Intelligence Services

Re.: Study of Badr Corps 9
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

To the respectable Assistant Director of the Intelligence Service for Operations
Re.: Study about the disloyal Badr Corps 9

We would like to inform your Excellency about a summarized study prepared aside by the General Security Office pertaining to Badr Corps 9 in the following manner:

1. The Corps is composed of the following formations / Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Commander’s Office, military security, political guidance, investigation and inspection, 4 divisions, two brigades, 3 battalions and a naval regiment.

2. Its most important weapons are: 122 millimeter, 130 millimeter, 152 millimeter, 120 millimeter, 122 millimeter and 106 millimeter cannons, Katioucha missile bases, RBG7 and BKC launchers, SBG9 cannons, T55 tanks and various armored vehicles, in addition to light and medium weapons. The naval regiment’s weapons include Yamaha boats, some carrying 108 millimeter Katioucha rocket launchers with 12 muzzles.

3. In 1999, the (axes) were created as follows:-
   A. Southern Axis – It includes 230 elements and its headquarters is in Al-Ahwaz. It has two branches in Al-Huwaiza and at the edges of Al-Ahwaz – Al-Mohammara Road.
   B. Middle Axis – It includes 150 elements and its headquarters is in Andamashk. It has two branches; in the Dahlaran region and in Badiya, governorate of Al-Muthanna, called also Abu Al-Fadl headquarters.
   C. Baghdad Axis – It includes 75 elements and its headquarters is in Bakhtaran – Al-Tanakah. It has a branch in Mahran.
   D. Northern Axis – Its headquarters is located in Al-Sulaimaniyah and has a branch in Bakhtaran.

4. The weapons used for the communications are Racal HF, Icom 80HF for the communication between the division and its regiments and in case the division spreads out, it will use various VHF equipment. The code for the equipment is centrally prepared by the Corps’ intelligence using a computer. It is changed every 3 to 4 months and the calling signals are changed daily.
5. The sessions held are training and preparatory sessions including (wired and wireless communications, military engineering, medical, chemical, cannon shooting, section commanders, cultural and ideological sessions) These sessions are held after the volunteer is trained on how to use the weapons and the fighting types. There are also special sessions for the disloyal Corps’ cadres.

6. An annual budget is allocated to the Corps by the General Command of the Iranian Armed Forces in the limits of (20 millions) Dollars for the purchase of weapons, salaries, foodstuffs, vehicles and equipment.

7. The Corps’ agents are granted privileges in addition to their salary. They are granted a health insurance booklet and a shopping booklet for the cooperative markets of the militaries. They could obtain a financial loan and they are provided with an ID with which they cannot be intercepted, allowing them to travel in the Iranian cities and register their children in the Iranian schools.

8. To attract and recruit elements, the disloyal Corps resorts to two methods. First, it plays the card of sectarianism and the second method which completes the first one is the financial enticement of the elements whom it wants to approach.

9. The Corps held a meeting for its cadres on 12/12/2001, in which was discussed the possibility of a US attack against Iraq leading to the overthrow of the regime (but they were disappointed). The agents discussed two possibilities. The first one is the open dispatch of military formations organized in the form of convoys inside Iraq. In the second possibility, the US would exert a pressure on Iran, putting it in an embarrassing situation. Therefore, they would enter secretly in the form of groups.

Kindly be informed… With appreciation.

/ill. signature/
Director of the Division for Operation Intelligence
October 13, 2002

/Handwriting reads:/
Ahmed
10/13

Lateef
10/13

A versed summary indicating the regions to be taken into consideration.

/ill. signature/
10/14
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

Republic of Iraq
President of the Republic – The Secretary
General Security Director
No.: Office of Division 5 – Section 75/7682
Date: Sha’aban 1, 1423 H.
Corresponding to: October 7, 2002 A.D.

To the respectable Director of the Intelligence Service
Re.: Study

Regards,

We refer to the letter of the Presidency of the Republic – Secretariat Office of the National Security Council No. (L. D. M./1806), dated 9/29/2002 and are glad to send you a copy of the said study.

Kindly be informed… With appreciation.

General Security Director
Sha’aban 1, 1423 H.
Corresponding to: October 7, 2002 A.D.

Attachments:
A study

1) I reviewed it. To make three copies. First to Office 4. Second to Office 5, and also to Office 4 to take advantage of it. To examine it and to prepare a letter by Office 1.
2) Letter of the Security Office to the Director of the General [Intelligence ??]

(1-1)

357 /ill./
10/9
General Security Office

Study about the

Disloyal Badr Corps 9

Taken from confessions made by two elements of the Corps’ Cadre arrested

by the General Security Office

at the beginning of 2002 A.D.
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Introduction

Since the beginning of Saddam’s glorious battle of Qadisiya, Iran tried hard to build a fifth column of agents to carry out the dirty missions inside Iraq and to escalate the tension on the internal front in preparation for embarrassing Iraq and creating a propaganda force composed of fugitive agents and exiled Iranians to use them when needed and as requested by the plan of hatred and aggression. The creation of this force was considered the core of the disloyal Badr Corps and its elements were tested by the Persian Labor Organization and Al-Dawa Party to accompany the Iranian army as guides during the war against Iraq. The Iranians worked on gathering the fugitive Iraqis in (Ghayour Asli) camp located 25 kilometers south of Al-Ahwaz. The official in charge of this camp was (Abdelraheem Al-Shoki), a native of Al-Amara and one of Al-Dawa party’s leaders. This camp also included elements from Al-Dawa party, Al-Mujahedeen Movement and the Scholars and Independent Group. At the beginning, their number ranged between (400 – 600) individuals. This camp’s missions focused on training and sending elements from Al-Dawa party to Iraq. The activity of this program continued until February 6, 1983 when two elements of the Iranian Revolution Guard came to the camp along with the agent (Hajji Kazem Abu Zeinab Al-Khalesi), a native of the governorate of Diyala. They brought up the idea of creating mobilization forces. Indeed, they proceeded with this idea, and the number of those registered at the time reached (450) individuals including a number of exiled persons.

In March of the same year, the first session for those registered with the mobilization forces to train on the use of weapons was inaugurated for a period of three months. On June 6, 1983, the first group of volunteers from the mobilization forces was sent to the battlefront in the sector of Basra under the command of an Iranian Major General (Wali A’asr). After three months at the battlefront, they withdrew to the camp. Later on, a succession of sessions pushed such elements to the battlefront. Al-Sadr Regiment was composed of elements from the first and second sessions whose number varied between (200 – 240) elements. Their duties focused on participating in the fight with the Iranian against the Iraqi forces in the eastern sector of Basra under the command of the Iranian (Hasan Dawlat Ayyadi) belonging to the
Iranian Guard along with the agent (Abu Mohamed Al-Tayeb), a native of Al-Kut. He was later on replaced by the Iranian Abdel Ameer Salemi.
In September of the same year, another regiment was created under the name of ((Dest Gheyb) and under the command of the Iranian (Nisi) belonging to the Guard. The location of the regiment was in the proximity of Keshk Al-Basri region. It had the same duty as Al-Sadr Regiment.

On January 15, 1984, a third regiment was created under the name of (Hashti Regiment) and under the command of the Iranian (Hasan Dawlat Abbadi).

In August 1984, after the creation of three regiments, a brigade was formed, including the three regiments mentioned at the beginning, under the name of (Imam Al-Sadek Brigade) and under the command of the Iranian (Ameer Huwashmi). Two months later, its name changed to (Badr Corps 9) and its commander was replaced by the Iranian (Ismail Daka’eki). Later on, a new regiment was created. It was added to the three previous regiments and given the name of (Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment). All the members of this regiment were from the tribes expatriated from the governorate of Misan. Its command was given to the agent Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari).

In March 1985, a fifth regiment was created under the name of (Musa Al-Kazem) Regiment and under the command of the Iranian (Mas’ud Al-Maleki). This regiment included elements from the fugitive and exiled people.

A short while after, a sixth regiment was created under the name of (Karbala Al-Thaniya) Regiment and under the command of (Ghazi Al-Fariji) also called (Abu Iman Al-Basari), a native of Misan who previously resided in the governorate of Basra. Therefore, the number of brigades reached 9 including six regiments.

In April 1986, the Iranian regime began arranging and preparing sessions for the Iraqi prisoners at a rate of (170) prisoners per session until the number of prisoners varied between (1000 and 1200) prisoners. Therefore, three new regiments were formed which were (Moslem Regiment), (Ammar Regiment) and (Ja’afar Regiment).

From these three regiments, a second brigade was created under the name of (Al-Hamza Brigade) and under the command of the Iranian (Joban).
In the middle of 1986, another regiment was created, composed of the sons of the fugitive tribes from the governorate of Misan. It was given the name of (Abu Al-Fadl Regiment) under the command of the fugitive (Abu Ashwak), a native of Al-Nasiriya. Later on, Badr Brigade 9 and Al-Hamza Brigade with the Southern Axis, composed of two regiments which were Ansar Al-Hussein and Abu Al-Fadl Regiments settled in Al-Ahwaz region, formed Badr Division 9, for which a new headquarters was created in the governorate of Karmanshah – Al-Tanakah region, which is the Corps’ present headquarters. The command of Badr Division 9 was entrusted to the Iranian (Ismail Daka’eki) who was later on replaced by the Iranian (Diya’ Shams) after he was killed at the front in the battle of Nahr Jassim.

Two months before Iran was compelled to accept the international UN resolution No. 598, the Iranian Diya’ Shams, leader of the Division, announced and for propaganda purposes that Badr Forces had become a corps and not a division. It was given the name of (Badr Corps 9) and its general force was evaluated at (6000) elements.

In 1989, Adnan Ibrahim appointed Mohamed Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari) as Commander of the Corps in replacement of the Iranian Diya’s Shams.

At the end of the Iran Iraq war, a number of elements stopped working for the Corps. With the unsteadiness which followed the Kuwaiti crisis in August 1990, Iran represented by its intelligence services began taking interest in this Corps so it would hire it to launch an attack against Iraq. In fact, the Iranian intelligence services pushed this Corps to stab Iraq in the back under the form of the Chapter of Treason and Betrayal in March 1991. At that time, the Corps was composed of (Imam Ali Brigade) under the command of Abu Zul Fikar, Al-Hamza Brigade under the command of (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki) at the beginning and later on under the command of (Abu Abdullah Al-Moussawi) and Imam Al-Hussein Brigade under the command of (Abu Husam Al-Sahlani – Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlani), a native of Basra. The number of Iraqi prisoners in these brigades reached a percentage of 60% of their total number.

After the 1991 events, Badr Corps 9 was composed of five divisions which were (Imam Ali Division, Al-Hamza Division, Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, Haydar Al-Karrar Division and Imam Al-Hussein Division).
In this focused study, detailed information will be raised pertaining to the disloyal Corps which are new information taken from confessions made by two agents who occupied leading positions in its formations until they were arrested.

With God’s blessings

General Security Office
2002
Corps’ Formations

Badr Corps 9 is connected to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and specifically to (Karar Kah Kuds) which supervises the intelligence activity outside Iran under the command of the Iranian (Kasem Salmani). The criminal Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem is considered the actual commander of the Corps in addition to its functions as President of what is called (Superior Council of the Islamic Revolution). He is assisted in the Corps’ leading responsibility by Jamal Ja’afar Al-Ibrahimily (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), an engineer, native of the governorate of Basra. The headquarters of the Corps is located in the governorate of Karmanshah, the region of Tanakah, in the camp of Al-Faqikh province.

The Corps is presently composed of the following formations

The formations connected to the Corps’ Assistant Commander are:

1. **Chief of Staff of the Corps** – The Chief of Staff of the Corps is Hadi Farhan Abdullah Al-A’ameri (Abu Hasan Al-A’ameri), a native of Diyala governorate.

2. **Office of the Corps’ Commander** – Under the supervision of (Abu Ja’afar Al-Shaybani), a native of Zi Qar governorate.

3. **Military Security (Al-Hefadah)** – Under the supervision of an Iranian officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel named Ahmadi belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Karar Kah Kuds).

4. **Political Guidance** (a representation) – Under the supervision of a religious man named (Ahmed Salek) assisted by a religious man named (Hasan Al-Kulaybakani).

5. **Investigation and Inspection** – Under the supervision of Mohamed Al-Samra’i (Abu Jassim Al-A’askari), a native of Baghdad governorate – A fugitive to Iran.

