Abstract: This article presents a chronological and thematic analysis of militant violence in Jammu and Kashmir from the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in August 2019 to July 2025. It traces three distinct phases: an initial decline in attacks due to lockdowns and security restrictions (2019-2020); a resurgence marked by hybrid militancy, targeted killings, and intimidation of civilians (2021-2023); and a lethal escalation involving high-profile and audacious assaults, intensified counterterrorism operations, and cross-border tensions (2024-2025). The April 2025 Pahalgam massacre—which killed 26 people, mostly Hindus—marked a turning point, prompting India’s limited military offensive Operation Sindoor against militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, followed by Operation Mahadev to track and eliminate the militants involved in the violence. The article examines these developments to assess the evolving threat, highlighting how militancy has shifted toward hybrid façade units backed by Pakistan-based legacy terror groups.
On April 22, 2025, five Islamist militants ambushed a group of tourists in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, Anantnag district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K, or Kashmir). The attackers executed 26 civilians, mostly Hindus, by shooting them in the head after allegedly asking them to recite the Kalima, the Islamic declaration of faith.a The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), immediately claimed responsibility, but days later, it backtracked, blaming Indian agencies for maligning the so-called Kashmir resistance movement.1 The later denial notwithstanding, this was the deadliest militant attack in Kashmir since the February 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing that killed 40 central reserve police force personnel.b The Pahalgam massacre has not only reignited national outrage in India against Islamist terrorism but also underscored the enduring threat of Pakistan-based Islamist-jihadi proxies active in the Kashmir region since the mid-1990s, and set the stage for a new, more assertive phase in India’s counterterrorism and security doctrine.c
Initial investigations led by India’s security apparatus, including the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), have traced coordination between the attackers of Pahalgam and their handlers across the border in Pakistan.2 The attack raises important questions about Pakistan’s long-standing tolerance of jihadi groups, and its symbiotic ties to and tacit support for groups such as LeT and TRF.3 d The communal targeting of Hindus signaled a dangerous shift in militant objectives, from so-called separatist insurgency to more focused sectarian jihadi terror.e For decades in Kashmir, while militants killed indiscriminately or selectively targeted political figures, migrant workers, and security personnel, it had been rare since the massacres of the 1990s to see people based on their faith deliberately isolated and executed in mass-style killings. Pahalgam survivors’ accounts confirmed that the attackers separated men, asked them to recite Islamic prayers, and then shot those identified as Hindus (non-Muslims), a chilling echo of earlier pogrom-like assaults in Kashmir such as the Chhatishingpora (Anantnag) massacre of March 2000 where 36 Sikh villagers (all males like in Pahalgam) were killed for their religion by the Kashmir militants.4 Arguably, this method of singling out victims by faith exposed the ideological drive behind the attack. Despite the rhetoric of ‘self-determination,’ freedom struggle, or ‘anti-India resistance’ often used to cloak this hybrid militancy in Kashmir, the Pahalgam massacre underscored that the LeT/TRF are pursuing a sectarian jihadi project rather than a separatist insurgency. Indeed, the targeting of Hindus at Baisaran Valley was not incidental; rather, it was the intended militant message to terrorize minorities, deter migrants (non-locals), and advance a communal agenda rooted in Islamist jihadi ideology.
The April 22 massacre not only reignited fears among Hindus in Kashmir and elsewhere but also triggered a chain of diplomatic and military responses from India, culminating in a brief but intense military conflict with Pakistan. It underscored the urgent need to reassess the trajectory of violence in Kashmir post-abolition of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which ended J&K’s special constitutional status on August 6, 2019.f In the immediate aftermath, New Delhi enforced an unprecedented lockdown, deploying security personnel and imposing a months-long communications blackout in Kashmir.5 These measures largely prevented militant violence against security forces and restricted civil unrest and disruption of law and order, marked by stone and petrol bomb pelting by the pro-militant Kashmir Muslims popularly known as ‘Sangbaaz.’ Still, these punitive or restrictive measures also caused Kashmir’s long-running Islamist militancy to evolve into more covert, hybrid, and lethal forms.
To examine this extreme evolution in militant violence in Kashmir in the last six years, this article presents a chronological and thematic analysis of militant violence in Kashmir between August 2019 and July 2025. It also focuses on how the Pahalgam attack marked a turning point, reshaping both internal security priorities and regional dynamics, triggering a military escalation between India and Pakistan. Against the backdrop of persistent violence and Pakistan’s harboring of jihadi proxies,6 this article underscores why Kashmir remains a volatile security and communal flashpoint, demanding urgent attention and strategic focus.
This article is organized into two core parts to offer a clear and comprehensive understanding of militant violence in Kashmir following the repeal of Article 370. Part I traces the evolution of the conflict through three distinct phases: the immediate post-abrogation period (2019-2020) when strict security measures and COVID-19 lockdowns led to a sharp drop in militant activity; the resurgence phase (2021-2023), marked by targeted killings, the rise of hybrid militants, and systematic intimidation of civilians; and the most recent lethal phase (2024-July 2025), characterized by high-profile audacious attacks, intensified counterterrorism operations, and heightened cross-border tensions. Part II briefly examines India’s counterterrorism response in the wake of the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, focusing on the launch of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which targeted militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and beyond, and Operation Mahadev in July 2025, which reportedly eliminated three Pahalgam perpetrators in Kashmir. The article concludes with an assessment of the future trajectory of militancy in Kashmir, drawing on developments after Pahalgam to evaluate emerging threats and security imperatives.
