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Chat

[Full translation of the first paragraph follows; it's a good introduction to the topic of the essay, the document is written by a man named Mustapha.]

In this report we will try, if God permits, to summarize the current situation in Afghanistan and the truth about the battles raging on the land of this Muslim nation, as well as the factions involved in the battle and its separation. In our research we have depended on the visit we conduct to the combat zones where God allowed us to meet with Mujahideen and to participate in battle with them and to get familiar with their situations from close up in one of the most important ongoing combat zones there, the state of Baktia. There we met several leaders and fighters from various Afghan states and members of various Islamic parties.

This essay covers the history of the Islamic Jihad against the communist, beginning with the reign of King Zahir Shah, president Daud Khan, and President Muhammad Turaqi. Turaqi actually was a communist who instituted communist rule and began changing traditional and Islamic laws. Due to his stand Muhammad Younis Khalis wrote a fatwa declaring Jihad on the government. This first Jihad garnered little public support and Khalis was forced to retreat to Pakistan where he began gathering support from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the rest of the world to prepare for the next phase of the Jihad. There was a military coup which removed Daud Khan was removed from power by a military coup, and Muhammad Turaqi took over power and began violent oppression of all Muslims who had shown any hint of Islamic tendencies, putting thousands in jail and forcing thousands to escape to Pakistan. On the third day of the coup Khalis and his group began the Jihad against the communists.

They expected the leaders of the various Islamic organizations to take swift action against the regime of Turaqi, but they were unable to agree on a course of action and thus stayed as they were, paralyzed, and they have not agreed even to this day.

The consensus (despite the lack of agreement) was to gather money and support from Islamic countries until they built an army strong enough to fight the Afghan communist army. Khalis disagreed with them, and based on his faith in the Qur'an which says to gather what you can to fight in Jihad, and God will grant you victory, he headed off to his birthplace, Nenjarhar, with his group, surrounding himself with Ulema', young men, tribal leaders and all types of Muslims and began his war in the mountains.

He sent some of his delegates to various locations in Afghanistan and picked up all able-bodied Muslims to form his Jihad army and started his attacks on communist interests. Even officers of the Afghan army defected and joined the Jihad with their men. Some of the early victories were members of the military rising up against the communist command. All of the various commanders got in touch with Khalis and let him know that they agreed with his goal of establishing an all-inclusive Islamic state with the Qur'an and the Sunna of the prophet as its constitution. Several religious leaders who had escaped to Peshawar started sending out statements, flyers, leaflets and delegations throughout the Islamic world as though they were the commanders of the Jihad in Afghanistan even though they had nothing whatsoever to do with the fighting.

The Mujahideen started guerrilla war in the mountains and they found themselves in dire need of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. Getting support was a problem as the groups involved in the fighting were some of the least well known in the world.

At this time Soviet control of Afghanistan was growing weaker for several reasons; Soviet greed, and danger of an Islamic revolution to name a couple. To control this issue the Soviets sent in a bunch of generals and a vast amount of heavy weapons. To counteract this, the leader of the Mujahideen found a source in Waziristan from which to purchase weapons (for outrageous prices) to fight them.

Pakistan's position in all of this was to provide survival level support, houses and tents for rent. They tell the story of a defector from the Afghan air force that came to Pakistan as a political refugee. Pakistan returned him and his aircraft to Afghanistan where he was executed on arrival.

There was little support forthcoming from the Arab world, Iran provided some help in the Herat area, and after Khalis sent a delegation to the Emirates he got some donations from the Mosques there. All other money raised in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab nations went to the counter-mujahideen who tried to break up the real mujahideen, this is mostly due to organizations, nations and leaders not giving enough importance to the Jihad against the Soviets or checking into it enough.

Over time all of the groups joined up with Khalis except for two of them, Qalb ad-Din's Islamic Party and Ahmed Jilani's group. Qalb ad-Din was very popular and was able to get a lot of funding from Saudi Arabia and the rest of the peninsula because they didn't know the reality of the fighting in Afghanistan.

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-short bio of Muhammad Younis Khalis follows, describing his rise as a major figure in the Jihad against the communists and the reasons why he was known to people before it started. The document discusses his first three deputies, Din Muhammad, Abdul Haqq and Abdul Qadeer, brothers from a wealthy, well-known and righteous Afghani family.