In addition to the following divisions, axes and formations:
Structural Plan of the Corps

Commander of the Corps

Assistant Commander of the Corps

Command Office of the Corps
Al-Wali Al-Faqih Representation

Chief of Staff of the Corps

All these units are connected to the Assistant Commander of the Corps


Tank Battalion | Anti-Armor Regiment | Anti-Air Battalion | Naval Regiment

All these units are connected to the Chief of Staff

Operations | Intelligence | Training | Administration | Planning & Budget | Finances | Supply & Transportation | Military Engineering | Technical | Defense & Duties

Cooperation | Communication | Medical treatment | Cadre Preparatory Institute | Warneen Camp | Mobilization
1. **First Division:**

   Imam Ali Division is located in Al-Khomeini Camp at a distance of 16 kilometers from Al-Fatran region which has an approximate population of 1600 inhabitants.

   - **The Commander of Mohamed Ne’emet Al-Hasan Division is (Abu Zul Fikar Al-Hasan),** a military officer with the rank of captain, a prisoner native of the governorate of Basra.
   - **The Chief of Staff of the Division is (Ab A’akeel Al-Moussawi),** a fugitive, native of Al-Qadisiya.
   - **The Official in charge of the division’s operations is (Abu Ali Al-Waseti),** a prisoner officer, native of the governorate of Waset.
   - **The Official in charge of the administration and the march to the battle of the division is (Abu Mustafa Al-A’ameri),** a prisoner, native of the governorate of Diyala.

   **The division is composed of six regiments which are:**

   - Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Karrar Al-Bahdali), a native of the governorate of Misan.
   - Moslem Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Kara’awi), a prisoner.
   - Ammar Regiment under the command of (Abu A’akeel Al-Hamadani), a prisoner.
   - Abu Ala’ Al-A’araji Regiment.
   - Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Zaher), a prisoner.

2. **Second Division:**

   Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division is settled in the civil camp of Dayzafoul located between Dayzafoul and Shoushter. This division counts between (1300 – 1400) persons.

   - **The Commander Ahmad Al-Helali also called (Abu Majed Al-Basari),** a native of Basra, a teacher and fugitive.
   - **The Chief of Staff is (Abu Hawra’ Al-Ahmadi),** a native of the governorate of Waset, a teacher and fugitive.
The Official in charge of the division’s operations is (Abu Ayat Al-Baghdadi).

The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu A’aqeel Al-Ne’emani).

The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

- Bakeyyat Allah Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Kena’ani), a native of Basra.
- 15 Sha’aban Regiment under the command of (Abu Majed Al-Najjar), a native of Basra.
- Tha’r Allah Regiment under the command of (Abu Yaser Al-Azraki), a native of Misan.
- Military Regiment under the command of (Abu Bassam Al-Faridawi), a native of Misan.
- Moussa Al-Kazem Regiment under the command of (Abu Ahmed Al-Meyahi), a native of Basra.

3. Third Division:

Haydar Al-Karrar Division is located in a civil camp in Dayzafool between Shoushter and Dayzafool and counts between (1250 and 1300) persons.

- The Division’s Commander is Kazem Hussein Al-Rashed also called (Abu Ahmed Al-Rashed), a native of the governorate of Basra and a fugitive.
- The Chief of Staff is Hamed Husseini also called (Abu Al-Nour Al-Husseini), a naval officer, native of Basra and a fugitive.
- The Official in charge of the operations is (Abu Yaser Al-Shuwaili), a prisoner.
- The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu Abdullah), a prisoner.

The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

- Al-Sadr Regiment under the command of (Abu Mariam Al-Mansouri), a native of Basra and a prisoner.
- Al-Reda Regiment under the command of (Abu Jawwad Al-Ghannami), a native of the governorate of Misan and a fugitive.
Al-Hasan Regiment under the command of (Abu Hasan Al-Fayyad), a prisoner.

Al-Mahtabi Regiment under the command of (Abu Zer Al-Wahili), a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.

Abu Zahra’ Al-Halli Regiment under the command of (Usama), a prisoner.

Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Wisam Al-A’akeeli), a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.

4. Fourth Division:

Al-Imam Al-Hussein Division is located in a civil camp in Dayzafool between Shoushter and Dayzafool and counts between (1400 and 1450) persons.

The Division’s Commander is (Abu Muntazer Al-Husseini), a prisoner officer native of Baghdad.

The Chief of Staff is (Abu Sadek Al-A’akeeli), an imprisoned officer native of Nasiriya.

The Official in charge of the operations is (Abu Nour Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra.

The Official in charge of the administration and march to the Battle is (Abu Hashem Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra and a prisoner.

The Division is composed of six regiments which are:

Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Mujahed Al-Rukabi), a native of Nasiriya and a fugitive.

Abu Al-Fadl Regiment under the command of (Abdullah Al-Mohammadawi), a native of Al-Amara.

Al-Muntazer Regiment under the command of (Sherif also called Abu Rabab Al-Moussawi), a native of Al-Amara.

Abu Al-Khair Regiment under the command of (Hadi Al-Sae’edi also called Abu Karrar Al-Sae’edi).

Sayed Al-Shuhada’ Regiment under the command of (Hussein also called Abu Muntazer Al-Moussawi), a native of Misan.

Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Mohamed Al-Moussawi), a native of Basra.
Structural Plan of the Division

All these units are connected to the Commander of the Division and the Chief of Staff

All these units are connected to the Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle
5. **Al-Mustafa Brigade**, located in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah between Banjuween and Midan including approximately (600) individuals under the command of **Ali Al-Sa’adi also called (Abu Zer Al-Khalesi)**, a native of the governorate of Diyala – Al-Khaless.

- The Chief of Staff is Abu Ayoub Al-Bayabi (Turkman), native of Kirkuk.
- The Official in charge of the Operations is Abu Usama Al-Sa’adi, a military officer, prisoner and native of Baghdad.
- Administration and March to the Battle (Abu Ammar Al-Rafi’i, a native of Najaf).

The Brigade is composed of three regiments which are:

- Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Ali Al-Tamimi), located between the headquarters of the brigade and Banjuween.
- Al-Wilaya Regiment under the command of (Abu Shima’), located in the Misan region.
- Support Regiment under the command of (Abu Ahmed Al-Qassab).

This brigade operates in the direction of the Northern region of Iraq where part of the Northern Axis was located. It separated its activity and became independent. Most of its elements are from the camps’ residents in Iran. Some of its elements are also from the Northern governorates of Iraq. The number of elements of this brigade amounts to approximately (300) individuals.

6. **Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade**

   **First:** An armored brigade under the command of Ayyad Al-Amara (Abu Jihad Al-Amara), a native of the governorate of Basra who escaped in 1982. He is assisted by Abu Ammar Al-Miyahi, a native of the governorate of Basra. This brigade amounts to approximately (600) elements.

   **Second:** The headquarters of the brigade is located in the region of Karmanshah with the headquarters of the Corps.

   **Third:** The brigade is composed of the headquarters, support units and three armored battalions which are:
A. Al-Mikdad Battalion in Dayzafoul.
B. Sayed Al-Shuhada’ Battalion in Karmanshah with the headquarters of the brigade.
C. Al-Muntazer Battalion in Karmanshah with the headquarters of the brigade.

It also includes three batteries and three platoons.

Fourth: Brigade’s armament: -

- 122 millimeter cannons, quantity (6).
- 130 millimeter cannons, quantity (4).
- 152 millimeter cannons, quantity (4).
- 122 rocket launchers, quantity (2).
- Portable 107 millimeter Katioucha missile launcher bases, quantity (14).
- In addition to RBG7 bombers, BKC rifles and Kalashnikov.

Fifth: Its present activity consists of training, preparing, making ready and the participation of some of its elements with the Axes in the execution of some operations (122 millimeter Crad missile operations launched on Baghdad).

7. Al-Mehdi Battalion (Anti-aircraft)

Its commander is Abu Sadek Al-Muwali, a native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner. He is assisted by (Abu Mohamed Al-Kannani) also a prisoner. It includes (275) elements and the weapons this battalion holds are:

- (44) 23 millimeter cannons.
- (1) Strella missile launcher in addition to light and medium weapons.
8. **Zul Fikar Regiment (Anti-Armor)**

   Its commander is Ali Zuwain, an imprisoned officer native of the governorate of Najaf assisted by Abu Hussein Al-Jarrah. This regiment approximately includes (200) individuals and the weapons in its possessions are:
   - (42) 106 millimeter cannons.
   - (26) SBG9 cannons.
   - (18) Malotka missile bases, in addition to light and medium weapons.

9. **Al-Hasan Battalion (Armored vehicles)**

   Its commander is Abu Zunun Al-Khaledi, an imprisoned officer native of the governorate of Al-Qadisiya assisted by Abu Mohamed Al-Iraqi. The headquarters of this battalion is located in a civil camp – Dayzafoul region. It is present with the divisions of Mohamed Rasoul Allah, Haydar Al-Karrar and Imam Al-Hussein and it amounts to (200) elements. Its weapons are:
   - (7) T55 tanks.
   - (29) various armored vehicles in addition to light and medium weapons.

10. **Naval Regiment**

    Its commander is Abu Hamed Al-A’aredi, a native of the governorate of Misan. The headquarters of this regiment is located in Al-Ahwaz region and the number of its elements is around (250) persons equipped with boats which are:
    - 48 horsepower Yamaha boats.
    - 115 horsepower metal made Yamaha boats carrying 107 millimeter Katioucha rocket launcher with 12 muzzles.
    - Diesel engine Volvo boats to transport large loads.
Structural plan of the regiment

The Assisting Regiment

Regiment's headquarters  First Company  Second Company  Third Company

Department  Finances  Communication  Section  Support Platoon  Rations

81 Millimeter  Doushka Section  Mortar Section

Company's Headquarters  First Platoon  Second Platoon  Third Platoon

Communicator  60 Millimeter Mortar Launcher  Department and Ration  First Section  Second Section
Axes

At the beginning of 1999, the disloyal Badr Corps worked on creating a new formation to which was entrusted the subversive operations inside Iraq called (Axes). These missions were previously entrusted to the divisions of the Corps. To allow the commander of the divisions to dedicate himself to the division and its activity without dividing his attention between the division’s activity and the headquarters existing on the inside, these axes were created inside Iraq and they became connected to the Assistant Commander of the Corps (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess). These axes are:

- **First Axis / Southern Axis** – Under the supervision of Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlani also called (Abu Hesam Al-Sahlani), a graduate from the School of Agriculture and a native of Basra. The number of elements of this axis amounts approximately to (230) persons. Its headquarters is located in Al-Ahwaz region and it has two branches. The first branch is located in Al-Huwaiza and has two subsidiary points in Shatt Ali region and the Iranian region of Hemat. The official in charge is (Hatem Aswad Al-Mohamadawi) also called (Abu Muntazer Al-Mohamadawi) from Al-Nawafel tribe. He is assisted in the management of this headquarters by Kareem E’elewi also called (Abu Kawthar Al-Mohamadawi). The second branch is located at the edges of Al-Ahwaz – Al-Mohamara Road under the supervision of (Abu Karrar Al-Hashemi). The axis has also a headquarters in the governorate of Zi Qar – Al-Fuhud under the supervision of (Abu Lika’ Al-Jaberi). This headquarters doesn’t exist at the present time because of the security measures taken by the security and party services against the headquarters existing in the region. Knowing that the field of action of this Axis is in (the governorates of Basra, Zi Qar, Al-Muthana and Misan).
Second Axis / Middle Axis – Located in the region of Andamashk and having approximately 150 elements. It is under the supervision of the criminal (Hamza Qasem Sabbat Fada’am Al-Darraji) also called (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), a native of Bagdad – Saddam City. This Axis has a headquarters in the Dahlaran region under the command of (Abu Ja’afar Al-Darraji). It also has a headquarters inside Iraq located in Badiya, in the governorate of Al-Muthana called (Abu Al-Fadl headquarters) under the command of the criminal Abdel Ameer Abdel Zahra Al-Dirawi also called (Abu Hamad Al-Dirawi), a native of Basra, assisted by (Khairallah Farhan Thajil Al-Sua’a’aidi) also called (Rasoul Al-Sua’a’aidi). The field of action of this Axis is in the governorates of (Najaf – Babil – Karbala – Al-Qadisiya). It also has groups working in Baghdad.

