By Scott Menner
On July 27, 2014, over 200 Boko Haram militants stormed Kolofata, a town in Cameroon’s Extreme North Region. They targeted Vice Prime Minister Amadou Ali’s house, kidnapping his wife and sister-in-law, as well as Seini Lamine, a senior religious leader and the town’s mayor. The night before, Boko Haram killed four Cameroonian soldiers and kidnapped at least 13 others. Earlier in the month, Boko Haram kidnapped two sons of Bieshair Mohaman, Cameroon’s traditional leader in Limani on July 15, 2014. In northern Nigeria, authorities traced some of the explosives used in recent suicide attacks to a quarry in northern Cameroon that was raided by Boko Haram in May 2014. Boko Haram has targeted Niger as well. In December 2013, Nigerien authorities foiled a Boko Haram plot to kidnap the central government representative, the local governor, and the military zone commander in Diffa. There is also increasing evidence that Boko Haram may be active in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad.
This article analyzes Boko Haram’s cross-border activities in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and its presence in the CAR. Although it is difficult to ascertain precisely why Boko Haram is undertaking these cross-border activities, there are at least four explanations for how it has carried out this activity: the region’s borders are long and fluid, militaries in the region are ineffective, multilateral cooperation is failing, and Boko Haram exploits historic ethno-linguistic cross-border ties.
In the aftermath of the 2012 Malian uprising and Nigeria’s implementation of the 2013 State of Emergency to crack down on Boko Haram, refugees flooded into neighboring countries, including Niger, which immediately feared Boko Haram infiltrations. In southern Niger, Boko Haram members have plotted to bomb public places. In 2012, Nigerien authorities arrested 15 suspected Boko Haram members in Diffa, where they were planning to attack the local military garrison. On October 14, 2012, news reports speculated that Boko Haram or al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militants kidnapped five Nigeriens and a Chadian in Dakoro. In 2014, the Nigerien government arrested 20 Boko Haram members in Diffa and Zinder for plotting to attack a market. Niger’s army chief General Seyni Garba said his country avoided a “bloodbath.”
Boko Haram is also known to recruit Nigerien herdsmen and farmers whose livelihoods have been undercut by severe drought. According to an interview with the BBC, some alleged Boko Haram recruits in Diffa claim that they accepted payments of over $3,000 each to join Boko Haram. In February 2014, Nigerien authorities reportedly uncovered a Boko Haram training camp.
More recently, Boko Haram members in Diffa ambushed an army patrol and escaped to the Nigerian side of the border. Three Boko Haram members were captured and the next day nine more were arrested in connection to the attack. Similar attacks, comparable to the Diffa kidnapping plot mentioned above, may increase as Boko Haram attempts to deter increased Nigerien counterterrorism efforts. If Niger takes an increased role in the international coalition to defeat Boko Haram, the militants may transform Niger into a more active theatre of operations.
Although there is little information on the details of Boko Haram’s activities in Chad, military sources in N’Djamena interviewed by the International Crisis Group reveal that Boko Haram elements are present in N’Djamena and elsewhere in the country. Some rumors, including a story in the Premium Times on September 12, 2014, based on Chadian Army sources and communications obtained between Nigerian field officers and the Nigerian military, allege that Modu Sheriff, former Borno State governor, is a sponsor of Boko Haram. The rumors say that he has harbored and trained Boko Haram militants in Abéché, Chad. In addition, arms trafficking routes suggest that weapons intended for Boko Haram pass through Chad’s territory from Libya, Sudan, and the CAR.
Chadian President Idriss Déby has raised the alarm about instability in the Lake Chad basin and about “the permanent threat” from Boko Haram and AQIM. As a result, Chad is sending more troops to the Nigerian border and receiving support from France, which in August 2014 launched Operation Barkhane, a regional initiative headquartered in N’Djamena. Even so, Chad’s expanded role in French-led counterterrorism operations is likely a double-edged sword. According to a United Kingdom travel warning, Chadian participation in counterterrorism operations with France increases the “risk that terrorist groups may cross into Chad to carry out attacks.” The U.S. State Department addressed border concerns for Chad on June 30, 2014, saying, “[d]espite recent stability, Chad’s historically volatile security environment could deteriorate unexpectedly, particularly in border areas.”
