Offensive against Al-Shabaab;” Ahmed Mohamed, “Somali Army Dislodges Al-Shabab From Key Stronghold,” Voice of America, December 6, 2022.
[13] Harun Maruf, “My analysis on Somalia military setbacks…,” X, April 16, 2025.; “Somali President Visits Defense Ministry Following Army Setbacks on Battlefields,” Garowe Online, May 22, 2025; “Hawadle Clan Militias Left to Fight Al-Shabaab Alone in Somalia’s Hiiraan Region,” Garowe Online, May 21, 2025.
[14] “Operation Hilaac Advances in Puntland,” Somali Wire Issue 783, February 5, 2025.
[15] “Drones Won’t Save Mogadishu,” Somali Wire Issue No. 804, March 26, 2025.
[16] “Somalia’s President Narrowly Escapes Al-Shabaab Bomb Attack; Media Station Briefly Shutdown, Dozen Journalists Arrested,” Horn Observer, March 18, 2024.
[17] “President Mohamud arrives in Middle Shabelle region to oversee military operations against Al-Shabaab,” Hiiraan Online, March 18, 2025; “Drones Won’t Save Mogadishu.”
[18] Jalale Getachew Birru, “Expert Comment: January saw the first use of drone strikes by IS Somalia,” ACLED, February 13, 2025.
[19] Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia.”
[20] “Somalia: Puntland forces shall defeat ISIS militants – army officer,” Garowe Online, January 30, 2025.
[21] Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia.”
[22] Caleb Weiss, “US, UAE conducting airstrikes in northern Somalia,” FDD’s Long War Journal, February 5, 2025; “UAE Airstrikes Hit ISIS in Somalia’s Puntland, Killing Dozens of Militants,” Garowe Online, February 16, 2025; “Puntland Praises U.S., UAE for ISIS Airstrikes, Plans Next War Phase,” Garowe Online, February 2, 2025.
[23] Mary Harper, “Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia,” BBC, February 6, 2025.
[24] Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia.”
[25] “Briefing on the situation in Somalia/ATMIS,” Amani Africa, June 19, 2024.
[26] “AUPSC Communiqué | 1225th Meeting on Consideration of the Concept of Operations of AU-Led Mission in Somalia post-ATMIS,” United Nations Office to the African Union, August 1, 2024.
[27] Harun Maruf, “AU, Somalia agree on troop numbers for new mission,” Voice of America, February 25, 2025.
[28] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM.”
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Omar Mahmood and Paul Williams, “What to Expect from the New AU Mission in Somalia” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, January 16, 2025; Boswell and Mahmood, “Which Way Will Trump Go on Somalia?;” Rossella Marangio, “Dawn or doom? The new AU mission in Somalia and the fight for stability,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, March 27, 2025.
[33] Hassan, “Somalia’s Parliament Approves Historic Constitutional Amendments.”
[34] “Kicking the Can Down the Federal Road: Somalia’s NCC in Crisis,” Somali Wire Issue 740, October 4, 2024.
[35] “Somalia’s Puntland State declares to act as an independent state,” Horn Observer, January 11, 2023; “Somalia: Political Crisis Deepens Amid Transition to Direct Elections,” ACLED, July 28, 2023.
[36] “December 2024 Monthly Forecast: Somalia,” Security Council Report, December 1, 2024; “Controversy over electoral reform sparks debate in Somalia amid al-Shabaab operation,” ACLED, October 28, 2024.
[37] “December 2024 Monthly Forecast: Somalia;” “Jubbaland suspends relations with federal government, calls for a consultative meeting,” Hiiraan Online, November 28, 2024; “Somalia’s Jubbaland government suspends ties with federal administration,” Reuters, November 28, 2024.
[38] “Al-Shabaab targets civilians in Somalia in retaliation for installing CCTV cameras,” ACLED, November 29, 2024.
[39] “Federal government rejects Ahmed Madobe’s re-election as Jubbaland President,” Hiiraan Online, November 26, 2024.
[40] “Al-Shabaab targets civilians in Somalia in retaliation for installing CCTV cameras.”
[41] Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia pulls troops out of Lower Juba after clashes with Jubbaland forces,” Reuters, December 12, 2024; “Kenya to repatriate 600 Somali soldiers after Ras Kamboni clash,” Hiiraan Online, December 13, 2024.
[42] “Clashes Erupt Between Jubaland and Federal Forces As Concerns of Civil War Intensified,” Horn Observer, December 6, 2024.
[43] “Somalia: Renewed counter-insurgency operations.”
[44] Muibu, “Somalia’s Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab.”
[45] “Somalia’s Last Chance Saloon,” Somali Wire 806, April 2, 2025.
[46] “National Consultative Council enters second day as Puntland, Jubbaland boycott talks,” Hiiraan Online, May 7, 2025.
[47] United States Bureau of African Affairs, “All relevant stakeholders should have a say in changes to Somalia’s federal and election systems …,” X, May 9, 2025; “U.S. Opposes Outcomes of Somalia’s National Consultative Council Meeting,” Garowe Online, May 9, 2025; “Jubbaland rejects outcome of national consultative meeting, accuses federal government of political interference,” Hiiraan Online, May 8, 2025.
[48] “National Consultative Conference concluded with a promise to support security and elections,” Somaliland Standard, May 8, 2025; “Sixteen former leaders accuse President Hassan Sheikh of politicizing leadership, undermining federal unity,” Hiiraan Online, May 15, 2025; “Villa Somalia turns to destabilising Gedo, again,” Somali Wire Issue 825, May 21, 2025.