Part I: Three Phases of Militancy in Kashmir
Rise of Façade Groups: From Decline to Consolidation (2019-2020). Post-August 2019, the decades-old Islamist militancy in Kashmir evolved through distinct phases, each marked by changes in operational tempo, target selection, geography, and group dynamics. While the government’s security clampdown—starting in previous years and continuing with COVID-19 restrictions—initially reduced militant mobility, cross-border facilitation networks adapted, and new factions emerged to mask the role of long-entrenched Pakistan-based terror groups such as Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),g Syed Salahuddin’s Hizbul Mujahideen,h and Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).i Though these Pakistan-based legacy terror networks were disrupted in Kashmir due to sustained counterterrorism operations by 2019, several hybrid offshoots (the so-called façade groups) such as TRF, People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF), Kashmir Tigers (KT), Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF), and J&K Ghaznavi Force (JKGF) appeared during this time as fresh proxy entities in Kashmir, camouflaging as indigenous ‘liberation’ or ‘resistance’ movements and claiming responsibility for most of the targeted violence and online recruitment and propaganda during the 2019-2020 period. While these pro-Pakistan groups emerged on the scene, transnational jihadi factions such as Islamic State Hind Province (ISH) or Jundul Khilafa and the al-Qa`ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)-linked Ansar Ghazwat-ul Hind laid low in operational terms mainly due to security crackdowns, turf wars, and ideological rivalries between different militant groupings within Kashmir.7
Militant attacks in this phase were sporadic and selective, targeting vulnerable civilians to intimidate people from other Indian states from visiting or settling in Kashmir and to disrupt economic activity in the state. Groups such as TRF, PAFF, and JKGF spearheaded multifaceted violence in Kashmir, opposed the revocation of J&K’s special status, which encouraged the return of Hindus to Kashmir who had left the state in the 1990s to escape Pakistan-backed militant violence in the Kashmir region.8 Grenade attacks in Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla, and elsewhere,j improvised explosive device (IED) recoveries, and small arms fire incidents persisted intermittently during this time. The PAFF, which surfaced in late 2019 in response to the abrogation of Article 370, unleashed armed encounters and ambushes against security forces in the Poonch area and other locations in Kashmir.9 For these hybrid groups, the strategy remained to broaden the local Muslim support base (including the Over Ground Worker (OGW) ecosystem)k while framing their attacks as resistance to the Indian state, rising Hindu nationalism,l and resettlement of Hindus and other non-Muslims in Kashmir.m These hybrid groups, particularly TRF and PAFF, had cleverly avoided pro-Pakistan rhetoric, Islamic religious symbols, and overt jihadi narratives in their propaganda, aiming to secularize the campaign as anti-fascist liberation movements.n
In October 2019, TRF and other militant factions killed several civilians, including truckers, apple traders, and migrant laborers, in Kulgam and Shopian districts in South Kashmir.10 The most tragic event occurred on October 29, 2019, when armed militants killed five migrant laborers (all Muslims) from West Bengal in Kitrusu in Kulgam district.11 Initially caught off guard, security forces in Kashmir launched sustained ‘search and sweep’ operations in 2020, even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, killing 225 militants (207 in the Kashmir Zone and 18 in the Jammu Zone), including top commanders of Hizbul Mujahideen, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, and Jaish-e-Mohammed.12 High-profile eliminations included Hizbul commander Reyaz Naikoo, Junaid Sehrai, Saifullah, Burhan Koka, and JeM’s Qari Yasir, among 46 top commanders killed in 2020.13 Despite these counterterrorism successes, grenade attacks and targeted killings persisted,o such as the October 29 assassinations of three Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) members in Kulgam by TRF militants.14 These recently emerged hybrid groups with newly recruited local militants with no prior records have become a major challenge as they can execute swift, low-key attacks before blending into civilian populations.
Resurgence and Rise of Anti-Hindu (Outsiders) Campaign (2021-2023). From 2021 onward, Kashmir’s hybrid militancy entered a phase overtly characterized by targeted killings of minority community members. Targeted victims in this phase of violence mainly included Kashmiri (Hindu) Pandits, migrant workers, non-Muslim teachers, and elected local self-government members, with TRF,p PAFF, Ghaznavi Force, Kashmir Tigers, and Muslim Janbaz Force frequently claiming responsibility.15
At the start of the year, a lesser-known militant group, Muslim Janbaz Force, claimed responsibility for an attack in Srinagar in mid-February that targeted Akash Mehra of the Krishna (Hindu) restaurant, resulting in his death on February 28, 2021. The group, in a statement, justified the attack as a retaliation against the new domicile rules, which allow “outsiders” to settle in Jammu and Kashmir, sparking widespread fear and panic among the Hindu community.16 Later that year, more targeted attacks against Hindus were reported. The Makhan Lal Bindroo assassination in Srinagar, a popular Kashmiri Hindu pharmacist; the killings of Hindu and Sikh teachers in a high school17 in Srinagar; and the killing of a migrant vegetable seller,q among a few others, in October 2021 made that month the most violent of the year.18 TRF claimed responsibility for Bindroo’s death, portraying him as a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)r agent and collaborator for the Indian government.s Frequent gun or grenade attacks on off-duty police and political workers created a climate of fear in Kashmir with the violent resurgence of these hybrid groups.t Militant activity also shifted into urban and semi-urban pockets, particularly in Srinagar, where shooters using small-arms operated in close quarters. In mid-October 2021, the JKGF (Ghaznavi Force) gained an operational advantage by conducting ambush attacks against the security forces in the Mendhar and Surankote areas of Poonch district. These ambushes resulted in the deaths of at least nine armed forces personnel and police.19 Ghaznavi Force also attempted to target a few religious sites in Poonch district with IEDs and grenades to instill fear among the Hindu minority in the region.20
Another pro-Pakistan group, the Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF), also emerged during this phase with its first grenade attack against paramilitary forces in Baramulla on November 17, 2021,21 and fatal attacks targeting Hindus subsequently,22 further complicating the militant landscape in Kashmir.u Similarly, on December 13, 2021, the Kashmiri Tigers ambushed a police convoy returning to camp near Srinagar, killing three officers and injuring at least 11.23 These attacks were claimed as proof that militancy remained entrenched despite the Indian government’s claims of peace and normalcy in the state.
In 2022, intermittent militant attacks continued to target security forces, minority Hindus, and migrant workers in Kashmir. A deadly suicide (fidayeen) attack on August 11 witnessed the deaths of four soldiers, including a junior commissioned officer (JCO) at Pargal in Rajouri.24 The ambush underlined that despite tight security measures, militant groups retained the capability to strike hardened military targets.
Minority Hindus continued to be the prime targets, as Kashmiri Hindus were gunned down in repeated attacks in 2022. On August 16, militants shot dead Sunil Kumar Nath while critically injuring his brother in Shopian.25 Two months later, on October 15, another Kashmiri Hindu farmer, Puran Krishan Bhat, was killed in Chowdari Gund, also in Shopian.v These killings reinforced the atmosphere of fear among Hindu Pandits who had cautiously returned to the valley under government resettlement schemes,26 showing how militants deliberately sought to intimidate and drive out the Hindu minority. Similarly, migrant laborers from outside Kashmir continued to bear the brunt.w The militant campaign against non-local workers escalated in mid-October 2022 when two workers from Uttar Pradesh were killed in a grenade attack in Shopian.27 These attacks claimed by TRF and other groups underscore the systematic targeting of non-local workers, a tactic meant to deter migration, and amplify the message that Kashmir remains hostile to ‘outsiders’ and, more plausibly, to weaken local economies.
By early 2023, the conflict’s geography began to expand. The twin terror attacks in Dhangri (Rajouri) on January 1-2—indiscriminate firing followed by an IED blast—marked a deliberate revival of violence in Jammu’s border districts. Seven civilians of the Hindu community, two of them minors, were killed in these incidents.28 High-casualty encounters, such as the prolonged Kokernag (Anantnag) gunfight and the Narla (Rajouri) encounter in September 2023, revealed improved militant fieldcraft, with forested terrain used to store arms and evade capture. A total of five security personnel and two militants were killed in this fierce battle.29
Like TRF and KFF, the PAFF perpetrated several high-profile attacks, particularly in the Jammu region during this phase.x For instance, PAFF claimed responsibility for killing Rakesh Pandita, a BJP municipal councillor, in early June 2021,30 and for the April 20, 2023, Poonch ambush that killed five army soldiers.31 It released a short helmet-camera video of the strike, taunting the Indian security apparatus. The video showed militants executing a well-planned attack, using sophisticated weapons and filming it for the first time in Kashmir. PAFF was also linked to the May 5, 2023, IED attack in Rajouri that killed five more soldiers.32 These two events marked the worst security force losses in Kashmir in 2023, underlining PAFF’s lethal capabilities. Again in December 2023, PAFF militants ambushed an army convoy, killing four soldiers in Poonch district.33
In 2022, Jammu and Kashmir recorded 253 militancy-related deaths, of which 30 were security personnel. In 2023, however, overall fatalities dropped to 134, but the proportion of security personnel killed more than doubled to nearly 25 percent of the total deaths, with 33 security force deaths.34 Militant fatalities also saw a sharp decline, falling from over 170 in 2022 to under 90 in 2023, reflecting both reduced militant presence and a shift in engagement patterns. However, this shift highlights a troubling trend and marks a notable consolidation in this phase. While militant casualties have declined, attacks have increasingly targeted and killed security forces, reflecting a rise in high-impact militant operations.