The cracks in Chad’s border security widened on August 6, 2014, when Boko Haram militants crossed into Chad and gunned down six Nigerians in Dubuwa village. The Nigerians fled an attack two weeks prior on Kirenowa, a Nigerian town close to the Cameroonian border. In a more brazen attempt to enter Chadian territory, on August 16, 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped at least 97 young men and boys, as well as several women from the Doron Baga fishing village in Nigeria near Lake Chad. Reports on this incident vary, including those that suggest Boko Haram militants loaded the victims into speed boats and ferried them to an island under Chadian control where Chadian security officials intercepted a convoy of buses, rescuing 85 hostages and arresting six men accompanying them. These incidents suggest that a shrinking Lake Chad and its archipelagic geography increases the porousness of the border region and creates a transit corridor for Boko Haram and potentially other violent non-state actors to move between Nigeria and its neighbors.
Further evidence shows that Boko Haram may intend to carry out more attacks in Chad. After the May 2014 Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria in which President Déby agreed to launch a “total war” against Boko Haram, an audiotape surfaced on Alwihda Info that threatened Chad for its participation in the military coalition. The tape threatened President Déby and an attack in N’Djamena. The speaker’s voice was identified as a Chadian. In response, Chad deployed security forces in N’Djamena and the French Embassy installed protective measures.
Cameroon has the longest and perhaps the most vulnerable border with Nigeria, and Boko Haram has been able to operate relatively easily in Cameroon, carrying out logistics operations, assassinations, kidnappings, and recruitment. Even though the first signs of Boko Haram’s cross-border activities in Cameroonian territory emerged in early 2012, Cameroonian President Paul Biya only reorganized border security in March 2014, deploying an additional 700 troops to patrol the border.
In March 2014, three Boko Haram arms dealers were arrested in the Extreme North Region for trafficking arms through Chad into Cameroon on their way to Nigeria. In a second incident, in June 2014, 40 Boko Haram members were arrested in Maroua and accused of using a market to conceal a large stockpile of weapons to be used in cross-border incursions into Nigeria. Also in June 2014, Cameroonian authorities discovered a large Boko Haram weapons cache and arrested a Chadian arms dealer.
In addition, while Cameroon was at first a victim of spillover violence from Nigeria and a transit state for arms trafficking, it has now become a rear base from which to attack Nigeria and an arena for Boko Haram’s kidnap for ransom activities. Boko Haram, which once preferred to profit from kidnapping foreigners like a French family in February 2013, a French priest in November 2013, two Italian priests and a Canadian nun in April 2014, and ten Chinese nationals in May 2014, has diversified to targeting locals like the Cameroon vice prime minister’s wife, the sons of traditional leaders, and soldiers.
In recent months, Boko Haram has intensified its cross-border assaults in order to ensure safe passage to Cameroonian border towns by establishing a buffer zone between its territory in Nigeria and the Cameroonian military. This marks a major shift in Boko Haram’s behavior as Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader, had not ordered attacks in Cameroon since 2010, aside from assassinating individuals who had quit his group. After Boko Haram increasingly clashed with Cameroonian troops throughout early 2014, and after the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, President Biya sent approximately 1,000 special forces troops to the border in May. Cameroon’s increased security posture gave Cameroonian troops an advantage for only a short time. From late July to early August 2014, Boko Haram has killed more than 30 civilians and abducted nearly 70 others from the border towns, and at least 25 Cameroonian soldiers died at the hands of Boko Haram during August 2014 alone.
Boko Haram’s presence in Cameroon has renewed fears of widespread recruitment activities. Because Cameroon is facing a refugee crisis on two fronts, one from Boko Haram’s violence in Nigeria and another from the sectarian violence in the CAR, Boko Haram may see the refugees as vulnerable targets and has allegedly begun to kidnap youth to force them to join its ranks. However, some recruits have joined Boko Haram willingly and received their parents’ permission. In fact, Boko Haram may have intended to capture or kill Amadou Ali instead of kidnapping his wife because he led an effort to rescue 500 youth that had recently disappeared and were thought to have been kidnapped by Boko Haram.
