

SUBJECT: REDACTED INTELLIGENCE REPORT 016

DATE: SPRING 2007-EARLY 2008

SOURCE: DEBRIEFING OF [DETAINEE] UNDER COALITION FORCES CONTROL

UNCLASSIFIED (AS REDACTED)

Summary:

The first group of SG members to receive training in Iran consisted of approximately 30 individuals. Only 16 of the 30 individuals undergoing training in Iran passed the training. The training was structured in a pass/fail manner due to the fact the trainees were undergoing training to become SG trainers within Iraq. The first group's training lasted for approximately one month. The training occurred approximately two months after the end of Ramadan 2006.

The first group of SG members to receive training in Iran received weapons training and physical training. The trainees received training on rifles, pistols, PKCs, and sniper rifles. [REDACTED] coordinated the training between Iraqi SG leaders and the Iranian/Lebanese trainers within Iran. [REDACTED] coordinated the travel between Iraq and Iran for the trainees. Trainees with passports traveled into Iran by way of roads and entered into Iran through a legal checkpoint. Trainees without passports were smuggled into Iran through marshes located south of Amarah. [REDACTED] arranged for a boat to take the trainees from Iraq into Iran through the marshes. The first training occurred at an Iranian training camp approximately two hours away from Tehran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the exact location of the training camp.

The second training for the original 16 occurred approximately four months after Ramadan 2006. The 16 individuals who passed the initial training were sent to Iran to receive specialized training on mortars, IEDs, weapons, and tactics. One of the 16 trainees, [REDACTED], was kicked out of the training due to the fact [REDACTED] was having fights and arguments with the rest of the trainees. [Detainee] overheard a Lebanese trainer, [REDACTED], discussing [REDACTED] with [REDACTED], and heard [REDACTED] tell [REDACTED] was attempting to hold conversations with the Iranian trainers, which subsequently irritated [REDACTED] fellow trainees. The 15 trainees were angry with Abu Banin for attempting to get involved with the Iranian trainers.

The trainees completed their training at an Iranian training camp approximately two hours from Tehran. The second training occurred at a different training camp from the training camp used for the initial training. [Detainee] has no knowledge on the exact location of the training camp.

[Detainee] provided funds to the 16 trainees in Amarah prior to the trainees entering Iran for the second training session. The trainees met at a safehouse in the Al-Awayshi area of Amarah, run by [REDACTED] prior to traveling to Iran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of routes taken to arrive at the safehouse in Amarah. [Detainee] has no knowledge of

waypoints used by the trainees prior to arriving at the safehouse in Amarah. The training was coordinated by [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] coordinated travel to and from Iran. [Detainee] provided funds to the trainees but did not have any further role within the coordination of the training.

While the 16 trainees were training to become SG trainers, two separate SG training groups were also concurrently in Iran undergoing training at the same time. One group of approximately 30 individuals was SG fighters who were receiving weapons training. The second group, consisting of approximately 33 individuals was receiving special forces training.

The fighter training course lasted approximately 20 days while the special forces course lasted approximately one month. The fighter training, along with the special forces training was not a pass/fail type of training. [Detainee] met with the 30 fighter trainees and the 33 special forces trainees before the trainees left to attend the training in Iran, gave the trainees money, and talked with the trainees about morale, behaviors, fighting, and emotions. After [Detainee] briefed the trainees, [REDACTED] coordinated the travel of the trainees into Iran. Those trainees having passports traveled into Iran by vehicle and passed through legal checkpoints. Those trainees not having passports were again smuggled from Iraq into Iran by way of boat through the Amarah marshes. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the names of any of the fighter and special forces trainees.

Approximately five months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture, [Detainee] received a phone call from [REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] told [Detainee] to call [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] to request five individuals from each coordinator to receive air defense training. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] called [Detainee] and informed [Detainee] each had selected the five individuals to receive the air defense training. [Detainee] has no knowledge on what air defense training entails, or what weapons are used for the training. [Detainee] called [REDACTED] and informed [REDACTED] 15 individuals had been chosen to receive the air defense training in Iran. [REDACTED] informed [Detainee] to send the 15 individuals in groups of 5 instead of in one large group of 15.

The first group of five individuals sent to Iran to receive air defense training was from Karbala. The training lasted 15-20 days in length. The individuals from Karbala entered into Iran through Mehran. [Detainee] has no knowledge of any of the individuals sent to Iran for air defense training. The first group of individuals to receive air defense training met at a safehouse in Karbala and departed Iraq for Iran from the safehouse in Karbala. [Detainee] met with the trainees at the safehouse in Karbala and provided the trainee's with funding and a briefing on prayers, food, automobiles, studies, and morals.

After the first group of five individuals sent to receive the air defense training had returned, the second group of five individuals left Iraq from the safehouse in Amarah and entered into Iran through Ahvaz. [Detainee] traveled to Amarah to provide the trainees with funding to travel to Iran. [Detainee] also briefed the group on prayers, food, automobiles, studies, and morals.

Upon the second group's return from Iran, the third group of five individuals to receive air defense training left Iraq from Baghdad and traveled to Iran through Mehran. The third group of individuals left for Iran approximately three months prior to [Detainee]'s day of capture. [Detainee] provided the trainees with funds and a briefing. While the third group of five individuals was receiving air defense training, a group of nine individuals was concurrently receiving sniper training in Iran at a separate training camp. [Detainee] has no knowledge of the locations of any training camps within Iran.

The nine individuals to receive sniper training met at the safehouse located in Amarah. [Detainee] met with the sniper trainees and provided the trainees with funds and with a briefing on how to act while in Iran. The sniper trainees left Iraq approximately two-three days after the third group of air defense trainees left Iraq for training. The sniper training lasted 20 days. [Detainee] has no knowledge of further training events in Iran. After the nine individuals returned from Iran for sniper training CF began closing in on the training network. ██████ called [Detainee] to inform [Detainee] training would be put on hold until the security situation for the training network improved.

[Detainee] has no knowledge of the names of any individuals sent to Iran to receive training on air defense, weaponry, fighting, sniping, or special forces.