The perennial OGW problem in Kashmir has also seen a major shift during this phase, though the crackdown started in 2019 as part of India’s broader counterterrorism approach in Kashmir.35 The focus remained beyond armed militants to the wider pro-Pakistan and pro-militant ecosystem that sustained terrorism for decades in Kashmir.y Between 2019 and 2023, over 1,900 OGWs linked to LeT, HM, or JeM, as well as their front groups, were detained. In 2023 alone, 201 OGWs were arrested under the Public Safety Act.36 Even though militancy has persisted, the erosion of OGW networks around this time has significantly disrupted recruitment channels and cross-border linkages, forcing militant groups to adapt under mounting security challenges.
Geographical Expansion and Violent Escalation (2024-July 2025). In 2024, militancy in Kashmir geographically consolidated its southward drift into Poonch, Rajouri, and Udhampur districts. Several attacks, including ambushes on security patrols, assaults on village defense guards,37 and strikes on Hindu pilgrims and tourists, marked the beginning of a lethal escalation phase of Kashmir militancy. Groups such as TRF, Kashmir Tigers, and PAFF have exploited the forested zones near the borders with Pakistan for infiltration, staging zones for renewed violence. The most notable among them was the ambush attack of June 2024. As briefly mentioned earlier, TRF militants attacked a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims to Shiv Khori in Reasi district, killing nine and injuring more than 30 people.38 Claiming responsibility, the group announced its intention to conduct more such attacks on tourists and non-locals, describing the assault as the “beginning of a renewed campaign.”39
In July 2024, Kashmir witnessed an uptick in militant violence targeting security forces, days after India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, mentioned the waning of terrorism in the state in a speech.z However, that month proved to be one of the deadliest for security forces in Kashmir, with at least 12 army personnel killed in multiple militant attacks and encounters across the region. Several high-casualty incidents occurred, including the July 8 ambush on an army truck in Kathua’s Lohai Malhar area that left five security personnel dead,40 and the July 15-16 encounter in Doda that claimed four more lives.41 Additional fatalities occurred elsewhere in July, underscoring both the sustained lethality of militants and the heavy toll on security personnel despite ongoing counterinsurgency efforts.aa These incidents highlighted the continuing threat in Kashmir’s frontier districts, which since late April 2024ab have increasingly witnessed infiltration-linked violence and militant hideouts in forested areas.42
In September and October 2024, Jammu and Kashmir held elections to the Assembly, marking the first such elections since the 2019 scrapping of Article 370 and the subsequent reorganization of the state. However, in less than three weeks, on October 20, TRF militants killed seven people, both locals and migrant workers engaged in the Z-Morh tunnel project that connects Gaganeer to Sonamarg in Ganderbal district.ac A month later, militants again triggered a fresh wave of violence in a mark of defiance of the democratically elected government. The killing of two village defense guards in Kishtwar on November 7 by Kashmir Tiger militants43 and the November 3 grenade blast in a busy Sunday market in Srinagar that killed a woman44 came as a surprise to both federal and state governments for the complicated security situation in post-election Kashmir. These successive incidents were part of a broader pattern of a new wave of escalating militancy, with activity moving south from the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley toward the Hindu-majority Jammu region, marking a renewed push to expand the conflict’s geographical and communal scope. According to an official Indian government estimate, in 2024, 68 militants were killed in Jammu and Kashmir, of whom 42 were foreign nationals and the rest were local recruits.ad Key militant commanders killed that year included Basit Ahmad Dar, Usman Lashkari, Arbaz Mir, and Farooq Ahmad Bhat (alias Nali), linked to hybrid militant groups TRF, PAFF, and Kashmir Tigers.45
In early 2025, the PAFF carried out two major strikes in Jammu and Kashmir. On January 11, an IED blast near the line of control (LoC) in Akhnoor’s Laleali area killed two armed force personnel and injured a couple of others.46 PAFF later released a video claiming responsibility for the attack. PAFF struck again on March 27, killing four Special Operations Group (SOG) police and injuring seven others in an armed counter in Kathua’s Safiyan Jakhole locality. 47 These back-to-back attacks underscored PAFF’s lethal footprint with an active network of OGWs in the Hindu-dominated Jammu region.48
The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, which overshadowed previous violence by the so-called façade groups, marked the deadliest assault on civilians, including Hindu tourists in Kashmir, in the ongoing phase of a lethal militant surge since June 2024. Five TRF militants, armed with sophisticated weapons, ambushed Hindu tourists in the Baisaran valley. Indian intelligence agencies traced the operation to handlers in Muridke and Bahawalpur, Pakistan, indicating direct cross-border orchestration.ae Indian investigations have established that two senior LeT leaders, Hafeez Saeed and deputy Saifullah Khalid Kasuri,af masterminded the attacks with Hashim Moosa (Faizal Jatt) of TRF, who was later killed during a counterterrorism operation in late July 2025.49
in the aftermath of an attack there. (Tauseef Mustafa/AFP via Getty Images)
Part II: India’s Post-Pahalgam Counterterrorism Response
The Pahalgam massacre of April 22, 2025, was no doubt a defining moment in Kashmir’s recent militant history, both in scale and in its deliberate sectarian targeting. Survivors and preliminary NIA investigation reports confirmed that the Pakistan-based attackers had carried out reconnaissance in the preceding days, using local facilitators, to identify tourist movement patterns and secure temporary shelter.50 Forensic examination of recovered shell casings matched weapon types frequently trafficked from across the border, from Pakistan.51
This attack proved to be a turning point as clamor for decisive action against Pakistan-based terror fountainheads grew manifold in India. Within a couple of weeks of Pahalgam, India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, a cross-border punitive military operation targeting nine major terror training camps, weapons depots, and logistics hubs in Bahawalpur, Muridke, Kotli, and Muzaffarabad, used by LeT, JeM, and Hizbul Mujahideen in PAK (Pakistan Administered Kashmir).ag This military offensive was a step beyond all previous counterterrorism operations deep inside Pakistan, such as the Balakot offensive of 2019.ah This also marked a significant evolution of India’s counterterrorism posture through a series of defining cross-border operations, employing airpower and long-range missiles, aided by drones, satellite surveillance, and psychological warfare. While Pakistan accused India of civilian casualties, India maintained all strikes were on verified non-civilian, militant sites.52 Together, these operations underscore India’s steady shift from reactive defense to proactive, hybrid deterrence against Pakistan-backed militancy.