The Central African Republic
In January 2013, the UN assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations asserted that the CAR resembles northern Mali in 2012 – a complete absence of central government in which al-Qa`ida-affiliated militants can operate. He speculated about Boko Haram’s involvement in the CAR saying, “[W]e have some indications that there is some kind of presence here.” Furthermore, an alleged Boko Haram statement that appeared on the website Chechen UmmaNews on February 14, 2014, “vowed to avenge the spilled blood of Muslims massacred by the Christian anti-balaka militia in the [CAR].”
Since then, Alwihda Info reported that French and Chadian intelligence believe that Boko Haram has connected with Séléka rebels and that it is supporting them with weapons in exchange for diamonds. Furthermore, the Central African group Revolution and Justice (RJ), whose self-proclaimed purpose is to protect northern CAR’s territory from Séléka and elements of the Chadian rebel group Baba Laddé’s Popular Front for Recovery (FPR), claims that it captured several Séléka militants as well as “two jihadists from Boko Haram” when Séléka militants attempted to cross the border between the towns of Boguila, CAR and Goré, Chad. Jeune Afrique claims that French intelligence confirmed that Noureddine Adam, the Séléka former second-in-command, traveled to Nigeria, which stoked fears in Paris over the potential birth of an alliance between Adam and Boko Haram. These connections may have encouraged Séléka to carry out attacks and kidnappings of their own in Cameroon.
A high-level French diplomat described the CAR as an “explosive cocktail” where Boko Haram, Séléka, Arabs from Darfur, Janjaweed, mercenaries from Chad, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are likely crossing paths. Some observers on the ground have witnessed regions overtaken by Islamist militants where churches are attacked and alcohol consumption and pork are banned.
Boko Haram’s intensified cross-border activities in the last two years have been enabled in part by four components.
First, the region’s borders are long and shifting, allowing Boko Haram to escape capture, evade the Nigerian Army’s offensives, and develop havens where they can plan attacks and recruit new members. The 2,000-mile border Nigeria shares with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon has almost 1,500 illegal or unmonitored crossing routes. Moreover, the shrinking of Lake Chad has made what had historically been a difficult border to traverse more permeable and enables the movement of Boko Haram and potentially other violent non-state actors in ways that were heretofore impossible.
Second, regional militaries are deficient. Chad’s military has been relatively effective at preventing incursions by Boko Haram, but Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria are suffering from poor communications and a lack of patrol vehicles, equipment, training, and motivation to counter Boko Haram activities. Nigerian troops in particular have mutinied and refused to fight due to the lack of firepower, deficient pay, and low morale. Similarly, Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), created to fight violent highway robbery, only began receiving training from United States Africa Command in 2012 and has been deemed “not very competent” by the director of Yaoundé’s War College.
Third, multilateral cooperation is failing. Despite the May 2014 Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria where Nigeria and its neighbors agreed to cooperate on security issues, all of the parties have a long history of failing to establish clear measures for multilateral cooperation to address cross-border vulnerabilities. Some also hold historical grudges from border conflicts. The two major issues preventing effective cooperation are the right of pursuit across international boundaries and intelligence sharing. While Nigeria was granted the right of pursuit in Niger, joint border patrols have yet to start. Nigeria’s other neighbors fear Nigerian troops operating on their territory because they have a reputation for human rights violations. Nigeria and its neighbors are currently hashing out legal agreements for pursuit and for the multinational force due to be in place by November 20, 2014, but this could be another of a series of recent agreements since May 2014 that have yet to come to fruition.
Fourth, Boko Haram has strong ethno-linguistic cross-border ties. The historic ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties of the region, particularly the Sunni Muslim cohesion of Kanuri, Hausa, and Shuwa Arab groups that transcend national boundaries facilitates cross-border movement and makes policing the area extremely difficult. Boko Haram takes advantage of this, penetrating the borders along with the regular flow of refugees and people participating in cross-border trade. Authorities have trouble distinguishing Boko Haram members from other citizens, which consequentially can backfire if harsh measures are used against individuals mistakenly associated with Boko Haram.
Without collectively addressing these four components that have allowed Boko Haram’s cross-border activity to expand, the group will continue to inflict human casualties and significant economic damage, not just in Nigeria, but throughout the broader region.
Scott Menner is a Research Associate for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and is currently a Masters Candidate in the Security Studies Program (SSP) at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. The views and conclusions presented are those of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or START.