America and the United Nations got involved to further their own interests in the area, choosing the groups they would support according to advice from people within their

own circle. The people they ended up with were the most extreme - Birhan Ad-Din Rabbani and Qalb Ad-Din Hekmyetar. These two were unable to garner a lot of popular support because they came from weak tribes and families. With external support, however, the Afghan fundamentalists were able to take over the government, and they began an unholy civil war and started putting a pressure on the Arab mujahideen to leave the country, and for all Jihad operations in central Asia to stop.

The second current in the Jihad parties was the western - moderate - movement, un-repenting allies of the west, seen as natural partners against the Soviets. This group was under Ahmed Jilani, then Subghat Allah Mujedidi, and Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi.

America decided to aid the Arab factions, and though they tried to do so in a hidden way it soon became common knowledge in Afghanistan and the Arab and Islamic nations.

Abdullah Azzam was one of the most important Arab leaders, but, unfortunately he worked on the side of the corrupt Afghans even after he learned that they were corrupt and denounced their actions. This was a problem with all of the Arabs - they fell for all the traps and joined up with the first group they met up with, having done no investigation into their integrity and purpose.

So now we return to Khalis and reiterate that he was the aborted legitimate Islamic leader for all Afghanistan. The webs weaved by the demonic spiders were nearly complete; hundreds of people were effected or stopped completely by the efforts and traps of the corrupt leaders.

Western Press and intelligence

Western press is strongly tied to the intelligence services, either through direct employment or close cooperation. The Christian West showed support for Afghanistan for its own purposes, even though it opposed Islam at every turn.

The corrupt Jihad leaders entered into a partnership with the communists in the army and intelligence services simply in order to rule Kabul, and they agreed to push Afghanistan into a civil war to tear the country apart. The communist goal was a pure ideological state where Marxism would have no competition.

More than a third of the population was killed or emigrated from Afghanistan, not counting those crippled or orphaned by the thousands (possibly millions) of land mines.

Later there were suggestions of building a government shared between the Muslim groups and the communists, headed by Hekmyetar and the communist president of the Socialist Republic of Afghanistan, Babarak Karmal.

The communists instituted laws that gave rights to women to do all kinds of things, enforced by the power of the rifle. The damage done to Afghanistan's honor was unbelievable. This is displayed in a small example of a quiet, sad Afghani named

Darwish who would turn into a ferocious warrior in battle... he entered a wedding contract with a girl, but he waited so he could work and save some money to please her mother (who did not like him). But when the communists passed the law that gave women more rights, the girl's mother took her and married her to a high ranking communist. Darwish was chased away from the area for his participation in the Jihad. Over the next few years Darwish's wife and the communist husband had some children, but the husband made the mistake of joining the wrong group. When his group fell out of favor he was forced to take his wife and children and run towards the border. One night in Ramadan of 1984 Darwish killed the new husband. The local government arrested his brother because they couldn't catch him, and held him as a hostage so Darwish would turn himself in. The tribal leaders convinced the police that the murder was within Darwish's rights as a husband in order to re-establish his honor.

Money was, of course, the great corruptor. If you had sufficient funds, nothing was impossible and nothing was off limits. The strength of money is what kept the system in place for fourteen years.

The Muslim nations, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, where were they now? The western nations now had enough knowledge and experience to affect great change in these kinds of societies, and enough money to execute them.

The first city liberated by Haqqani was Khost, and then the mujahideen went on to Jardeez with intent to liberate it before winter set in.

In forming a new government after the departure of the Soviets in 1989 they decided to implement a reform government rather than one based on socialism, revolution or Islam. Socialism would revert to an Islamic government under duress, as was witnessed when Saddam Hussein declared a Jihad against the west in the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991. An Islamic government would revert to a strong alliance between the Marxists and the apostates, as we saw Hekmyetar, Barhan ad-Din Rabbani and Siyaf ally themselves with the historic communist military leaders in order to seize power.

The leadership at this time was made up of several infighting factions, each of whom was after power.

Over time this led to a leadership crisis within Islamic organizations in general and in the Jihad groups specifically. The American crusader forces were able to have their way in Afghanistan, followed by Arab nations, and eventually by Egypt and Israel. They just needed to have a leader who could stand up and tell them what to do. Once they had decided that it was legal to launch a Jihad against the corrupt government, the operational issues and leadership problems came up, and there were conflicts in trying to determine a solution.

These problems existed within Arab nations who were under the control of the American crusaders, and spread to the Jihad groups within Afghanistan. If they couldn't come to an agreement on the operational form of the Jihad, it would have to be cancelled.