Pakistan’s military retaliated to India’s actions with its strikes under Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos,53 bringing the two nuclear-armed rivals to one of their most dangerous confrontations since the Kargil conflict in 1999. However, after almost three days of clashes and amid international alarm, a fragile ceasefire came into effect.
Following Operation Sindoor, India’s security agencies launched Operation Mahadev, a targeted ‘search and termination’ campaign that lasted nearly 70 days, was initiated on May 22, 2025, and aimed at tracking and eliminating the three identified TRF militants. This intelligence-driven operation relied on a combination of human intelligence, mobile intercepts, drone surveillance, and satellite imagery. After locating militants’ presence in the Dachigam-Harwan forest belt area, the operation involved a prolonged surveillance phase lasting two months. Using advanced signal-capturing equipment, security forces confirmed the presence of the militants—Faizal Jatt, Hamza Afghani, and Jibran, all Pakistani nationals affiliated with LeT/TRF—on July 22, 2025.54 A joint operation team comprising special forces, paramilitary, and state police killed the three militants behind the Pahalgam killings in late July 2025.55 The operation was hailed as a major success, preventing their escape to Pakistan, as per India’s Home Affairs Minister.56 Earlier, in June, the NIA arrested two local militants, Parvaiz Ahmad Jothar of Batkote and Bashir Ahmad Jothar of Pahalgam, for sheltering and guiding the April 22 Pahalgam attackers. Investigations revealed that the duo provided food, shelter, and logistical support to the three Pakistani militants at a dhok (hut) in Hill Park before the massacre.57 During questioning, they also allegedly disclosed the identities of Pakistani terrorists directly involved in the Pahalgam killings.58
While the two arrested militants remain in custody,59 NIA continues to probe the wider conspiracy and support network behind the Pahalgam attack.60 The swift elimination of the Pakistani assailants underlined India’s resolve to deliver retribution, even as the involvement of local recruits highlighted the persistent challenge of hybrid militancy in Kashmir.
Conclusion: The Future of Islamist Militancy in Kashmir
The Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 and India’s swift retaliation through operations Sindoor and Mahadev have changed the contours of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Over the last six years, militancy has shifted from large, visible militant formations to smaller, harder-to-detect hybrid factions like TRF or PAFF, supported by globally designated terror groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed across the border in Pakistan. These factions often rely on local overground workers for shelter and logistics, as witnessed in Pahalgam events, while receiving weapons, training, and funding from Pakistan-based groups.ai
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that India is now willing to respond with deep, precision strikes on militant bases across the border. India’s position was further reinforced internationally when, in July 2025, the United Nations Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee report linked TRF to the Pahalgam attack.61 Just before India launched Operation Sindoor, U.N. Security Council members in a closed-door consultation62 strongly criticized Pakistan over tensions with India and the terror attacks on tourists. During that meeting, members questioned Islamabad on the role of LeT in the Pahalgam massacre.63 On July 18, 2025, the U.S. State Department designated TRF as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity under Executive Order 13224, freezing its assets within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting material support from U.S. persons.64 Again on September 1, a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) declaration strongly condemned the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack and demanded justice against those responsible.65
The Pahalgam attack and India’s retaliatory military responses reflect a decisive doctrinal shift in counterterrorism policy. India has made it clear that cross-border terror incidents, whether like Pahalgam or Pulwama, will increasingly be met with multi-domain, precision strikes. While retaliation will not be automatic for every militant incident, the threshold for response, however, has been markedly lowered, raising the costs for Pakistan-backed militancy in Kashmir. Going forward, this shift is likely to alter India-Pakistan crisis dynamics, making deterrence more credible but also increasing the risk of post-attack escalations. The threat will continue to come from these hybrid militants, drone-assisted supply lines,66 and sporadic cross-border facilitation by Pakistan-based parent groups. India’s challenge will be to maintain an intelligence and technological edge, disrupt domestic recruitment networks early, and sustain public confidence while ensuring that high-profile, mass fatality attacks, such as Pahalgam, are not repeated. CTC
Animesh Roul is the executive director of the New Delhi-based policy research group Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict. He specializes in counterterrorism, radical Islam, terror financing, and armed conflict in South Asia, and he has written extensively on these subject areas in the media, including edited books, journals, and policy magazines. X: @Animesh_Roul
© 2025 Animesh Roul
Substantive Notes
[a] Twenty-six people were killed in the Pahalgam terror attacks, including 25 tourists (24 Hindus and one Christian) and a local Muslim pony/mule ride tour operator, while 17 others were injured. Five assault rifle-wielding TRF militants, reportedly filming the massacre with helmet cameras, singled out male Hindus, asked them their religion, and shot them in front of their female relatives. One Hindu tourist reportedly recited the Kalima and survived the wrath of militants. “List of 26 Dead and 17 Injured in Pahalgam Terror Attack,” Daily Excelsior, April 23, 2025.
[b] On February 14, 2019, suicide bomber Adil Ahmad Dar of Jaish-e-Muhammed, Pakistan, targeted a security convoy carrying Indian paramilitary police in Pulwama, killing 40 people and injuring several others. A recent FATF report notes that a key IED component (aluminium powder) was sourced via an e-commerce platform and online marketplace (similar to Amazon), with investigations revealing cross-border movement of explosives into India to amplify the blast’s impact. “Component of Pulwama IED was ordered via Amazon: FATF,” Times of India, July 9, 2025.
[c] India’s Ministry of Home Affairs updated the list of 67 banned entities (45 designated terrorist organizations and 22 unlawful associations) in mid-March 2025. In Jammu & Kashmir, key groups include LeT/TRF, JeM/PAFF, Hizbul Mujahedeen, Al-Umar Mujahideen, JKIF, TuM, and JKGF. Among unlawful associations are Jamaat-e-Islami J&K, JKLF (Yasin Malik faction), JK Democratic Freedom Party, Muslim League (Masrat Alam faction), Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, J&K National Front, J&K Peoples Freedom League, and multiple factions of the J&K Peoples League. See “Terrorist Organisations Listed In The First Schedule Of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, March 17, 2025, and “Unlawful Associations Under Section 3 Of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, March 17, 2025.
[d] Four days before the Pahalgam events, Kashmir-centric militant groups such as LeT and JeM along with their front groups, TRF and PAFF, gathered at the Khaigala rally in Rawalakot in PAK on April 18, 2024, to pay tribute to Akif Haleem and Abdul Wahab who were previously killed by Indian forces in J&K. The Khaigala rally witnessed cadre mobilizations and incitements for jihad in Kashmir by LeT commander Abu Musa and others militant leaders who have threatened to continue beheadings and gun fights in Kashmir targeting non-Muslims (outsiders) settling in J&K, post-abrogation of Article 370. Indian investigators believed that this rally set the narrative of targeting Hindus as part of demographic resistance by Kashmir militant groups. Thus, Khai Gala served as a precursor event, signaling intent, mobilizing cadres, and legitimizing future violence, sort of making the Pahalgam massacre a publicly announced strategy. Yuvraj Tyagi, “Lashkar-e-Taiba Hosts Tribute for Slain Terrorists in PoJK, Threatens India with More Beheadings, Attacks,” Republic, April 22, 2025. For audio-visuals of the Khaigala rally and Anti-India and Anti-Modi speech by Abu Musa, see OsintTV, “Lashkar-e-Tayyaba declares that they will continue to send …,” X, April 19, 2025.