 “Boko Haram Kidnaps Cameroon’s Vice PM’s Wife, Kills 3,” Nigerian Tribune, July 28, 2014; “Cameroun: 14 Membres de Boko Haram Reçoivent 10 à 20 Ans de Prison,” Cameroon Web News, July 26, 2014; See also Javier Blas, “Kidnap Attack Shows an Expanding Boko Haram Now Targeting Cameroon,” Financial Times, August 1, 2014.
 One soldier who survived the attacks indicated that Boko Haram may have kidnapped up to 13 of his comrades in the attack. See “Boko Haram Clashes with Cameroon Soldiers in Cross-Border Attacks,” Reuters, July 26, 2014. See also “Two Cameroon Soldiers ‘Killed in Crossborder Boko Haram Attack,’” Cameroon Web News, July 25, 2014.
 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Suspected Boko Haram Militants Kidnap Cleric’s Children,” Voice of America, July 15, 2014.
 “Boko Haram: Explosives Used by Female Suicide Bombers Traced to Chinese Factory,” DailyPost, August 2, 2014.
 This attack resulted in the kidnapping of 10 Chinese nationals. See “Suspected Boko Haram Rebels Attack Chinese Plant in Cameroon,” Reuters, May 17, 2014.
 David Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists,” Reuters, March 19, 2014; Thomas Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram Fallout,” BBC News, April 22, 2014.
Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel? (International Crisis Group, September 19, 2013), p. 41.
 “Le Niger et Le Nigeria Renforcent Leur Coopération et Signent Un Accord de Défense,” RFI, October 19, 2012.
 “Gunmen Kidnap Five Aid Workers, Driver in Niger,” Vanguard, October 15, 2012.
 Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists.”
 “Niger Arrests 20 Boko Haram Militants in Suspected Plot,” Reuters, February 17, 2014.
 Nafeez Ahmed, “Behind the Rise of Boko Haram – Ecological Disaster, Oil Crisis, Spy Games,” The Guardian, May 9, 2014.
 Chris Agbambu and Seyi Gesinde, “How Boko Haram Recruits Niger Republic Youths with $3,000,” Nigerian Tribune, April 23, 2014; See also “Boko Haram Pays N500,000 to Niger Recruits — Gang Members,” Vanguard, April 24, 2014.
 The specific location of the camp was not identified. See Fidelis Soriwei and Kamorudeen Ogundele, “B’Haram’s Anti-Aircraft Training Camp Uncovered in Niger,” Punch, February 19, 2014.
 “Niger Arrests Fourteen Suspected Boko Haram Gunmen after Patrol Ambushed,” Reuters, May 7, 2014.
 Lewis, “Niger Fears Contagion from Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists”; Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram Fallout.”
Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency (International Crisis Group, April 2014), p. 25.
 “EXCLUSIVE: Secret Intelligence Report Links Ex-Governor Sheriff, Chad President to Boko Haram Sponsorship,” Premium Times, September 12, 2014.
 “Arms Smuggling to Boko Haram Threatens Cameroon,” IRINnews, February 21, 2014; Sagir Musa, “How Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram Smuggle Arms into Nigeria,” Vanguard, May 11, 2013.
 Ely Karmon, “Boko Haram’s International Reach,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8:1 (2014), p. 78.
 “Africa’s Jihadists, on Their Way,” The Economist, July 26, 2014.
 “François Hollande’s African Adventures,” The Economist, July 19, 2014; Marcelle Balt, “Operation Barkhane Increases French Influence in the Sahel,” RFI, July 22, 2014.
 Conway Waddington, “Understanding Operation Barkhane,” African Defence Review, August 1, 2014.
 “Chad Travel Advice – GOV.UK,” available at https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/chad/terrorism.
 “Chad Travel Warning,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Passports & International Travel, (June 30, 2014), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/alertswarnings/chad-travel-warning.html.
 Kirenowa was the one of the first places that Nigerian forces removed a Boko Haram camp in 2013 following the State of Emergency declared by President Goodluck Jonathan. A fisherman from Kirenowa said that all indications point to a return of Boko Haram in full force to Marte and “other local government areas along the shores of the Lake Chad.” Boko Haram reportedly hoisted its flags and indoctrinated children in these villages in 2013 and may be poised to do it again. See Hamza Idris, “Boko Haram Trails Nigerians to Chad, Kills 6,” Daily Trust, August 6, 2014.