Third Axis / Baghdad Axis – It is under the supervision of Hameed Thajil Al-A’attabi also called (Abu Mustafa Al-Shaybani), a native of the governorate of Zi Qar. It counts approximately (75) elements. The headquarters of this axis is located in Bakhtaran – Al-Tanakah region along with the headquarters of the Corps. Its field of action is in the governorates of Baghdad – Waset – Diyala. This axis has a headquarters in the Mahran region called Al-Mikdad headquarters under the command of the criminal (Hussein Kazem Al-Tahhan) also called (Abu Hana’ Al-Baghdadi), a native of the governorate of Baghdad – Al-Kazemiya. It also has a headquarters in Saleh Abad region under the command of the criminal (Abu Ali Al-Waseti), a native of the governorate of Waset and it has a third headquarters in Kasr Shereen region under the command of the criminal (Abu Jihad Al-Tamimi), a native of the governorate of Diyala.
Fourth Axis – Northern Axis – This Axis is considered one of the operation axes on the inside belonging to Badr Corps 9. Its headquarters is in the north of Iraq, in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah. It has a secondary headquarters in Iran, in Bakhtaran Kamfar Khalafi. The field of action of this Axis is in the northern governorates of (Al-Sulaimaniyah, Irbil, Ninawa, Al-Ta’mim, Diyala and Salaheddine). A station was created for the Axis in the sector of Toz Kharmatu under the supervision of Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar also called (Abu Ali Al-Basari), a native of the governorate of Basra – District of Shatt Al-Arab (Al-Tanouma) and a mathematics teacher. He is assisted by Abu Firass Al-Hamadani, a native of the governorate of Diyala who is in charge at the same time of the intelligence of the Axis and the Diyala line.

* The most important elements of this Axis are Majed Hammadi Al-Sae’edi (Abu Shehab Al-Sae’edi), in charge of the special operations. Abu Jasem Kawet, in charge of the Irbil line. Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani (Assistant Commander of Al-Mustafa Brigade), in charge of Al-Ta’mim line. Abu Ja’afar Al-Fatlawi, administrative official of the headquarters. Abu Ali Al-Tamimi, in charge of collecting information from the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah. Abu Ahmed, in charge of public relations. Dr. Farhad, an Assistant Official in charge of the public relations. Abu Ali Al-Sahlani, a driver. Abu Abbass Al-A’askari and Abu Tayseer two drivers. Abu Nour, a PC operator.

* In addition to a group estimated at 14-18 elements between guards and intelligence. The headquarters of the Axis consists of a rented residence changed on a yearly basis. Three cars are used at the headquarters. A new red station wagon Toyota, a red Toyota Pick-Up Double Camary and a new white Super Salon.
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Structural Plan of the axes

The axes are connected to the (Assistant Commander of the Corps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Axis</th>
<th>Second Axis</th>
<th>Third Axis</th>
<th>Fourth Axis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Axis</td>
<td>Middle Axis</td>
<td>Baghdad Axis</td>
<td>Northern Axis</td>
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<td>(Abu Hesam Al-Sahlani)</td>
<td>(Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki)</td>
<td>Its headquarters is in Bakhtaran, in the Corps’ headquarters in Bakhtaran</td>
<td>Its headquarters is in Al-Ahwaz under the supervision of</td>
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<td>Its headquarters is in Al-Ahwaz under the supervision of</td>
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<td>Hatem Aswad</td>
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<td>Dahlan HQ.</td>
<td>Abu Al-Fadl HQ.</td>
<td>Kasr Shereen HQ.</td>
<td>Saleh Abad HQ.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ja’afar Al-Darraj</td>
<td>in Badiya Al-Muthana</td>
<td>under the supervision of</td>
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<td>under the supervision of</td>
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<td>Abdel Ameer Abdel Zahra Al-Dirawi</td>
<td>Abu Ali Al-Waseti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Huwaiza Headquarters</td>
<td>Al-Ahwaz - Al-Mohamara HQ.</td>
<td>Mikdad HQ. in Mahran region under the supervision of</td>
<td>Kasr Shereen HQ. under the supervision of</td>
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<td>of Abu Hana’ Al-Baghdadi</td>
<td>Abu Jihad Al-Tamimi</td>
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<td>Shatt Ali Hemat region</td>
<td>Al-Hashemi</td>
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<td>under the supervision of</td>
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<td>Abu Lika’ Al-Jaberi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Formations connected to the Chief of Staff of the Corps

1. **Operations**: Under the supervision of Ibrahim Abd Jassim Albu Basiri, also called (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), a native of the governorate of Basra who escaped to Iran.

2. **Corps’ intelligence (Ittila’at)**
   Its headquarters is located with the Corps’ headquarters in Karmanshah – Al-Tanakah region under the supervision of agent Nouri Ja’afar Al-Safi (Abu Lika’ Al-Safi), a native of Al-Hay in the governorate of Waset, an officer who escaped in 1981. He is assisted by four elements; two of them are native of Basra and the two others are native of Waset.

3. **Training**: Under the supervision of Abu Saif Al-Marzouk, a native of the governorate of Babil and a renegade prisoner. It is divided in two parts: -
   A. Corps’ Training Center in Hizbullah camp, Warameen region, Teheran. The official in charge is Youssef Al-Amara (Abu Ammar Al-Amara), a military captain, native of the governorate of Basra and a fugitive.
   B. Cadre Preparatory Institute in the city of Qom – Rasoul Allah Al-A’azam Camp, under the supervision of Ali Fekri, a military full colonel, native of Baghdad and a renegade prisoner.

4. **Administration**: Under the supervision of Sadek Al-Sa’adawi (Abu Farkad Al-Sa’adawi), a native of the governorate of Najaf, a military officer with the rank of lieutenant and a fugitive.

5. **Planning and Budget**: Under the supervision of Abu Ihsan Al-Muhandess, a mechanical engineer native of the governorate of Basra.

6. **Finances**: Under the supervision of Samir (Abu Hareth Al-Basari, a native of the governorate of Basra).

7. **Military Engineering**: Under the supervision of Mohamed Al-Zawbai’i (Abu Haytham Al-Zawbai’i), a chemical engineer native of the governorate of Basra.

8. **Defense and duties**: Under the supervision of Abu Haydar Al-Lami, a native of the governorate of Misan.
9. **March to the Battle**: Under the supervision of Abdel Hussein A’abtan (Abu Ali Al-Najafi), a native of the governorate of Najaf.

10. **Communication**: Under the supervision of Abu A’aqeel Al-Sheikh Al-Kazemi, a native of Baghdad.

11. **Cooperation**: Under the supervision of Hussein Al-Moussawi (Abu Ali Al-Saydali), he holds a PhD in pharmacy and a native of Baghdad.

12. **Medical Treatment**: Under the supervision of Dr. A’alloush (Abu Isra’), a native of the governorate of Diyala.
**Some of the Corps Formations’ Positions**

As previously mentioned, the effective position of the Corps’ headquarters is in Welayat Al-Faqih Camp, in Al-Tanakah region, governorate of Bakhtaran (Karmanshah). It has no mobilization headquarters at the present time. It has been decided that the mobilization headquarters will be in the border region in front of the Iranian city of Mahran, in the proximity of the Iranian Police Precinct of Al-Karsiya facing the Iraqi region of Badra.

As to the locations of the divisions (their present camps), their mobilization and alternate camps, their permanent and rear camps and any information about them, they are:

- **Imam Ali Division** – Its present location is in the governorate of Karmanshah (Yastoun city), at an approximate distance of 16 kilometers from the governorate, in the proximity of the cement factory in the direction of Al-Jeel, on the right hand side of the street where the division and its regiments are settled in this region with the exception of the Support Regiment in Al-Hor Al-Raylahi Camp, in the city of Sankar, 80 kilometers distant from Bakhtaran.

- **Rasoul Allah Division and Haydar Al-Karrar Division** are both with their regiments in the civil camp located between the cities of Dayzafool and Shoushter. They are (20) kilometers far from Dayzafool on the right hand side of the street and at a distance of 3 kilometers from the street. Knowing that these camps don’t have mobilization camps or alternate or rear camps with the exception of Imam Al-Hussein Division which has a mobilization camp in the border city of Al-Huwaiza, opposite to Al-Madina, in the western front under the name of Imam Al-Muntazer Camp. As to the administrative and supportive units of the Corps, they are all located in the Corps’ headquarters in Welayat Al-Fakih Camp, in Bakhtaran, with the exception of the following units:
  - **Imam Al-Hasan Tank Battalion** / in the civil Camp of Dayzafool.
  - **Al-Abbass Naval Regiment** / in Ghayour Al-Asli Camp in Al-Ahwaz.
  - **Mobilization Headquarters** / in Teheran – Kalbacz Street.
Southern Axis / Located in Al-Ahwaz region opposite to Shahrak Ahwaz region at a distance of 5 kilometers from Sarah Kharmashahr region in the proximity of (Al-Khaffajiya – Al-Mohammara – Al-Ahwaz) intersection.

Middle Axis / Located in Andamashk, at a distance of 5 kilometers from the city in the direction of Al-Ahwaz, at the right hand side of the street.

Southern Axis / Located in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah.

**Size of the combat force of the Corps’ formations**

The size of the effective combat force of the Corps and its formations is calculated as being 60% of the general force for the following factors:

- Elderly persons.
- Sick and handicapped persons.
- Those with no desire to fight.
- Those with security and judicial measures against them.

At the present time, the number of the Corps’ elements varies from (11,000 to 11,500) elements approximately distributed in the following manner:

- Corps Command Office, (70) elements.
- Judicial Office, (30) elements.
- Investigation and Inspection Office, (40) elements.
- Military Security, (70) elements.
- Imam Ali Division, (1650) elements.
- Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, (1350) elements.
- Haydar Al-Karrar Division, (1400) elements.
- Imam Al-Hussein Division, (1450) elements.
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- Mustafa Brigade, (300) elements.
- Southern Axis, (230) elements.
- Middle Axis, (150) elements.
- Baghdad Axis, (80) elements.
- Northern Axis, (60) elements.
- Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade, (600) elements.
- Al-Mehdi Battalion, (280) elements.
- Zul Fikar Regiment, (220) elements.
- Al-Hasan Battalion, (200) elements.
- Al-Abbass Naval Regiment, (270) elements.
- Operations, (27) elements.
- Intelligence, (150) elements.
- Training, (14) elements.
- Administration, (80) elements.
- Planning and Programming, (34) elements.
- Finances, (50) elements.
- Supply and Transportation, (600) elements.
- Engineer, (340) elements.
- Defense and Duties, (370) elements.
- Medical Treatment, (170) elements.
- Communication, (70) elements.
- Technical, (40) elements.
- Cooperation, (130) elements.
Hizbullah Camp, (280) elements.

Cadre Preparatory Institute, (70) elements.

Mobilization, (170) elements.