[e] Though Islamist militants in Kashmir have historically targeted Hindus, most infamously during the Pandit exodus of the 1990s, and in recent incidents such as the May 2022 sticky-bomb attack on Vaishno Devi pilgrims in Katra, or the June 2024 ambush on a bus returning from the Shiv Khori Shrine in Reasi, the April 22 Pahalgam massacre stands apart. Unlike earlier assaults, which often struck Hindus as part of broader indiscriminate violence against ‘outsiders’ and ‘pilgrims,’ the Pahalgam attackers deliberately profiled on the basis of religion, isolated, and executed Hindus. For violence against Kashmir (Hindu) Pandits, see “Timeline of Terror: Chronology of The Ethnic Cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits: 1989-2003,” News18.com, March 17, 2022. For two recent pilgrim bus attacks, see “J-K: Search operation underway in Reasi after terror attack,” DD News, June 10, 2024, and “4 Dead, 20 Injured As Bus Returning From Vaishno Devi Catches Fire,” NDTV News May 13, 2022.
[f] Article 370, as ‘temporary provision’ of the Indian Constitution (1949), granted Jammu and Kashmir special status with its own constitution, flag, and autonomy over all matters except defense, foreign affairs, and communications. Rooted in the terms of the 1947 Instrument of Accession signed by the king, Hari Singh, after Pakistan’s invasion, the provision defined the unique constitutional relationship between the state and the Union of India. In August 2019, the Government of India revoked that article through Presidential Orders that reinterpreted the “Constituent Assembly” of Jammu and Kashmir as its Legislative Assembly, whose powers, under President’s Rule, were exercised by Parliament. Concurrent resolutions passed in both Houses on August 5-6, 2019, stripped the provision of its remaining powers, while the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 bifurcated the state into the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. In December 2023, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the abrogation, validating the Presidential Orders and confirming that Article 370 now stands inoperative. For details, see “Abrogation of Article 370: Judgement Summary,” SC Observer, December 11, 2023.
[g] Hafiz Muhammad Saeed remains the founder and emir (leader) of LeT and its associated groups such as Jamat ud Dawa (JuD) and Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF), a role he has held since co-founding the group in the late 1980s. Saeed, a U.N.-designated terrorist, is not actively running the show as earlier; his son Hafiz Talah Saeed (U.S.-designated terrorist) and senior ideologues and commanders such as Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, and Saifullah Kasuri run these organizations with his guidance. “Hafiz Muhammed Saeed,” United Nations Security Council, n.d.
[h] Syed Salahuddin is the emir of Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), a Pakistan-backed militant group leading an insurgency in Kashmir since the 1990s. Designated by the United States as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in June 2017, Salahuddin has directed Hizbul’s operations for several deadly attacks in Kashmir. The U.S. State Department also lists Hizbul Mujahideen as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. See “Terrorist Designations of Mohammad Yusuf Shah AKA Syed Salahuddin,” U.S. Department of State, June 26, 2017.
[i] Masood Azhar, the founding leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), is a U.N.-designated terrorist associated with major attacks on India, including the December 2001 parliament assault and the February 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing. In October 2011, the United Nations designated Jaish-e-Muhammad as a terrorist group. In May 2019, the U.N. Security Council added Azhar to its global terrorist list, imposing travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes on him. “Mohammed Masood Azhar Alvi,” U.N. Security Council, May 1, 2019.
[j] There were at least six grenade attacks targeting civilian market areas and security convoys between September and early November 2019 with one death and 86 injuries. See “Grenade attack kills one, injures 40 in Srinagar,” New Indian Express, November 5, 2019.
[k] In Kashmir militant landscape, the Over Ground Worker (OGW) networks, the so-called ‘silent enablers’ comprising of pro-Pakistan and pro-militant individuals who are responsible for aiding and abetting the militant groups, mostly assist in logistics, safe houses, finances, and recruitment, and as ‘eyes and ears’ (informants).
[l] One of the earliest propaganda audiovisuals of PAFF, released on December 21, 2020, threatened to kill members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu socio-cultural volunteer organization close to the ruling nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), accusing them of aiding the “fascist Indian regime” in its bid to “colonize” Jammu and Kashmir. The message said: “We won’t allow Israeli-type settler colonies, and Indians who try to settle in them will be legitimate targets. While we don’t target civilians, RSS agents with sinister plans to settle in Kashmir will not be spared. Outsiders won’t be allowed to alter the pious status of Jammu and Kashmir. Freedom fighters will put their lives on the line to crush such dirty plans. Be aware.” See “‘Won’t Allow Israeli-type Settlement’: Militant Body Warns ‘RSS Agents’ Against ‘Usurping J&K Land,’” News18, December 20, 2020.
[m] TRF targeted people who obtained the new domicile certificate that enables non-native Kashmiris to buy property and settle in Kashmir. On December 31, 2020, TRF militants killed jeweler Satpal Nischal in Srinagar’s Saraibala after he received the certificate. TRF’s “Shaheed Squad” brands such civilians as RSS agents. “Police probe Srinagar jeweller’s murder as little-known group claims responsibility,” Hindustan Times, January 2, 2021.
[n] Militant groups like TRF and PAFF use distinct messaging tools including logos, banners, and statements to set themselves apart from parent outfits such as LeT and JeM, which rely heavily on Islamist-jihadi imagery. TRF adopted non-religious symbols like the Kashmir map, swords, and grenades in its logo, while PAFF projected anti-Hindutva and anti-India themes, branding India as a “fascist regime.”
[o] TRF issued posters stating, “crematoriums will get overbooked” and continued its targeted killings throughout the year, stepping up attacks on BJP workers and leaders, killing eight of them in 2020. On July 8, a BJP leader along with his two family members (both were BJP members, too) were shot dead in Bandipore, North Kashmir. Similarly, in October 2020, two separate incidents witnessed four BJP leaders’ deaths in Kashmir. Similarly, a spate of grenade attacks shook Kashmir, especially in December 2020, when militants carried out successive grenade attacks underscoring the persistence of low-intensity violence. On December 9, six civilians, including a woman, were injured when a grenade aimed at a security orce vehicle exploded in the crowded Singhpora market of Baramulla district. Later, on December 23, another grenade attack at Tawheed Chowk in Ganderbal injured five security personnel. These incidents reflected the continued reliance on grenades as a tactic to spread fear and disrupt public life despite heavy security deployments.