 “Boko Haram Dumps Kidnapped Doron Baga Villagers Around Lake Chad,” Sahara Reporters, August 15, 2014.
 Ibid.; See also Aminu Abubakar, “Chadian Troops Rescue 85 Nigerian Hostages from Boko Haram,” CNN, August 17, 2014.
 “African Leaders Pledge ‘Total War’ on Boko Haram,” Al Jazeera America, May 17, 2014.
 Abu Adil, “Boko Haram Menace Le Tchad,” Alwihda Info, May 23, 2014.
 “L’enregistrement de Boko Haram Qui Menace Le Tchad,” Alwihda Info, June 5, 2014.
 Boko Haram has assassinated 20 informants in Cameroon since the beginning of the year. See Stephanie Gosk, “Nigerian Neighbor Cameroon Faces ‘Phantom Enemy’ Boko Haram,” NBC News, May 20, 2014. See also, Yuh Timchia, “Boko Haram ‘Informant’ Killed in Cameroon,” Africa Review, January 21, 2013.
 Cameroon first began to fear Boko Haram incursions after the April 10, 2012, attacks on the Nigerian border town of Banki. See: Grégoire Djarmaila, “Boko Haram Frappe À La Frontière Du Nigeria Avec Le Cameroun,” Cameroon-Info.net, April 11, 2012; “Timeline of Boko Haram and Related Violence in Nigeria,” IRINnews, February 22, 2013; “CrisisWatch Database – International Crisis Group – Cameroon,” International Crisis Group, 2014.
 “CrisisWatch Database – International Crisis Group – Cameroon.”
 “Cameroon Arrests Three for Trafficking Arms to Boko Haram,” Vanguard, March 27, 2014.
 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “40 Suspected Boko Haram Militants Arrested in Cameroon,” Voice of America, June 24, 2014.
 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon’s Military Seizes War Weapons,” Voice of America, June 18, 2014.
 Comfort Oseghale, “Boko Haram Releases Video of Kidnapped French Family,” Punch, February 26, 2014.
 “French Priest Kidnapped in Cameroon,” France 24, November 15, 2014.
 “Canadian Nun and Italian Priests Kidnapped in Northern Cameroon,” Standard-Tribune, April 5, 2014.
 James Bwala and Johnson Babajide, “Boko Haram Kills 29 in Borno, Abducts 10 Chinese in Cameroon,” Nigerian Tribune, May 18, 2014.
 “‘Islamist Militants’ Kill 10 in Northern Cameroon,” BBC, August 6, 2014.
 “Boko Haram Steps up Cameroon Raids,” IRINnews, July 24, 2014.
 Jacob Zenn, “Northern Cameroon Under Threat from Boko Haram and Séléka Militants,” Terrorism Monitor 12:1 (2014), p. 8.
 Bate Felix, “Cameroon Sends Troops to Nigeria Border to Tackle Boko Haram,” Reuters, May 27, 2014.
 “CrisisWatch Database – International Crisis Group – Cameroon.”
 Niyi Odebode, “Cameroon Kills 102 Boko Haram Fighters in One Week,” Punch, June 8, 2014.
 Civilian deaths and kidnappings were calculated using information from International Crisis Group’s CrisisWatch Database for the months of July and August along with corroborating news stories. See “CrisisWatch Database – International Crisis Group – Cameroon,” available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7B5C2283AD-398B-4CEB-8ED9-B322B29F7E9A%7D. See also Ezekiel Attah, “Cameroon Fortifies Border as Boko Haram Kill Four in Fresh Clash,” TODAY, July 27, 2014; “‘Islamist Militants’ Kill 10 in Northern Cameroon,” BBC, August 6, 2014; Emmanuel Uzodinma, “Boko Haram Abducts 15 Persons in Cameroon Village, Kills Three,” DailyPost, August 19, 2014; “Cameroon Kills 27 Boko Haram Members in Border Clashes,” Nigerian Tribune, August 28, 2014.
 “Le Cameroun Rend Hommage À 25 Militaires Tués Par Boko Haram,” Africatime.com, August 29, 2014.