As to the size of the reserve units for reinforcement sent to the Corps when needed, they are in the limits of (2000) elements. The source of this reinforcement is the refugee camps in Iran and the Iraqis present in the Iranian cities. The approximate time needed for these elements to join the Corps is between five to eight days. They are called in through the branches of what is called (Mobilization). The Corps has no instructions to recall the elements who were discharged from it.
Leading elements of Badr Corps

1. Mohamed Baqer Mohasen Al-Hakeem – Commander of the Corps.
2. Jamal Ja’afar Al-Ibrahimi (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), Assistant Commander of the Corps, an engineer native of Basra.
3. Hadi Farhan Abdullah Al-A’ameri(Abu Hasan Al-A’ameri), Chief of Staff or the Corps, a native of Diyala governorate.
4. Ibrahim Abd Jassim Albu Basiri (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), official in charge of the Corps’ operations, a native of Basra.
8. Sadek Sa’adawi (Abu Farkad Al-Sa’adawi) – Official in charge of unifying the administration.
10. Abu Hareth Al-Basari, Official in charge of the Corps’ finances, a native of Basra.
11. Abu Ihsan Al-Muhandess, Official in charge of the planning and budget, a mechanical engineer native of Basra.
12. Abu Jassim Al-A’askari (Mohamed Al-Samra’i), Official in charge of the Corps’ investigation and inspection, a native of Baghdad.
15. Abu Sadek Al-Muwali, Official in charge of Mehdi Anti-Air Battalion, a native of Al-Amara and a prisoner.
17. Ya’areb (Abu Ahmed Al-Kutaifi), Official in charge of the Corps’
technicality, a civil engineer, native of the governorate of Basra.
18. Abu A’aqeel Al-Sheikh (Al-Kazemi), Official in charge of the
communications, a native of Baghdad.
19. Dr. A’alloush (Abu Isra’), Official in charge of the Corps’ medical treatment,
a native of Diyala and a prisoner.
cooperation, a pharmacist and native of Baghdad.
22. Abu Haydar Al-Lami, Official in charge of the Defense and Duties Regiment,
a native of Al-Amara.
23. Youssef Al-Amara (Abu Ammar Al-Amara), Official in charge of the training
camp.
24. Ali Fekri, Official in charge of the Cadre Preparatory Institute in the city of
Qom, a military full colonel, native of Baghdad and a prisoner.
25. Mohamed Al-Zawbai’i (Abu Haytham Al-Zawbai’i), Official in charge of the
military engineering, a chemical engineer native of Baghdad.
30. Hameed Ibrahim Al-Sahlan (Abu Husam Al-Sahlan), Official in charge of
the Southern Axis, a graduate of Basra School of Agriculture and a native of
the governorate of Basra.
31. Hamza Qasem Sabbat Fada’am Al-Darraj (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), Official
in charge of the Middle Axis, a native of Bagdad – Saddam City.
32. Adnan Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Najjar (Abu Ali Al-Basari), Official in charge of
the Northern Axis, a teacher and native of Basra.
33. Hameed Thajil Al-A’attabi (Abu Mustafa Al-Shaybani) – a native of the governorate of Zi Qar, Official in charge of Baghdad Axis.
34. Mohamed Ne’emet Al-Hasan (Abu Zul Fikar Al-Hasan), Official in charge of Imam Ali Division, a military captain native of Basra and a prisoner.
35. Ahmad Al-Helali (Abu Majed Al-Basari), Official in charge of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a teacher native of Basra.
37. Abu Muntazer Al-Husseini, Official in charge of Imam Al-Hussein Division, an imprisoned officer native of Baghdad.
38. Ali Al-Sa’adi (Abu Zer Al-Khalesi), Official in charge of Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of the governorate of Diyala.
40. Mohamed Alsani (Abu Ahmed Al-Rumaithi), Assistant Officer in charge of Baghdad Axis, a native of the governorate of Muthanna – Albu Hassan.
41. Abu Ammar Al-Amara, Official in charge of the Corps’ Training Camp, a military captain, native of Basra.
42. Abu Farkad Al-Sa’adawi, Official in charge of the Corps’ administration, military officer with the rank of lieutenant, a fugitive and native of Najaf.
43. Fadel Ali Zuwain, Official in charge of Zul Fikar Regiment (Anti-Armor), a native of Najaf and a prisoner.
44. Abu Ja’afar Al-Shaybani, an official in charge of the Corps Commander Office, a native of Zi Qar.
45. Hussein Kazem Al-Tahhan also called (Abu Hana’ Al-Baghdadi), Official in charge of Al-Mikdad Headquarters in the Mahran region belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
46. Abu Ali Al-Waseti, Office in charge of Saleh Abad Headquarters belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
47. Abu Jihad Al-Tamimi, a native of Diyala, Official in charge of Kasr Shereen belonging to the Baghdad Axis.
48. Abu A’aqeel Al-Moussawi, Chief of Staff of Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of Al-Qadisiya governorate.
49. Abu Mustafa Al-A’ameri, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Diyala.

50. Abu Karrar Al-Bahadli, Commander of Al-Hussein Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.

51. Abu Ali Al-Kara’awi, Commander of Moslem Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

52. Abu A’aqeel Al-Hamadani, commander of Ammar Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

53. Abu Daoud, Commander of Ja’afar Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

54. Abu Zaher, Commander of the Support Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

55. Abu Hawra’ Al-Ahmadi, Chief of Staff of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Waset and a teacher.

56. Abu Ayat Al-Baghdadi, Official in charge of the operations for Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.

57. Abu A’aqeel Al-Ne’emani, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.

58. Abu Ali Al-Kannani, Commander of Bakiyat Allah Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Basra.

59. Abu Majed Al-Najjar, Commander of 15 Sha’aban Regiment within Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Basra.

60. Abu Yaser Al-Azraki, Commander of Tha’r Allah Regiment within Rasoul Allah Division, a native of Basra.

61. Abu Bassam Al-Faridawi, Commander of a military regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.

62. Abu Ahmed Al-Miyahi, Commander of Moussa Al-Kazem Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Basra.

63. Abu Ali Al-Miyahi, Commander of the Support Regiment within Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division, a native of the governorate of Basra.

64. Abu Al-Nour Al-Husseini, Chief of Staff of Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a naval officer native of the governorate of Basra.

65. Abu Yaser Al-Shuwaili, Official in charge of the operations for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

66. Abu Abdullah, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle for Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.

67. Abu Mariam Al-Mansouri, Commander of Al-Sadr Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Basra and a prisoner.
68. Abu Jawwad Al-Ghannami, Commander of Al-Reda Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
69. Abu Hasan Al-Fayyad, Commander of Al-Hasan Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
70. Abu Zer Al-Wahili, Commander of Al-Mahtabi Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
71. Abu Usama, Commander of Abu Zahra’ Al-Halli Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, a prisoner.
72. Abu Wisam Al-A’akeeli, Commander of the Support Regiment within Haydar Al-Karrar Division, native of the governorate of Misan and a prisoner.
73. Abu Sadek Al-A’akeeli, Chief of Staff of Imam Al-Hussein Division, an imprisoned officer and a native of Nasiriya.
74. Abu Nour Al-Moussawi, Official in charge of the operations of Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Basra.
75. Abu Hashem Al-Moussawi, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of the governorate of Basra and a prisoner.
76. Abu Mujahed Al-Rukabi, Commander of Ansar Al-Hussein Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Nasiriya.
77. Abd Mohammadawi, Commander of Abu Al-Fadl Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Al-Amara.
78. Sherif, also called (Abu Rabab Al-Moussawi), Commander of Al-Muntazer Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Al-Amara.
79. Hadi Al-Sae’edi, also called (Abu Karrar Al-Sae’edi), Commander of Abu Al-Khair Regiment, a native of Al-Amara.
80. Hussein, also called (Abu Muntazer Al-Moussawi), Commander of Sayed Al-Shuhada’ Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of the governorate of Misan.
81. Abu Mohamed Al-Mousawi, Commander of the Support Regiment within Imam Al-Hussein Division, a native of Basra.
82. Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani (Turkman), Chief of Staff of Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of Kirkuk.
83. Abu Usama Al-Sa’adi, Official in charge of the Operations of Al-Mustafa Operations, a military Officer, prisoner native of Baghdad.
84. Abu Ammar Al-Rafi’i, Official in charge of the Administration and March to the Battle within Al-Mustafa Brigade, a native of Najaf and a prisoner.
85. Abu Ali Al-Tamimi, Commander of Al-Hussein Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.

86. Abu Shima’, Commander of Al-Wilaya Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.

87. Abu Ahmed Al-Qassab, Commander of the Support Regiment within Al-Mustafa Brigade.

88. Abu Ammar Al-Miyahi, Assistant Official in charge of Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade, a native of Basra governorate.

89. Abu Mohamed Al-Kannani, Assistant Official in charge of Al-Mehdi Battalion (Anti-Aircraft), a prisoner.

Armament
The armament of the Corps’ headquarters and its formation is presently the following:

1. **Armors and their types:** -
   - (7) T55 tanks.
   - (5) armored vehicles.
   - (10) Avigo Iranian wheeled armored vehicles
   - (14) various armored vehicles.

2. **Artillery:** -
   - (4) 152 millimeter cannons.
   - (8) 130 millimeter cannons.
   - (11) 120 millimeter cannons.
   - (3) 122 millimeter rocket launchers with 40 muzzles.
   - (8) 122 millimeter rocket launchers (with one muzzle).
   - (14) 107 millimeter rocket launchers (with 12 muzzles) and 14 rocket launchers distributed among the divisions.

3. **Anti-tank weapons:** -
   - (42) 106 millimeter cannons.
   - (26) SBG9 cannons with 12 cannons in the divisions.
   - (18) Malotka cannons (Launching base).
   - One Tao base.

4. **Anti-Aircraft weapons:** -
   - (60) 23 millimeter anti-air cannons.
   - (16) Anti-air Strella cannons.
(4) 14.5 quadrilateral anti-air cannons.

(8) 14.5 (bilateral) anti-air cannons.

5. **Approximate Medium weapons:**
   - (600) BKC rifle.
   - (70) Doushka machine guns.
   - (1600) RBG7 bombers.
   - (60) Shatayer sniping rifles.

6. **Approximate Light weapons:**
   - (16,000) Kalashnikov rifles.
   - (100) RBK rifles.
   - (250) guns.

7. **Mortars:**
   - (26) 120 millimeter mortars.
   - (44) 81 millimeter mortars.
   - (12) 82 millimeter mortars.
   - (255) 60 millimeter mortars.
   - With a quantity of mortar ammunitions according to the measurement of each one of them.

The source of armament are the weapons left during the war with Iran which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard prepared for them, in addition to what is bought by the Iranian Ministry of Defense.
Equipment:

The number of specialized vehicles used by the Corps amounts to approximately (750) various vehicles distributed among its units and formations. In each division, there are the following approximate vehicles:

1- 10-12 pick-up vehicles (Land Cruise – Nissan – Patrol).
2- Three station vehicles (Box).
3- Two Land Cruise ambulance vehicles.
4- Two Toyota or Mazda Double Camary.
5- 2-3 Mercedes loading vehicles.
6- 1-2 reservoir cars.
7- Two 18-passenger vehicles.
8- Two 40-passenger Iranian made or German Ricardes vehicles.
9- One Iranian taxi vehicle.
10- One Land Cruise reservoir vehicle for the transport of fuel.

Service vehicles

1- Vehicles of Anti-Armor Regiment.
2- 50 Jeep Sonata vehicles.
3- 5-6 Pick-up Land Cruise vehicles.
4- 2-3 Mercedes loading vehicles.
5- Two Land Cruise reservoir vehicles for the transport of fuel.
6- Two drinking water vehicles (reservoir).
7- Vehicle for the transport of passengers.
8- Toyota station box vehicle.
Vehicles of Malek Al-Ashtar Brigade
1- (5) Mercedes vehicles to pull the cannon.
2- (7) Hino vehicles to pull the cannon.
3- Two transport vehicles, each having a capacity for 40 passengers.
4- Two 18-passenger vehicles.
5- (2-3) station vehicles (Box).
6- Two reservoir vehicles.
7- (6-8) Pick-up Land Cruise vehicles.

Anti-Air Battalion’s Vehicles
1- (3) Mercedes vehicles.
2- 18-passenger vehicle.
3- (6-7) vehicles including Pick-up Land Cruise + Nissan + Patrol.
4- Reservoir vehicle.
5- Two station box vehicles.

Corps Units’ Vehicles
The number of vehicles for the Corps’ units ranges between 8 and 10 different vehicles (Pick-up Land Cruise – Nissan Patrol – Station – Pick-up Double Camary – 5-passenger taxi) and they are distributed as follows:
The supply and transport vehicles are approximately the following:

- (40-50) different vehicles for the transport of 40 passengers.
- (10-15) different vehicles for the transport of 18 passengers.
- (30-40) different loading vehicles (Lowry and Trella) in addition to water and fuel reservoir vehicles for the transport of foodstuffs. Most of the vehicles used by the leaders and commanders are of taxi type and some use station box vehicles or Patrol Nissan or Toyota.
Communications

The type of equipment used by the Corps are (Racal HF) Icom 80 HF and sometimes a regular telephone is used linked to a coding equipment. The number of the Racal equipment ranges between (50 and 60) equipments and the number of Icom 80 is (12) equipments. As to the communication equipments used between the divisions and their regiments in case they are spread out, they are the VHF equipment and the (BRC77, German equipment, Iranian equipment, Asfen Turkish equipment) equipments. There are in the Corps approximately (300-500) VHF equipments and also the Walkie-Talkie distributed among the divisions and units amounting to 400 equipments. The main network is located in the Corps’ headquarters and it provides the communication with the headquarters of the divisions and axes. There are no network branches because all the Corps’ units are in their camps with the exception of the Middle Axis which has Abu Al-Fadl headquarters located in Badiya Al-Muthanna and the headquarters of Imam Ali Division has the Support Regiment located in Al-Hor Al-Riyahi Camp. The range of frequency used during the day is approximately (3000-5000) Megahertz, and during the night it amounts to (8000-9000) Megahertz. As to the combat frequencies, they are not known at the present time. The code is centrally prepared by the Corps’ intelligence by using the computer and changed every 3 or 4 months. As to the calling signals, they are changed daily and consists of two-digit numbers such as 11 or 12.