The Jihad in Syria in the 1980s can be used as an example of what is happening in Afghanistan, it would be beneficial for us to learn from what happened there.

The Jihad in Syria began after a long period of preparation, gathering money, political contact with foreign nations, but the biggest problems they faced were in organization, militarization and determining strategic policy for both the political and military branches of the Jihad, followed by fundraising for the organization.

The moderates put three conditions on beginning the Jihad all focused around approval and support from the west.

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In Syria the Jihad was usurped by opportunists from all over the Arab world who were trying to use the problems there to strengthen their own power. When it was over the crusaders came back to power and there was no benefit in the change.

In Afghanistan after 14 years of fighting to be rid of the soviets the Americans and their United Nations had control over the country and they did nothing to stop the civil wars and the tribal conflicts within the country.

In 1979 entire units of the communist army defected to join the Mujahideen in the mountains. This added a lot of structure and strength to the Mujahideen, and if they had applied all of that experience properly they would have been able to prevent the Soviet invasion in December of 1979. They weren't able to stop the Soviets because most of the officers ran to safety in Pakistan and the enlisted stayed and served (literally - cooking, washing clothes and other types of labor) the Mujahideen for a slightly longer period of time. The Mujahideen were more interested in collecting weapons and ammunition from the military units who joined them and then re-distributing them like sheep. The military forces lost their effectiveness due to this policy rather than being used to put pressure on the regime.

As the battles waged one of the soviet tactics that came to the fore was to destroy the infrastructure of cities and towns through terrorism (scorched earth policy) to drive the civilians out, leaving only the fundamentalists, gangs and Mujahideen. This was extremely effective, and the only way to counter it was for the different factions to try and support the civilian population and to keep their suffering to a minimum in order to keep them in place and provide them with cover. The civilians found themselves between a rock and a hard place - between the communists and the rogue mujahideen.

All of the movement of civilians to refugee camps led to further corruption. Some civilians had their children register themselves as orphans to receive greater support, some registered at multiple camps, and the Pakistanis and others running the camps took a lot of the food, money and equipment for themselves.

The Soviet Union undertook similar action in Tajikistan, claiming that defending the borders of Tajikistan was the same as defending the borders of the Soviet Union. They

announced that the Muslims and Islam were the dissidents and the enemies of the state, and this time the United States helped them instead of the Muslims. The Mujahideen from Afghanistan helped the Muslims in Tajikistan, seeing this as an extension of the same Jihad that they had just completed fighting in Afghanistan. Since help was not forthcoming from any other source, they jumped into the fray, especially after 1989.

The Soviets also took extreme measures to ensure that heavy weapons, ammunition for the weapons and the tactics and strategies for their use did not fall into the hands of the Mujahideen. This brought about a vicious corrupt cycle of heavy weapons and ammunition (including the Stinger missile from the US); the intelligence service would sell arms to dealers on the Afghani border and then the Pakistani intelligence service would buy them. The second circle took place within Afghanistan, the US would provide weapons to the Arabs who would sell them to the Afghans, where they leaked out to the arms dealers where they were sold to the Arab Mujahideen, and the cycle would start again. All the while it was the Saudis that financed all of the buying.

When the Soviet problems started up in Afghanistan, many Afghans sought help in Pakistan as refugees. When they got there they did not find any charities or Islamic organizations waiting to help them, rather there were Pakistanis willing to rent homes to them. When the problems started in Tajikistan, one would have thought that they would have learned the lesson and treated the refugees well, but their aid was worse than that which the Pakistanis offered.

At first Iran was very supportive of the jihad in Afghanistan, but when their leader died and the regime changed they began a dualistic approach - talking like they were supportive, but not really providing support. Once again, this was due to their subservience to American interests after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Even so, we cannot claim that Iran is totally an American tool the way it is in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic charitable organizations and the leadership need to go through an intense cleansing. The entire setup is full of poisonous parasites and weeds that absorb donated funds and keep the money from its intended purpose of helping the emigrants and supporting the mujahideen. The same thing happened during the jihad in Syria - the leaders took the money and made alliances with the demons in Baghdad and Amman. The other problem with these organizations is that many of them were charitable in name only. They were actually agencies of their parent governments, riddled with spies whose aim was to destroy the operations of the jihad from within to keep it from spreading to their corrupt systems. These organizations should be in the hands of faithful Muslims who support the mujahideen commanders. But the organizations that helped in Afghanistan were international Christian organizations working for their own interests.