[p] In 2021, TRF was linked to 72 militant incidents across Jammu and Kashmir, as per its propaganda poster. These included 12 attempted IED attacks, 27 targeted shootings, eight ambushes, and 25 grenade attacks. Security forces reported that these incidents resulted in the deaths of at least 21 personnel, comprising members of the Jammu and Kashmir Police (JKP), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the Indian Army, and injuries to 63 others, including senior officers. This year, TRF attacks also targeted civilians, particularly non-local migrant laborers, political workers, and suspected informers, resulting in multiple fatalities. Counterinsurgency operations during the year led to the deaths of nearly 31 TRF militants, including four senior commanders, in 13 separate encounters across Kashmir, the Union Territory. Information gathered from TRF’s 2021 annual report poster.
[q] Virender Paswan, a street vendor from Bihar, was one of three victims on October 5, 2021. He was shot near Lalbazar’s Madina Chowk in Srinagar and surprisingly the killing was claimed by the Islamic State’s Hind Province. It was one such controversial claim by ISH during the heights of TRF/PAFF’s attacks against outsiders in Kashmir. Reports at that time suggested a split in TRF ranks and that some members pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in mid-2021. “J&K civilian killings: ISIS claims credit for killing Bihar resident in Srinagar,” One India News, October 7, 2021.
[r] The RSS, founded in 1925, is a Hindu nationalist volunteer organization that envisions India as a Hindu nation. Headquartered in Nagpur, India, it views “Hindu” not merely as a religious category but as a civilizational and national identity for the people of the country. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the Centre traces its ideological roots to the RSS.
[s] TRF’s spokesman Ahmed Khalid released a statement on Bindroo’s killing on October 6, 2021. See “JK: The Resistance Front asked Kashmiris not to mourn, also claimed attack,” Aajtak (Hindi) October 7, 2021.
[t] In June 2021, three off-duty police officials died in militant attacks in separate targeted incidents in Kashmir. See “J&K cop, wife killed by terrorists in Pulwama,” India Today, June 28, 2021.
[u] Kashmir Freedom Fighters (KFF) carried out a string of attacks targeting security personnel and civilians in Kashmir. A May 30, 2023, propaganda poster of KFF vowed to continue killing ‘non-local Hindus’ and Kashmiri Pandits living in the region. “Who are ‘Kashmir Freedom Fighters’?” Daiji World, June 2, 2023.
[v] Kashmir Freedom Fighter (KFF) claimed this attack. Its statement said: “We have already warned about our attacks on Pandits and non-locals working on the Modi-led agenda of settler colonialism post the abrogation of Article 370.” See “Kashmiri Pandit shot dead by militants in J&K’s Shopian,” Hindu, October 18, 2022.
[w] In 2022, a string of attacks took place targeting migrant workers (both Hindus and Muslims from other states) in Kashmir. On September 2, militants opened fire on a worker from West Bengal in Pulwama, leaving him seriously injured. Later that month, two Bihari laborers were similarly attacked in the same district. “J&K: Non-locals Targeted Again, 2 Bihar Labourers Injured in Terrorists Attack in Pulwama,” News18.com, September 24, 2022. See also “Militants open fire at non-local labourer in J&K’s Pulwama; Victim hails from West Bengal,” Daily Excelsior, September 2, 2022.
[x] By early 2023, India had proscribed all major hybrid militant groups in Kashmir, including TRF, PAFF, and Ghaznavi Force, and designated their leaders as individual terrorists in an effort to disrupt their operations and curb recruitment and attacks in the region. On January 5-6, 2023, the government banned TRF and PAFF under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) for their involvement in terror activities in Kashmir. A month later, on February 17, 2023, it outlawed JKGF. See “TRF among four outfits notified as terrorist outfits under UAPA: Govt in RS,” Kashmir News Observer, March 15, 2023.
[y] A concerted crackdown on the OGW ecosystem was enabled by using the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and the Public Safety Act (PSA), as these legal tools allowed investigating and law enforcement agencies in Kashmir to detain suspects pre-emptively, disrupt funding flows, and weaken clandestine supply chains. By early 2025, OGWs’ support to the militants was reduced substantially due to a series of measures taken by the Kashmir police, including attachment (taking over) of their property and registration of cases against them under UAPA. “Terrorists prefer App over OGWs to keep their locations secret,” Daily Excelsior, January 24, 2025.
[z] Prime Minister Modi, in his address to the Rajya Sabha (upper house of the Indian Parliament), said on July 3, 2024: “Terror and separatism are ending, and the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir are leading this fight.” He went on: “Our fight against terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, in a way, is in its last stage, last leg. We are moving with a multi-pronged strategy to eliminate the remaining terror network there.” He also praised the growing faith in democracy among J&K residents, noting increased tourism and investment as signs of progress. “Fight against terrorism in J&K in last stage: PM Modi,” Times of India, July 3, 2024.
[aa] The July 6 Kulgam encounter, resulting in the death of a special forces soldier, marked the beginning of a violent month for security forces in Kashmir, signaling robust militant presence despite sustained counterinsurgency operations. The other notable gunfights in Poonch (July 23) and Kupwara (July 24) witnessed security force fatalities underscoring both the ongoing infiltration attempts from Pakistan-administered territory and the lethal risks faced by soldiers during forward-area engagements. “4 militants shot dead in Kulgam, 2 soldiers martyred,” Daily Excelsior, July 7, 2024; “Poonch encounter: Soldier, injured in exchange of fire during counter-infiltration operation, dies,” India TV News, July 23, 2024; “Terrorist, soldier killed in Lolab ongoing operation,” Greater Kashmir, July 25, 2024.
[ab] Though there was an uptick in infiltrations in September and October 2024, the infiltration concerns surfaced sometime around late April that year, when a Village Defence Guard (VDG) member, Mohd Sharief, was killed in a gunfight with suspected Pakistan-origin militants in Udhampur. This incident triggered a massive joint operation (involving army, police, and paramilitary CRPF) in the dense Basantgarh forests the following week to track down two suspected terrorist groups that had infiltrated into Kashmir. “VDG Sharief who died fighting Pak terrorists buried with state honours,” Awaz-The Voice, April 30, 2024.
[ac] TRF’s Pakistan-based chief Sheikh Sajjad Gul reportedly masterminded this violence, targeting both Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri people involved in the government’s infra project in Kashmir. “Doctor, non-locals among 7 killed by terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir,” India Today, October 20, 2024.
[ad] In Kashmir’s decades-old militancy, the term “foreign militants” usually refers to militant fighters from Pakistan, and occasionally from Afghanistan, who are affiliated with groups such as LeT and JeM. Though there were sporadic instances of Arabs, Sudanese, or Central Asian nationals’ presence in early years of militancy—mostly affiliated with groups such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or Harkat ul Ansar (later merged with JeM)—there was no reported presence in the last couple of decades. See, for example, “Chechen Fighters killed in Kashmir,” UPI Archives, June 7, 1996. A data map of foreign fighters arrested or killed in J&K between 1991-1999 shows militants’ presence from multiple countries. See “Foreign mercenaries arrested and killed,” SATP, n.d.