 “Boko Haram Said Recruiting Fighters in Cameroon,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 17, 2014; Damien Gayle, “Boko Haram Snatch Young Boys from across Border in Cameroon,” Mail Online, June 19, 2014; Chris Stein, “As Muslims Flee Central African Republic Fury, Fears of Radicalization; Thousands Are Threatened as Christian-Dominated Militias Take Retribution for Atrocities Blamed on a Muslim-Dominated Former Government. Many Worry the Mass Displacement Will Further Destabilize CAR,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 2014.
 “Boko Haram Starts Fresh Recruitment,” Nigerian Tribune, April 19, 2014.
 “Biya’s Answer to Boko Haram,” Africa Confidential 55:17 (2014).
 Hannah McNeish, “Lawless CAR Attracting Terrorists’ Attention,” Voice of America, November 22, 2013.
 “Nigeria Islamist Boko Haram Vows to Avenge Spilled Blood of CAR Muslims,” BBC Monitoring Africa, February 15, 2014.
 Johnny Yannick, “Chadian Comment Raps France for Omitting CAR from Boko Haram Summit,” BBC Monitoring Africa, May 21, 2014; Johnny Yannick, “Sommet Spécial Boko Haram : Ce Que La France N’a Pas Fait Est Grave,” Alwihda Info, May 18, 2014.
 Jamil Ahmat, “Centrafrique: ‘Révolution et Justice’ Dément Être Un Groupe Rebelle,” Alwihda Info, January 13, 2014; “Un Nouveau Mouvement Politico-Militaire En Centrafrique,” Radio Ndeke Luka, March 21, 2014.
 Issa Abakar, “RCA: Violents Combats À La Frontière Tchadienne, ‘2 Hommes de Boko Haram’ Capturés,” Alwihda Info, January 20, 2014; Issa Abakar, “RCA/Tchad Une Section Motorisé de La Séléka Attaque Une Ligne de Défense Des FS-RJ, ‘de Sérieuses Pertes,’” Alwihda Info, January 20, 2014.
 “Nigeria-Centrafrique, La Dangereuse Connexion,” Jeune Afrique, March 12, 2014; “Séléka: La Présence de Nourredine Adam Au Nigéria Inquiète Paris,” Journal de Bangui, March 13, 2014.
 See “Affrontements Sanglants entre Rebelles Séléka et les Elements du BIR,” Camer.be, February 18, 2014; “Cameroon Cracks Down on CAR Rebels,” Voice of America, December 30, 2013; “Criminalité Transfrontalière: La Séléka Abat Deux Militaires et Un Chef de Village Camerounais,” Journal Du Cameroun, December 31, 2013.
 “Cameroon Blames Séléka Rebels for Hostage Taking,” Voice of America, May 15, 2014.
 John Irish, “France Wants Action on Central Africa ‘Sectarian Poison,’” Reuters, October 11, 2013.
 Jean-Paul Passi, “Commentary Slams ‘Unconsciousness’ of CAR’s Ex-Rebel Group,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 27, 2013.
 Adelani Adepegba, Friday Olokor, and Tunde Ajaja, “Ebola: Nigeria’s 1,479 Illegal Borders May Spread Virus,” Punch, August 2, 2014.
 Tim Cocks, “Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against Boko Haram: Nigeria,” Reuters, May 30, 2014; “Multilateral Action against Boko Haram,” National Mirror, August 25, 2014.
 “Nigerian Troops Charged with Mutiny,” BBC, October 16, 2014; Alroy Menezes, “Nigerian Soldiers Mutiny, Refuse To Fight Boko Haram Claiming They Are Ill Equipped,” International Business Times, August 20, 2014.
 Stephanie Gosk, “Nigerian Neighbor Cameroon Faces ‘Phantom Enemy’ Boko Haram.”
 “Nigeria, Neighbours ‘Declare War’ on Boko Haram over Abducted Girls,” i24news, May 18, 2014.
 Oghogho Obayuwana, “How Abandoned Pact Fuels Insecurity in Nigeria,” The Guardian, May 5, 2014.
 Thomas Fessy, “Niger Hit by Nigeria’s Boko Haram Fallout.”
 Adekunle Aliyu, Ben Agande, and Favour Nnabugwu, “We’ll Wipe out Boko Haram – Cameroon,” Vanguard, October 14, 2014.
 Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Growing Presence in Niger,” Terrorism Monitor 10:20 (2012). pp. 4–5.