[49] “Sixteen former leaders accuse President Hassan Sheikh of politicizing leadership, undermining federal unity;” “Somali President launches new political party ahead of popular vote in 2026,” Shabelle Media Network, May 14, 2025.
[50] “Sixteen former leaders accuse President Hassan Sheikh of politicizing leadership, undermining federal unity.”
[51] Harun Maruf, “Ethiopia ‘Secures’ Access to Sea After Deal With Somaliland,” Voice of America, January 1, 2024; Boswell and Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions.”
[52] Federico Donelli, “Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions: Power Dynamics and Extra-Regional Actors in the Red Sea Region,” E-International Relations, April 13, 2025; Boswell and Mahmood, “Somalia amid a Swirl of Regional Tensions;” “The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal,” International Crisis Group, March 6, 2024.
[53] Harun Maruf, “Somalia wants all Ethiopian troops to leave by December,” Voice of America, June 3, 2024; Mohamed Olad Hassan, “Somalia: Ethiopian troops cannot be in AUSSOM, unless Somaliland deal nixed,” Voice of America, August 23, 2024.
[54] Hassan, “Somalia: Ethiopian troops cannot be in AUSSOM.”
[55] Maruf, “Somalia wants all Ethiopian troops to leave by December.”
[56] Abdi Sheikh and Giulia Paravini, “Egypt sends arms to Somalia following security deal, sources say,” Reuters, August 28, 2024; “Egypt-Somalia Defense Pact Escalates Horn Tensions,” Africa Defense Forum, September 25, 2024.
[57] “AUSSOM Faces Funding Crisis Amid Donor Fatigue and Disputes,” Mogadishu 24, April 1, 2025.
[58] See Colin D. Robinson and Jahara Matisek, “Military advising and assistance in Somalia: fragmented interveners, fragmented Somali military forces,” Defence Studies 21:2 (2021).
[59] Muibu, “Islamic State in Somalia;” Weiss, “US, UAE conducting airstrikes in northern Somalia.”
[60] See, for example, “Update: U.S. Forces Strike on ISIS-Somalia,” United States Africa Command, February 11, 2025; “U.S. Forces Strike ISIS-Somalia,” United States Africa Command, February 16, 2025; “U.S. Forces Conduct Strike Targeting ISIS-Somalia,” United States Africa Command, May 5, 2025.
[61] Harper, “Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia.”
[62] Marangio; “Ministerial meeting on consideration of the situation in Somalia and the Post-ATMIS security arrangements,” Amani Africa, December 18, 2024.
[63] “Risch, Cruz, Scott Introduce Bill to Protect American Taxpayer Dollars from African Peacekeeping Operation,” Foreign Relations Committee, May 2, 2025.
[64] For more, see Corine van Emmerik and Peter Albrecht, “The crisis of multilateralism and African peace operations,” Danish Institute for International Studies, April 24, 2025.
[65] Omar Mahmood and Paul Williams, “What to Expect from the New AU Mission in Somalia” in “The Horn,” International Crisis Group podcast, January 16, 2025.
[66] Ibid.
[67] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM.”
[68] “Update Briefing on The Status and Operations of The AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia,” Amani Africa, April 10, 2025.
[69] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM”; “Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?” Amani Africa, May 23, 2025.
[70] Paul-Simon Handy and Félicité Djilo, “Global uncertainty calls for an overhaul of AU peace support operations,” Institute for Security Studies, May 7, 2025; “Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?”
[71] Handy and Djilo.
[72] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM;” Zekarias Beshah and Solomon Ayele Dersso, “Will the possible end of the AU Mission in Somalia open new opportunities for peace?” Amani Africa, May 23, 2025.
[73] Beshah and Dersso.
[74] Samira Gaid, “The 2022 Somali Offensive Against al-Shabaab: Making Enduring Gains Will Require Learning from Previous Failures,” CTC Sentinel 15:11 (2022); Hansen, “Can Somalia’s New Offensive Defeat al-Shabaab?;” Barnett; “Sustaining Gains in Somalia’s Offensive against Al-Shabaab;” Boswell, Mahmood, and Harrison; Muibu, “Somalia’s Stalled Offensive Against al-Shabaab;” Daisy Muibu, “Operation Black Lion: Challenges That Lay Ahead of Somalia’s Second Phase of the Offensive,” Soufan Center, October 30, 2023; Michael Jones, Christopher Hockey, Stig Jarle Hansen, and Mohamed Gaas, “Crunch Time in Somalia,” RUSI, June 19, 2024.
[75] Maruf, “My analysis on Somalia military setbacks…”
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] “Burgavo Base handover marks end of ATMIS Phase Three drawdown,” ATMIS, November 14, 2024.
[79] Maruf, “My analysis on Somalia military setbacks…”
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] “Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and AUSSOM.”
[83] For background, see Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda’s Most Powerful Ally (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2018); Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (London: Hurst, 2013); and Tricia Bacon and Daisy Muibu, “The Domestication of Al-Shabaab,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 10:3 (2019): pp. 279-305.
[84] Paul D. Williams, “The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment,” CTC Sentinel 17:4 (2024).
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Boswell and Mahmood, “Which Way Will Trump Go on Somalia?”
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] United States Bureau of African Affairs, “All relevant stakeholders should have a say in changes to Somalia’s federal and election systems …;” “U.S. Opposes Outcomes of Somalia’s National Consultative Council Meeting.”
[91] “Puntland leader says region will send forces to southern Somalia to fight militants,” Somali Guardian, April 26, 2025.