[ae] India’s Ministry of External Affairs told a parliamentary committee in mid-May 2025 that the initial probe into the Pahalgam terror attack revealed terrorists’ “communication nodes” with masterminds in Pakistan. This is why Jaish-e-Mohammad’s stronghold in Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba’s base in Muridke—both long-recognized as command hubs for cross-border militancy—were targeted during military operation. See “Pahalgam probe reveals terror-Pak communication nodes,” Rediff.com, May 19, 2025.
[af] NIA investigations confirmed the role of Saifullah Kasuri who, in a video shared on social media in February 2025 warning of escalating militant activity in the region, reportedly said: “Kashmir will become the ‘land of the pure’ by February 2, 2026.” Fatima Dar, “LeT Deputy Chief Saifullah Kasuri says, ‘By Feb 2, 2026 …,” X, February 2, 2025.
[ag] ‘Operation Sindoor,’ named symbolically after the sacred vermilion for married Hindu women, aimed at dismantling terror infrastructure across LoC and avenging the killing of 26 men in front of their female relatives. See “Operation Sindoor: Forging One Force, The Synergy of India’s Armed Forces,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, May 18, 2025.
[ah] The September 2016 surgical strikes by Indian special forces inside Pakistan-administered Kashmir in retaliation for a deadly terror attacks in Uri that claimed 19 soldiers, marked the first public admission of offensive ground action against terror launch pads, signaling a departure from India’s past restraint. This was followed by the February 2019 Balakot airstrikes, where the Indian Air Force struck Jaish-e-Mohammed training camps deep inside Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, nearly 80 km beyond the LoC, in retaliation to the Pulwama suicide bombing. These actions set new precedents for punitive responses to cross-border terror strategy of Pakistan. Pradip R. Sagar, “2016 Year of the warrior,” New Indian Express, December 24, 2016; “Six years of Balakot airstrike: Here’s how India’s bold military operation hit Pakistan out of the blue,” FirstPost News, February 26, 2025.
[ai] After India’s military strikes, a widely circulated photograph purportedly showed uniformed Pakistan Army personnel attending the funeral of three senior militants—including an individual believed to be Abdul Rauf Azhar, the JeM commander and key conspirator behind WSJ journalist Daniel Pearl’s abduction and death (February 2002)—killed in India’s counter offensive. Hafiz Abdul Rauf, leader of LeT/JuD and a U.S.-designated global terrorist, was also reportedly shown in the unverified image standing beside them. This public display raises uncomfortable questions about the Pakistani military’s direct association with (and concern over the loss of) key militant leaders. For background, see Zainul Abid, “Explainer: Who were militants killed in Indian strikes in Pakistan?” BBC Monitoring, May 14, 2025. See also “‘What exactly are you mourning?’ Daniel Pearl’s father slams Pakistan Army for attending funeral of terrorists,” WION, May 10, 2025.
Citations
[1] “Terrorist outfit lays claim to J&K tourist attack: What is The Resistance Front,” Indian Express, April 23, 2025. On TRF’s denial, see “LeT offshoot TRF retracts Pahalgam attack claim, blames ‘hacking’ for earlier statement,” The Print, April 26, 2025.
[2] “Kashmir crisis: what is Lashkar-e-Taiba and is it supported by Pakistan?” Guardian, May 7, 2025; “Biometrics, chocolate wrapper: How Pahalgam attackers’ link to Pak was uncovered,” Hindustan Times, August 4, 2025.
[3] “Lashkar Chief Hafiz Saeed’s Role Revealed In Pahalgam Terror Attack,” NDTV News, April 25, 2025; “Pahalgam attack planned by LeT with ISI, Pak Army help: NIA report; 20 Valley OGWs under probe,” New Indian Express, May 2, 2025; “NIA conducts searches at 32 locations in J&K against terror-ecosystem,” NIA Press Release, June 5, 2025.
[4] “Press Release on the massacre of Sikhs in Chittsinghpora, Jammu & Kashmir on March 20, 2000,” Indian Embassy, USA, March 27, 2000.
[5] “No respite in sight as J&K lockdown enters 25th day,” Asian Age, August 29, 2019. See also “60 days of lockdown: Kashmir journalists protest against clampdown, demand restoration of internet,” India Today, October 3, 2019.
[6] Tricia Bacon, “Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s Dangerous Reemergence,” Lawfare, September 14, 2025. See also Praveen Swami, “After The Resistance Front’s terror designation, Lashkar is planning evil new war against India,” The Print, July 22, 2025.
[7] Aarti Tikoo Singh, “Pro-Pak and pro-Caliphate groups fight for Kashmir’s ‘jihadi’ space,” Times of India, July 17, 2019.
[8] For a brief background on the long-standing conflict and how the Islamists’ call of “Ralive, Tsaliv ya Galive (convert, leave or perish)” forced Hindu Pandits to leave the state amid targeted violence in the 1990s, see Col (Dr) Tej Kumar Tikoo (Retd.), “Kashmiri Pandits offered three choices by Radical Islamists,” Indian Defence Review, March 13, 2022. Post-370 abrogation, the Indian government facilitated the safe return and reintegration of displaced Hindus in Kashmir. See “2,105 Migrants Returned To Kashmir After Repeal Of Article 370: Centre,” NDTV News, April 6, 2022.
[9] For PAFF’s late 2019 emergence on the Kashmir militant scene, see the Ministry of Home Affairs notification at https://www.mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2023-pdfs/RS15032023/1647.pdf. Also, one of its early propaganda videos threatened returning Hindus. See “Won’t Allow Israeli-type Settlement’: Militant Body Warns ‘RSS Agents’ Against ‘Usurping J&K Land,” CNN-News18, December 20, 2020.
[10] “Terrorists Kill Apple Truck Driver In J&K, Fourth Attack In Under 2 Weeks,” NDTV News, October 28, 2019; “Chhattisgarh labourer shot dead in south Kashmir,” The Telegraph (India), October 16, 2019.
[11] “5 migrant labourers from West Bengal killed by terrorists in Kashmir,” Press Trust of India, October 30, 2019.
[12] “225 Terrorists Killed In Jammu And Kashmir In 2020: State Police Chief,” NDTV News, December 31, 2020.
[13] “46 top commanders among 225 militants killed in 2020: DGP,” ScoopNews, December 31, 2020.
[14] “Three BJP workers shot dead in J&K; Lashkar-backed Resistance Front claims responsibility,” New Indian Express, October 30, 2020.
[15] “What is behind the recent surge in violence in Kashmir?” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2021; Animesh Roul, “India Responds to New Kashmiri Militant Factions’ Campaign Against Civilians,” Terrorism Monitor, December 7, 2021.
[16] “11 days after LeT attack, Srinagar’s Krishna Vaishno Dhaba scion dies,” Times of India, March 1, 2021.
[17] “Principal, teacher shot dead inside Srinagar school,” Hindu, October 7, 2021.
[18] “‘He will never die’: Kin of pharmacist killed in Kashmir stay defiant in grief,” Hindustan Times, October 7, 2021.