[Page 20, there is a break marked in the text]

The US knew about the Soviet intentions in Afghanistan, all of their movements were plainly visible to American satellites and they had warnings from diplomats all over the world. Evidence of this knowledge was found in documents in the American embassy in

Tehran. This proves that American policy was to allow the Soviets to do whatever damage they wanted in Afghanistan so that their political image would suffer around the world, especially in Arab nations.

After the Iranian revolution where America was named “The Great Satan” and evidence that the feelings ran much deeper than slogans, America thought that by helping the Afghans against the Soviets they could improve their relations with Arab and Muslim nations around the world. The situation in Afghanistan also served as a distraction to allow the Jews to slowly take over more of Palestine without it being noticed by Muslims around the world. It was during this period that Israel truly became an American state in good standing.

America actually controlled the whole situation. No one did anything unless America wanted them to, what America said was right was right, same for what was wrong. The Arabs were not able to come to Afghanistan to help in the Jihad until America decided they would allow - or tolerate - them. And when America decided they should leave, the Arabs left the field in Afghanistan.

Arab support came from the different governments, from Islamic groups such as the Islamic Brotherhood (ikhwan), the Jima’a al-islamiya, and the jihad al-islamiya in Egypt and from individuals who felt their service would help. The individuals made up the largest number of supporters.

[Page 22, another chapter break - row of asterisks (*)]

The Russian invasion came in the winter, at a time when its allies were involved in fighting in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The timing couldn’t have been better - it happened during the last days of President Carter’s administration and the beginning of Regan’s, they were also dealing with the hostage issue in Iran. None of the Islamic nations took any action until the new American regime gave word to do so.

The Islamic countries convened a study of possible actions and after issuing their statement they took very little action. The most dangerous thing they did was to send two planeloads of tents and food as emergency supplies to the mujahideen from Saudi Arabia. The other result of this conference was to unify the six factions who were fighting the Soviets under a single leader, Abdul Rasool Siyaf, creating a group (the Islamic Union to Free Afghanistan) with whom foreign governments could work. He had been a political prisoner of the system in Kabul, and one of his first actions as the leader of this group was to meet with the secretaries of state from the Islamic nations to find out what their stand was regarding the situation in his country.

Going back to America’s involvement in Iran... America’s actions there were not simply to handle the situation in Iran, but rather represented America’s policy to destroy Islam. This was further reinforced after the war to liberate Kuwait when America declared war on Islam in the Arab nations and around the world.

Most Sunni Muslims felt that America's war with Iran which they fought through Iraq was in the interest of Islam as Muslim press at the time labeled Shiite Islam as more dangerous than the Christians and the Jews.

This goes right along with the feeling that America was an ally, helping the Mujahideen in Afghanistan fulfill their holy duty in fighting the Soviets, even if we were speaking out against the American infidels and turncoats.

In Regan's first press release he declared war on both Communism and Islam. But we didn't take it that way; we believed that he meant Communism and the Shiite sect. America proved the true meaning after the communists were defeated in Afghanistan. They said that they had three great enemies in the century, the Nazis, the Communists and Islam and that two of them were now defeated; only one remained. We learned too late that America was not at war with any Islamic sect or group, but rather with Islam itself in a war of ideology.

[Page 23, another chapter break]

So we ended up with seven separate Jihad groups in Afghanistan, and each of them wanted to attend the conference of Islamic foreign ministers. When Pakistan heard about this they asked that the seven groups choose a single representative for all seven to attend. The individual groups knew that this person was going to represent all of their interests to the foreign ministers and to the world, and that it would be a simple thing for this representative to form his own group - it is possible to buy anything you need, money, weapons, etc. if you have enough money.

The different groups saw many farcical attempts at unification. Every time two groups tried to merge they would pick a weak leader for the new group. Then when the new leader would try to do something in the interest of the group as a whole they would fight with him and split up again, only as they split up some would remain loyal to the new leader and create a new group.

This is how Siyaf ended up as the leader of the seven groups. He had to be weak, he had been in the Soviet prison but they had not executed him. If he was actually a great leader they certainly would have killed him while he was under their control. While in prison he received financial support from Hekmyetar, and Hekmyetar was the one who pushed to have him set up as the leader.