Other equipment

With regard to the night vision equipment used in open locations, they are not available at the Corps. The Corps used the GBS indicative equipment since mid-2001, where (22) equipments were bought and distributed as follows:-

| 33 |
1. Middle Axis – (4) equipments.

2. Southern Axis, Baghdad Axis and Northern Axis - (Two equipments for each axis).


4. Corps’ intelligence – (Two equipments).

5. For each division an equipment.

6. Al-Mustafa Brigade – One equipment.

7. Cadre Preparatory Institute (One equipment).

8. Corps’ Operations Headquarters (One equipment).


The equipments for chemical protection include the protection mask and the disinfecting tools which are all 100% damaged since the Corps has not been equipped with these tools for the last ten years and their quantities don’t cover 20% of the Corps’ elements.

**Training and preparation:**

The course followed in the training is almost similar to the one adopted in the training of the Iraqi army where the Corps’ Training Station prepares an annual training bulletin for the infantry, services and administrative units and divides the training year in the operative units into phases as follows:

1. **First part includes the individual training phase**

   During this phase which lasts (20-25 days) training on the fighter’s individual weapons is performed, then begins the general training phase including the battle of the section and platoon which lasts (20-25) days.
2. **Second part**

The fighter is trained on alternate weapons. At the end of this part, an annual shooting operation is performed which lasts 20-25 days.

3. **General training phase (Second part)** during which the units are trained on different types of combat (Advance, attack, defense and withdrawal) and which lasts 20-25 days.

4. **Training phase on special combat** (ambushes, patrols, raids and field profession) which last 20-25 days.

5. **Training phase on the war in the cities** which lasts 20 to 25 days.

6. **Phase for ending the training procedure by a mobilization exercise**, i.e. it is required from each unit to carry out a mobilization exercise or to participate in the Corps’ maneuvers performed once every two years. It means that the division carries out in the first year a mobilization exercise by itself and in the second year it participates in main maneuvers performed by the Corps. As to the training manuals used, the Training Station prints them out based on the training manuals used by the Iraqi army (old manuals), i.e. before 1991. The Corps gets also educated with training manuals belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard once they are translated, printed and distributed on the Corps’ units.

**Types of session created in the Corps:**

1. Sessions held in the supportive divisions and units which are:
   A. Wired and wireless communication sessions.
   B. (Military) engineering sessions.
   C. Medical session (First aids to those wounded in the battle).
   D. Chemical sessions which are a protection against the weapons of mass destruction and clustered weapons.
F. Sessions to those assigned to the artillery shooting.

G. Sessions of the sections’ commanders.

H. Educational and ideological sessions.

The number of participants in these sessions is specified according to the needs of the units and it varies between 15 and 30 elements with an approximate duration of 30 days per session. These sessions are held in the units based on the unit’s need.

2. There are sessions held at the Cadre Preparatory Institute of the Corps, located in the city of Qom, Rasoul Allah Camp. The sessions are:

A. Regiment Commanders’ Sessions (Main Command), the number of participants in the session is 20-50 elements with a duration of one month. The lessons taught are (Military code – Art of command – Types of combat – Assessment of the situation – Intelligence – Administrative affairs – Reading of a map – Revolutionary war – Solution of a problem).

B. Command and Administrative Affairs Sessions with a duration of four to six months in which participate 20-50 elements per session and are taught the same lessons of the regiment’s commanders but the focus remains on the administrative affairs.

C. Command and Staff Sessions, with a duration of one year in which participate 16 elements and are taught the same lessons but with more details to which are added the topics of military history, mountain wars and navigation.

D. Intelligence Sessions, with a duration of two months in which participate 16-20 elements and are taught the military codes, reading of maps and intelligence.

3. Training sessions in Hizbullah Camp, in the district of Warmeen – Teheran.
A. Commando Sessions, with a duration of two months each in which participates a regiment from each division since the number of the regiment’s elements varies between (160 and 180) elements. Three Commando Sessions are organized annually in this camp.

B. Platoon and Company Commanders Sessions with a duration of 45 days each in which participate 30 elements per session.

C. Technical Sessions (Driving and Mechanics) in which participate 40 elements.

D. Weapon Teachers Sessions (Mortar – Bomber – Sniping – BKC – Doushka), with a duration of 30 days each in which participate (25 – 30) elements.

E. Main Sessions opened for the new Corps’ Volunteers.

F. Engineering Sessions in the units and divisions, in which participate (2-3) elements from each regiment and approximately (25) elements from each division. They get trained on how to plant all types of mines, finding areas in the mine fields, crossing all types of obstacles (barbed wires) and the way of using a bomb. The elements are trained in general on the first aids and transport of the wounded.

The types of sessions opened for the Corps under the supervision of what is called (Revolutionary Guard) and sessions opened in the Guard's camps:

1. 4 Special Sessions in which participate 30 elements per session from each division with a duration of three months and in which are taught (Physical fitness – Swimming –
Mountain climbing – Mountain field – Light personal weapons such as rifle, gun, sniping, fusil).

2. All types of Intelligence, Espionage and Monitoring Sessions. These sessions are opened in the Revolutionary Guard’s Camps in Teheran, Karj region.

3. Military Engineering Sessions, in which participate (14 – 16) elements. They are trained on how to use explosives as well as the technical methods. This session is organized for the elements operating within the axes’ formations on the inside, the Corps’ Intelligence and the Technical Office included.

4. Anti-tank Malotka Missiles Sessions in which participate 30 elements per session from the Anti-Armor Regiment. This session is opened at the headquarters of the Corps under the supervision of the Guard’s training cadre.

5. Sessions for the use of GBS equipment and equipment for the specification of distances and indications. This session was opened in the Corps. The teaching staff is Iranian and the number of elements per session amounts to 26 elements.

Corps’ mobilization exercises and maneuvers:

The Corps carries out a mobilization exercise every three years in which participate all its units. The majority of the mobilization exercises carried out by the Corps are three mobilization maneuvers for the years (1994 – 1997 – 2000). It was decided that the execution be done once every two years. There are preliminary preparations for the performance of the maneuvers for all the Corps’ units and formations of the year. In their viewpoint, the summary of the idea for conducting these exercises is that as a result of the lengthy blockade and practices performed by the Iraqi government against the people, an uprising (Intifadah) should occur leading to the destabilization of the situation and the absence of control over
the internal situation. In this case, orders are issued to the Corps to solve the issue and control the situation by cooperating with the people and the military units which join to participate alongside the people. On these grounds, the Corps draws a plan on how to enter Iraq in the indicated circumstances and how the Corps should be able to control the military units loyal to the regime. Therefore, the units become ready through their participation in the mobilization exercises including the battle of the section and platoon, the special combats, the sessions, ambushes and regiment’s exercises (Advance, attack, defense and withdrawal), war of the cities, chemical training, first aids, security teaching including performances and exercises to boost the physical fitness such as sport games and contests, cross-country, endurance walks, morning jogging and Swedish exercises. At the end of these training programs the elements participate in the performance of a mobilization exercise, whether each units performs a mobilization exercise or the units participate in the maneuvers of the Corps. The Corps carried out recently three large maneuvers which are:

A. 1994’s Exercise in the region of Jafeer close to the borders (Eastern sector of Basra).
B. 1997’s Exercise in the governorate of Hamdan (Middle part of Iran).
C. 2000’s Exercise in Al-Khaffajiya region (On the hills of Allah Akbar).

The purpose of the abovementioned exercises was to specify a city, then to apply the method of controlling and defending it. The Revolutionary Guard participated in the 2000’s maneuvers with an anti-air battalion composed of 57 and 23 millimeter cannons and anti-air missiles for the protection of the maneuver region only. As to the effective participation, it does not exist. All divisions and units of the Corps have participated in these exercises and with all their weapons (Artillery – tanks – anti-armor – anti-aircraft –
light and medium weapons). Bombs were used during these maneuvers. The purpose of these maneuvers was the training of the Corps’ elements and commanders for their future missions when entering Iraq during crises and disturbance of the security situation.

**Corps’ Administrative Affairs**

The average monthly salary for each element of the Corps is 114,000 Tomans i.e. the equivalent of $142.5. The highest salary varies between 70,000 and 200,000 Tomans. The salary is disbursed at the end of each calendar year and according to the Persian calendar. There is a special salary for the qualitative operations carried out inside the cities whether a missile launching operation or an assassination or a blasting. Special rewards are given by the command of the Corps to the perpetrators.

As to the mechanism for the supply of ammunitions, it is done by submitting a request by the commander of the unit or the formation to the Operations Station of the Corps showing the reasons for the request. The Operations Station examines it and takes note of what is available at the unit (the cadre). If there is need, the effective need is examined with what is available at the Corps’ warehouses. In case what is requested is available, an order is issued by the Operations Station to the Supply and Transport Station to equip the unit with the requested quantities.

As to the mechanism for the supply of the means of living, it is done directly by the Supply and Transport Station to the units settled outside Al-Tanakah Camp, based on the number of individuals available at the unit minus a percentage of 35% (for those who are on leave) and the means of living are disbursed once every two months.

The locations for the storage of ammunitions, means of living and medical treatment are in Welayat Al-Fakih Camp, in the region of Al-Tanakah, in Bakhtaran, meaning at the Corps’ headquarters. As to the divisions, each division has ammunitions for the first and second lines and also means of living sufficient for three months.
Leaves:

The Corps gets leaves according to the following arrangement:

1. The volunteer is given a 4-day leave for each thirty days, in addition to the holidays and gathering days for those who go daily inside Iraq.

2. The volunteer is given a 12-day vacation in case he has been in the camp for 25 days.

3. Whoever doesn’t take the leave, the latter is counted as a balance but this method is no more in effect.

4. The divisions get leaves according to the law of the Corps but their leave is collective, meaning that all the division goes on leave with the exception of the administrative units of the division.

5. As to the individuals inside Iraq, their leaves are dealt with differently.
   
   First: For the administrative units of the internal axes, according to the abovementioned Corps’ system for giving the leaves.
   
   Second: For the elements who go daily inside Iraq (the linkers) and present in the headquarters, each day they are on the inside is worth two days of leave. As to the (guides), they are sent to inside Iraq when there is a duty or mission. Later on, he goes home and when there is need for him, he is called from his residence.
   
   Third: For the individuals who go inside Iraq, the linkers, present at the headquarters, each day spent on the inside is worth two days of leave. As to the guides, they are called when there is need to entrust them with a duty or mission inside Iraq. After executing what he was charged with, he goes home and whenever they need him, he is called from his residence.
Corps’ financial resources:
The General Command of the Iranian Armed Forces allocates an annual budget to Badr Corps 9 amounting to (16) billions Iranian Tomans, i.e. the equivalent of US$ 20 millions. There are no other resources for the Corps’ budget. This amount is disbursed for the salaries. The weapons existing before 1990 were given free of charge to the Corps but now their price is paid to the Revolutionary Guard, in addition to cost of the foodstuffs, vehicles, equipments and other expenses of the Corps.

Corps’ mobilization methods:
The Corps’ recruiting methods used is the voluntary approach of the Iraqi elements present in the Iranian camps and cities. The lack of work opportunities pushes them to volunteer to work for the Corps to adjust their financial condition and get privileges enjoyed by the Corps’ elements such as freedom of movement inside Iran and acceptance of their children to join the Iranian schools, obtainment of the health insurance booklet and permission to shop at the cooperative markets of the military establishments. But the Corps stopped accepting volunteers and limited it to the elements harmed by the operations going on inside Iraq and who escaped to Iran. This process is done through a recommendation made by the supervisors of the axes for these elements. The main reason for not accepting volunteers at the Corps is the Corps’ shortage of financial capabilities since it has to pay out salaries and privileges to these volunteers which constitutes a financial burden for it.
The privileges granted to the volunteered elements of Badr Corps 9 are:

- **Salary**: Paid out to the volunteer at the beginning of his enlistment from (60-70) thousand Tomans. The salary increases with the years of service and responsibilities entrusted to him taking into account his educational background and the number of his family members.

- The volunteer and his family members are granted a health insurance booklet with which he could resort to hospitals and health specialists in exchange for a payment of 25% of the examination and treatment expenses.

- The volunteer is given a shopping booklet for the cooperative markets of the militaries where the prices are symbolic and with a 50% discount from the item price in the local markets.

