From the Editors
In December 2025, the United States reported that it had launched strikes against Islamic State fighters in northwest Nigeria, specifically in Sokoto state near the border with Niger. Our cover article this month—based on extensive fieldwork by the authors—provides meticulous, new insights into jihadi expansion in this part of Nigeria. James Barnett and his co-author find that “jihadis tend to expand into regions that are impacted by banditry (which is rampant in rural Nigeria) yet simultaneously not dominated by any overly powerful bandit leaders”—what the authors term the “Goldilocks effect.” Furthermore, they observe that “jihadis try to expand in areas where the commanders have existing social or religious ties, and these ties are typically more important for gaining new recruits than appeals to factional affiliation per se.” These conclusions help clarify the complex, often nuanced security situation in Nigeria.
In our feature commentary, Brian Michael Jenkins uses a red team approach to examine different strategies that Hamas may pursue during the next phase of the Gaza peace plan. He puts forth three possible options the group may pursue: a confrontational approach, a peaceful pathway, and a flexible, more opportunistic strategy. In examining each of these in turn, Jenkins reminds us that “terrorist strategic planning may be determined by factors other than conventional military calculations or sensitivity to the prospect of catastrophic losses that would deter most political leaders.”
In light of recent terrorist threats against elected officials in Europe, Thomas Renard considers whether we are witnessing the beginning of a new era of political violence against government representatives. He finds that while there is a persistent threat, “the data does not allow one to conclude that the phenomenon is rising in Europe. However, it is occurring in a broader context that could result in a growing trend of political assassinations in the future.”
Finally, Tanya Mehra and Merlina Herbach explore disparities in how European criminal justice systems prosecute minors and young adults involved in terrorist activities. Using a dataset of 98 cases from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (2020 to mid-2025) and through close examination of “the legal frameworks and sentencing practices for juvenile extremist offenders (JEOs) aged 10 to 23,” they find that “most JEOs are convicted of preparatory offenses or possession and dissemination of extremist material rather than violent acts” and “most JEOs receive custodial sentences (69 percent), often with probation and deradicalization requirements.”
Don Rassler and Kristina Hummel, Editors-in-Chief