[Page 24, break one]

You can find more information in the book, "The Epic of Arab Supporters in Afghanistan" by Basil Muhammad, published by Lejnat al-Birr, one of the relief agencies in Afghanistan

[Page 24, break two]

Back to Younis Khalis, one of his commanders, Ahmed al-Munyawawi came in from Jalalabad in order to fight in the cities with a group of Khalis' fighters.

A delegation from the group of mujahideen, made up of Abdul Rasool Siyaf, Sabghat Allah Mujedadi and Jilal ad-Din Haqqani obtained visas to visit Abu Dhabi by saying that they represented a Pakistani group who were going to raise funds for schools. They got through the process as no one knew their names at the time.

[In this section he details information about the visit to the UAE, the people and places they visited and the names of those who helped them, also providing descriptions of some of the groups that did and did not provide assistance]

The idea that a jihad can be a national undertaking, i.e. "The Afghani Jihad", is almost certainly an invention of the Christian and Jewish west. In Islam there is only one nation and all Muslims are required to support their brothers.

One of the things we encouraged during our tours was to strengthen the ties between the Afghani jihad movement and Islamic people, emphasizing the value of their monetary and physical contributions. This was to avoid making the same mistake we saw the Palestinian Authority make - the PA worked on ties with Arab governments and never really got support, by working directly with the people we will find a stronger support structure.

We also wanted to avoid using manufactured leaders making statements behind microphones and in newspapers when those programs and papers are only seen in first class hotels in this or that capital city.

The most important thing was to deal with people directly and simply.

The visit to the Emirates was very successful in publicity and fundraising, but more importantly, some of the extremists in the Emirates were able to obtain visas for Siyaf and his delegation to visit Saudi Arabia.

When Siyaf came back from Saudi Arabia he was a changed man. We all felt it, but we all lied to ourselves and made excuses for his changed behavior. One of the things we noticed was that he had obtained a Saudi passport. Another change was that he changed his name from Abdulrasool Siyaf to Abdu Rabb Al-Rasool Siyaf. He said the change was suggested by some of the ulema in order to correct a conflict with Islamic doctrine. From that point forward he never introduced himself to any Arab without using his new name, even going so far as to claim that this was his given name at birth. Over time it became clear that the chain of Siyaf's lies began with his name.

His path to acceptance in Saudi Arabia was made easier by his studies at Al-Azhar during Sadat's regime followed by studies in the USA. It still amazes me how quickly and completely Saudi Arabia accepted Siyaf as one of the top Afghan politicians. He has even won two awards from King Fahd for service to Islam.

After his return from the Emirates and Saudi Arabia I found Siyaf to be much more guarded and less willing to open up to people the way he used to. He never mentioned how much money he raised, and we never allowed ourselves to ask.

The fact that Siyaf knows Arabic helped him a lot; he was able to give speeches to the Muslims in the Emirates in their own language. And I have never seen anyone as sharp as Siyaf, or anyone that understands the Arab mind better than he does. No other Afghan leader was even close, and that was why he was able to gain financial support from them with no trouble.

There were several internal conflicts and disagreements between the different leaders. One of the group's leaders died and was replaced by his corrupt son... These leaders drew up a constitution with several conditions for his leadership. One of these conditions was that any funds raised by Siyaf in his official position as the chairman of the jihad group's union should be divided evenly between the six groups which make up the organization. The second condition was that if the coalition were to dissolve, Siyaf promises that will not create his own group. This document was secret, we didn't learn of its existence until after several years of conflict between Siyaf and the leaders of the jihad organizations. The reason for the problem was that Siyaf was not set as a leader of the Jihad, but rather as the head of an organization under which money for the six member groups could be raised in order to show a unified front to contributing Muslims around the world.

But as time passed the leaders of the six groups found out that they had raised millions of dollars without distributing it properly, and arguments ensued. Problems continued and eventually Siyaf took his money and formed a new group in Peshawar. He bought all religious scholars and set up an advisory council, he bought former military officers and commanders, a trade that has become very active since that time.

Siyaf set up this organization and called other scholars to join him in order to re-establish a true unified organization for the Jihad, and they went with good intentions. He used this organization as a showcase for his fundraisers, showing these scholars and experienced mujahideen to potential donors in order to gain more money.

It was about this time that the new US President, Ronald Regan, decided to establish a policy of interference and make the Afghan war a proxy war between the powers involved in the cold war.

[The remainder of this document complains about corruption within the various jihad factions during the Afghan-Soviet war]