- The volunteer is entitled to get a loan from the Corps’ finances going from (150 to 300) thousand Tomans reimbursable to the Corps’ finances in monthly installments deducted from the fighter’s salary over a period of thirty months.

- The volunteer is given an ID with which he could not be intercepted by the authorities and he could travel in the Iranian cities. With the ID, he also obtains a form allowing him to get a vacation from the Corps.

- Foreigners, living in Iran and holding the green card issued to them by the heads of their administrative units in the Iranian cities, have the right to get their children admitted to the schools of the cities where the card was issued to them. In case they change their place of residence to another city, they have no right to register their children in the schools of that other city. The volunteer in Badr Corps 9 is exempted from this restriction.

- The volunteer is granted the right of ending his service with the Corps when he wishes to do so. He is paid one month and a half for each year of service he spent with the Corps.

- When the volunteer is entrusted with a mission inside Iraq, he is paid the amount of (1,000) Tomans for each day he spends inside Iraq.
When the designated element is charged with the execution of an operation inside (Iraq), a monetary compensation is paid out to him according to the type of operation he is entrusted with.

Facilities offered to those affiliated with Badr Corps 9:

There has been no case of political asylum granted by the Iranian authorities to the Corps’ elements or permission to go outside the country as long as the element is in the service of the Corps. But there were elements of the Corps who ended their service with the Corps. They traveled outside Iran and were able to get the political asylum. For example, (Abu Haydar Al-Basari), the official in charge of the Corps’ budget, ended his service at the beginning of 2000 and traveled from Iran to Malaysia then to Indonesia and Australia. Also, Sheikh (Abu Baqer Al-Kazemi) used to work in the religious guidance of the Corps. He ended his service with the Corps and is presently in Australia. Also, Abdel Abbass Ali Al-Moussawi, also called (Abu Mujahed Al-Moussawi), one of the Corps’ elements, he is presently in Australia. There are approximately (16) members who ended their service with the Corps and are presently in Australia and some Scandinavian countries. There is a leading member of the Corps (Abu Zafer Al-Moussawi), a native of Kufa, who used to be the official in charge of the Corps’ intelligence. He ended his service and is presently in Denmark.

The granting of the Iranian nationality to the Corps’ elements and the Iraqi fugitives present in Iran is performed in the following manner: -

The Iranian nationality is granted to the Iraqi elements present in Iran capable of presenting documents to the concerned Iranian authorities proving their Iranian citizenship. The others are not granted the Iranian nationality. Some of them obtained the Iranian nationality including (Abu Mujtaba Al-Sari) who worked at Karar Kah Fajr and (Abu Mohamed Al-Muhajer), a native of Al-Amara who worked at the Corps. They submitted documents proving their Iranian nationality. There were other elements whose names are unknown belonging to Al-Sawae’ed tribe who obtained the Iranian nationality.
Law for the Purchase of the Service:

At the beginning of 2000, a resolution was issued by the Revolutionary Guard to Badr Corps 9. This resolution was named (Law for the Purchase of the Service), according to which the elderly persons present at Badr Corps 9 could be eliminated and their service ended in exchange for giving them privileges consisting of one month and a half salary for each year of service spent at the Corps. This resolution was applied and the first group whose service was compulsorily ended amounted to (60-70) agents, all of them were non-leading elements of the Corps. Later on, the Corps gave the same right to the elements who wished to end their service with the Corps by submitting an application to the Command of the Corps for the purpose of ending their service and getting the same privileges. This law continued to be applied and the number of those who submitted applications to end voluntarily their service reached (300) elements. There are still other elements who submitted applications but their request was not approved for unavailability at the Corps of the required amount allocated to that. The purpose of this law was to get in young elements to work in the Corps in replacement of the elderly ones since the Corps had no retirement law should the person become old or be subjected to injury and illness. The law compensated such cases so that the elements would take advantage of the monetary amounts to adjust their living and financial condition. This law was considered in effect for some young elements as well, for many reasons including the following:-

- Desire of some elements to leave the Corps.
- There were aggressive elements with disciplinary problems or warnings against them.
- Elements who didn’t have the enthusiasm and desire to fight.
Relationship of the Corps with the sons of the tribes which escaped to Iran:

The tribes’ priority with the Corps and their cooperation depends on the size of this tribe’s elements affiliated with the formations of the Corps or present with their families in the refugee camps (Ordakat). The approximate number of the Corps’ fighters and their families present at the refugee camps is as follows:

- The number of the Corps’ fighters varies between 11,150 and 12,000 fighters belonging to the Iraqi tribes.
- The Iraqi refugees present in Iran in the camps (Ordakat) amount to approximately (41) thousands persons distributed among eleven camps in the governorate of Khuzistan. These camps are:

1. Ashrafi Asfahani Camp – Located in the city of Dayzaful. The Ministry of Interior supervises its administration and the (14,000) Iraqi individuals present in it. The camp consists of residential units. Each residential unit is composed of two rooms. In the camp, there is an elementary school which previously taught in the Arabic language. Almost two years ago, the study changed and became in the Persian language. There are no differences among the residents of this camp with regard to the living privileges since the residential units are of the same type. In the camp, there is a market managed by the residents of the camp themselves. The elements of the camp could leave and go to the city close to the camp and get a food supply ration consisting of rice, flour, butter, groceries distributed to them free of charge. The residents of the camp could practice liberal work (construction work – farming work) inside the Iranian cities close to the camp. There is a mosque and a medical center inside the camp which are available in all the camps dedicated to the Iraqi refugees.

2. Hashti Camp - Located in Dayzaful. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2000) inhabitants.
3. **Mathari Camp** - Located in Dayzafool. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2500) inhabitants.

4. **Ansar Camp** - Located in Andamashk. The number of those residing in it is approximately (5000) inhabitants.

5. **Ba’athat Camp** - Located in Shoushter. The number of those residing in it is approximately (3000) inhabitants. This camp consists of caravans.


7. **Azna Camp** - Located in Kharm Abad, in the district of Dord. The number of those residing in it is approximately (3000) inhabitants. It’s an old camp.

8. **Suristan Camp** - Located in the governorate of Shiraz. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2000) inhabitants.

9. **Jahram Camp** - Located in the governorate of Shiraz. The number of those residing in it is approximately (4000) inhabitants. It’s an old camp.

10. **Gharib Camp** - Located in the region of Arak. The number of those residing in it is approximately (2500) inhabitants.

11. **Safid Jakka Camp** - Located in the region of Bakhtar. The number of those residing in it is approximately (1000) inhabitants.

🔗 A census was done in the second part of the year 2001 for all the Iraqis and their trends, including the Corps and the camps which approximately comprise (53,000) persons. When this figure is divided among the Iraqi tribes, the sequence based on the higher lineage is as follows:

- Albu Mohamed Tribe (Albu Ghannam – Al-Nawafel)
- Al-Sawae’ed Tribe – especially Al-Kurja.
- Al-Shaghanaba.
- E’ebada Tribe.
- Al-E’edan Tribe – from the residents of Basra.
Al-Sada Al-Bukhat Tribe.

Albu Bakheet Tribe present between Al-Aziz sub-district in Misan and the district of Al-Korna in Basra.

Al-Miyah Tribe present in Basra and Waset (Al-Shahman – Al-A’awamer).

Bani Sae’ed Tribe present in Zi Qar.

Al-Joyeiber, native of Suk Al-Shuyukh – Zi Qar.

Al-Sada Al-Battat – native of Basra – Al-Madina.

Small numbers of other various tribes.

Among the Sheikhs and influential social figures who escaped and are present in Iran:-

- Criminal Waheeb Al-Shaghanebi – One of the influential social figures of Al-Shaghanaba Tribe, residing in Al-Ahwaz.
- Criminal Hammadi Ali Sheya’a (Sheikh of Al-Sawae’ed - Al-Kurja Tribe), residing in Bakhtaran.
- Criminal Mohamed Al-Daoud – from Albu Mohamed – Albu Faisal Shuyukh, residing in Al-Khaffajiya.
- Criminal Shafi – One of the influential social figures of Al-Joyeiber Tribe, residing in Ashrafi Asfahani camp.
- Criminal Sukkar – One of E’ebada Tribe’s sheikhs, residing in Ashrafi Asfahani camp.
- Criminal Abdel Reda Jebara Al-Ghannami – One of Albu Ghannam Tribe’s sheikhs, residing in Al-Ahwaz.
All the abovementioned tribes present in Iran cooperate with the Corps when they are needed in any operation. For example, when the assassination of Imam Al-Sadr was known, the sons of these tribes present in the camps sent delegations and they went to the Camp of Badr in Dayzaful in the form of groups announcing their readiness to volunteer and carry out what would be entrusted to them to revenge Al-Sadr. In the light of what was mentioned, the Corps considers the abovementioned tribes, which are related to the tribes of Iraq, on its side and it could resort to them to carry out its designs and as a base to rely on inside Iraq.

The results deriving from that is the supply and protection of the officials assigned with duties inside Iraq. These officials are selected from the sons of these tribes to get the assistance of their tribes in completing the missions they are charged with.

**Organizational operation inside Iraq and its method:**

The Corps adopts three rules of operations to work inside Iraq which are:

1. **Stations:** They in are in charge of the first follow-up and they receive the officials coming from Iran to Iraq. They are usually in the border regions and they provide methods to prepare the requirements, guides, transportation and first information the officials need to enter Iraq.

2. **Collection of information:** Elements who have the characteristics and possibilities of getting with precision the required information are selected and organized in groups ranging from (2 to 3) elements according to the need of the axis in the region where a group is desired. These groups are linked to the commands of the axes or the Intelligence Station in the Corps through linkers.
who directly and periodically get in touch with the officials of these groups. Through this process, the instructions, orders and financial support are dispatched to be used in the hostile activity against Iraq.

3. **Operation groups**: Capable elements having security coverage to carry out operations inside Iraq are selected and organized in groups. The number of each group varies from (3 to 5) elements according to the axes’ need for them. Two linkers are allocated to them to link them to the Operation’s Command. The elements belonging to the axes and intelligence are the ones in charge of carrying out the qualitative operations in all their types, knowing that each axis presents an annual operation plan which is submitted to the Command of the Corps to be approved and established. To get any monetary amounts required for each operation, or for any activity or operation meant to be executed, a detailed plan is drafted including the following:

A. Type and purpose of the operation.
B. Location of the target.
C. Date of the reconnaissance and execution.
D. Time needed for the execution.
E. Method of execution.
F. Size of the force needed for the execution.
G. Operation’s requirements which include the following:

- **First**: Amounts needed for the reconnaissance operation.
- **Second**: Amounts needed for the transport of materials.
- **Third**: Other amounts such as (purchase of a car, rental of a house or farm for the follow-up and surveillance of the target).
- **Fourth**: Allocation of a small monetary amount as an incentive or gift to the executors before the execution of the operation.
Should the Command of the Corps approve the execution of a specific operation, the amount agreed on is transferred to the executing axis and the assessment of the amount is discussed with the axis. Sometimes, the amount requested by the axis to carry out the operation is not granted but instead the amount decided by the Command of the Corps is the one to be allocated.

**Corps leading elements’ plan for the gaining of recruits and movement inside Iraq:**

The issue of the Corps’ plans for movement and gaining new recruits among the social sections inside Iraq was discussed by the Corps’ leaders and they reached the conclusion that any increase of new recruits would lead to more damages and therefore would create complaints from the families of the harmed individuals towards the Corps. An instruction was issued to the officials of the axes that their activities inside Iraq should not be an organizational one but rather limited to gaining a small number of elements whose duties consist of (collecting information – sharing in the execution of operations along with the members of the taskforce sent from Iran for these missions).