[19] “Four more soldiers martyred in anti-terror operations in Poonch-Rajouri, death toll at 9 now,” National Herald, October 16, 2021.
[20] “4 held, bid to target religious places foiled: Jammu & Kashmir cops,” Indian Express, January 12, 2021.
[21] “Grenade attack in Baramulla, three including CRPF personnel injured,” New Indian Express, November 17, 2021.
[22] “Kashmir Freedom Fighters’ terror outfit takes responsibility for killing Kashmiri Pandit in J&K’s Shopian,” Daily Excelsior, October 15, 2022; “J-K: Killed circus worker was sole earning member of family,” Rediff.com, May 30, 2023.
[23] “Three militants of Kashmir Tigers group carried out attack on police bus in Zewan: IGP,” Kashmir News Service, December 13, 2021.
[24] “Army repels terror strike at camp in J&K; 4 soldiers killed,” Hindustan Times, August 12, 2022.
[25] “Another targeted killing: Kashmiri Pandit man shot dead by terrorists on Shopian village orchard, brother hurt,” Times of India, August 17, 2022.
[26] “Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits,” Press Information Bureau, July 16, 2019.
[27] “2 labourers from UP killed in targetted grenade attack in J&K’s Shopian,” India Today, October 18, 2022.
[28] “Dangri terror attack toll climbs to seven; villagers demand NIA probe,” Hindu, January 8, 2023.
[29] “J&K: security forces resume operation against terrorists in Kokernag,” News on Air, September 14, 2023.
[30] “Lashkar offshoot behind fatal attack on BJP leader in Tral: Police,” Hindustan Times, June 4, 2021.
[31] “Five soldiers killed as militants attack Army truck in J&K’s Poonch,” Hindu, April 20, 2023.
[32] “5 soldiers killed in gunfight with militants in Rajouri,” Hindu, May 5, 2023.
[33] “Four soldiers killed, 2 injured as terrorists ambush Army vehicles in J&K’s Poonch,” New Indian Express, December 23, 2023.
[34] “Casualties among security forces double in J&K; Rajouri & Poonch report 40% of militancy deaths,” Deccan Herald, December 31, 2023.
[35] Naveed Iqbal, “J&K security net cast wider: Not only ops, raids, arrests in new strategy,” Indian Express, January 10, 2022.
[36] “55 foreign terrorists among 76 neutralised in Jammu-Kashmir in 2023: DGP,” Business Standard, December 30, 2023.
[37] “Village defence guard killed in gunfight with terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir,” Business Standard, April 28, 2024.
[38] “Jammu bus terror attack: NIA team reaches Reasi as LeT-backed TRF takes responsibility for attack,” The Week (India), June 10, 2024.
[39] “Pak-backed Lashkar front claims responsibility for J&K bus terror attack,” India Today, June 10, 2024.
[40] “Five Army personnel killed, five injured in terrorist ambush in J&K’s Kathua,” New Indian Express, July 8, 2024.
[41] “Officer Among 4 Soldiers Killed In Action In Encounter With Terrorists In J&K,” NDTV News, July 16, 2024.
[42] “VDG Sharief who died fighting Pak terrorists buried with state honours,” Awaz-The Voice, April 30, 2024. For the winter infiltration of 2024, see “Infiltration at an all-time high In Kashmir Ahead of Winter,” NDTV News, November 12, 2024.
[43] “Terrorists Kidnap, Kill 2 Village Defence Guards In J&K’s Kishtwar,” NDTV News, November 8, 2024.
[44] “Srinagar market blast: Injured woman dies, relatives seek justice,” Hindu, November 12, 2024.
[45] “94% decline in recruitment of locals into militancy in Kashmir since 2021,” Deccan Herald, December 30, 2024.
[46] “From wedding preparations to grief, families left inconsolable,” Tribune, February 13, 2025.
[47] “Four slain cops in Kathua encounter given tearful adieu as officers vowed to root out terrorism from J-K,” The Print, March 29, 2025.
[48] “J&K: Six Family Members, Including Four Women, Detained For Allegedly Aiding Militants In Kathua Encounter That Killed Four Policemen,” Swarajyamag, April 1, 2025.
[49] “Pahalgam attack planned by LeT with ISI, Pak Army help: NIA report; 20 Valley OGWs under probe,” New Indian Express, May 2, 2025.
[50] Ishfaq Naseem, “Pahalgam Attack: Over 1,900 People Detained In Growing Crackdown Against Militancy In Kashmir,” Outlook India, April 28, 2025.
[51] “How bullet-matching confirmed M-9, AK-47s used in Pahalgam massacre,” India Today, July 29, 2025.
[52] “India denies civilian strikes, warns Pakistan against further escalation,” New Minute, May 8, 2025. For a detail of targets and the operation, see “Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, May 14, 2025. On Pakistan’s claim of civilian casualties, see “Pakistan And India Say Civilians Killed After India Fires Missiles Into Pakistani Territory,” RFERL, May 7, 2025.
[53] “Pakistan Army declares completion of Operation ‘Bunyanum Marsoos,’” Daily Spokesman, May 13, 2025. See also how Pakistan considers April 22 Pahalgam as part of this broader military campaign against India in “Military campaign Marka-e-Haq comes to victorious end,” Radio Pakistan, May 12, 2025.
[54] “Security agencies say they have evidence confirming Pakistani nationality of Pahalgam attackers,” Economic Times, August 4, 2025.
[55] “Guns, Made-in-Pak Chocolates: Amit Shah Lists Proof On Pahalgam Killers,” NDTV News, July 29, 2025.
[56] “Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah participates in the special discussion in the Lok Sabha today on India’s strong, successful, and decisive response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack through ‘Operation Sindoor,’” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, July 29, 2025.
[57] “NIA Arrests 2 for Harbouring Pak Terrorists in Pahalgam Terror Attack Case, Gets Identities of the LeT Attackers,” NIA, June 22, 2025.
[58] “NIA confirms three LeT terrorists behind Pahalgam attack,” New Indian Express, August 28, 2025.
[59] “Pahalgam attack: NIA court extends custody by 45 days; accused’s forensic, DNA and mobile data reports awaited,” Times of India, September 19, 2025.
[60] “Anti-terror agency uncovers Malaysia, Gulf funding trail to Pakistan-backed TRF,” India Today, September 3, 2025.
[61] “Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations Security Council, July 24, 2025; Shishir Gupta, “Foreign secretary Misri provided TRF dossier to US and UN 1267 Committee,” Hindustan Times, July 19, 2025.
[62] “India/Pakistan: Emergency Closed Consultations,” United Nations Security Council, May 5, 2025.
[63] “At UNSC huddle, Pakistan faces tough questions,” Times of India, May 8, 2025.
[64] “Terrorist Designation of The Resistance Front,” U.S. Department of State, July 18, 2025.
[65] “SCO declaration strongly condemns Pahalgam attack; calls for justice against those responsible,” News On Air, September 1, 2025.
[66] “Major Targeted Killing Plot Foiled in Jammu; Drone-Dropped Weapons Recovered, One Arrested,” Sunday Guardian, July 30, 2025.