With regard to the desirable elements to be recruited among the social sections, an instruction was issued by the Corps’ Command to Nouri Ja’afar Al-Safi also called (Abu Lika’ Al-Safi), Official in charge of the Corps’ intelligence, to move and gain new recruits among the ranks of the army, especially the influential elements of the officers. This instruction was issued at the end of 2000, and information about these elements are at the hands of (Abu Lika’). As to the preferred social sections to be gained, they are the educated social sections with the appropriate scientific education and social influence to supply accuracy of the information they provide and accuracy in the implementation of the instructions issued to them.
The Corps uses in the gaining and recruiting process two methods. The first one is the use of the sectarian card. The second method completes the first one and consists of the financial enticement of elements whom it wants to approach. There is an institution called (Internal Information Center) administratively attached to the Representation (Political Guidance) which in turn is attached to the representative Ali Khamanthi at the Iranian Guard and attached to Al-Hakeem from an instructional viewpoint. The official in charge of this office is (Hasan Al-Zameli), a fugitive Warrant Officer, native of one of the southern governorates. The function of this office is to investigate the link between the students of Al-Hawza in Najaf and Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem. It also worked on introducing to Iraq sectarian books printed in Iran so they are at the disposal of Al-Hawza students. Early after the nomination of Al-Sadr they became a religious authority in Al-Hawza, Najaf. The Commander of the Corps at the time (Abu Ali Al-Basari) instructed (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki) when he was the commander of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division to go to Iraq, to have a direct meeting with Al-Sadr, to get acquainted with Al-Sadr’s orientations, to know the extent of his influence on the society and to get to the bottom of his relationship with the authority and his viewpoint towards Iran, the Corps and Al-Hakeem. Indeed, Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki was able to materialize this meeting through the so-called (Abu Ja’afar Al-Husseini), one of Al-Badiya headquarters’ elements belonging to the Middle Axis, a native of the governorate of Basra, a previous student at Al-Hawza Scientific School (presently deceased). He introduced them to Al-Sadr and Abu Haytham began asking Al-Sadr a few questions regarding the regime in Iran and what he thought about the regime of Ali Khamanthi. Al-Sadr answered him that Ali Khamanthi is the ruler of Iran only and not the ruler of all the Muslim nations and they had no disagreement with regard to the other issues including the issues and concerns of Islam and Muslims and what Islam is subjected to such as the disruption and attacks coming from the West and the persecution of Muslims everywhere and at any time because they have one interest in common and Ali Khamanthi defends the Iraqis.

He also clarified in some of his answers that he stressed the importance of Jihad against the government and should any person working against the government die or get killed he is considered as a martyr.
Execution of operations and infiltration:

The mechanism for executing the subversive operations inside Iraq is performed as follows:

1. Each axis submits to the Operations Section of the Corps a number of goals examined by its elements and aimed at being carried out.

2. The Operations Section of the Corps unifies the goals submitted by the axes and presents them to the Assistant Commander of the Corps (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess).

3. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess discusses the important and appropriate goals.

4. Abu Mehdi discusses the goals to be executed with Quds Operations through its Iranian Official (Hamed) so that financial and technical capabilities would be allocated for the implementation of the operation.

5. The Operations Section issues the approval and informs the axes about the matter so they would begin with their implementation.

Before the resolution for the creation of axes, the operations inside Iraq were the responsibility of the divisions. The elements who were entrusted with missions were able to infiltrate to Iraq through Al-Ahwar without the approval of the Iranians. As for the Northern section, Diayala and Waset, there was a coordination to let the taskforces go through (Abu Hasan Al-A’ameri) who was in charge of the operations inside Iraq and who coordinated with the Iranian military units and border precincts to facilitate the missions for the crossing of weapons and taskforces. At the present time, Al-Ahwar (lagoons) dried out and the passage from the North to the South is done cautiously and with the approval of the Iranian side. There is a coordination between the axes, the border regiments and border precincts with regard to the operation of the axis on one hand and the Iranian Official in charge of the operation for the entry of the axes’ elements to Iraq should the taskforces be forbidden to enter by the Iranian army or the border precincts on the other hand. Karar Kah Fajr Wa Zafr belonging to Karar Kah Ramadan is assigned to facilitate the crossing and frequent visits.
Methods of Infiltration

The Iranian Tala’iyya region opposite the Iraqi Al-Nashwa region in Basra is considered the appropriate point for the infiltration of the Southern Axis’ taskforces in the direction of Basra where these taskforces use the bicycle, the motorcycle and the walking on foot since the region is exposed and unfit to conceal the vehicles upon their entrance to Iraq. Also are used the passage of Al-Shalamja region located in front of Abu Al-Kusaib region and the point facing the previous petrochemical factory.

There is another passage used by these elements to infiltrate to Iraq which is the passage of Sayed Al-Shuhada’ Street linking the southern edge to the northern island of Majnoun in the direction of the Iranian territory. The Southern Axis also uses the Iranian Hemat Road in the direction of the northern field of Majnoun as a way of infiltration for the taskforces in the direction of Al-Amara. Once on the inside through this way, the taskforces resort to either the walking on foot or the use of carriages pulled by horses due to the nature of the region which does not allow the passage of vehicles. Vehicles travel only through the main street which links to the border region in the direction of Al-Jawaber region. There are on this street military units impending the passage of the taskforce. Additionally, there is another passage in the Iranian region of Shat Ali opposite to the region of Al-Bayda belonging to the sub-district of Al-Aziz, in the governorate of Misan. There is also another passage through Al-Busayteen region facing Al-Mashrah region in the governorate of Misan and the passage of Al-Fakka opposite to Naft Al-Bazerkan region in the governorate of Misan as well.

As to the Middle Axis, it uses the Dahlaran road in the direction of the point of Wadi Khuwaysa opposite to the Iraqi precinct of Al-Manzeliya where the taskforce uses vehicles to get into Iraq and has a coordination with the headquarters of the border regiment located between Dahlaran and Wadi Khuwaysa through the Iranian military point of Wadi Khuwaysa. This road was previously selected by the axis because it has a coordination with the Iranian official within the sector and there are no Iraqi units on the other side, besides the region is fit for the circulation of the vehicles to the main street linking Waset to Misan.
There are two other passages for this axis which are the border passage of Musyan opposite to Al-Tayb region in the governorate of Misan and the passage of Jallat opposite to Ali Al-Gharbi region.

As to the Axis of Baghdad, it goes through Mahran road in the direction of the south of Badra, then through Badra-Kut road or Badra Dabbouni road. The taskforces of this axis use vehicles and in the presence of Iraqi military ambushes on the road, they use bicycles or they walk on foot. The axis had previously another road through Kasr Shereen in the direction of Khanakeen. Presently, this road is not used by the axis’ taskforces.

There are two other passages used by the elements of this axis. The first one is Al-Zeyadi Precinct located in the direction of the border precinct of Al-Shehabi in the governorate of Waset and in the direction of Sheikh Sa’ad region. The other one is the passage of Jankoula located 40 kilometer south of Wadi Kallala passage.

With regard to the Northern Axis, its taskforces infiltrated with the help of smugglers whether through Clar – Jaloula’ or Jamjamal – Kirkul. All the taskforces assigned to infiltrate in Iraq use regular false IDs and rental cars. They pass through regular checkpoints because of the poor search done in these checkpoints. Since the infiltration to the Middle Axis is done using modern cars and because the taskforces’ elements hold security forces’ ID, their passage through the checkpoint is done routinely. The ID they hold don’t raise any doubt and don’t push the members of the checkpoint to investigate the individuals holding these IDs. (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari) entered Iraq with the ID of an intelligence officer. He drove from Misan to Basra, then to Al-Muthana, and from there to Al-Anbar and Baghdad. He never witnessed any measure or inspection to the car he was driving done by the members of the checkpoints he went through.
Weapons and missiles entered to Iraq by the Corps:

All the Middle Axis’ weapons were entered through Dahlaran via the Iranian precinct of (E’ein Mansour) and the Iranian precinct located in the proximity of Wadi Khuwaysa opposite to the Iraqi precinct of Al-Manzariya, thanks to the coordination between (Abu Ja’afar Al-Darraji), the official in charge of the headquarters of Dahlaran for the Middle Axis on one hand and an Iranian officer with the rank of major named (Rahimi) working at the intelligence of the headquarters for the Iranian border regiment located between Dahlaran and Wadi Khuwaysa along with another Iranian officer with the rank of lieutenant assigned to the Iranian border point of Wadi Khuwaysa on the other hand. The weapons which were entered to Iraq from 9/1/2001 to 12/31/2001 are the following:

1. On September 1, 2001, (4) 122 millimeter Crad missiles with their bases were entered to Iraq in a Land Cruise car used at Dahlaran headquarters and belonging to the Middle Axis and utilized by the official in charge of (Abu Ja’afar Al-Darraji) headquarters. The missiles passed through the road of the Iranian precinct of Wadi Khuwaysa. Abu Ja’afar buried the missiles in Wadi Khuwaysa in the proximity of Sada Al-Shamshari.

2. On December 15, 2001, a 107 millimeter missile base with 12 muzzles along with BKC ammunitions and light ammunitions were seized in a Land Cruise car used by the headquarters of the Middle Axis in Dahlaran. They passed through the Iranian point located in Wadi Khuwaysa and were taken to Al-Badiya headquarters in the governorate of Al-Muthana. The taskforce was under the command of (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), the official in charge of the Middle Axis and with him (Abu Ali Al-Najafi), the official in charge of the supply and transportation and (Abu Ilhsan Al-Muhandess), the official in charge of the planning and programming of the Corps.

3. On December 16, 2001, Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki, the official in charge of the Middle Axis entered Baghdad. He was at Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Al-Badiya Al-Muthana. On the 20\textsuperscript{th} of the same month, Abu Ahmed Al-Dirawi, the official of Al-Badiya headquarters, came to him with elements of Al-Badiya headquarters.
in a Land Cruise car bearing a government plate number. They had with them a number of weapons. They withdrew them from Al-Badiya headquarters and buried them in a nest they had in Baghdad.

4. On December 24, 2001, (10) 107 millimeter missiles with Kalashnikov guns, a case of ammunition and a case of hand grenades were entered to Iraq through the Iranian border point of Wadi Khuwaysa in a Land Cruise car used at Dahlaran headquarters and belonging to the Middle Axis. The taskforce which entered with the weapons from Iran was under the command of (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), the official in charge of the Corps’ operations and with him (Abu Rasoul Allah, Abu Turab, Abu Saji, Abu Karrar and Mohamed Ali) who were members of Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Badiya Al-Muthana. Abu Hasan Al-A’ameri, the Chief of Staff of the Corps, came to say farewell to them. He had facilitated their entrance through the Iranian point of Wadi Khuwaysa. Abu Ayoub and the said elements transported the weapons to the headquarters of Al-Badiya, in the governorate of Al-Muthana. On the 25th of the same month, (Abu Haytham Al-Sadeki), the official in charge of the Middle Axis who was present at Abu Al-Fadl headquarters, transported the weapons from Al-Badiya headquarters to the nest they owned in Baghdad using a Land Cruise car bearing a government plate number.

Adjustment of the co-ordinates using equipments:
The launching of 107 millimeter missiles or 122 millimeter Crad requires the finding of exact co-ordinates for the target and the launching place of the missiles as well as the direction and trajectory. Since the GBS equipments provide that kind of information, therefore they were used and the Corps bought them from the markets of Teheran and distributed them on the axes in Iraq to be used in their operations. These equipments are also used
to indicate the ground roads and they store the locations of the cities and the roads leading to them. The target meant to be reached is indicated by the equipment which gives a signal determining the target and distance both displayed on the screen of the equipment. Abu Al-Fadl headquarters in Badiya was also equipped with (2) GBS equipments to fit the capacity of the region in which the headquarters is located, its ruggedness and difficulty of signal in it.

**Important meetings held in Iran after September 11, 2001 and trends raised in it:**

1. In September 2001, a meeting was held in the governorate of Al-Sulaimaniyah at the Political Office of the National Union Group between the elements of the Corps’ Command (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess – Corps’ Assistant Commander, Abu Ayoub – Official in charge of the Corps’ Operations, Abu Zer Al-Khalesi – Official in charge of Al-Mustafa Brigade, Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani – Assistant Commander of Al-Mustafa Brigade, Abu Ali Al-Saydali – Official in charge of the Cooperation at the Corps, Abdulaziz Al-Hakeem and Dr. Abu Ahmed Al-Khaffaf) and the National Union Group represented by Jalal Al-Talibani and the Public Relations Official. During the meeting (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess) raised the issue of admitting the sons’ of those already affiliated with the Corps and the sons of the Iraqis present in Iran at Al-Sulaimaniyah University. Jalal agreed that the matter be studied and he assigned from the Corps Dr. Abu Ahmed Al-Khaffaf to coordinate with the President of Al-Sulaimaniyah University in this respect. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess presented also to Jalal Al-Talibani the possibility of giving the opportunity to the Corps to enter into investment operations in Al-Sulaimaniyah such as contracting works and others. Jalal responded by agreeing on the request which was never materialized. The Corps continued receiving financial support from the Iranian regime according to what was previously mentioned in the financial resources of the Corps.
2. In October 2001, a meeting was held between Mas’ud Al-Barazani Group and the Corps Command’s officials. It took place in the summer resort of Salaheddine and was attended from the Mas’ud’s Group by (Jawhar Namek, Fadel Mirani and Azad Barraqi) and on the part of the Corps by (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess, Abu Ayoub Al-Basar, Abu Zer Al-Khalesi and Abu Ayoub Al-Bayani). During the meeting Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess outlined to the audience that the purpose of meeting was to resume the relations with Mas’ud (Democratic Party) and to reinforce these relations. He inquired from them about the US viewpoint towards Iraq and their future expectations.

3. In October 2001, a meeting between the abovementioned representatives of the Corps and Mas’ud Al-Barazani and Azad Barrawi took place in the summer resort of Salaheddine. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess spoke about the ways of establishing and developing the contact between the Corps and the Kurdish Democratic Party. He inquired from him about the US intentions towards Iraq and their future expectations. He also raised the issue of agreeing on opening a public relations office for the Corps in Irbil. With regard to the contacts, Mas’ud welcomed the idea. As to the creation of an office for the Corps, he had to discuss the matter with the Political Bureau of the Kurdish Democratic Party. He also confirmed that the US had the intention of attacking Iraq after completing its mission in Afghanistan. Their future expectations were that the Turkish and US forces will enter from Turkey accompanied by the entrance of the US forces from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Mas’ud Al-Barazani expressed his concern about the entrance of Turkey since it had ambitions in the Northern region, especially Kirkuk. He also confirmed that part of the Americans relies on the National Conference Group and considers it the substitute which would take over the power in Iraq. The other part of the Americans considers the substitute whoever holds a real power in the region such as the Kurds and the Superior Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and that the US support should not be given but to the opposition which takes the US side.
4. In November 2001, a meeting was held at the recreation room of the Fuel Company in Al-Ahwas. The meeting was attended by Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess, the Assistant Commander of the Corps; Abu Hassan Al-A’ameri, the Chief of Staff of the Corps; Abu Lika’ Al-Safi, the Corps Intelligence’s Official; Abu Ayoub Al-Basari, the Corps Operations’ Official and the Commanders of the axes. Also were present, Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem and Abu Nour, the Assistant Official of Al-Hakeem’s Office. The attendants discussed the possibilities expected in Iraq in the light of the US threat of an attack and they named many possibilities including:

- Possibility of replacing President Saddam Hussein, may God bless him and protect him, by Mr. Qusay.
- Possibility of replacing the prominent elements of the regime but keeping the same structure for the regime.
- Possibility of arranging for a military coup with a group of officers and a US airdrop to support the coup.
- The application by the US of the Afghani scenario after finding justifications and relying on the Kurdish and Islamic forces present on the political arena.

5. On December 10, 2001, a meeting was held for the officials of the disloyal Badr Corps 9 attended by the agents Jamal Al-Ibrahimi also called (Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess), the Assistant Commander of the Corps; Hadi Farhan Abdullah also called (Abu Hasan Al-A’ameri), the Chief of Staff of the Corps; Nouri Ja’afar Al-Safi also called (Abu Lika’ Al-Safi), the Corps Intelligence’s Official; Ibrahim Abdel Jassim also called (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari), the Corps Operations’ Official; Abu Nour Al-Karbala’i, the Assistant Official of Mohamed Baqer Al-Hakeem’s Office. The meeting was held after the visit Al-Hakeem paid to Kuwait. Abu Mehdi Al-Muhandess spoke about the possibility of a US attack against Iraq which would lead to a change in the regime (but they were deceived in their hope)
and that the Corps should be ready to take advantage of it and prepare a plan fit for
the expected event. The attendants discussed the general context of the plan (to be
drafted and revised later on by the attendants) taking into consideration the following
issues:-

A. Maximum utilization of the Corps’ forces represented in its three divisions
   (Haydar Al-Karrar Division – Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division – Imam Ali
   Division and Al-Mustafa Brigade) in case of a US attack and the government
   incompetence of controlling the situation, to implicate these divisions so they
   would enter under the form of military convoys from the following axes
   extending from Al-Khanekeen region in Diayala to Al-Fakka region in Misan
   with a final objective of reaching Baghdad.
   First: First Axis: Mahran – Al-Fakka – Responsibility of Haydar Al-Karrar
          Division.
   Second: Second Axis: Mahran – Mandali – Responsibility of Mohamed Rasoul
          Allah Division.
          Division.
   Fourth: Fourth Axis: Northern Region – Responsibility of Al-Mustafa Brigade
          with a coordination with the Kurdish parties.

B. When advancing, the abovementioned divisions will occupy the army’s camps
   located in the proximity of Waset, Diyala, Baghdad and will establish in them
   command and domination headquarters.

C. The disloyal Badr Corps 9 will establish itself a headquarters in the Iranian region
   of Mahran.

D. Should the abovementioned divisions be unable of fulfilling its indicated duties
   because of Iran’s interdiction to allow said activities due to the possibility of a US
   pressure on Iran forbidding it from interfering to take advantage of the situation
   resulting from the coup and endorsing it in favor of its well-known interests and
   ambitions, at that time, the plan would take the following direction:-
   First: To divide the said divisions into small armed groups.
   Second: Some of these groups would work openly and some others would work
            secretly.
   Third: They will be supplied with light and supportive weapons.
To get ready and gain time, the abovementioned attending agents agreed to proceed in a way to serve the purposes of their plan:-

A. To contact the influential elements inside Iraq through their relatives who held responsibilities with Badr Corps 9 and to urge them to cooperate with them in case of a US attack against Iraq.

B. To explore all the roads extending from the Iraqi-Iranian borders within the sectors of (Diyala, Waset, Misan) and to find guides to use them upon their entrance after beginning with the application of their plan.

C. To bring in to Iraq the largest quantity possible of weapons in order to be used by their elements and sympathizers.

D. To prepare the communication equipments including the long range (HF) and short range (VHF) Racal equipments and (Serial – Radium) international telephones.

Corps’ plan in the occurrence of the crisis:

The Corps’ presence in Iran means that the relationships between the Iranian authorities and Iraq are not satisfactory and it is normal that the Corps takes advantage of any opportunity to undermine the security and stability inside Iraq to weaken the force of the central authority. The best opportunity the Corps should take advantage of and draft a plan in its light is the (crisis) in which Iraq goes through with its international relationships, whether with the Security Council or with the Inspection Team or the US threats. When an attack is expected to happen against Iraq, the Corps begins arranging the conditions of its units and fighters, putting a detailed plan which would enable
its elements to infiltrate to Iraq, play a role in the events and participate in the overthrow of the regime. The Corps held a meeting for its cadres on December 12, 2001 in which it discussed the possibility of a US attack which would lead to the overthrow of the power in Iraq and that the Corps should discuss two possibilities to select the appropriate time for them. In the light of this, an appropriate plan should be created with the participation of the Corps in order to enter Iraq, control the main junctions in Baghdad, instigate of the citizens on the inside and mobilize them and arm the groups sent to Iraq before the beginning of the attack.

In the first possibility, the Corps is requested to send openly to Iraq military units organized in the form of convoys. In the second possibility, a US pressure on Iran would happen placing it in an embarrassing position in which it cannot allow the Corps to enter Iraq in the manner mentioned in the first possibility. They would rather enter secretly in the form of groups in the direction of regions assigned to them. The attendants at the Corps’ Command considered more likely the occurrence of the second possibility and they set the Corps’ Working Plan in the light of the previous possibilities as clarified hereunder:-

- To sort out individuals from the Corps having a social influence in Iraq and to send them to the inside upon the beginning of the US attack. Their duties would consist of contacting the citizens and creating groups especially in the popular regions.
- To bring in to Iraq the largest quantity of weapons and ammunitions to arm the said groups.
- To determine different roads within the region confined between Khanekeen and Al-Fakka, to prepare the guides for the purpose of exploring the region, to use the GPS guiding equipments and to confirm that all the explored roads are distant from the presence of the Iraqi military units.
Division of the region to three working sectors:

1. The first sector from Al-Fakka to outside Mahran – Under the responsibility of Haydar Al-Karrar Division.
2. The second sector from Mahran to outside Mandali – Under the responsibility of Mohamed Rasoul Allah Division.
3. The third sector from Mandali to inside Khanekeen – Under the responsibility of Imam Ali Division.

The three divisions create small groups, prepare small and large vehicles good to travel on sandy roads to transport the elements selected from the formations with their supportive weapons such as 106 millimeter cannon, 107 Katioucha base and 23 millimeter anti-air cannon.

In case of a continuation of the US bombing, of the disturbance of the security situation and in the absence of the government’s control on the inside, the divisions proceed, each one within its assigned sector, to occupy the camps close to Baghdad (Diyala and Waset), to create commanding headquarters for them in these military locations and to provide support and protection to the groups working on the inside.

A headquarters for the Corps’ Command should be opened in the border region of Mahran. The Corps continues to follow up the divisions’ headquarters when the divisions are able to carry out their duties.

The communication system among the Corps’ headquarters, the divisions and axes is done by using HF equipments along with the serial and radium telephones. The communication between the division and the headquarters of the regiments is done through the VHF equipments and the use of Walkie-Talkie.

The axes send individuals to inside Iraq with weapons and the mission of exploring the roads.

The control of the ammunition and foodstuff warehouses and the stations for the filling of fuel by fear that they would not arrive from Iran.

Imam Al-Hussein Division and the Southern Axis work in a similar way in the governorates of Misan and Basra.
Al-Mustafa Brigade and the Northern Axis coordinate the work with the Kurds according to the plan they prepared.

The Assistant Commander of the Corps prepared in writing a detailed plan of the Corps’s future activity in accordance with the mentioned points and he confirmed that he discussed them secretly and personally with the commanders of the divisions and the axes’ officials in accordance with the sector of responsibilities. The Corps Intelligence’s Official (Abu Lika’ Al-Safy) announced that he undertook the preparation of information for the drafting of the detailed plan. The Corps Intelligence’s Official assigned (Abu Ayoub Al-Basari) to go to Iraq and examine Abu Al-Fadl headquarters, explore Badiya Al-Anbar confined between Najaf, Al-Nakheeb and Kilometer 160 in order to study the possibility of opening new headquarters for the Middle Axis. He examined the condition of the citizens, the extent of their readiness to cooperate with the group of headquarters present inside Iraq. As to the vital targets in Baghdad which the Corps confirmed, they consist of the presidential palace, the radio, TV, security service building, camps surrounding Baghdad, weapons and foodstuff warehouses and station for the filling of fuel.

**Corps’ attitude towards the Northern region:**

The Corps has two designs for the Northern region. The first one is the Corps’ conviction that perhaps the borders between Iraq and Iran will be closed under an Iranian decision and therefore the Corps’ elements will be forbidden from infiltrating to Iraq. In that case, the Corps would have no way of entering except from the Northern region. The second design is that the Kurds represent an influential force in the Northern region and it is possible of finding ways to coordinate the relationships and the common activity with them. Therefore, the Corps worked on building good contacts with the agent Jalal Al-Talibani and got his approval on finding a military force for the Corps inside the city of Al-Sulaimaniyah and thus Al-Mustafa Brigade composed of two infantry regiments and a support regiment moved from Iran to Al-Sulaimaniyah. Headquarters were assigned to the Brigade in Banjuween and Midan and its presence has become as follows:-
Headquarters of Al-Mustafa Brigade – Under the command of Abu Zer Al-Khalesi, it is located in Banjuween and it occupies three buildings. Together with the Brigade’s headquarters (First Regiment), there is Al-Hussein Regiment under the command of (Abu Hasan Al-Tamimi) along with two companies from the Support Regiment and the Second Regiment (Al-Wilaya Regiment occupies four floors with the Police Precinct) in the Midan region.

To reinforce the presence of the Corps in Al-Sulaimaniyah, he also worked on finding a headquarters for the Northern Axis in the city of Al-Sulaimaniyah and he appointed to the position of Commander of the Axis Abu Ali Al-Basari who was previously the Corps’ Commander.

As to relationship with Mas’ud Al-Barazai, it is still a simple and limited relationship and the Corps was not able to convince Mas’ud to approve the creation of a Public Relations Office in Irbil. In any case, the Corps continues on maintaining and developing the contact with the Kurds hoping to participate in the execution of their plan upon the occurrence of any exceptional circumstance inside Iraq.